

2. How far do you agree that Truman's leadership sowed the seeds that led to the division of post-war Europe?

Tutor's comments:

- **Essay requirements:**
 - o In order to **answer the question specifically** (to hit band 4 onwards), instead of **generally** answering why the divisions developed in Europe / why the CW broke out in Europe (which will only allow you to hit band 5, 11-13 marks)
 - 'Truman's leadership': need to differentiate from the general role of US and the Roosevelt's leadership; personality of Truman needs to be reflected in comments about his leadership
 - 'sowed the seeds': needs to be differentiated from other terms which indicate causal relations such as 'trigger', 'accelerate'
 - **Clear end points:**
 - 'division of post-war EU', though connected to the CW, is not synonymous. The division is merely a characteristic of the CW and not the CW in itself.
 - o Better answers will:
 - Weave in the **historical debates**
 - Have **balance**:
 - In showing that other factors accelerated/concretised/triggered the division, students are actually merely demonstrating the validity of the given assumption!
 - To show balance, students need to argue how other factors might have sowed the seeds.
 - Examine the **extent of significance**:
 - Sowed the seeds, or other levels of significance such as 'merely accelerated', 'triggered' etc?
 - Have **scope**:
 - Not just the role of Truman and Stalin (as almost all students identified) but also the role of other players such as Truman's advisers, Roosevelt and Churchill. Students might also want to examine 'historical context' such as the seemingly opposing ideologies of USSR and US which came into conflict since the establishment of USSR in 1917 (but remember to link to 1945-onwards!)

Note:-

- In dealing with the reasons of conflict, it is important to analyse the reaction of the other party. Eg
 - o Truman's political actions (Truman Doctrine) → matched by Soviet political actions (aftermath of Two Camp Speech)
 - o US economic policies (Marshall Plan) → matched by COMECON
- It is not useful to simply look at later evidences such as the Berlin Blockade/Airlift – not very convincing in advancing an argument about 'sowing seeds'!

- The only way this might work if you are looking at who/what sowed the seeds for territorial division. But this brings about its own problems (see points below).
- Not a useful approach to address the different divisions separately – eg ideological division, economic division, territorial division etc
 - What students mistakenly do is to attribute one player to be responsible for one type of division **without convincingly analysing the impact**.
 - For example, an argument that ‘Truman’s leadership was more important than Stalin’s leadership in sowing the seeds for the economic division.’ can easily be countered by an argument that ‘Stalin’s leadership was more important than Truman’s leadership in sowing the seeds for the economic division.’
 - Furthermore, students are unable to see the ‘division’ holistically by arguing that one type of division laid the foundations for the other types of divisions.

T	Origins of the Cold War
I	Reasons for outbreak of CW
A	Truman’s leadership sowed the seeds
C	<p>Define ‘division of post-war Europe’:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1945-1949 - Different aspects: political, ideological, economic, military, territorial <p>Truman’s leadership sowed the seeds:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Truman’s aggressive actions and decisions <u>created the conditions</u> / laid the foundations for division, by causing a build up of mistrust and tension between US and USSR. - Reflects the revisionist school of thought which places responsibility on the US for the outbreak of CW <p>However:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Can be argued that other factors sowed the seeds – the leadership of Stalin and other western leaders namely Roosevelt and Churchill, as well as Truman’s advisers - Can also be argued that Truman’s leadership, though significant, was only in terms of accelerating what was already developing in the long term
T	<p>Weight the factors – which is the most valid?</p> <p>Students might also consider using terms which demonstrate different pace of change – accelerated, triggered, exacerbated etc – in developing their arguments.</p>

Possible points of discussion:

1. Truman’s leadership arguably created the conditions for division as he had established policies which raised Stalin’s suspicions of the US.
 - In line with the revisionist school of thought
2. However, Stalin’s leadership could be argued to have created the conditions for Truman to become suspicious of Soviet intentions in the first place.
 - In line with the orthodox school of thought

