



ANDERSON JUNIOR COLLEGE
JC2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 2018
Higher 2

HISTORY

Paper 1 Shaping the International Order (1945-2000)

9752/01

No Additional Materials are required.

Wed 29 August 2018
3 hours

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name and PDG on all the work you hand in, including this cover sheet.
Write in dark blue or black pen.
Start each answer on a fresh piece of writing paper.

Section A

Answer **Question 1(a) and 1(b)**.

Section B

Answer **two** questions.

Write the question number of the questions attempted on this cover page.

At the end of the examination, fasten the answer to each question separately, with this cover sheet attached on top of your answer to Question 1(a).

You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers.

Name : _____

PDG : _____

Question No.	Marks
Section A	
1 (a)	/10
1 (b)	/30
Section B	
	/30
	/30
Total Marks:	/100

This document consists of **6** printed pages, including this page.

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Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow.

Source A

I believe the renewed strength of the democratic movement, complemented by a global campaign for freedom, will strengthen the prospects for arms control and a world at peace.

I have discussed on other occasions, the elements of Western policies toward the Soviet Union to safeguard our interests and protect the peace. What I am describing now is a plan and a hope for the long term - the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Communism on the ash-heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and the self-expression of the people. And that's why we must continue our efforts to strengthen NATO as we move forward with our Zero-Option initiative in the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces and our proposal for a one-third reduction in strategic ballistic missiles.

Our military strength is a prerequisite to peace, but let it be clear we maintain this strength in the hope it will never be used, for the ultimate determinant in the struggle that's now going on in the world will not be bombs and rockets, but a test of the values we hold, the ideals to which we are dedicated.

From Reagan's speech at the British Parliament, June 1982.

Source B

We failed to end Reykjavik with agreements because the Americans started from two erroneous assumptions. The Americans persuaded themselves that we were more interested in reaching agreements on the issues of disarmament. They believed that because of our internal difficulties we would have to accept their proposals. Another error is of a strategic nature. The US believed they might exhaust us economically via arms race, create obstacles for the Soviet leadership, undermine its plans for resolving economic and social problems and thereby provoke popular discontent. All these determined their behavior at Reykjavik, their desire to limit the talks to just cosmetics, so as to silence the critics, who speak against the policy of this administration.

After Reykjavik the USA and the USSR have reached a new level of understanding of the disarmament issues. The discussion with the Reagan administration about nuclear disarmament has reached a new, higher level, from which we now have to begin a struggle for liquidation and complete ban on nuclear armaments, and to conduct our peace offensive actively.

From the minutes of the meeting of the executive committee of the Soviet Communist Party, 14 October 1986.

Source C

If there is one thing Americans agree on, it is that 'we won the Cold War.' The claim is insulting to the people and places it describes. In visits across Eastern Europe and the Balkans, I have not found a local person who thinks that America generally won the Cold War, but had more to do with the several revolutions and reforms that have swept the region since 1989.

The expressions of gratitude to the West by Eastern Europe leaders were more in anticipation of help than repayment for our support. In fact, it could be argued that we did very little, very late. From the Hungarian revolution of 1956 to the rise of Solidarity in Poland, the West was quite cautious. Indeed, our intelligence organizations were caught off guard when the Berlin Wall collapsed and country after country rejected Communism for their own idea of democracy.

From an article published in a US newspaper, 1992.

Source D

The reorientation of Gorbachev's policy toward the Warsaw Pact countries was further signalled in December 1988 by his announcement, on a speech before the United Nations General Assembly, that the Soviet Union would reduce its military forces in Europe. Gorbachev pressed ahead with his efforts to recast Soviet foreign policy and policy towards Eastern Europe. As the pace of reforms accelerated in the USSR, the 'winds of change' gradually filtered throughout the Eastern bloc, bringing long-submerged discontent to the surface. Under growing popular pressure, the Eastern European authorities embarked on more ambitious paths of reform in 1988-1989. As agitation in the region increased, Gorbachev's public comments about Eastern Europe grew bolder. Against the backdrop of the remarkable changes under way in Poland and Hungary, including the impending formation of a Polish government led by Solidarity, this declaration took on even greater importance.

From an academic book written by a professor of East European History, 2004.

Source E

Gorbachev showed that he was a different kind of leader. First, in 1986, Gorbachev put forward the idea of a nuclear-free world, which resulted in the Soviet-American dialogue on nuclear disarmament and the signing of a treaty on the liquidation of medium and shorter range missiles. The two opposing sides decided to destroy a whole class of weapons that could have triggered a nuclear war. This decision was followed by negotiations on strategic offensive arms reductions and cuts in conventional weapons.

Gorbachev's second great departure was his conviction that nations were entitled to choose its government, a belief that was crucial to the release of Eastern Europe from Soviet grip. When revolutions swept across Eastern Europe, their leaders made frantic calls to the Kremlin pleading for help, but Gorbachev responded with a firm 'No.' Gorbachev did not want a repeat of the Prague Spring. Gorbachev buried the world communist system, marking the end of the Cold War and confrontation between two hostile systems vying for world leadership.

From a Russian newspaper, 2011.

Source F



Picture of a nuclear freeze movement rally held outside the White House in the USA, 1985.

Now answer the following questions:

- (a)** Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B on Reagan's approach towards the USSR in the arms race. [10]
- (b)** How far do Sources A-F support the view that it was People Power that ended the Cold War? [30]

Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

EITHER

- 2** How far did the economic miracle of Western Europe lead to the Golden Age of Capitalism? [30]

OR

- 3** Assess the significance of the developmental state in South Korea's economic transformation into an Asian Tiger from the 1970s to 1990. [30]

AND EITHER

- 4** 'A passive bystander of international affairs.' Do you agree with this assessment of the political effectiveness of the United Nations Secretary-General in maintaining international security? [30]

OR

- 5** How far do you agree that the effectiveness of UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era was dictated by Great Powers' interests? [30]