


## Lecture 1.1: Introduction

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Cold War Imperialism and Fears<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Roberts, Priscilla, The Cold War, 2001

## 1. Key definitions

### Cold War (1945-1991)

- The term was first used in 20<sup>th</sup> century by British author George Orwell in 1945. It was then popularized by an American journalist Walter Lippman who defined the Cold War as being **a hostile, acrimonious relationship** in all areas through threat, pressure, propaganda and espionage in political and economic fronts, **short of a direct conflict**.
- During 1945 - 1991, the world was embroiled in a state of **political, ideological, strategic and military rivalry** between the 'capitalist' western bloc, led by the USA against the 'communist' eastern bloc, led by the USSR, which never erupted into an armed conflict or 'hot war'.  
Communist China would later play an increasingly important role.  
Many 3<sup>rd</sup> world countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa soon was involved.
- As such, most historians agree that 'Cold War' dominated international relations in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

## 2. Characteristics of the Cold War

### a. Bipolarity: Division of the world into 2 opposing blocs

- The end of the Second World War did not signal a return to normality; on the contrary, it resulted in a new conflict. The major European powers that had been at the forefront of the international stage in the 1930s were left exhausted and ruined by the war, setting the scene for the emergence of two new global superpowers. **Two blocs developed around the Soviet Union and the United States, with other countries being forced to choose between the two camps.**
- The division of Europe began in the fading days of WWII. Much of **Eastern Europe** was **occupied by the Soviet Red Army** after 'liberated' from German control. This led to the **rise of socialist / communist governments** who **chose** or were **forced to align** themselves with the Soviet Union. These were known as the **Eastern European satellite states** who took on a more **totalitarian form of government**.

**Western Europe** was dominated by an American-led alliance and these countries favoured a **liberal democratic political model and supported capitalism**. Germany and its capital, Berlin itself was divided into West and East Germany.

- **Outside of Europe**, the Cold War also led to the division of **Korea** and **Vietnam**. Together with **divided Germany**, these places became **epitome symbols** of the **great ideological, political and economic divide** that existed between the two bloc led by the superpowers.

- **Other 3<sup>rd</sup> world countries** in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East underwent **decolonization and national liberation**. They too subsequently fell into either the **capitalist liberal democratic bloc** or a **communist authoritarian bloc**. These countries would usually receive varying **degrees of political, economic and military support from one of the superpowers**, depending on the 3<sup>rd</sup> world leaders' choice of ideological allegiance.
- Some 3<sup>rd</sup> world countries sought to remain **neutral** and stayed outside the political rivalry by being friendly to both superpowers. These came to be known as the **Non-Aligned Movement**.

#### **b. Intense Economic Rivalry & Competition**

- As the USA and Soviet Union had two vastly different ideologies: **capitalism** and **communism**, **economic competition emerged as a key area of rivalry and conflict**. Both superpowers tried to show that theirs was the more successful model which will ultimately prevail in time. They deem each other as **unfair and exploitative**.
- It should be noted that the superpowers' economic competition was tied to their **POLITICAL** and **MILITARY** power.

#### **c. The Arms Race**

- This was a **distinct feature of the Cold War** in which the superpowers tried to outdo each other by building a **massive stockpile of conventional and nuclear weapons**.
- The **USA** could play the role of '**global policeman**' without the need to maintain a large army of American soldiers outside its national borders due to its **nuclear monopoly** from 1945 - 1949.
- This **strategic advantage** was eliminated when the **Soviet Union** exploded its 1<sup>st</sup> nuclear bomb in 1949. This threw the **arms race in motion** as each superpower tried to win a military and strategic advantage by developing bigger and better nuclear weapons (eg long range bombers, rocket launchers & Inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The arms race was also extended to space.
- The arms race was premised upon the **idea of deterrence**, where aggression from both sides would be prevented from the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. However although nuclear deterrence could have prevented a war between the superpowers, it also poisoned their relationship with **fear and mistrust**.

#### **d. Proxy wars**

- While there was no direct armed conflict between the two superpowers, both sought to **expand their influence by supporting a party or warring faction** in a country militarily

(military supplies and intelligence) and economically (financial support) to win their favour and/or to UNDERMINE the influence of other parties supported by the rival superpower.

- Examples of proxy conflicts that occurred in the world:
  - Europe
    - Poland, Jun1945
    - Turkey, Nov 1945
    - Yugoslavia, Jan1946
    - Greece, May 1946
    - Czechoslovakia, Feb 1948
    - Germany (Berlin), June 1948
    - Hungary, 1956
  - Asia
    - China, Aug 1945
    - Korea, June 1950
    - Indochina, Dec 1946
    - Malaya, June 1948
  - Africa
    - Congo, July 1960
  - Middle East
    - Palestine, 1949
    - Egypt (Suez crisis), 1956
    - Lebanon, 1978
  - Latin America
    - Guatemala, 1954
    - Cuba, 1962

### 3. Historical interpretations of the roots of the Cold War

Historians have produced 3 conflicting explanations for the start of the Cold War:

- I. *The USSR was to blame. Stalin planned for a communist take-over of the world. The take-over of Eastern Europe was the first step towards world control. (Orthodox / Traditionalist interpretation)*
- II. *The USA was to blame. Soviet actions were defensive. The USA wanted to control its area of influence but refused to allow the USSR to do the same. (Revisionists interpretation)*
- III. *Neither side was to blame. The Cold War was based on misunderstanding and forces beyond the control of both sides. (Post-revisionist interpretation)*
- IV. *The clash of ideologies and in particular, the personality of Stalin, was more accountable for the ensuing problem. (Post-1991 interpretation)*

Read the following adaptation of John Gaddis' seminar work on the Cold War, published in 2020 and decide which interpretation he leans more towards.

John Gaddis, *The Cold War*, 2020<sup>2</sup>

a. *What did Stalin want after the war?*

Stalin's post-war goals were **security for himself, his regime, his country, and his ideology**, in precisely that order. He sought to make sure that **no internal challenges** could ever again endanger his personal rule, and **no external threat** would ever again place his country at risk. The interests of Communists elsewhere in the world, admirable though those might be would never **outweigh the priorities of the Soviet state as he had determined them**. Disproportionate losses during WWII may have entitled the Soviet Union to disproportionate postwar gains, but they had also **robbed the Soviets of the power required to secure those benefits unilaterally**. Stalin's understanding of his wartime allies and their objectives was based **more on wishful thinking** than on an **accurate assessment of priorities** as seen from Washington and London. It was here that **Marxist-Leninist ideology influenced Stalin's illusions**: that the *capitalists would never be able to cooperate with one another for very long*. *Their inherent greediness (the irresistible urge for profits above politics)- would sooner or later prevail*, leaving Communists with the need only for patience as they waited their adversaries' self-destruction.

**Commented [LQPJ1]:** Can we retain the overview of the School of Thoughts? P8-11 of current notes. Previously we used to put SOT at the back, but we reviewed and felt that it is good for the kids to have a frame right from the start so that when they start going through all that happens for the origins, they can start asking themselves who is to be blamed, and which interpretation does it then help support as well. Am more inclined to have the frame at the beginning. one of the feedback from the j2 batch end last year that they keyed into the survey was also the request to have a broad framework through which to understand what they are expected to know of the topic.

**Commented [ACSS2R1]:** I had thought about keeping it before the tale unwinds, but if the SOT serves to enhance the historiography / various historical arguments, then leaving it to the end AFTER the kids have understood the **whole story** would help them understand **why** there were different view points and the **examples** that was used to support it. 2020, the J1s went through SOT in Lecture 3 and in my opinion (and after discussion with R3bers, it was a 'wasted opportunity' as they could not link SOTs to their understanding of the story, so early in the narrative.

**Commented [ACSS3R1]:**

<sup>22</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War*, 2002, Pg 11-34.

*b. What did the Americans want after the war?*

Unquestionable also **security**, but in contrast to Stalin, **they were much less certain** of what they would have to do to obtain it. WWII brought about an **American commitment to restoring power beyond the Western hemisphere**. With these priorities by both sides, what prospects were there for a WWII settlement that would preserve the Grand Alliance (UK, USA & USSR)? The coalition had been from the start, both a means of cooperating to defeat their common Axis enemy *and* an instrument through which each of the victors sought to position itself for **maximum influence** in the post-war world. The members of the Grand Alliance tried to reconcile **divergent political objectives** even as they pursued a common military task during WWII. For most part, **they failed** and it was in that failure **that the roots of the Cold War lay**.

*c. Why were the wartime leaders surprised and alarmed by the breakdown of the Grand Alliance?*

The leaders had a differing visions of post-war outcome. The US and UK envisioned a post-war settlement which would **balance power while embracing liberal principles**. Stalin's vision was a settlement which would **secure his own and his country's security** while **simultaneously encouraging the rivalries among capitalists** and this capitalist fratricide would ensure an **eventual Soviet domination of the world**. The first vision was a **multilateral vision** that assumed the possibilities of compatible interests, **even among incompatible systems**. The second **assumed no such thing**.

*d. What was the result?*

There was a growing sense of insecurity at the highest levels in Washington, London and Moscow, generated by efforts each of the wartime allies were making sure to **ensure their own post-war security**. With their common enemy (Germany) defeated, there was less incentive to keep their anxieties under control. **Each crisis fed the next one**, with the result that a divided Europe became a reality.

*e. How did the allies misinterpret each other's actions?*

Stalin's first priority after the war was to remove what he regarded as **vulnerabilities to his security**. **Washington met Stalin's seemingly illegal expansionist actions** in Eastern Europe, Iran and Turkey with a **new firmness** in their new President Truman's policies, even as Americans searched for explanations for Soviet behavior at the same time. This answer came in the form of **George Kennan's 1946 Long Telegram** that attributed Moscow's intransigence to internal insecurities and necessities of the Stalinist regime **to expand until they dominated the world** to satisfy their security fears, and thatr was **nothing the West could do to alter that fact**. The **USSR responded in kind** when they assessed the **US's post-war foreign policy** to be an imperialistic one that sought to strive **for world capitalist supremacy** that would **endanger the USSR's interests and survival**.

The **1947 Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan / European Recovery Programme** committed the US to the reconstruction of Europe and **it did not distinguish between those parts of the Europe that were under Soviet control** and those that were not - but the **thinking behind it**







certainly did. Several premises shaped this US containment policy: that the **gravest threat to Western interests in Europe** was not of the prospect of Soviet military intervention, but rather the risk that hunger, poverty and despair might cause the Europeans to vote their own communists into office, who would then obediently obey Moscow's wishes. Truman also believed that American economic assistance in the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan would produce immediate psychological and material benefits that would reverse this trend and he was rightly confident that Stalin would not allow itself or its satellite states in Eastern Europe to accept such aid that came with the condition of opening its economy to the world for free trade access.

Caught off guard by the 1947 Marshall Plan and the US revitalization of West Germany, Stalin became even more insecure and intensified his consolidation of his grip in Eastern Europe, firmly forbidding the USSR's satellite states to join in. This led to the 1948 Czech coup (*which finally persuaded US Congress to authorize the huge spending for the Marshall Plan*) and culminated in the 1948 Berlin Blockade that backfired badly as that won the emphatic gratitude of the Berliners and most Germans, but made Stalin look both brutal and incompetent. By the time the blockade ended in May 1949, NATO had been signed and the Federal Republic of Germany proclaimed; these further increased Soviet Union's security problems.