- Possible L2 analysis: Stalin had acted in defense, and hence his leadership was merely the consequence.
3. Furthermore, it is arguable that the leadership of other western leaders allowed and even pushed Stalin to take on a more aggressive stand.
 - Namely Roosevelt and Churchill
 - Possible L2 analysis: Reaction of USSR not significant enough to result in divisions. Remember that up to 1947, Stalin was still openly keen on cooperation with the US.
 4. Other than the leaders, we can also consider Truman's advisers who had sowed the seeds for division because they were the ones who greatly influenced Truman's leadership.
 - Possible L2 analysis: It was Truman who shuffled his cabinet to fill it with 'yes-man', to suit his inherently anti-communist bias so it's not completely accurate to overstate the influence of Truman's advisers who merely confirmed Truman's suspicions.
 5. It can also be argued that there was an **long-term underlying context which laid the foundations** for the miscommunications and misunderstandings – Truman's leadership was merely continuing the pattern of American suspicions of Soviet and **at most, was the trigger to the division of EU**
 - Possible L2 analysis: In terms of a more concrete foundation, it can still be attributed to Truman's leadership as it was only with his leadership that Stalin retaliated. Previously, Roosevelt's leadership had mitigated the ideological differences between US and USSR.

3. “It was the Cold War which worsened the Korean War, not the other way around.” Discuss.

Tutor’s comments:

- **Essay requirements:**
 - o Examine the negative impact that the Cold War had on changing the nature of the Korean War (brief), and how that led to the increased intensity and scale of the conflict (main focus).
 - o Examine the negative impact that the Korean War had on the Cold War in terms of the militarisation and the extension of the latter.
 - o Only essays that have attempted to compare the two perspectives and argue for which is more valid will be able to access Band 3.
 - o Better answers will:
 - Have **balance**:
 - Examine both perspectives substantially. At least two distinct points supporting each perspective.
 - Have **scope**:
 - Should be able to bring in subsequent events that demonstrate whether the Korean War did indeed worsen the Cold War and vice-versa.
 - Provide a relationship between the two perspectives / establish a **criterion** of comparison between the two perspectives to argue for why one is more valid than another:
 - E.g. Cold War’s impact on Korean War was more LASTING, as both Koreas remain divided, compared to the other way around. Although the Korean War had initially worsened the Cold War, this had been mitigated by other factors, as seen from the detente between USA and USSR after the Cuban Missile Crisis).
- **Common mistake:**
 - o Overly narrative and dwelt too much on explanations (how Korean War became a Cold War conflict), but failed to provide tangible evidence to illustrate the “worsening” of the Korean War.
 - (v) If your point is that the Cold War increased the scale and intensity of the Korean War, your evidence could examine number of casualties from 1950 - 1953 (estimated 2.5 million; vs. border skirmishes before outbreak of Korean War which resulted in 100,000 casualties) and the potential use of nuclear weapons in the war when after North Korean and Chinese forces captured Seoul a second time in Feb 1951.
 - (X) Instead, many spent too much time talking about what the Korean War was about originally and HOW it became a Cold War conflict.

Possible points of discussion:

Given perspective: Cold War worsened the Korean War (in what sense?)

1. Cold War changed the nature of the Korean War from a civil war to a Cold War proxy war, and worsened it by increasing the scale and intensity of the conflict.

- E.g. USA and USSR's intervention in the Korean War for both ideological and security motivations provided their respective client states with the additional resources with which to wage war on a more extensive scale. Aerial warfare fought primarily between USAF's F86F and USSR's MiGs 15 - bombings led to widespread devastation. Complete destruction of North Korean infrastructure. Seoul changed hands four times in the course of the war and suffered massively. Estimated 2.5 million civilian casualties.
- E.g. Cold War tensions also worsened the Korean war as it led to China's entry on the side of North Korea to defend their communist allies and to safeguard China's own security as a nascent Communist republic, in response to changes to US's aims from containment (defensive) to "roll-back" (offensive) Communism. Led to increased tensions in the Korean War, as this further validated Truman's perception of the Korean War as an attempt by the Communist bloc to spread its influence, and prompted Truman and MacArthur to contemplate using the atomic bomb in Korea to force Chinese withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula. Demonstrates the heightened intensity of the Korean war as a result of it being changed from a nationalistic endeavour to unite the country, to one where Cold War tensions and power struggles were played out. Note: Chinese troop contributions exceeded that of North Koreans (1.35million Chinese troops vs. 266,000 North Korean troops).

2. Cold War considerations led to the protraction of the Korean War, and also hindered the conclusion of a proper resolution, leaving both Koreas divided at the 38th parallel.

- E.g. Stalin's role in protracting the conflict - Stalin's insistence that Kim and Mao sought more concessions from the other party led to two years of stalemate from July 1951 - 1953, which was only overcome after Stalin's death (March 1953).
- E.g. But despite that, there was still no genuine resolution, as the Geneva Conference 1954 only confirmed the separation of the two Koreas at the 38th parallel, as this suited the interests of the USA and USSR to keep Korea a 'limited' war, and not to push for a complete victory, which could prove costly for both parties.

