



HISTORY

9752/01

Paper 1 Shaping the International Order
(1945-2000)

15 September 2021

3 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Booklet

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name, civics group and question number on the work you hand in.
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the pages in the Answer Booklet.
Write your answer to each question in the booklet.
Do not use paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer **two** questions.

Start each answer on a fresh page in the Answer Booklet.
You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers.

At the end of the examination, all work must be handed in.
If you have used any additional booklets, please insert them inside the 12-page Answer Booklet.
The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

This document consists of 5 printed pages and 1 blank page.

Section A


You must answer Question 1.

1975

The Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s

- 1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow.

Source A



A political cartoon in a British magazine, 8 December 1965.

Source B

Tonight, back in more familiar surroundings in New York, we'd like to sum up our findings in Vietnam, an analysis that must be speculative, personal, subjective. Who won and who lost in the great Tet offensive against the cities? I'm not sure. The Vietcong did not win by a knockout, but neither did we. The referees of history may make it a draw.

We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds. ... For it seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate.

Walter Cronkite was a famous American news anchor in CBS Evening News, known for his balanced, unbiased, presentation of events.

A CBS Special Report by Walter Cronkite summarising his trip to Vietnam, "Report from Vietnam: Who, What, When, Where, Why", telecast 27 February 1968.

[Turn over]

Source C

There are questions about this difficult war that must trouble every really thoughtful person. And I am going to give you the very best answers that I can give you.

There is progress in the war itself, steady progress considering the war that we are fighting; rather dramatic progress considering the situation that actually prevailed when we sent our troops there in 1965; when we intervened to prevent the dismemberment of the country by the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. The campaigns of the last year drove the enemy from many of their major interior bases. The military victory almost within Hanoi's grasp in 1965 has now been denied them. The grip of the Vietcong on the people is being broken. Since our commitment of major forces in July 1965 the proportion of the population living under Communist control has been reduced to well under 20 percent.

President Lyndon B. Johnson, in a speech before the National Legislative Conference, 29 September 1967.

Source D

Throughout the years of negotiations, we have insisted on peace with honor. In my addresses to the Nation... I set forth the goals that we considered essential for peace with honor.

In the settlement that has now been agreed to, all the conditions that I laid down then have been met: A cease-fire, internationally supervised, will begin at 7 p.m., this Saturday, January 27, Washington time. Within 60 days from this Saturday, all Americans held prisoners of war throughout Indochina will be released. There will be the fullest possible accounting for all of those who are missing in action. During the same 60-day period, all American forces will be withdrawn from South Vietnam. The people of South Vietnam have been guaranteed the right to determine their own future, without outside interference.

Now that we have achieved an honorable agreement, let us be proud that America did not settle for a peace that would have betrayed our allies, that would have abandoned our prisoners of war, or that would have ended the war for us but would have continued the war for the 50 million people of Indochina.

An address by President Richard Nixon, made on radio and television, 23 January 1973.

Source E

Brandishing a captured Chinese machine gun, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara appeared at a televised news conference in the spring of 1965. The United States had just sent its first combat troops to South Vietnam, and the new push, he boasted, was further wearing down the beleaguered Vietcong. "In the past four and one-half years, the Vietcong, the Communists, have lost 89,000 men," he said. "You can see the heavy drain."

That was a lie. From confidential reports, McNamara knew the situation was "bad and deteriorating" in the South. ... Lies like McNamara's were the rule, not the exception, throughout America's involvement in Vietnam. The lies were repeated to the public, to Congress, in closed-door hearings, in speeches and to the press. The real story might have remained unknown if, in 1967, McNamara had not commissioned a secret history based on classified documents — which came to be known as the Pentagon Papers. By then, he knew that even with nearly 500,000 U.S. troops in theater, the war was at a stalemate.

An article in The New York Times titled "The Secrets and Lies of the Vietnam War, Exposed in One Epic Document" (9 June 2021).

[Turn over]

Source F

I want to make it clear to you that all the evidence from the Soviet archives indicates that up until at least late 1973, the Soviet Union had enormous respect for American military power and political will. And, in fact, the whole history of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship up to that time is of the Soviets attempting to restrain the North Vietnamese. The Soviets believed that the North Vietnamese were lacking contact with reality in a certain sense – that they were too gung-ho. ... there was a continuing effort by the Soviets to influence the Vietnamese, to moderate their ambitions militarily, to look more towards a political settlement of the war rather than achieving a military victory.

And it will interest you to know that the North Vietnamese did not inform the Soviets of their decision to launch the 1972 Easter Offensive. This was in spite of the fact that the Soviet military delegation to North Vietnam, at the beginning of March, was besieged with various requests for military support.

According to a report made by Soviet military intelligence, the Politburo in North Vietnam was in enormous disarray at the end of the Easter Offensive. There was not any confidence about how the war would continue to be conducted... And, ultimately, an important meeting was held at the Politburo in the first week of October of 1972. At this extraordinary meeting, a majority of the Politburo in North Vietnam came to the conclusion that the war could no longer be won militarily, by primarily military means. And that it had to be pursued primarily by political and diplomatic means.

An academic's presentation at a conference on the Paris Peace Agreement on Vietnam, April 1998.

Now answer the following questions:

- (a) Compare and contrast the evidence in Sources C and D on the progress made by the USA in the Vietnam War. [10]
- (b) How far do Sources A-F show that external powers were in control of developments in the Vietnam War during the 1960s and 1970s? [30]

[Turn over]

Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

EITHER

- 2 Assess the significance of protectionism in the development of the global economy from 1945 to 2000. [30]

OR

- 3 How far do you agree that the factors that started South Korea's economic transformation were the same as those that maintained it? [30]

AND EITHER

- 4 "The effectiveness of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security hinged on America's political interests." Assess the validity of this claim. [30]

OR

- 5 ~~To what extent has the United Nations been impeded by structural limitations from 1945 to 2000?~~ [30]

[Turn over]