*f. In conclusion:*

The superpowers had contrasting post-war aims which shaped by their ideological lenses, took certain actions to achieve their goals. However, actions by one side triggered reactions from the other. It reinforced the perception from the other as hostile and this gradually resulted in an ever-increasing animosity, mistrust and hostility of each other's actions. Both sides misinterpreted each other's search for security as a threat to their own security concerns.

#### 4. List of Key Players in the Cold War during this time (1945 - 1949)

Year	Name / Description & Significance		
	<b>USA Presidents</b>	<b>USSR Leaders</b>	<b>The World Leaders</b>
1945	<p>Harry Truman - President of USA (1945-1953)</p>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Containment policy against USSR</li> <li>Helped to create West Germany</li> </ul>	<p>Joseph Stalin - Leader of USSR (1929-1953)</p>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Overwhelming desire for security</li> <li>Deep desire for revenge against Germany (invaded 3x)</li> <li>Sovietization of Eastern Europe as an essential buffer for USSR's security against the West</li> </ul>	<p>Winston Churchill - former leader of UK (1940-1945, 1951-1955)</p>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Made the 'Iron Curtain' speech in Mar 1946, warning the West of Stalin's expansionistic actions in Europe</li> </ul>
	<b>USA Secretary of State / Diplomats</b>	<b>USSR Foreign Ministers</b>	
1946	<p>George Kennan</p>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wrote 'Long Telegram' to Truman to address possible motives behind Soviet's conduct. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>USSR did not believe in peaceful cooperation</li> <li>Soviet sense of insecurity + Marxist ideology made Soviet expansionism DANGEROUS &amp; INSIDIOUS</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>Vyacheslav Molotov (1939 - 1949, 1953-1956)</p>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Advised Stalin regarding SU's position in regards to atomic weapons and arms reduction</li> <li>27 July- Walked out of a meeting with representatives of the British and French governments, signaling the Soviet Union's rejection of the Marshall Plan. Molotov's action indicated that Cold War frictions between the United States</li> </ul>	<p>Andrey Vyshinsky (1949 - 1953)</p>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Became foreign minister March 1949</li> <li>represented the USSR at the United Nations,</li> <li>frequently launched bitter verbal attacks on the United States</li> <li>After Stalin's death in 1953, he was demoted to first deputy foreign minister, but he remained at the UN as the permanent Soviet representative until his own death a year later.</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Recommended that only way to deal with USSR is in form of CONTAINMENT</li> </ul>	<p>and Russia were intensifying</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 29 Oct - Gave fiery speech to UNGA warning that USA was dividing Europe into two camps, one capitalist and the other communist.</li> <li>▪ Molotov Plan - in response to Marshall Plan The plan created several bilateral relations between the states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; and later evolved into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)</li> </ul>	<p>From a British diplomat 'I had a certain unwilling respect for Molotov, I had none at all for Vyshinsky. All Soviet officials at that time had no choice but to carry out Stalin's policies without asking too many questions, but Vyshinsky above all gave me the impression of a <b>cringing toadie only too anxious to obey his master's voice</b> even before it had expressed his wishes"</p>
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## 5. Roots of US-Soviet Mistrust: 1917 - 1941

### a. US-Soviet Relations before WWI:

#### American Reaction and Actions to the Bolshevik Revolution (1917)

- When the Russian Tsar was overthrown in 1917, the US had hoped this events would herald an era of democracy in Russia. But this did not happen as **Lenin and the Bolsheviks** seized power and proceeded to build a one-party communist state.
- As the US had **no domestic political and social tradition of left-wing policies** (ie strong central state, one-party government, command economy, closed society), the **US was hostile** to the world's 1<sup>st</sup> communist state as it **was at odds** with American values (limited government, multi-party politics, individual rights, free enterprise economy and an open society).
- The US **feared that communism would spread westwards** and thus US troops intervened briefly on the side of anti-communist forces (the Whites) during the Russian Civil War, 1918-20

#### Stalin's Perception of the West & the result

- Stalin's perception to the West was shaped by these factors:
  1. Intervention by foreign powers in the Russian Civil War left the **Soviets bitter** about western intervention.

2. Marxist-Leninist thinking implied that **clash with capitalism would be inevitable**, hence **permanent compromise** that would lead to stable world order was **not possible**.
- This resulted in a **pragmatic and realistic** foreign policy approach with the following foreign policy objectives:
    1. To always want to seize and maintain initiative against the West when possible.
    2. To seek maximum benefits and limit options of Western opponents.
    3. To seek secure borders with Eastern and South-eastern European states by arranging bilateral treaties of friendship.

#### **b. US-Soviet Relations in the Inter-war period: 1920s - 1936**

- 1920s: During the inter-war period, both the USA and the USSR pursued a foreign policy of non-intervention/ isolationism (so nothing much to disagree about)
  - American business community was interested in investments in the USSR which was industrializing rapidly.
- 1931-1932: This 'honeymoon' period in US-Soviet relations lasted under a year.
  - The US realized that the Soviet Union might be able to help restrain Japanese imperialism.
  - 1933: Formal diplomatic relations developed between the US and the USSR when President Roosevelt recognized the world's only communist state.
  - When the USSR promised not to interfere in US domestic politics, the US considered granting it a loan.
- 1933-1936: Stalin had gained absolute control of Soviet government by 1936
  - Launched a nation-wide series of purges against middle and senior officials in the party and state bureaucracy, industrial management, military and creative & technical intelligentsia.
  - Soviet Union had turned inwards economically by cutting down on capitalists imports.
  - The **Americans were appalled** by the show trials, torture and execution of Soviet victims, which ran contrary to American ideals of human rights.

#### **c. US-Soviet Relations in 1939-1941**

- 1939: The Nazi-Soviet Pact  
Further **damaged** Stalin's reputation in the eyes of the West. It was perceived as an unholy alliance between two totalitarian dictators.

However, the **USA ignored the fact** that it was due to the **reluctance of the Western powers** (Britain & France) to negotiate and conclude a defensive alliance with the Soviet Union against an aggressive & expansionist Nazi Germany that **drove Stalin to negotiate with Hitler directly**.

- Joint Soviet-German attack on Poland, war in Finland, incorporation of Baltic states and Bessarabia into the USSR **further strengthened Western convictions** that the **USSR was expansionist and aggressive**.

1941 - 1944: German invasion of Soviet Union (22 Jun 1941) & **Grand Alliance**  
Major turning point of the war and in world history where the 3 great powers (USA, USSR & Britain) came together in an **alliance of necessity**. This was known as the **Grand Alliance** as they shared the **common interest of defeating Nazi Germany**.

It was an effective partnership because the combined might of the Alliance did cause Germany to surrender unconditionally. However, it **temporarily concealed the fundamental differences in attitudes and agendas** of the members, especially regarding the question of who would fill the **power vacuum in eastern and south-eastern Europe once Germany was defeated**.

**Commented [LQPJ4]:** Can we perhaps highlight in our formatting that this is a separate section. The content prior is really background background (i.e. not within syllabus), but this is the point at which the kids really need to take note because it is the start of emerging tensions within the syllabus. Noted that this breakdown of Grand Alliance gets fleshed out in 1.2. so is it repetitive?

**Commented [ACSSSR4]:** No, it's not as 1.1 is meant as an overview & historical background context for underlying roots of mistrust and suspicion that plagued the Grand Alliance?

	Why did the USA ally itself with the Soviet Union?	Why did the Soviet Union ally with the US & West?
Politically/ Military	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Primary goal was to win the war against Nazi Germany and Japan.</li> <li>2. President Roosevelt could understand why Stalin did not want anti-Soviet regimes in Eastern Europe; felt that the Soviet Union was less expansionistic than Nazi Germany. Stalin was seen as the lesser of two evils.</li> <li>3. If the Soviet Union's legitimate security needs were met, they could be persuaded to withhold support for communist governments elsewhere.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Unlike the USA who had considered the benefits of the alliance beyond the wartime period, USSR's considerations were more immediate.</li> <li>2. USSR badly needed military reinforcements to drive off the invading German army.</li> <li>3. Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour and its German declaration of war on the US now made the USA an official ally of the USSR.</li> <li>4. Britain had agreed to divide Europe according to spheres of influence, as was stated during the Moscow Meeting of 1944, which assured the Soviets that the Grand Alliance would not be detrimental to their post-war interests.</li> </ol>

	Why did the USA ally itself with the Soviet Union?	Why did the Soviet Union ally with the US & West?
Economically	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Post-war USSR would be economically weak and thus its energies would be channeled into rebuilding its shattered economy, with less focus on foreign expansion, thus rendering it 'less dangerous'.</li> <li>2. An economically stronger USA could then pump in financial investments and industrial exports into the USSR to aid its economy.</li> <li>3. The US economy needed Soviet markets to sustain its economy.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. US aid to the USSR (1941-1944) Between June 1941 and June 1944, the US provided the Red Army with over 10 million tons of war material without strings attached. This was largely to appease Stalin for the delay in the 2<sup>nd</sup> front.</li> </ol>
Socially	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Soviet's image was improved due to their stoicism and courage during the war.</li> <li>2. Lenin's abolition of Comintern (an international communist organization founded in 1919) in May 1943 gave the impression that the Soviets were no longer expansionist.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Soviets also surmised that President Roosevelt seemed genuinely interested in building US-Soviet friendship</li> </ol>

Commented [LQPJ6]: Perhaps put in a table?

Commented [ACSS7R6]: I considered it, but did not do it as ensuring that the information is captured on a table (formatting) can be time-consuming. But can try =)

Nonetheless, American & Soviet troops NEVER fought side by side during the war and hence **did not regard the other as true war comrades**. The question over **who would fill the power vacuum in Eastern Europe** once Germany was defeated was **put on hold**.

## 6. Conclusion

From 1917 to 1941, Communism appeared to be a threat in the eyes of the many Americans and West Europeans. However, the **threat from the aggression of Nazi Germany and Japan** soon was regarded as an **even greater menace** to international stability.

New of the 1949 Nazi-Soviet Pact raised the unexpected spectre of an 'unholy alliance', but with the massive German attack on the USSR in June 1941, this was soon exorcised.

The **Grand Alliance** or Big Three was established following America's entry into the war in Dec 1941 and they **cooperated in a bid to defeat the Axis powers**.

However, this alliance was not a harmonious one as they were deeply suspicious of each other's motives and intentions.


#### **7. Check point questions for self-review**

- What was the Cold War?
- Who was involved?
- Why did it break out?
- How was it fought?

## Lecture 1.2: The Breakdown of the Grand Alliance

At a glance:

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4. Establishing the context:	
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7. Timeline of Key events in this period (1945-1946)	19-20
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The World Waits at Yalta <sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Published in February 9, 1945. The U.S., U.S.S.R., & U.K. redrew the world map at the Yalta Conference. Clifford Berryman National Archives



## 1. Introduction

- The victory over Hitler created new worries for the winners. They had different views as to the future of Europe after the war. Before the end of 1945, deep divisions were emerging between the leaders of the USA and the Soviet Union.
- The US and USSR were both **partners and competitors during the war**. While the British and Soviets favoured reaching an agreement on postwar spheres of influence, the US wanted to delay discussion on territorial disputes until after the war. Compromises and concessions reached during this period were thus tenuous.
- While US-Soviet relations cooled progressively after the war, it did not freeze suddenly. The first two years after the war (1945-1947) saw a period of intense diplomatic contact between the leaders of the Grand Alliance. For example, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, peace treaties with the former enemy states of Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy and Romania were successfully negotiated. However, due to **USA's refusal to commit to territorial settlements**, the **USST thus acted unilaterally** and these Soviet actions **contributed significantly to the breakdown of relations and the emergence of bipolarity** as Soviet activities in Eastern Europe **conflicted with American intentions and interests**.
- Wartime disagreement thus fostered **mutual suspicion that meant that maintaining peace in the post-war climate** would prove to be much **harder** than winning the war together.