Cold War had worsened the Korean War, as brought it more players, which brought with them more resources and sophisticated weapons with which to wage war and effect destruction on Korea and its people. Subsequently held it captive to Cold War agendas - despite the original agenda of the Korean war being the reunification of Korea, the superpowers saw that it was in their interests to keep the divide, and continued to prop up their respective regimes, hence cementing the divide and precluding the conclusion of a proper resolution to the conflict.

Other perspective: Korean War had worsened the Cold War (in what sense?)

3. Korean War had led to an escalation of Cold War tensions, as seen from the militarisation of the Cold War, with implications for Europe and the wider world.

- E.g. Further cemented military divide of Europe. Korean War episode increased US's paranoia of the spread of Communism, and sought to make NATO a more effective shield against Communism. NATO was enlarged to include Greece and Turkey in 1951, and West Germany in 1955. The latter prompted USSR to respond with the creation of the Warsaw pact.
- E.g. Increases in military expenditure fuelled the arms race, culminating in the potential nuclear showdown as seen from the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962. Passing of the NSC-68 in Congress in 1950, which saw the increase in US military expenditure - \$10 billion on US armed forces, \$260 million for the Hydrogen bomb project and \$4 billion in military aid for US allies. USSR also responded by channeling a larger proportion of its GNP towards military expenditure, and by 1953 had built their first hydrogen bomb.

4. Korean War worsened the Cold War by extending the stage of the conflict from Europe to the wider world. The entry of China as a player in the Korean War led to the extension of US Containment policies beyond Europe to the developing world - saw the waging of more proxy wars in Vietnam and subsequently in Afghanistan.

- E.g. The Sino-Soviet alliance that was created in Korea was further extended to their aid and support to North Vietnam's war of independence from the French. Following the Korean War, US, which had previously confined its support to financial support for the French increased their involvement in the Vietnam War, by sending in military advisors and subsequently deployed more than half a million American troops to the Vietnam War by 1968.

Although Korean War did worsen the Cold War as seen from above, its impact was circumscribed by the superpowers' common desire that the Korean War should not be blown out of proportion and took steps to prevent this from happening. [Cite instances when both USSR and USA sought not to antagonize the other; Truman's speech that Korean War should be a limited war, 1951]

Moreover, while the Korean War's impact on the Cold War was significant, it could be mitigated, as seen from the period of détente (1962 – 1970s) following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Hence, compared to the Cold War's lasting impact on the Korean War, the Korean War only worsened the Cold War to a limited extent.

4. Assess the view that it was the adoption of economic liberalisation which set into motion China's economic rise in the post-Mao era.

Tutor's comments:

- **Essay requirements:**

- o Examine how the adoption of economic liberalisation "Gaige Kaifang" (HHRS, TVEs, SEZs) initiated China's economic rise in the post-Mao era.
- o "Set into motion": **initiated, kick-started, created the momentum, laid the foundations of a development that was subsequently sustained. Only essays that have addressed this will be able to access Band 3.**
- o Examine other factors: e.g. Deng's leadership which initiated the economic reforms, while maintaining political stability; foreign policies stemming from late Maoist era.
- o Better answers will:
 - Have **clarity of end point**:-
 - China's economic rise (in what sense?) Domestic economy? Rise as an important player in the global economy?
 - Have **scope**:
 - Examine economic, political and foreign policies / agency of Deng, and how these contributed to a particular aspect of the end point.
 - Provide a **relationship** between economic policies and political/foreign policies to establish a coherent argument.
 - E.g. Although the adoption of the policy of economic liberalization was more apparent in kick-starting China's economic rise in the post-Mao era, it was less about the policy per se, and it was more to do with Deng's leadership which actually created the momentum for the whole reform process.
 - E.g. Deng's leadership in establishing the prerequisite political climate (absence of destabilizing Maoist-era political campaigns which compromised on growth) which created a more conducive environment for economic growth; in extending the good foreign relations first established by Zhou Enlai through the US-Sino Rapprochement (1971), which made the SEZs a viable concept; in reinvigorating the initial momentum created by the SEZs through the Southern Tour 1992.

- **Common mistakes:**

- o Failed to understand requirements of question: "economic liberalisation" included both Gaige (economic restructuring + marketization) and Kaifang (opening up). Essays which did not recognise this were unable to progress beyond Band 3.

