

Section A

TJC

You must answer Question 1.

Indonesia's Policy of Confrontation

- 1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow.

Source A

The discussions which Malaya's Prime Minister will have in Manila this week with President Macapagal are bound to be a crucial phase of the "Confrontation". The occasion which takes the Tunku to Manila, a Ministerial Meeting of ASA, has shrunk almost to no importance: the existence of ASA itself depends upon the Philippines' attitude to Malaysia. The Tunku is travelling hopefully, confident that discussions will reduce tensions.

The Tunku's chief concern is to refute the Communist-conceived accusation that Malaysia is a neo-colonialist concept. Indonesia's hostility to Malaysia should provoke thought in Manila. It is becoming more and more difficult to acquit the Indonesian government of expansionist ambitions. Jakarta has no territorial claims in Borneo but the open encouragement of insurrection in Brunei tells another story.

From an article published in a Singapore newspaper, 1 April 1963.

Source B

You will remember the foreboding I mentioned in my first broadcast to you on the question of Malaysia. This has come true. Confrontation from Indonesia and the Philippines has left us with no choice except to break off diplomatic relations with them. We met in Manila where we agreed to invite a United Nations team to ascertain the wishes of the people there as to whether they desired to join Malaysia or not. When the team had gone there to carry out its work and discharged its task in accordance with the terms of reference agreed upon by the three countries, both Indonesia and the Philippines decided to reject its report just the same. The invitation to U Thant to send a team to the Borneo territories was a ruse to defeat Malaysia. From the very beginning, they did not intend to honour their pledge, written in black and white and signed by all the three leaders in Manila.

From the Tunku's broadcast to Malaysia, 20 September 1963.

Source C

Before West Irian was resolved, the Tunku announced the plans for Malaysia. In response, Foreign Minister Subandrio wished the territories in Malaysia well. In December 1961, the PKI came out and, for the first time, Malaysia was denounced as a piece of neo-colonialism. But still the Indonesian leaders were quiet. Once the PKI had taken a strong nationalist line and worked up Malaysia as an anti-colonial issue and spread these sentiments among the masses, the Army could not lag behind. So the Indonesian generals who are known to be anti-Communist and who make no secret of their dislike for Communism also took up the Malaysian issue. The leaders of Indonesia have their own internal problems to take into account and they must be allowed to resolve them in their own way. In the end a lasting solution must be found. The alternative to peaceful co-existence is for a very small power in South-East Asia to have the backing of a big power. Our size makes the fight unequal.

From an address by Lee Kuan Yew to foreign correspondents, 25 October 1963.

Source D



From a New Zealand newspaper, 17 April 1964.

* The figure on the right is New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake.

Source E

Indonesia's key declared objective was laid out at meetings in Manila in 1963. Indonesia also had a range of undeclared objectives. These included eliciting greater prestige and respect as well as nation-building, with Confrontation reinforcing historical narratives of struggles for independence against oppressive external powers. But perhaps the key unarticulated objective of Confrontation was domestic power balancing. Confrontation perpetuated a feverish atmosphere of revolutionary struggle. This external struggle focused Indonesians away from the country's domestic problems and thus put off the need to engage in economic reforms. Crucially, it reinforced Sukarno's role as 'national shadow puppet-master' in managing the relationship between the Army and the PKI. Whatever objectives Sukarno identified, it was designed to strengthen his position.

However, Confrontation exacerbated the domestic contradictions within Indonesia, making it impossible for Sukarno to continue his balancing act. Though the PKI's declaratory goal in Confrontation was the destruction of Malaysia, its actual objective was to use the conflict to assist its rise to power successfully. Confrontation performed this function successfully. The PKI extended its influence, marginalised many rivals, and encouraged Sukarno's radical shift leftwards. For the Army, Confrontation provided an opportunity to establish a nationalist rhetoric that helped to undercut the appeal of the PKI.

From a journal article, 2018.

Source F

A government White Paper which sets out the background of "Indonesian expansionism" recalls that Indonesia's dream of realising the myth that Malaya is part of its territory dates back to the closing days of the Japanese occupation in 1945. Indonesia's claim was based on the ground that Malaya had been included within the boundaries of past Indonesian empires. The Paper added: "The history of past empires was reinforced by Hitler's favourite science of geopolitics. Indonesian aspirations were most precisely defined by the late Yamin."

The Paper stressed that these ideas were "no passing thoughts". In a speech in 1960, Yamin included Burma, Vietnam, Madagascar and the Polynesian Islands in his scheme for a "Greater Indonesia". Yamin's views were warmly endorsed by Sukarno who spoke of a pan-Indonesia which would include all the present Maphilindo territories.

The White Paper went on: "The Communists, too, with their keen eye for the inheritance of Western imperialism in South East Asia, saw in the pan-Indonesian dream, a means of establishing their power in the focal centre of South East Asia."

From an article published in a Singapore newspaper, 24 April 1964.

Answer the following questions:

- (a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B on their assessment of relations between Malaya and the Philippines. [10]
- (b) How far do Sources A-F support the view that the Indonesia's policy of Confrontation was due to ideology? [30]

Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

You must support each answer with examples drawn from **at least three** countries.

EITHER

- 2 How important was the Cold War in shaping the political development of independent Southeast Asian countries? [30]

OR

- 3 How far have minority policies of Southeast Asian states enhanced their national unity? [30]

AND EITHER

- 4 How effective were rural reforms to the achievement of economic development in Southeast Asian states? [30]

OR

- 5 How effective were Southeast Asian governments in responding to the Asian Financial Crisis? [30]