## 2. Why did the wartime alliance fall apart? How did it lead to the emergence of tensions? (Historical concepts: Cause & Effect & Significance)

### Main areas of disagreements

#### a. Wartime Disagreements, 1941-1944

The US and USSR were both **partners and competitors during the war**. Wartime disagreement fostered **mutual suspicion that meant that maintaining peace in the post-war climate** would prove to be much **harder** than winning the war together.

- **The Delay in the Opening of the Second Front (May 1942 to 6 June 1944)**  
Stalin entered the alliance with the **expectation of help** from the British and USA. He wanted the Allies to open a second front in France so that the burden of fighting the German Army on the Eastern Front could be taken off the Red Army. In May 1942, Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov got President Roosevelt's promise to open the 2<sup>nd</sup> front in Europe.

Despite agreeing initially, Britain later favoured the invasion of North Africa and Italy instead. It was not until D-Day on 6 Jun 1944 did the Allied troops land in Normandy, France. The **repeated delay** in launching the 2<sup>nd</sup> front **fueled the Soviet fears** that the Allies would conclude a separate peace with Hitler and **turn against USSR instead**. It **fed Stalin's**

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suspensions that the capitalist powers wanted to see Germans and Russians fight each other to a standstill.

**b. The Polish Question (as discussed in Tehran Conference (Nov 1943), Moscow Meeting (1944) & Yalta Conference (Feb 1945))**

- This was the **most divisive issue** of post-war settlement meetings. Poland was the largest country in Eastern Europe and was a complex issue as both Great Britain and the USSR attached great significance to it
  - The **British** had gone to war with Germany in Sept 1939 over it and so it was clear to them that Poland's boundaries must be guaranteed.
  - The **Soviets** viewed it as a **critical matter of life and death** for the USSR as Poland had been the traditional invasion route to Russia, so they were equally adamant that Poland must be secured. Throughout the war, Stalin had made clear that the USSR would not accept a hostile (anti-Communist) Poland on the Soviet western frontier after the war.
- The wartime allies had disagreed strongly about that settlement **before** the war ended. Hence, it was thus inevitable that **major differences would arise** over the issue of Poland and its **postwar settlement would set a pattern for the rest of Eastern Europe**.
- Two different groups wanted to form the government for Poland. Each group had a very different relationship with Stalin:
  - The London Poles  
When the war broke out, some members of the Polish government fled to London and set up a 'government-in-exile' in 1939. They were **strongly anti-Stalin** as many were Catholics and landowners and hated Communism and Stalin for carving up their country through the Nazi-Soviet Pact (1939). In 1943, they were horrified to learn that the Soviet army had executed about 15,000 Polish officers and buried their bodies at a place called Katyn. **Stalin** thus knew that **if the London Poles formed a Polish government, it would be hostile to the USSR**.
  - The Lublin Poles
    - In July 1944, the USSR set up its own government for Poland. They first met in the town of Lublin, in Poland, and became known as the Lublin Poles. They were **mostly Communists** and **Stalin felt that they could be trusted**.
- Wartime developments & complications over Poland:  
The Warsaw Uprising & Consequence (Aug 1944)  
The **London Poles** decided that their only chance of frustrating Stalin was to seize control of part of Poland before the Red Army did. In August 1944, Polish resistance fighters, loyal to the London Poles attacked German forces occupying Warsaw (the capital of Poland).

Despite the Red Army being just 10km away from Warsaw, they did nothing to help the Poles. **Stalin did not want then to defeat the Germans.** He wanted the Lublin Poles to take over the war. The **British and Americans** were **appalled at Stalin's attitude.** Stalin had obviously sacrificed the Poles because he did not Warsaw to be liberated by the non-communist Poles.

Without Soviet help, the uprising was ruthlessly smashed by the Germans and almost 300,000 Poles were killed. The Germans sent the surviving people of Warsaw to concentration camps. The Red Army went on to take control of the whole of Poland. By **January 1945**, the USSR announced that Poland had been liberated and **recognized the Lublin Committee as the legal government of Poland.** This caused a **major row** between the USSR and the Western Allies.

#### Poland: The Tehran Conference (Nov 1943)

**Churchill** suggested that the USSR could regain its 1914 boundaries by absorbing Eastern Poland, while Poland would be compensated on the west by receiving parts of Eastern Germany. No confederation of central European or Balkan states would be allowed to come into existence.

**Stalin**, on his part, suggested that the Soviet Union would not force communist regimes on other people; seemed reasonable and far-sighted.

**Roosevelt** did not object as he needed to secure continued Soviet cooperation in the war effort, but also **could not publicly agree** because he did not want to alienate Polish-Americans whose votes he needed for the 1944 Presidential elections.

#### Poland: The Moscow Meeting (Oct 1944)

In early October 1944, **Churchill** flew to Moscow to discuss with **Stalin** various post-war issues, especially who should have responsibility for overseeing eastern and south-eastern Europe.

On **9 Oct 1944**, they concluded an **informal Percentages Agreement** where:

- The British would have 90% influence in Greece (eastern Mediterranean had historically been British area of influence).
- Soviets would have 90% influence in Romania, 75% in Bulgaria (both had traditionally formed a defensive curtain on Russia's south-western frontier).
- Yugoslavia and Hungary would be split evenly between the USSR and Britain.


**Commented [LQPJ8]:** Can we insert the extract of the % agreement (p20 of current notes)

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Side note: The photo on the right is the actual document of original "Percentages agreement" or "naughty document" written by Churchill and ticked as approved by Stalin, how to divide the control over the countries from Southeastern Europe, all done in just a matter of couple of minutes, determining the faith of millions of people.<sup>4</sup>

#### The significance:

The Tehran & Moscow Agreements thus formed the guidelines of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe as Stalin believed that the Allies had conceded it as the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. As Roosevelt did not openly oppose these agreements, it was seen that he appeared to endorse the idea of the creation of 'spheres of influence' in some parts of Europe.



#### Poland: Yalta Conference (Feb 1945)

The discussions at Yalta were wide-ranging but the predominant issue was the Polish Question.

Churchill and Roosevelt backed away from the prospect of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Roosevelt objected to unilateral revision of Poland's eastern borders and asked for the inclusion of London Poles in the Lublin Committee, to be followed by free Polish elections.

Stalin was livid at Anglo-American moves to reopen the issue which he believed had been resolved at previous wartime meetings. But he did promise to broaden the Lublin Committee through the addition of some London Poles and to hold free elections. However, the problem was that the Soviet Union and the US had interpreted terms like 'democracy' and 'free elections' very differently.

- USA's perspective:
  - The US had wanted self-determination in the region
  - Free elections to be held in order to set up democratic regimes
  - The region would be then integrated into a universal market economy.
- USSR's perspective:
  - The Soviets wanted the region to be dominated by friendly communist regimes.

<sup>4</sup> Image retrieved from: Researchgate.net

- This meant an area under **DIRECT Soviet control** in Eastern Europe (Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the future Soviet zone in Germany)



- An **INTERMEDIATE** zone which the communists should share power with middle-class parties and thus bridge the West (Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia & Finland)

Within 18 months, Poland fell to the communists and her government depended more on Soviet army and secret police support than her own people.

#### The significance:

This **pattern** would later be **repeated across Eastern Europe** as the western term of ‘**salami tactics**’ that gradually eliminated opposition leaders and USSR gained control of the countries by helping socialists and communists to come to power.

The Western view of the **threat posed by Stalin** would therefore be **cemented**.

In summary, to secure continued Soviet cooperation in the war effort, Roosevelt had **appeared to endorse the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe** as outlined in the **1943 and 1944 conferences**. The Tehran & Moscow Agreements thus formed the guidelines of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe as **Stalin believed that the Allies had conceded it as the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence**.

American demands at Yalta were an attempt to **retrieve what has been given away at previous meetings**. As such Roosevelt called for an ‘open door’ policy that the areas be opened up to American influence and pattern of free elections and representative government. It was thus **ironic that Roosevelt and Truman blamed the Soviets** for not honouring the promise made at Yalta.

Such inconsistent and ill-conceived US **policy confused and deepened Stalin’s** mistrust of the US and Western allies.

Further details on the Yalta and Potsdam conferences are found on section 3, pg 12 in this set of notes.


**Commented [LQPJ10]:** Could we perhaps bring in the weaknesses and the actual practice of Yalta (p18 of current notes)

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### c. The German Question



Germany's position in the middle of Europe and its potential military and economic strength meant that **neither the USSR nor USA and its allies wanted the other to dominate.** There was no clear agreement on the exact conditions of Germany's surrender and how it would be administered after the war.

5

#### Germany: Yalta Conference, Feb 1945

The Big Three had decided to divide postwar Germany into **4 zones of occupation** in which:

- each occupying power would be entitled to take reparations (eg in the form of industrial output & equipment intended as compensation for human and financial losses incurred in the war) from its own zone
- Soviets were granted additional reparations from other 3 western ones in exchange for food and raw material from the Soviet zone. This was because Soviet war losses were considered to be more extensive.
- Occupying powers also agreed to treat the 4 zones of occupation as a single economic area: goods allowed to move freely between the 4 zones.

However, both the USSR and Western allies had **vastly different policies and objectives** with regards to the restoration of **Germany's economy**. Such **fundamental contradictions** between Soviet demands for reparations and Western desire for a resuscitation of Germany's economic life in their respective occupation zones **set the stage for further conflict between both superpowers.**

- **USSR's Objectives**
  - Russia's industrial regions in the west of Moscow were destroyed by the German army. Hence. It was determined to bring about a **MASSIVE DISMANTLEMENT** of German factories in the Soviet zone of occupation.

<sup>5</sup> Retrieved from <http://mark-carlile.com/id72.htm>

- Secure large quantities of reparations from the western zones
- Western allies' Objectives
  - Utmost importance to restore the European economy, by RESUSCITATION of the INDUSTRIAL life of occupied Germany. This was due to the nature of economic interdependence in Western Europe

While the Soviets viewed Western aims as evidence of capitalist collusion, the **fundamental contradiction** between **Soviet demands for reparations** and **Western desire for economic and industrial recovery** in their respective occupation ones **set the stage for further conflict** between both superpowers during the Potsdam Conference.

#### Germany: Potsdam Conference, July 1945

These were **agreed** in relation to Germany:

- Germany and Berlin to be divided as previously agreed (Soviet Zone would be in East Germany and the French, British and USA zones would be in West Germany)
- Germany to be demilitarized
- Democracy to be re-established in Germany including free elections, free press and freedom of speech
- Germany to pay reparations to the Allies in equipment and materials. Most would go to USSR, which suffered the most. The Soviet Union would be given ¼ of industrial goods made in the western zones in return for food and coal from the Soviet zone.
- Nazi party was banned and leading Nazi officers were put on trial
- Full participation in the United Nations Organisation
- Poland's frontier to be moved westward to the rivers Oder and Neisse

But there were **further disagreements** in regard to:

- German reparations  
The USSR sought and negotiated for higher reparations which would have totally and permanently crippled Germany. \$10 billion was agreed as the starting point for negotiations. Truman refused. He saw a revived Germany as a possible barrier to future Soviet expansion. He did not want Germany to be punished the way it had been in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.