- Failed to pay attention to “set into motion” ≠ caused/contributed. “Set into motion” examines the factors that contributed to IGNITING the process (start), and not so much on the subsequent development. Quite a few essays examined how a factor “accelerated” China’s economic rise, which is not relevant to the question.
- Many essays did not fully understand the relationship between late Maoist era foreign policies (“opening up” politically and re-entry into the international arena) and how this made post-Mao “opening up” in the economic sense possible.
- Failure to cite economic data as evidence. Explanation ≠ evidence. Overly lengthy explanations about the intent and development of the policies, but insufficient evidence on the IMPACT of the policies (e.g. increase in GDP, growth rates, employment, income, investment etc), and how that “set into motion” China’s economic rise.

Possible points of discussion:

Given perspective: Adoption of economic liberalisation, as seen from Gaige Kaifang did kickstart China’s trajectory of economic development, which was focused on high growth rates. This was seen both in the rural (HHRS and TVEs) and urban sectors (SEZs in the coastal areas).

1. Notably, the Household Responsibility System (HHRS) first implemented in 1978, set into motion China’s domestic economic progress, as its success helped to impact other sectors positively.

- Success of the HHRS led to the extension of the principle of private enterprise to the Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs), which subsequently became the most dynamic sector in the Chinese domestic economy, growing by 20 – 30% per year. Presence of these innovative and more productive TVEs in turn placed an implicit pressure on the cumbersome State-owned enterprises (SOEs) to reform.
- Success of HHRS led to increased productivity and the freeing up of labour from the land, which supplied the SEZs with an available pool of cheap labour, which attracted manufacturing companies to China.

2. The Special Economic Zones (SEZs) also set into motion China’s economic rise as an important player in the Global Economy. Marked the departure from Maoist-era autarkic policies, and initiated a different economic trajectory of export-led growth.

- Expansion of the SEZs from 4 in 1978 to 14 in 1984, to 124 in 2000, employing about 18 million people. Positive momentum created - foreign direct investment and expertise in the eastern coastal areas spreading to the western inland regions.
- Cite economic data on the success of SEZs in terms of FDI, export volumes etc.

Other perspective: Despite the apparent contribution of the adoption of economic liberalisation that set into motion China’s economic rise in the post-Mao era, there were other more important policies (political and foreign policies) that made the adoption of economic liberalisation possible. Also, it was less about the adoption of disparate policies per se and more about the importance of the agency of Deng in

setting into motion a suite of appropriate policies that culminated in China's rise as an economic powerhouse on the world stage.

3. Deng's leadership set into motion China's economic rise, as he placed economics rather than politics in the driving seat, and departed from the Maoist-era radical and destabilising political campaigns (Great Leap Forward 1958 - 1960 and the Cultural Revolution 1966 - 1976) that had stunted China's economic growth. Political direction was intended to create the prerequisite conducive environment for economic development

- Maintenance of political stability through assertion of CCP's continued rule through the 4 Cardinal Principles in order to attract economic investors
- But also promoted more reform-minded politicians such as Zhao Ziyang to Politburo positions, in order to ensure the commitment to economic reforms.

4. Ironically, foreign policies in the late-Mao era also helped to set into motion China's economic rise in the post-Mao era, as the improvement in foreign relations had made economic liberalisation a possible trajectory.

- It can be argued that the US-Sino Rapprochement initiated by Zhou Enlai in 1971 set into motion China's change in outlook from being isolationist to becoming more involved in international relations. This created the momentum which allowed for China to subsequently conceive of economic policies premised on export-oriented industrialisation (SEZs).
- Without the improvement in relations with the US, which at that point was still the main economic hegemon, it would not have been possible to set into motion the policies of economic liberalisation which subsequently kick-started China's economic rise.
- Subsequently followed through by Deng – normalisation of relations with US in 1979 + signing of US-China trade agreement that granted China the most favoured nation status.

L2 Analysis: Credit Deng for astute leadership, in knowing what to break with and what to continue with from the Maoist era. Hence, it was Deng's leadership which ultimately set into motion China's economic rise, as he was able to draw on the good policies of his predecessors, to tap on good talent (e.g. extending Zhao Ziyang's successful Sichuan experiment in 1976 to the rest of China, through the HRS), to enforce political stability where necessary (as seen from the Tiananmen Incident and the purging of Zhao who was seen as too much of a political liberal), and in sustaining the economic trajectory of the SEZs through the Southern Tour 1992.

