



NANYANG JUNIOR COLLEGE

Year Two

Preliminary Examination 2014

HISTORY

8814/01

9731/01

Paper 1 International History, 1945-2000

25 September 2014

3 hours

No Additional Materials are required

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name and civics tutorial group on all the work you hand in.
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.
You may use a soft pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working.
Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue, or correction fluid.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer any **three** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.
All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

Section A

You must answer Question 1.

THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Read the sources and then answer the question.

Source A

While there are several examples that clearly show how UN decisions were influenced by the East-West division, which is also generally seen as the main reason for the UN's failure to achieve its ultimate goal during the Cold War, this can be misleading. Indeed, many conflicts were caused by deep divisions between other states that had little direct connection with the superpower division, such as the divisions between India and Pakistan, Israel and its neighbouring states, and Iran and Iraq. In some ways, these divisions were intensified because of the UN, for example by the advancement of the idea of state sovereignty. The USSR and the US were sometimes even found to be backing the same side in Middle Eastern conflicts, as in the Iran-Iraq war. Moreover, the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was largely successful with a calming effect on the region, as well as keeping Israel and Egypt apart.

Adapted from Nicola-Ann Hardwick, "A Tool of Superpower Influence Stymied by Superpower Conflict?" in an international relations website.

Source B

Dag Hammarskjöld's plan, for which he obtained full Security Council approval, including both the US and the USSR, was simple: reinforce and train the new Congolese army. The troops for l'ONUC (United Nations Operation in the Congo) soon had their mandate enlarged to include preventing the secession of the mineral-rich province of Katanga and assuring Congo's political independence. It soon became clear that l'ONUC had been handed a job that Hammarskjöld described as "giving first aid to a rattlesnake". Every move the UN made could be, and was, misinterpreted as partisan: the US thought l'ONUC was favouring Lumumba, now cast as a Communist puppet, and the USSR thought it was too soft on the secessionists and their foreign corporate backers. The Soviet Union initially supported the deployment of United Nations troops in the Congo as a way of supporting national liberation movements that were dedicated to decolonization. After the assassination of Lumumba, however, the Soviet Union withdrew its support for the operation and refused to contribute financially to it.

Adapted from comments on l'ONUC by an independent Canadian UN support group.

Source C

Despite both legal and practical limitations, it must be stated that, by virtue of the assertive leadership of the United States, the United Nations stood the test admirably, particularly in those international problems wherein Soviet vital interests and American national interests were not in direct confrontation.

[Turn over

Such secondary situations which did not directly involve the global bipolar balance included the armistice between Israel and the Arab States, the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia, the disposition of Italian colonies in Africa, and certain colonial questions under the Trusteeship Council.

Maria Mikhailtchenko from the Department of Political Studies in Queen's University.

Source D

First, contrary to the conventional wisdom, Russia and China are not the most profligate in their use of the veto. Since the 1970s, that distinction has belonged to the United States (usually on draft resolutions containing criticism of Israel). Second, overall use of the veto has declined markedly since the end of the Cold War. The threat of the veto has important shadow effects on Council deliberations, of course, but the historical trajectory is toward greater consensus on the Council and against the casual use of the veto.

Perhaps the most fundamental point about the veto is that you could not have a Security Council without it. Major powers will simply not grant an international body binding legal authority on matters of peace and security unless they are certain that it will not prejudice their interests. So the alternative to the Security Council veto is really no Security Council, or at least not in a recognizable form. As maddening as the likely Russian *nyet* will be, that's a trade-off that few would be willing to make. As frustrating as it is, the Security Council is still an enormously useful body, not least because it institutionalizes the practice of great-power security consultations.

From The Journal of Foreign Affairs, 2012.

Source E

In effect the United States arranged to move the constitutional goal-posts to serve its military and political objectives. If the Charter gave the USSR the power to block enforcement with its veto, the Charter could be changed. On 3 Nov 1950, the General Assembly passed the so-called 'Uniting for Peace' resolution by a large majority. Effectively an amendment to the Charter which reversed its original intent, this permitted the transfer of decisions over security matters when the SC was blocked by a veto. A draft resolution that called on China to withdraw from Korea was now vetoed by the Soviet Union only to be passed by the assembly. The significance of this was somewhat blunted by the absence of any threat of military enforcement in the resolution. The UN was not now, in reality, in a position to make military threats nor carry them out. Events were taking their own course on the ground and the Security Council could do little to help or hinder them. Yet the circumstances from which the Uniting for Peace resolution emerged – and the institutional balance of power that ensured its adoption – were a further measure of the obstacles to effective collective security inherent in the international system of the early 1950s.

Norrie Macqueen, "The United Nations Since 1945: Peacekeeping and the Cold War"

Now answer the following question.

How far do sources A-E support the view that the UN Security Council hindered peacekeeping in the Cold War?

[Turn over]

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

1. 'The impact of the Korean War was limited to Korea.' How far would you agree with this statement?
2. Assess the role played by Ronald Reagan in the ending of the Cold War.
3. How far would you agree with the statement that the Global Economy in the post-World War Two world was not able to sustain its growth rates after the end of the Bretton-Woods era?
4. 'The most significant explanation of China's economic growth in the post-Mao era was the role played by an ideological shift.' Discuss.
5. How far would you agree that the failure to resolve conflict over Kashmir was due to religion?