However, the Soviets were unhappy with the arrangement as it had less industrial, more agrarian part of Germany in its occupied zone. Hence, they proceeded to strip the eastern zone of resources which in turn infuriated the western Allies.

- Views about free election  
**Truman** wanted **free elections in the countries of Eastern Europe** occupied by Soviet troops. He believed that all states had the right to self-determination. He believed that America had a mission to export democratic values to the rest of the world, where

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democratic institutions would flourish and its people could then enjoy human rights of free speech and free elections.

The American vision of a free world with free markets was **unacceptable to the Soviets**. This was because Russia never had the tradition of democracy and free speech, whether under Tsarist Russia or the Bolsheviks. Even though Stalin had signed the Declaration of Liberated Europe which pledged free elections and democratic institutions to countries freed from Nazi rule, **he never saw that as a legally binding document**. Stalin believed that the Red Army's occupation of Poland, Romania and Bulgaria **entitled the USSR** to determine the sort of governments, ie **communist governments in east and south-eastern Europe friendly to Moscow**.

Stalin refused to submit to US pressure, believing it was unwelcome interference. Truman was furious and began a 'get tough' policy against the Soviet Union.

#### d. Economic Reconstruction

WWII caused massive destruction of Europe which meant that economic reconstruction was one of the most important concerns after the war. In view of the Soviet Union's enormous devastation, Stalin was especially concerned about rebuilding the severely weakened Soviet Union.

- In **July 1944** at the **Bretton Woods Conference**, the **Soviets agreed** to join the World Bank and International Monetary Fund as they **did not want to appear antagonistic nor alienate the Western Allies**. He hoped to work outside these 2 organizations and approach the US for a loan to finance the Soviet economic recovery. Buoyed by the **US's promise of a loan** to help with its postwar reconstruction, **Stalin overcome his reservations and suspicions** about increasing American economic influence and joined the World Bank and IMF.

Six months later, on **Jan 1945**, the **Soviets** asked the Americans for a **loan of US\$6 billion**, to which the **US imposed conditions** like opening of Eastern European markets in the Soviet sphere to US trade. This was **unacceptable to the USSR**, who perceived it as an example of '**US dollar diplomacy**' in which the US due to her economic dominance, gave her the power to **intervene in the domestic and foreign policies** in countries where the USA had sizable investment.

- Economic Reparations: Yalta Conference, Feb 1945  
A clear difference in economic policies & perceptions of each other emerged in this conference.  
Stalin asked for US\$20,000 million worth of reparations for the Soviet Union. This was opposed by Churchill as he was worried that if this was granted, it would greatly

strengthen Soviet's economy. Roosevelt accepted the sum as a **basis for future discussion**, but **did not make any formal promises**.

Later, in **May 1945** the **USA abruptly ended the Lend-Lease programme** to her allies (Britain & Soviet Union) as Truman had felt that American taxpayers were unwilling to finance aid to the Soviets in peacetime.

The significance:

These events **hardened Soviet attitudes towards the West** as Stalin perceived this as an **act of political pressure** for the **US to assert their economic power** so as to **keep the Soviet Union weak**.

This resulted in influencing the settlement of Germany in following conference in Potsdam where the **Soviets increased their desire to wrest as much as they could from Germany** and other countries in Eastern Europe **to rebuild and strengthen the USSR**.

- Economic Reparations: Potsdam Conference, July 1945

**Stalin insisted on more reparations from Germany** (his starting point of negotiation being \$10 billion) which the **Western Allies balked at**.

**Truman** only allowed the **respective powers to extract reparations** from their **own occupied zones**. The **Soviet Union felt short-changed** as their sector in eastern Germany was mainly agriculture and therefore **poorer** as compared to the more industrialized zones in western Germany.

Eventually the **US** did agree to let the **USSR** have **25%** of its machinery from the western zones **on condition** that the **USSR** sent back **60%** of what it had received from them in the form of goods and raw materials. **Stalin** was **incensed** by this as well.

In August 1945, **Soviet** request of the earlier loan was **mysteriously misplaced** by the **US State Department**.

The significance:

**Stalin** had felt that the **US was not sincere or willing to collaborate** in post-war economic reconstruction of the Soviet Union, hence, it **did not sign up** for membership in the World Bank and IMF in Dec 1945. Instead they sought to increase reparations from countries within its sphere of influence. The possibility of a **separate economic bloc in Eastern Europe** under direct Soviet leadership was a **source of great concern in the West**.

#### e. Nuclear Weapons



Since 1941, American scientists had been developing the atomic bomb in a programme called The Manhattan Project. In July 1945, the atomic bomb was successfully detonated in the New Mexico desert. The US refused to share its secret technology with the USSR, which made them more paranoid and determined to strengthen itself to match the Americans. When the US dropped 2 atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in August 1945, it had a profound impact on US-Soviet relations.

▪ Nuclear Weapons: Yalta Conference, Feb 1945

Stalin promised Roosevelt that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan once Germany was defeated. However, this did not come to pass due to a few factors:

- Successful testing of the atomic bomb convinced Truman that the US did not need the USSR against its war against Japan. This would effectively prevent any Soviet demands for influence in Asia.
- The use of the bomb would reduced US casualties in the Asia-Pacific war to a minimum.

▪ Nuclear Weapons: Potsdam Conference, July 1945

Truman saw the A-bomb as a powerful negotiating tool at Potsdam. He believed that the weapon would allow the USA to force the USSR to accept its plans for the postwar world. This was especially crucial as Truman attempted to get Stalin to be more amenable about issues relating to the type of governments in Eastern Europe and the occupation of Germany.

The significance of use of atomic bombs in Japan, August 1945

- Brought the Asia-Pacific war to a speedy end.
- Stalin interpreted the use of the bombs as **an anti-Soviet move**, designed to **deprive USSR of strategic gains** in the Far East and to **give US the upper hand** in defining the postwar settlement.
- He was **deeply worried** about **US's atomic monopoly** as it **signified a permanent shift in the balance of world power**. In response, Stalin hastily authorized an accelerated atomic weapons program in the USSR. He was aware of the economic and military weaknesses of the Soviet Union compared to the US. Hence, he concentrated on building up USSR's industrial capacity and technology. By **1949**, the **Soviets broke the American monopoly on nuclear weapons** when it detonated its own atomic bomb. This signaled the start of the arms race.



▪ Both sides believed that the possession of more atomic bombs and ways to deliver them would help them **win concessions at the negotiating table**. Historians sometimes refer to this as 'atomic diplomacy'.

▪ Some historians (those who lean towards Revisionist point of view) tend to point out that the **nuclear arms race, use of atomic diplomacy was evidence of US aggression** in the start of the Cold War as its nuclear monopoly forced the Soviets into a corner, which in turn intensified its control of Eastern Europe to counter American actions.<sup>6</sup>

### 3. An overview of Yalta and Potsdam Conferences

#### ▪ The Yalta Agreement (Feb 1945)

Yalta was the high-point of the wartime alliance. To Roosevelt and many Americans, it seemed like the beginning of a post-war period of cooperation. There was enthusiastic cheering in the American Senate when the Agreement was read out.

The Big Three agreed quite amicably that Germany was to be divided into four zones of occupation (controlled by the three - USA, USSR & Britain and joined by France). Each occupying power would be entitled to reparations, in the form of industrial output and equipment, as compensation for human, material and financial losses incurred in the war. However, this was an initial agreement in principle, and it was decided that the exact amount would be decided later.

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**Commented [ACSS17R16]:** The idea is to give students a range of factors that accounted for the breakdown in relations, then proceeding to highlight in detail Germany and Poland (which were considered the high-points of disagreement) as discovered in Yalta & Potsdam. I thought it was important for students to see the flow of how these 2 factors originated and accelerated erosion of superpower relations. (SBS can be focused on these turning point events)

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<sup>6</sup> A cartoon by British cartoonist, David Low in response to Truman's speech which suggested that the US did not intend to share the secrets of the atomic bomb with anybody, including the British. Published on 30 Oct 1945.

The maps of Poland and Germany were re-drawn. Germany lost territories to Poland because USSR demanded parts of Poland's eastern territories. It was also agreed that Poland would then receive territorial compensation from Germany up to the Oder-Neisse River.



The goodwill shown by the Big Three at this conference (sometimes coined 'the spirit of Yalta') especially in the agreements reached over Germany, seemed to suggest that they could overlook profound ideological and political differences to work collectively to shape the postwar order.

In fact, the Yalta Agreement was flawed in a number of ways:

- The Problems

The Soviets and the Americans interpreted it differently. The Agreement talked about the need for "democracy" and "free elections". For Roosevelt democracy was the American system of free speech. Stalin's idea of democracy was a communist one, in which the communist party represented the people and no opposition was allowed.

Yalta raised false expectations in the USA. People expected that Stalin would now allow western-style governments to be set up in Eastern Europe. They were bitterly disappointed when this did not happen.

The Agreement tried to achieve compromise over the future of Poland. In fact, compromise was not possible. Either Poland was democratic or it was friendly towards the USSR. Leading

<sup>7</sup> Occupation zones in Germany, 1945. Retrieved from <https://bostonraremaps.com/>

<sup>8</sup> 1945 map of a potential post-World War II partition of Poland, Time/Robert M. Chapin Jr.

figures in Polish society were anti-Russian. Stalin knew that he could only make sure that Poland was friendly by destroying free speech.

Roosevelt was proud of the Yalta Agreement and he was disappointed to see how Stalin put it into practice.

- Yalta in Practice

Stalin only paid lip service to the idea of bringing non-communists into the government of Poland.

At Yalta it was agreed that the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, would negotiate the details of the new Polish government with the British and American ambassadors to Moscow. These talks were NOT successful. Molotov refused to let the London Poles play a significant part in the government.

The American ambassador, Harriman, later said, “We began to realize that Stalin’s language was somewhat different from ours.” By the beginning of April, Harriman was reporting to Truman that the talks were achieving nothing.

At the same time, Polish opponents of communism were dealt with harshly. In March, 16 leaders of the Polish Resistance went, at the invitation of Stalin, to have talks with the Soviet authorities near Warsaw. They were arrested and never seen again.

- The Potsdam Conference (17 July & 2 Aug 1945)

It was the last of the great wartime summit meetings where the leaders of the Grand Alliance met at Potsdam, near Berlin. The membership at this conference showed that the wartime alliance was changing. The American leader, Roosevelt was now Truman, Churchill was replaced halfway through by Clement Atlee.

At Potsdam, Truman told Stalin that America had the atomic bomb. Churchill noticed the sense of power that Truman seemed to feel now that he had this powerful weapon. The US government thought that it might take 20 years for the USSR to develop an atom bomb (they took 4 years). Truman believed that the bomb put the USA in a strong position in any arguments with the Soviet Union.

During this conference, the Allies **rebuffed** Soviet repatriations demands. However, the USSR was able to achieve much of what they wanted regarding the occupation of Germany and the new borders of Poland.

The Big Three agreed on:

- joint occupation, demilitarization and de-Nazification of Germany
- Trial of war criminals
- Minimum political and economic guidelines for future of Germany.

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- Preliminary agreement was also reached on German reparations.

It also decided that the main source of reparations from Germany for each power would **come from within their own occupation zones**, with **limited access for USSR** to some parts of the more industrialized western zones. This consideration was given to the Soviets in light of their extensive losses in the war. Hence, they were **granted additional reparations from the three western zones** in exchange for **food and raw materials** from the Soviet zone.