5. "The end of the Golden Age of Capitalism in the late 1970s came as a shock."
Discuss.

Tutor's comments:

- Essay requirements:

- o Examine where the perspective was valid: End of GAC was shocking as there was a sudden and radical break from the prosperity and high growth from the GAC, marked in particular by Nixon's Shock 1971 and First Oil Shock 1973. And where it did not come as a shock as the GAC was built on weak foundations. **Only essays that have examined both perspectives and were able to come up with an argument would be able to access Band 3.**
- o "shock": unexpected, sudden, radical break from before.
- o Examine perspective: where the end of the GAC was not a shock, as there were already warning signs from the earlier period.
- o Better answers will:
 - Have **clarity of end point**:-
 - End of GAC – end of era of high growth rates, low unemployment, general sense of prosperity and high levels of consumerism.
 - Onset of inflation, unemployment, reduction in consumer demand and the corresponding negative impact on export-oriented industries.
 - Be able to bring in **perspectives** into argument:
 - From the perspective of contemporaries, the sudden and abrupt end of the GAC did come as a shock – as reflected in the common reference of the devaluation of USD as being "Nixon's Shock" and the increase in oil prices as bring the "Oil Shock".
 - However, when taking a retrospective view, it is possible to read warning signs from the fact that the GAC had been built on weak foundations – over-reliant on the USA as the main proponent of the Bretton Woods System, and on the low cost of oil.
 - From an economics perspective, the end of the GAC was not unexpected in that it fitted in with the accepted economic cycle of boom and bust, but perhaps the timing was unexpected. US had only experienced a trade deficit in 1971, despite allowing Japan and Western Europe to practice limited protectionism to aid their recovery; and this triggered a knee-jerk reaction from Nixon – in the form of the devaluation of USD in 1971.

- Common mistakes:

- o Misunderstanding of question: some students were thrown off by the "late-1970s", and argued that end of GAC was not a shock, due to the

presence of earlier 'shocks' such as "Nixon's Shock" and the "Oil Shock". Failed to realise that the end of the GAC was the culmination of the two earlier shocks.

- Misunderstanding of question/ flaw in argument: some students argued that it was not a shock as it was easily resolved. Even if the oil crisis was resolved subsequently, especially for the developed countries, as these were able to find alternatives, it does not mean that the increase in oil prices, and subsequently the end of the GAC, was not a shock to them.
- Poor expression of points, which made it sound like retrospective history (using the lenses of the present to view the past): "I do not find the end shocking as it was already coming, just that people did not see it coming."
- Some students examined the Debt Crisis, but this was after the "end of the GAC" in the 1980s.

Possible points of discussion:

Given perspective: End of GAC came as a shock to the people then, as it was a sudden and radical break from the prosperity of the GAC.

1. Nixon's shock as being a sudden and radical break from before. Contemporaries had not expected that the erstwhile chief advocate of free trade and the key driver behind the BWS would suddenly depart from the principles which had contributed to the GAC.

- While some may argue that US's actions could be expected as the period of détente with the USSR during the mid 60s – 70s could have lessened US willingness to sacrifice national economic interest in order to achieve the greater goal of containment of Communism, the fact is that US's actions did catch the world unaware.
- US had only experienced a trade deficit in 1971, despite allowing Japan and Western Europe to practice limited protectionism to aid their recovery and to resist the appeal of Communism; and this triggered a knee-jerk reaction from Nixon – in the form of the devaluation of USD in 1971. Led to instability in financial markets and investor caution.

2. Although oil prices had been increasing gradually in the years leading up to 1973, the decision by OPEC members to use oil as a political tool to punish Western countries for taking a pro-Israeli stance was highly unexpected.

- Sudden rapid increase in prices from \$2 to \$10 marked the end of the days of cheap oil which had facilitated export-led growth which characterised the GAC. Ripple-effect throughout the world, as many had adopted EOI to drive economic growth.
- 1973: faced with sudden increase in cost of production, which increased the prices of goods, and had a dampening impact on consumption, which further impacted the employment prospects of those engaged in the manufacturing sectors.

6. 'Non-state players were more important than state players in the development of the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir.' Discuss in relation to the period 1947 to 2000.