- The Problems:

- Areas of Disagreement:

- USSR wanted to play a part in the running of the rich German industrial area of the Ruhr. This was rejected by the USA.
    - USSR wanted a share in the occupation of Japan. Truman firmly blocked this idea.
    - USA and Britain wanted a greater say in what went on in Eastern Europe. Stalin rejected this idea.
    - US did agree to let USSR have 25% of its machinery from the western zones but on condition that the USSR send back 60% of what it received in food and raw materials. Stalin was incensed by this.

In conclusion, the **peace conferences** suggested there were the **beginnings of a schism in the Grand Alliance**. Once the German army was defeated, **the mutual benefits** that were necessary during the war between USA and USSR **vanished**. The **failure to communicate** about the existence of the atom bomb and the **constant bickering** behind the scenes over **Germany and Poland**, showed that the Grand Alliance was only one in name only.

#### 4. Establishing the context:

##### a. What were Superpowers' motives regarding the postwar European and global world order?

	USA	USSR
<b>Ideological</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Spread the ideas of capitalism and democracy to create a world where nations were trade with each other.</li> <li>• Believed that all states had the right to self-determination through free elections.</li> <li>• Democratic institutions would flourish and people would enjoy human rights of free speech.</li> <li>• Believed they had a mission to export democratic values to rest of world so that poverty and desperation which propel wars would be overcome, avoiding WWII.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Spread communist ideas and practices throughout the world, hence achieve 'worldwide revolution' in accordance with Marxist-Leninist principles.</li> <li>• Believed that conflict between capitalists and socialists was inevitable and eventually, socialism will triumph.</li> <li>• Stalin's adherence to Bolshevik strategic culture meant that he prioritized the survival and enhancement of the Soviet state and ideology as over-riding goals to which all other interests - including temporary allies like USA were subordinated.</li> </ul>
<b>Political-Strategic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Roosevelt had envisioned the US, Britain, USSR &amp; China as 'Four Policemen' who would 'maintain sufficient armed forces to impose peace.'</li> <li>• Roosevelt wanted the creation of a world peacekeeping organization, the UN - which would mediate strife between and within countries so that US would not need to get involved</li> <li>• In immediate post-war period, was keen to secure Soviet cooperation</li> <li>• Create and maintain a favorable balance of power in Europe and the rest of the world viz-a-vis the new rising threat - USSR</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need to secure vast Soviet borders, especially on the western front.</li> <li>• Need to build strong safeguards against future German aggression / Western intervention. Hence, need for buffer zone in Eastern Europe was a necessary step.</li> <li>• Skeptical about the UN's ability to keep peace, but joined it anyway because membership would not endanger Soviet security.</li> <li>• USSR's membership to UN Security Council with rights to veto any UN decision contrary to Soviet interests also assured Stalin of benefits of the UN.</li> <li>• Genuinely wanted a workable relationship with the US</li> <li>• Fear US imperialism: refusal to recognize Soviet sphere of influence and breaking of promise of loan to SU as part of reconstruction for its economy.</li> </ul>

	USA	USSR
<b>Economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Create an international economic environment open to US trade and investment.</li> <li>• Integrate countries into the world economy so as to ensure that they do not fall under Communism or Fascism so to ensure world peace.</li> <li>• Wanted free-trade, unrestricted exchange of goods between nations to create a vast marketplace for American goods.</li> <li>• US would not need to station troops all over the world to acquire influence for the US dollar would perform the same function. (dollar diplomacy)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Short term: USSR desperately needed to recover from massive wartime damages - hence needed American and British cooperation to secure reparations from German industry, as well as US loans to finance reconstruction efforts.</li> <li>• Long term - desired the establishment of communist states with centrally-planned economies worldwide so as to resist the seduction of American capitalism.</li> <li>• Worried that desire for American credit would lead countries in eastern and south-eastern Europe and Asia to accept US economic conditions, leading to increasing US political influence.</li> </ul>

**b. Why were the US and Soviets interested in establishing a sphere of influence in Europe after WWII?**

	USA	USSR
<b>Lesson learnt from History</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Believed that its isolationist policy and Europe's' appeasement policy had enabled the rise of Hitler in the 1930s which resulted in WWII.</li> <li>• Believed that the greatest military lesson learnt in 1930s and 1940s was that potential adversaries must never again be allowed to gain control of the resources of Europe and Asia through economic practices, political subversion and military aggression.</li> <li>• Such acquisition of resources allowed potential aggressors to enhance their fighting capabilities which encouraged them to wage a protracted war against other countries and USA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• USSR had entrenched memory of Hitler's surprise attack on June 1941, plus German invasion in WWI &amp; Allied intervention during the Russian Civil War against the Bolsheviks induced an obsession with the security of its western borders.</li> <li>• WWII had exposed USSR's critical strategic weaknesses: easily penetrable borders, lack of ready access to key seaways and technologically backward in comparison to the smaller, but technologically more advanced Germany.</li> <li>• Stalin thus came to believe in idea of 'defensive expansion' to keep Germany weak and at same time</li> </ul>

	USA	USSR
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Determined not to allow a repeat of enabling rise of 'new threats' to endanger the US and the world.</li> <li>• Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour shattered US illusion of invulnerability that US had enjoyed for over 200 years. It heralded the need for US to play a more active role in global politics to prevent an attack on American soil.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>extend Soviet borders by recovering all territories lost in WWII, as well as envisioning a buffer zone of 'friendly states' along USSR's western borders.</li> <li>• Poland was a matter of 'life and death' to Stalin as it was the traditional invasion route.</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<b>Post war aspirations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defeat of Germany and Axis powers + US monopoly of nuclear weapons convinced US that it was no longer necessary to compromise with the USSR.</li> <li>• New world order should be based on American ideals of capitalism, democracy and US military strength should be forged to ensure global peace through global network of US military bases to deter potential aggressors.</li> <li>• Concept of 'Peace through Prosperity' was particularly appealing - that if everyone had a stake in a healthy global economy, there would be peace, and not war.</li> <li>• Concern about the power vacuum created by fall of Germany and Japan and decline of former European powers of Britain and France. Post-war Western Europe was too weak to prevent Soviet expansionism.</li> <li>• Additionally, many 3<sup>rd</sup> World countries in Africa and Asia was undergoing decolonization and national liberation. These were viewed as suitable targets to fulfill Marxist-Leninist prediction of worldwide communist revolution. Hence the need to stem the communist threat.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Main concern was the security of the Soviet Union.</li> <li>• Stalin believed that the Red Army's occupation of Poland, Bulgaria and Romania entitled the USSR to determine the sort of governments which existed there: meaning the setting up of communist regimes in east and southwestern Europe</li> <li>• Wanted 'new democracy' or 'people's democracy' that refers to multi-party coalition governments dominated by the Communist party initially, and then to be replaced by Soviet-type communist one-party rule.</li> <li>• Stalin did not want to antagonize the Western Allies because of the Western promise of aid and cooperation. He was prepared to respect Western sphere of influence if they respected Soviets' sphere of influence.</li> <li>• Hence, he reined in militant tendencies of communist movements and urged a more moderate course of action (advised Communist leaders to work with non-communist in the governments)</li> </ul>



## 5. Conclusion

It was clear that the USA and the USSR were allies during WWII because they had a common enemy - Nazi Germany. However, despite that commonality, both sides wavered between the desire to continue the **wartime alliance** and **profound mistrust and suspicion** of each other's post-war ambitions within Europe and beyond.

Unlike the Americans, the **Soviets** had **no coherent masterplan** or clear vision of the post-war order as they were **mostly driven by their security interests**. Hence, Soviet policies were flexible and **dependent on the actions and reactions of the Western Allies**.

Unfortunately, the **Americans interpreted Soviet actions** in eastern and south-eastern Europe as **aggressive** and saw the USSR as an **enemy intent on territorial aggrandizement and world domination**.

By **1946**, the **US** abandoned the policy of long-term cooperation and **committed itself to containment of Soviet power across the globe**. Part of this new, more forceful US foreign policy could be attributed to Truman's political inexperience and hence less nuanced understanding of the Soviet Union, as compared with Roosevelt.

The world would then see a new war - The Cold War, fought between the two most powerful nations of the time.

The next two topics would focus on the manifestations of such emerging tensions between the 2 superpowers: USA policy of Containment & Soviet policies in Europe.

## 6. Check point questions for self-review

- How has the US-Soviet relationship evolved through the years?
- What has influenced their policies against each other?
- Why were US and Soviets interested in establishing a sphere of influence in Europe after WWII?
- Why did disagreements arise and how did these lead to the emergence of tensions between members of the Grand Alliance?

## 7. Timeline of Key events in 1945

DATE	PLACE/INCIDENT	DETAILS
1945 Feb	Yalta Conference	The leaders of Great Britain, the USSR, and the United States meet to decide the fate of postwar Germany and resolve various other issues at the Yalta Conference. The compromises fail to completely satisfy any of the participants but lead to the Allied occupation of Germany, and the establishment of the United Nations.
	Czechoslovakia and Hungary	The USSR invades and occupied these 2 countries.
1945 Apr	Rise of Truman	Franklin D. Roosevelt dies, and Harry Truman becomes the President of the United States
	United Nations is formed	The founding United Nations conference convenes on April 25 in San Francisco, California. The conference lasts until June 26 and leads to the formation of the United Nations Charter.  Adolf Hitler kills himself on April 30; the remaining German forces surrender unconditionally to the Allies on May 8, and the Allies occupy Germany and Austria; both countries are divided into 4 occupation zones.
1945 May	Lend-Lease Act	The Americans refuse to extend the duration of Lend-Lease to the USSR
	Germany surrenders	Germany is divided into 4 occupation zones, as is its capital, Berlin
1945 Jun	Poland	The Soviets had obstructed the Polish government-in-exile from establish its authority, but allowed them to be included in the newly formed Communist-dominated Polish Government of national unity under a Socialist Premier. Although recognized by the West, it remained very pro-Soviet. Over time, the pro-Soviet Communists not only dominated the government, but continued to increase their power within the state, turning it into a police state. The final result was a Poland which was devoid of opposition to Soviet power and influence, and a satellite that was extremely loyal to the USSR.
1945 Jul-Aug	Potsdam Conference	Harry Truman, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin meet in the Potsdam Conference from July 17 to August 2, the final wartime conference between the Allies. Churchill is replaced on July 28 by the newly appointed British Prime Minister Clement Attlee. The Conference leads to the formation of the Cold War spheres of influence and the division of Germany.
	Yugoslavia	The Yugoslav Communist party takes control of the Yugoslavian Government.
	Atomic Bomb	On August 6, the American B-29 bomber <i>Enola Gay</i> drops an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. The Hiroshima bombings bring WWII to an end and signifies the dawn of the nuclear age. On August 9, the Nagasaki bombing destroys the city and kills tens of thousands of people. On August 14, Japan surrenders, and WWII is brought to an end.
1945 Nov	Hungary	Elections were held; a coalition government was formed with the Communists taking control of key positions.
	Bulgaria	An election with limited choices given returns a Communist-controlled government in Bulgaria
	Turkey	Soviets placed troops at its border with Turkey to pressure Turkey into providing naval access to the Mediterranean; US thought an attack was imminent and prepared a war plan.
1945 Dec	Iran	Rebels in Iranian Azerbaijan, acting under Soviet protection, declared their independence. Rebel Kurds in Iranian Azerbaijan, also acting under Soviet protection, also declared their independence.

## **8. Past A'level questions**

- 2020
  - Compare and contrast the evidence in Sources A and B about the origins of the Cold War in Europe.
  - How far do Sources A - F support the view that the Berlin crisis of 1948 was a result of the Western Powers' policies in Germany?
- 2019
  - How far do Sources A - E support the assertion that the main motive behind Soviet policy in Eastern Europe was to ensure that they were never attacked by Germany again?
- 2018
  - Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B about plans for German reconstruction and reparations at the end of the Second World War.

### Lecture 1.3: Manifestations of Emerging Tensions: US Policy of Containment

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## 1. Introduction

- In the years immediately following the end of the WWII, **differences** between the Western Allies and the USSR were **exacerbated** by a number of key developments. The **resulting hostility** that ensued can be argued to have especially caused the relationship between the two superpowers to deteriorate which began the Cold War. Clearer signs emerged from both sides that they were no longer wartime allies but fierce enemies and rivals as each forged policies which heightened the Cold War.
- The **Soviet Union** had tightened its grip on the states in Eastern Europe that it had liberated. This was due to several reasons:
  - The Percentage deal - Stalin and Churchill with the tacit approval of Roosevelt had reached an understanding regarding who should have responsibility for overseeing eastern and south-eastern Europe. **Stalin** believed that Churchill had accepted the **influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe**.
  - Strategic importance of Poland - **Soviet Union's future security** was dependent on a friendly Polish government. Indeed, in 1945, Stalin wanted to move the Polish frontier so that most of Poland became part of the Soviet Union.
  - Security against Germany - As the Soviet Union had been invaded from the east by Germany on two occasions, and had suffered huge casualties during the ensuing world wars, **Stalin** wanted to create a zone of 'friendly' or better still, Soviet-controlled states in eastern Europe as a **buffer against future invasions**.
- However, the **USA, Britain and France** believed that **Stalin's motives were political - expansion of the Soviet empire and communism throughout Europe**. Hence, the **US's policy of containment** was developed in response to perceived Soviet expansionism. The **Truman Doctrine** and **Marshall Plan** of 1947 were **two major aspects** of this new hardening of American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union which **intensified the rivalry** between the two superpowers.
- Some historians regard the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan as **part of the same policy** of containment as seen from Truman's statement that they were 'two halves of the same walnut'. However, there were others like **George Marshall who did not**.
- Nonetheless, **by 1949**, with the formation of NATO, one could argue that the USA had by this time developed a comprehensive (political, economic and strategic / military) policy of containment.

## 2. Developments which heightened tensions between USA and USSR, 1945-1947

### a. Developments in Eastern Europe, 1945-1947

#### ▪ Sovietisation of Eastern Europe

*Why did the USSR want to 'takeover' Eastern Europe?*


Twenty million Russians had died during WWII, so one of Stalin's **main objectives** of a creation of a **buffer zone** in Eastern Europe so as to ensure that Soviet Union would never be invaded from Eastern Europe.

*How was this achieved?*

Having freed much of Eastern Europe from the Nazis, the Red Army remained in occupation in Eastern Europe. Since Churchill had agreed that Eastern Europe could be a Soviet 'sphere of influence', Stalin made sure to establish communist governments in these countries.

The same pattern was followed in each country:

- Coalition governments were set up in which the communists shared power with the other political parties.
- Backed by Stalin, the communists took over the civil service, media, security and defense.
- Opposition leaders and non-communists were arrested or forced to flee due to the fear from being beaten, murdered or executed.
- Elections were held, but fixed to ensure support for the communists.
- 'People's democracies' were set up.



The Hungarian Communist Rakosi described this process as '**slicing salami**' - gradually getting rid of all non-Communists opposition, bit by bit.

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<sup>9</sup> Retrieved from <http://hf.titansable.com/>

This is a graphic map of how the Satellite States came to be:

## Satellite States:

Baltic states were conquered by Soviet Union in 1940, they were treated as part of USSR

Czechoslovakia was the only democracy in Eastern Europe 1919-1938. A coalition government post ww2 tried to restore it's democracy. Stalin saw this as a threat to his 'buffer zone' so supported a communist coup in 1948 setting up a pro-Soviet communist government

Yugoslavia and Albania were also satellite states. They were never 'occupied' by the Red Army so had more independence than other neighbouring countries



1944 – Poles rebelled against the Nazis in the Warsaw uprising. Stalin waited for the rebellion to be crushed and then entered Poland **putting** a pro communist government in place. There were supposedly 'free' elections to confirm a pro soviet government – as promised

Elections in 1945, not enough communists to form a government. 1947 saw another election following intimidation from Moscow a communist government was elected. By 1949 Hungary was a one party communist state

1944 and 1945, following Soviets taking control, there were 'free' elections. Again, following Soviet intimidation, communist governments were elected

How might Truman feel about these 'free' elections

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In this way, the Soviet Union gained control of:

Country	Date	Method
Bulgaria	1945	A left-wing coalition gained power in 1945; the Communists then executed the leaders of all the other parties.
Romania	1945-7	A left-wing coalition was elected in 1945; the Communists gradually took over control.
Czechoslovakia	1945-8	A left-wing coalition was elected in 1945. In 1948, the Communists banned all other parties and killed their leaders.
Poland	1947	A coalition government took power in 1945, but Stalin arrested all the non-Communist leaders in 1945, and the Communists forced the other non-Communists into exile.
Hungary	1947	Hungary was invaded by the Russians and in 1945, the Allies agreed that the Russian troops should stay there. Stalin allowed elections in 1945 which the non-communists won and Zoltan Tildy was made president. However, some communists were elected too and they were led by a pro-Russian called Rakosi.  Rakosi, took control of the secret police (the AVO), and executed and arrested his opponents. Tildy was forced to resign and Cardinal

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Country	Date	Method
Bulgaria	1945	A left-wing coalition gained power in 1945; the Communists then executed the leaders of all the other parties.
		Ministry, head of the Catholic Church, was imprisoned. By 1948, Rakosi had complete control of Hungary.

This process of creating the Soviet buffer zone came to be known as the **Sovietisation of Eastern Europe**, as countries such as Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia fell one by one to Communist rule.

The Significance:

- The success of Soviet Union in expanding its political and social system into Eastern Europe as early as 1946 and 1947 fueled **widespread fears** in the West that Greece, Italy and even France would be the next to fall.
- The Americans and their allies **perceived** the creation of a Soviet buffer zone in Eastern Europe as an **aggressive rather than defensive move**.
- As a result, the **US developed a sense of insecurity** over a chain of events which **they believed** was a **manifestation of the USSR's expansionist policy** and the **spread of communism**.

*Were the Soviets takeover in Eastern Europe an aggressive or defensive move?*

- **Some historians** have argued that the Soviets saw their own insistence on friendly governments in Eastern Europe as a **legitimate security demand** that posed **no threat** to the West.

To Moscow, **western moves appeared aggressive and threatening**, particularly in relation to its position in Eastern Europe. The Soviet leadership thus responded in kind, issuing a call for resistance to capitalist and imperialist threats and encroachment. Cominform, Comecon, the formation of East Germany and the Warsaw Pact were concrete moves in response to Western hostility.

- **Other historians** have argued that it western reaction to **Soviet encroachment in areas of Western influence**. Problems arose because Soviet foreign ambitions were not limited to their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. For example:
  - In the Far East, Stalin wanted a share of the postwar occupation of Japan;
  - In the Middle East, the Soviets wanted Iranian oil concessions and a sphere of influence in Northern Iran;
  - In the Near East, they wanted control of the Black Sea Straits;
  - In the Mediterranean, they wanted trusteeship of the former Italian colony of Tripolitania.
- One may **counter-argue** that the Soviets made such demands because of economic and strategic reasons, and because they saw these as **entitlements to a victor state** and a great power.

- Nonetheless, in each case, the **Soviets backed off** on their demands when the western allies firmly resisted them because they felt none of these demands were worth the break up of the Grand Alliance. Unfortunately, the **British and Americans** viewed the **demands as indications of Soviet expansionism**, choosing to **ignore Soviet retreat** on these issues.

## b. George Kennan's 'Long Telegram', Feb 1946

In February 1946, responding to an urgent request by the State Department for clarification on Soviet conduct, the charge d'affaires at the US Embassy in Moscow, George F. Kennan drafted his now famous "Long Telegram". This was a 8,000 word cable of his summary of what American officials gauged to be the attitude of the Soviet Union at that time.

In his report, Kennan addressed possible motives behind the Soviet Union's refusal to join the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. He also indicated why Stalin had publicly denounced capitalism

In summary, Kennan argued that underlying Moscow's foreign policy was an 'instinctive Russian sense of insecurity, which, combined with Marxist-Leninist dogma made Soviet expansionism more 'dangerous and insidious than before.'

- Soviet expansionism had its **roots in Russian history**.
- Russian leaders had always been **insecure** and tried to assert authority and unite Russian people behind their rule by **inventing an external enemy** - i.e. the West, meaning that Russian borders had to be fixed as far west as possible,
- Suggested that **communism would only serve to provide ideological justification for Soviet aggression**, since it stipulated that communist states cannot co-exist peacefully with capitalistic states.
- Claimed that it was **no use for America to grant the Soviets any concessions** or compromised since the Soviets were **bent on the total destruction of rivals**, and that **western nations must band together in a more cohesive bloc, and this would be led by the US**.
- Made it seem as if the **Soviets were single-minded** in pursuing **hostile policies** but Soviets were more flexible than it was believed at that time because of the USSR's economic and political weaknesses.
- Recommended that the only way to deal with Soviet Union was in the form of **containment**, a policy of the middle way, between isolationism on one hand and preventive war on the other.

## Truman's response to the 'Long Telegram'

It was well-received by Truman's administration. was described as a "splendid analysis" by the Secretary of State, James Byrnes, and hundreds of copies were circulated within the administration.

Truman had embraced Kennan's thinking because it appealed to him for several reasons:

- Kennan's vision of a hostile USSR **resonated** with **Truman's anti-Soviet instincts**.
- Truman was exasperated by the failure to settle key post-war issues with the Soviets and by January 1946, he had felt that it was time to stop "babying the Soviets".
- Truman was an inexperienced politician who tended to view the world in black and white; Kennan's arguments that Soviet foreign policy was aggressive was interpreted in a simplistic manner, prompting Truman to define the Soviets as the enemy and to develop a clearer and tougher policy towards them.


The significance:

- Kennan's suggestion that the very existence of the Soviet Union and the security of USSR would be achieved that the expanse of US internal harmony and international authority had a **profound effect on American and international public opinion**, reinforcing the suspicion and mistrust of the Soviets.
- 
- This 8,000 word cable **became famous** for both its length and content, recommending a policy of containment that would **dominate US policy towards the USSR** for a generation. **This policy would find its final form in the Truman Doctrine which sought to contain communism.**

**c. Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech, March 1946**

In March 1946, Winston Churchill who was no longer British Prime Minister, **encouraged the new hostility** towards the Soviet in a famous speech.

The speech was made in Fulton, Missouri USA. **President Truman was in the audience** and had seen the speech before it was given. Churchill called for an American-British alliance to



meet the communist menace.<sup>10</sup>

Although the general American public felt that he was exaggerating about the Soviet threat and unnecessary at that time (in early 1946) when the war had just ended. However, more Americans came to agree with him.

In summary, Churchill argued that:

- An “**iron curtain**” had descended across Europe and the **Soviets were building an empire** in Eastern Europe behind this curtain.
- **Warned** that the Soviets were attempting to **project their power** by directing communist parties in Western Europe to work against elected governments.
- Suggested that the only way to deal with the Soviets was to be **firm in negotiations**.
- Urged that Britain and the US must not repeat the **mistake of appeasement** in the 1930s.
- Called for a **British-American alliance to prevent Soviet expansion**.