Tutor's comments:

- Essay requirements

a. Time period: 1947 – 2000

- i. While you can and should discuss why the IPC broke out in 1947, your answer should take a much longer view (up to 2000).

b. In order to **answer the question specifically** (to hit band 4 onwards), instead of **generally** answering why the IPC developed (which will only allow you to hit band 5, 11-13 marks)

- i. **Categorisations of players** need to be accurate
- ii. **Comparisons** need to be made

c. **Better answers will:**

i. **Compare:**

1. **explicitly** (specific basis of comparisons identified),
2. **conscientiously** (throughout the essay and not just in the intro or conclusion),
3. **thoroughly** (with a range of basis of comparisons)

ii. Have **balance:**

1. In what ways might non-state players > state players, and state players > non-state players?

iii. Have **scope:**

1. Not just regional state/non-state players but also global ones

iv. Be clear with the **end points**

1. Worsening as well as improving the situation (in what ways was the situation worsened or improved?)

T	IPC									
I	Reasons for the protraction of the IPC (take note of the time)									
A	Non-state players > state players									
C	<p>‘development of the IPC’</p> <p>2. In <u>increasing</u> the violence and tension as well as <u>decreasing</u> them and <u>promoting</u> the resolution of the IPC</p> <table><tr><td></td><td>Non-State Players</td><td>State Players</td></tr><tr><td>Regional</td><td>3. Extremist groups / terrorist groups 4. Kashmiris</td><td>5. Pakistan 6. India</td></tr><tr><td>Global</td><td>7. UN</td><td>8. US/USSR</td></tr></table> <p>Possible basis of criteria:</p> <p>9. Which group was the underlying factor and which was merely the</p>		Non-State Players	State Players	Regional	3. Extremist groups / terrorist groups 4. Kashmiris	5. Pakistan 6. India	Global	7. UN	8. US/USSR
	Non-State Players	State Players								
Regional	3. Extremist groups / terrorist groups 4. Kashmiris	5. Pakistan 6. India								
Global	7. UN	8. US/USSR								

	<p>consequence?</p> <p>10. Which group had a more lasting negative/positive impact and which group had a less lasting one?</p> <p>11. Which group's impact had a more direct role and which had a less direct role?</p>
T	NST > SP or SP > NST, and on what basis?

Possible points of discussion:

PERSPECTIVE 1: YES, NST > SP

1. The regional non-state players (extremist groups) were arguably more important than the regional state players (India and Pakistan) insofar as the former **continued** to be a destabilising force even when the regional state players appeared to be **less aggressive** towards each other. [LT/ST]
 - Extremist groups continued to destabilise the region through their violent means and hence made it difficult for the state players to come to any real consensus.
 - o According to Pakistan, it was independent militants who crossed the LOC and triggered the Kargil War of 1999 – not directed by the Pakistani state.
 - o India used terrorism as a reason to block further discussions with Pakistan who were allegedly supporting terrorist groups.
 - In comparison, Pakistan and India engaged in peace talks (give examples).
2. The global non-state player (UN) was also more important than the global state players (US/USSR) in establishing a **concrete and long lasting** framework for peace. [LT/ST, tangible/less tangible]
 - UN's efforts at ceasefire – ceasefire line became Line Of Control (discuss the implication of the change to LOC eg the acceptance by P and I of a status quo which helped lessen tensions)
 - In comparison, US/USSR not as interested in the region due to the lack of geopolitical significance – increasingly distanced themselves from the region which only gained international support only in the late 1990s when both India and Pakistan became nuclear powers. And even then, no real concrete measures up to 2000.

PERSPECTIVE 2: NO, SP > NSP

3. However, it can also be argued that the regional state players (Pakistan/India) **controlled** the regional non-state players (insurgents/terrorist groups), thus any developments in the region were ultimately due to the former. [underlying reason/consequence]
 - Pakistan, for one, **made use** of these insurgents/terrorist groups in its strategy of using proxy wars to bleed India dry: moral and military support of insurgents/terrorist groups
 - India, on the other hand, had **effectively kept terrorists from completely destabilising India** through various measures. (give examples)

4. Furthermore, the aims of regional state players (Pakistan/India) continue to **overshadow** those of the regional non-state players (Kashmir) – thus the former were more important in prolonging the conflict. [direct/indirect role]
- While Kashmiris increasingly clamoured for independence/autonomy (see 1989 insurgency), their desires had been curtailed by both Pakistan and India
 - o Eg India's refusal for plebiscite in order to protect its one-nation theory, and Pakistan's support of Kashmiri insurgency in order to protect its two-nation theory esp in light of the undermining from Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan (Pakistan merely making use of the non-state players)