***\*\* It is imperative to note that Churchill did not challenge the basic premise of collaboration between the Soviets and the West.***

The significance:

- Marked an **important shift away** from the ‘spirit of Yalta’, at least from the leaders’ point of view. Further **worsened relations** between two sides in the Cold War with **Stalin seeing it as deliberately provocative**.
- Hardened US public opinion against the USSR.

#### **d. Iran, March 1946**

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<sup>10</sup> Churchill's “Sinews of Peace” or Iron Curtain speech on March 5, 1946 at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. Retrieved from <https://winstonchurchill.org/>



Background information:

Iran was important to both the US and British for its oil resources. Since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, British had dominated much of Iran (previously known as Persia). Her oil supplies generated enormous profits for British Petroleum (BP) and for the British government. Both US and British set up joint ventures with the Iranian government to exploit her oil resources in the British sphere.

**In 1941, British and Soviet troops occupied Iran to prevent a possible pact between Iran and Hitler. An agreement was then drawn up stipulating that both countries' troops would leave by 2 March 1946.**

During the war years, the **Soviets had given support** to the **anti-monarchy** Tudeh Party in Iran, as well as **Kurdish and Azerbaijani separatist**. In **Oct 1945**, an 'independent' state of Azerbaijan was set up with Soviet backing. A war almost broke out as Soviet forces amassed on the border and Britain and the US threatened to intervene.

When the time of departure came in March 1946, the British withdrew their troops, but the **Red Army did not**. Instead, they sought to strengthen their position in northern Iran by:

- inciting Azerbaijani communists there to demand autonomy within the Iranian state
- moving troops into central Iran.

The result:

- Wanting to take a firm stand against the Soviets, the **Americans, British and Iranian government took the case to the UN Security Council**.
- **Truman** threatened to take **military action** against the Soviets in May 1946.
- **Stalin** did not want to risk a military confrontation with the West over Iran, and so withdrew his troops after a few weeks of negotiations with the Iranian government.
- **Truman** boasted that his get tough attitude had pressured the Russians to withdraw. But in reality, the **Soviets had secretly negotiated** for oil concessions with the Iranian government before agreeing to withdrawal.
- However the Iranians reneged on this secret agreement the moment the Soviets withdrew. At the same time, the Americans helped the Iranian army re-establish a grip on northern Iran.

#### The significance:

- Iran was **the site of the first confrontation** between US and Soviet Union after the war ended in 1945. It revealed how **new perceptions of the Soviet Union** quickly resulted in the **redirection of US policy**. The confrontation over Iran showed Truman's 'patience with firmness' or 'get tough' policy towards the Soviet Union that **preceded the policy of containment**.
- The **Soviets were angry** that the US sought to **embarrass** them by raising the issue to the UN rather than attempt to **negotiate a solution bilaterally**.
- More importantly, the political machinations of the Americans and the Iranians **heightened their suspicions against the Anglo-American camp**.
- This incident added to the **fast growing rift** between the East and West.

#### e. Turkey Straits Crisis, April - August 1946

##### Background Information


For the **Soviet Union**, the **Turkish Straits** could not have been more important. Since ancient times, the narrow bodies of water that make up the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles via the Sea of Marmara held **enormous strategic importance both militarily and in terms of trade**. The **only way** the Soviet navy could get from its Black Sea ports to the Mediterranean and the wider world was through the straits.

In **1936**, the Soviet Union, along with several other regional and world powers, signed the Montreux Convention. It agreed that **only ships from countries bordering the Black Sea** could use the straits and it was up to neutral Turkey to police it. This, however, wasn't enough of a guarantee.

In **March 1945**, Soviet deputy premier Lavrentiy Beria declared that a swathe of eastern Turkey close to the Black Sea belonged to Georgia, (which was then a part of the Soviet Union). It had been stolen, he said, by the Turks during the days of the Ottoman Empire. Moscow also complained that **ships not from the Black Sea** had been allowed to pass through the straits in violation of the convention.

**April 1946**, Stalin stated that the USSR needed to do something to **protect its security** and that of the **Dardanelle Straits**.

For the **Americans**, this confirmed their worst fears of **Soviet expansionism**. In April 1946, the visit of the huge American battleship *USS Missouri* arrived in the Straits, **further angered the Soviets**. The ship had come to the region under the explanation that it was delivering the mortuary urn of the late Turkish Ambassador home, a claim which was dismissed by the Soviets as coincidental.





The crisis reached a head on **7 August 1946**, when the **Soviet Union** handed Turkey a note stating that it had breached the Montreux Convention and a new treaty was needed. A **Soviet military build-up** followed.

The **US** countered Soviet threats with an announcement that any attack on Turkey would justify action by the UN Security Council.

However, knowing that the USSR sat on the Council and had the power to veto such an action, **Truman** decided to **send in an aircraft carrier task force** to join the battleship *Missouri* in Istanbul as a **form of deterrence**.

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**Moscow backed down**, and under protest, withdrew its demands for a renegotiation of the convention.

#### The Significance:

- **Turkey** abandoned its policy of neutrality and **accepted USD \$100 million** in economic and defense aid from the US in 1947 under the Truman Doctrine's plan of ceasing the spread of Soviet influence into Turkey and Greece. It **joined NATO in 1952**.
- Buildup of Soviet forces in Turkey **confirmed US perception of Soviet's expansionist tendencies**. The incident would later serve as a **deciding factor** in the issuing of the **Truman Doctrine**. United States adopted a firmer stance into the direction of supporting Turkey, even taking into account the **possibility of using force**.

<sup>11</sup> Photo of the battleship *The Missouri* from Getty images



#### f. Disagreements over US occupation policies in Germany, July - Sept 1946

A fundamental problem was that the US and the USSR differed in their attitudes towards Germany.


- The **USA** wanted a **demilitarized Germany** but hoped for **rapid German economic recovery** so that it would not be dependent on Allied aid and **democracy would be able to flourish** in a strong, stable, rehabilitated and unified Germany.
- The **USSR** however, wanted to **punish Germany heavily** so that a revived Germany **would not pose a security threat**. They also needed German resources for Soviet economic reconstruction.
- Although the Grand Alliance had agreed to divide Germany into 4 occupation zones as agreed in Yalta and Potsdam conferences, **significant changes occurred in the US occupation zone in 1946** because the **US believed that the USSR was trying to take over Germany** by restricting food and commodities from their zone to the other zones.
- The **US misinterpreted Soviet intentions** because the **Soviets wanted to work** towards having a future central German administration overseeing all four zones which would eventually be integrated into a single political unit.
- Hence, in an attempt to secure food and commodities from the Soviet zone, the Americans **halted reparations deliveries to the Soviets** from the western zones in **May 1946** and reasoned that the only way to prevent a Soviet takeover of Germany was to divide it into **two clear zones** by merging Britain and the USA in one area called Bizonia. This would now form a **single political and economic unit** would come into effect on 1 July 1947.
- In **September 1946**, the US further announced the relaxation of restrictions on German industrial production and the creation of a central import-export agency which would enable (West) Germany to export enough goods to finance food imports.

#### The Significance:


- The **Soviets** interpreted this measure of merging the Western zones as a **breach of the Potsdam Agreement**. They argued that they were being **denied legitimate compensation** for Soviet war issues.
- US actions alarmed Stalin as:
  - It appeared that **America was overseeing the economic revival** of the USSR's wartime enemy.
  - It seemed that Bizonia would be the **nucleus of a future West German state hostile** to the USSR.
- American priorities in Germany were now clear:
  - Emphasis of US occupation policy had **shifted** from the **punishment of Germany** to the **rehabilitation** of it. **Sustaining the German population** and harnessing German resources for European economic recovery were **now more important than satisfying Soviet reparations claims**.

#### g. Failure of the Baruch Plan, June - Dec 1946

In 1945, the Americans and the Soviets attempted to work out proposals for the international control of atomic weapons via the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission but with no success.



On 15 June 1946, US politician Bernard Baruch presented the American plan to the United Nations (UN) to put nuclear weapons under international control, with aims to allay Soviet fears about American nuclear monopoly.



The **Baruch plan** proposed the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), run by the UN, which could **control all atomic plans and uranium deposits to be used for peaceful purposes only**. The United States however, would be left with the **right to continue to manufacture its own atomic bombs**.

Another **controversial point** was **frequent inspection of atomic energy installations in UN member states** as well as "immediate, swift, and sure punishment" for violations.<sup>12</sup>

Unsurprisingly, **the Soviet Union rejected the Plan** and vetoed it in the UN Security Council. The emphasis on inspection caused an impasse (deadlock) between the US and the USSR:

- The US refused to destroy their existing atomic stockpile until inspection arrangements were firmly in place.

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<sup>12</sup> American Association for the United Nations, Inc; 1st edition (January 1, 1946)  
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- The Soviets refused to submit to inspection of their sites until the Americans had destroyed their atomic weapons.

Some historians have argued that the **Baruch Plan** was **deliberately designed** to be **unacceptable to the Soviets** and to **prolong America's atomic monopoly**. This is because with the Cold War unfolding, the Soviet Union would not accept a plan that would eliminate its veto, deprive it of its option of acquiring nuclear weapons, and open its borders to intrusive international inspection, all in the hope that the United States would eventually relinquish the bomb. Hence, the uncompromising position of the US made agreement on joint control of atomic weapons difficult.

Yet it is **doubtful** whether Stalin would have agreed to give up on his atomic weapons ambitions.

In 1946, US Congress passed the McMahon Act, **prohibiting the exchange of atomic energy** information with any foreign power, including US allies.

#### The significance:

- The Baruch plan was perceived by **Moscow** as a plan to **preserve American monopoly of nuclear weapons** and **deprive the Soviets** of an opportunity to develop their own nuclear weapons.
- It thus **reinforced Soviet fears of Western hostility** as seen in American assertiveness and yet another sign that the Grand Alliance was over.
- The USSR pressed on with its own atom bomb project. It successfully exploded its 1<sup>st</sup> atomic bomb on August 29, 1949, ending American's nuclear monopoly and driving the **nuclear arms race**, which became an **enduring feature of the Cold War**.

#### **h. Negative assessment of USSR in Clifford - Elsey Report**



In July 1946, Truman commissioned two of his most trusted advisors, Clark Clifford and George Elsey to analyze US-Soviet relations.

This report:

- **Accused the Soviet Union** of deliberately delaying or violating wartime agreements by highlighting examples of aggressive Soviet actions in Iran and Manchuria.
- Identified communist ideology and **not the search for security** as the driving force of Soviet foreign policy.
- Stated that the ultimate Soviet objective was world domination as they were inspired by the 'Marxian theory of ultimate destruction of capitalist states by communist states'.

- Suggested that a potential Civil War in Greece would threaten the political stability of the Middle East.
- Concluded that the very existence of the Soviet Union threatened the US.

#### The Significance:

- Reflected and crystallized the emerging Cold War consensus within the Truman administration in 1946 with members of Congress and the public sentiment that the USSR directly threatened the security of the US.
- Truman Doctrine is basically Truman's **adopted version** of this report as it recommended that the **US adopt a policy** to "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" **in order to keep the Soviet Union in check.**


#### **i. Reshuffling of Truman's Cabinet**

Members of the Truman administration who did not share the above views were marginalized.

- Henry Wallace, Secretary of Commerce, who publicly criticized the 'Get Tough with Russia' policy in Sept 1946, was sacked.



- State of Secretary, James Byrnes, gave a speech repudiating (rejecting) the administration's anti-Soviet foreign policy was fired by Truman and replaced by George C. Marshall (right) in Jan 1947.



- Dean Acheson, who advocated the new policy was appointed Under-Secretary of State

#### The significance:

- There was an unbalanced tilt in Truman's cabinet who all favored the sharpened approach to Soviet Union.

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<sup>13</sup> Retrieved from npg.com.uk



#### j. Greek Civil War, 1946 - 1947

While Soviet pressure on Turkey lessened, the Greek problem became worse. In 1944, the Greeks had begun fighting a civil war in which the **unpopular monarchy was supported by the British** while the **Greek communists were supported by Yugoslavia and Albania**. This fact was not known at that time and it was presumed that the Greek Communists had Moscow's support.

By early 1947, following a series of blizzards that deepened her economic crisis, Britain gave notice to the US that it could no longer support Greece and Turkey (formerly part of the British sphere of influence). The British government informed Truman that they had to drastically cut costs, including suspending all economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey by 31 March 1947. This could potentially create an **undesirable power vacuum** in the Mediterranean. If the Soviets controlled Greece and Turkey, they could extend their influence into the oil-rich Middle East area.

As a result, to **maintain the status quo at that key strategic part of the world**, the US had to take over Britain's role, to **give aid** even though the Greek and Turkish governments who corrupt and repressive, but anti-Communist.



The US wrongly believed that Stalin was behind the civil war, but in fact **logistical support for the Greek Communists** came from Yugoslavia's leader, Marshall Josip Tito, who secretly sent military supplies across the border.

Stalin did not give the Greek Communists any support as he had already agreed that Greece belonged to the Western sphere influence as agreed in the informal Percentage Agreement between Churchill and himself in Oct, 1944.

Waiting for the next move<sup>14</sup>

Subsequently, Stalin would use this agreement to **justify** that as he had respected Britain's sphere of influence, the West should have also **rightly respected Soviet's sphere of influence**.

<sup>14</sup> Cold War Chess Match, March 12 1947. Retrieved from pastdaily.com

Unfortunately, such distinctions **meant little** to **Truman** who could only see the hand of the Soviet Union in the flow of arms from Yugoslavia and Albania to the Greek communist rebels.

Truman chose to believe that **ALL COMMUNISTS** took their orders from Moscow. Americans believed that Moscow wanted and had the means to **establish a communist hegemony** (*the power to greatly influence what Communists parties do*)

#### The Significance:

- The struggle was one of the first conflicts of the Cold War and represents **the first example of Cold War postwar involvement** on the part of the Allies in the **internal affairs** of a foreign country.
- Greece in the end was funded by the US (through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan) and eventually joined NATO in 1952.
- The final victory of the western-allied government forces was caused partly by the large infusion of American aid as well as the bitter split between Stalin who wanted the war ended, and Yugoslavia's Tito, who wanted it to continue.
- Their victory over the Communists led to Greece's membership in NATO in 1952.
- This event was the **immediate factor** leading to the **formulation of the Truman Doctrine**.

#### **Summary for points a to j:**

- Although some grievances may be predominant, there was **NO ONE FACTOR** that led to the deterioration of relations between the USA and the USSR.
- There was still **no concrete US policy** towards the USSR from **1945 to 1946** even though resentment and suspicion had grown significantly. The Americans just knew that they had to be tougher with the Soviets.
- But by 1947, this changed, **a coherent, sharper** American foreign policy towards the USSR emerged.
- Although the **USSR was generally keen on peacetime cooperation** in the same period, **increasingly hostile US and British actions** and statements meant that the **Soviets had to react with similar moves**.

### Check point questions for self-review for developments in Europe & US in 1946:

- Why did the US hold on to its perception that the Soviet Union was involved in every communist activity in the world? (Remember the concept of a Communist hegemony?)
- Were the concerns of the USA justifiable? Did the USSR really pose a significant threat to the USA, or did the US misinterpret Soviet actions as a threat?
- Was there a shift in Soviet foreign policy?

**Commented [LQPJ22]:** Start section 3 on a fresh page to give some visual space for the kids to jot down some thoughts to the checkpoint questions

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### 3. The Truman Doctrine, 12 March 1947

The Truman Doctrine outlined the political intent of the USA to combat the spread of communism through the policy of containment. Under this doctrine, the US agreed to the extension of financial aid to help free nations, especially in Europe, in order to maintain their survival and independence. US dollars could be used to nurture Western Europe and Japan as stable, democratic and capitalist states which would form the core bulwarks against communist expansion.

At the same time, the US would do its best to counter and contain communism in peripheral areas such as Korea and Vietnam, although these places had lower priority. This would also prevent more countries from coming under Soviet or communist control.

Hence, containment would be applied in the economic, military, political and diplomatic fronts in all parts of the world in which the US had interests in.

The main objectives of containment was thus:

- To prevent the USSR from moving into Western Europe and thereby establishing control over Europe and gaining access to the Atlantic seaboard.
- To put pressure on the Soviet Union from its combined strength of the atomic bomb and its superior economic strength and prevent further expansion.

#### a. Background:

In the light of Britain's announcement of their inability to support Greece and Turkey, as well as the influence of Kennan's Long Telegram and Churchill's Iron Curtain speech, President Truman announced his doctrine in a speech to the US Congress on 12 March 1947.

Resistance to the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan (ERP) in America



Truman speech to the House of Representatives, 1947.


In the beginning, Congress was dominated by Republicans who were suspicious of foreign entanglements and was keen on reducing military expenditure after the war. The American public also thought that concerns about the Soviets were exaggerated.

However, with the series of developments across Europe in 1946, American leaders soon became convinced of the need to contain the USSR and the spread of communism. The defence of continental America became even more vital with the development of nuclear

**weapons technology by rival powers** (this meant that the security of the US was potentially under threat, even if enemy troops did not physically invade American soil).

One of the architects of the containment policy was **Dean Acheson**, who used the '**rotten apple**' theory to whip up support for the policy.

This **theory was the forerunner** to the '**Domino theory**' which was used to describe how communism can spread in Asia.



b. US Assumptions behind the containment policy:

- The **USSR could not be bargained with** and that it would **constantly attempt to extend its power** by applying pressure on the weak points beyond its own sphere of influence.
- Only the **language of power and force would be more effective** than other forms of diplomacy.
- The **chief instrument of Soviet expansion would not be war but communist movements** in Western Europe and Asia which aimed to destabilize existing governments by methods such as propaganda and strikes.

c. Truman's Address - his purpose, 12 March 1947

- In order to get support from a largely Republican Congress for aiding Greece and Turkey and laying down a foreign policy that would shape the American public, Truman **had to convince** them by **exaggerating** the threat posed by communism.
- In his speech, he depicted the struggle between American democracy and communist totalitarianism. He called for countries to choose between the freedom of the West or 'subjugation of communism'. He strove to remind Congress that one of the primary objectives of American foreign policy was to create 'conditions' that 'nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion.'
- Important to note: Truman **did not** specifically name the Soviet Union, although the reference to the USSR was obvious.
- On 22 May 1947, Congress **approved** Truman's request of aid of **\$400 million for Greece and Turkey** (by 1949, the Greek communists had suffered a bloody defeat and Turkey was firmly in the western bloc). This was accompanied by an increase in military preparedness and stockpile of atomic weapons.

d. The Significance:

- Most consider this as a **turning point in History** as the US turned away from the policy of isolationism to become active and engaged in foreign affairs.

Central to the Truman Doctrine was the knowledge that if other nations were in trouble, and if the US did not help them, the Communists might, and this would bring them under the influence of the US's ideological and potential enemy, the Soviet Union. By doing so, the **US had committed itself to military obligations to foreign countries** in peacetime!

- Truman's declaration had in effect, constitute a 'blank cheque' policy that could be used by any country in future that demonstrated it was in danger of communist subversion.
- The Truman Doctrine **marked the start of Containment** which would become the **cornerstone of American foreign policy during the Cold War.**
- Important to note:

Despite the provocative nature of the Truman Doctrine, **the Soviet response** was surprisingly **muted**. On 14 March, the Soviet official newspaper *Pravda* carried a report of Truman's speech that focused on US aid to Greece and Turkey, rather than the general direction of American policy shift to containment.

It should be noted that **Stalin himself did not respond to the speech**. It could be that he thought it **unwise to engage** in a direct confrontation with the US President so soon. Some historians have pointed out that **Stalin had still hoped for cooperation with the West.**

More would be explained in the next chapter on Soviet response to Truman Doctrine & the Marshall Plan in Lecture 1.4. <sup>15</sup>



<sup>15</sup>Retrieved from <https://www.blendspace.com/>

**Check point questions for self-review for Truman Doctrine:**

- To what extent was the Truman Doctrine important in the origins of the Cold War?
- Was it a turning point in US-Soviet relations?

#### 4. The Marshall Plan, 5 June 1947

a. Background: Economic crisis in Western Europe & growing US concern

- By the end of 1946, Western European countries were experiencing intense economic difficulties in recovering from the devastation of WWII. Food production was only 83% of pre-war levels. Harvests were poor in 1946 and the winter blizzards of 1946-1947 were made worse by coal shortage.
- Due to severe food shortages, rationing was imposed. Unemployment soared and there were many public strikes and demonstrations in reaction to these harsh economic conditions.
- Countries like France and Italy saw growing support for the local communist parties. In France, the communist party was part of the coalition government. In Italy, the communist party had 2 million members, and were in position of winning elections. This meant that the European communist parties might gain electoral success which would lead to closer ties with Moscow.
- This worried the US as economic malaise and poverty provided fertile ground for the spread of communism in Western Europe, which was seen as the most important theatre of the Cold War.
- After meeting Stalin in March-April, 1947, new Secretary of State, George Marshall was convinced that Stalin was hoping for an economic collapse of Europe which eventually would allow communism to triumph.
- By then, Washington was convinced that without American help, there would be little chance of recovery for Western Europe. The US believed that economic dislocation and suffering would cause people to turn to extreme communist parties for solutions to their problems.

b. The Marshall Plan, 5 June 1947

- Marshall announced his scheme in a speech at Harvard University in June 1947, where he declared that the US will offer massive economic aid to Western Europe.
- Approved by Congress and signed into law in April 1948, the European Recovery Programme as the Marshall Plan was officially known would provide billions of dollars to aid Western European states to reconstruct and rebuild themselves.
- It proposed large dollar grants which these countries could use to purchase food, raw materials and industrial machinery.

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The Way Back, 1947

The Significance of Marshall's speech, 1947:

- The speech contained **no specific numbers** or details about the plan.

He called for **Europeans** to meet and create their own plan for rebuilding and the **US would provide their funds**.

- The Marshall Plan was portrayed as a **pro-European** rather than **anti-Communist**. He argued that the programme was 'directed **NOT** against any **country or doctrine** BUT against **hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos**.' So, **technically**, the programme was **open to the Soviet Union and her allies**. This was to convince the public that the **US was not the instigators of the division of Europe**. However, despite Marshall's claims, the Plan was **always directed against Soviet influence**, to prevent Western Europe from falling into Soviet hands.

The reality was that **hunger and deprivations** were conditions that were prime fodder for **influence of communism**, potentially shifting the balance of power from US toward the Soviet Union. Hence, by reducing economic misery and suffering of the people, the **US hoped to suppress the allure of communism** by creating economic conditions that would promote the ideologies of liberal democracy and capitalism.




▪ However, US aid **would NOT** be advanced to countries which **did not open their economies** to US exports, **made it almost certain** that the Soviet Union would not accept it.

▪ The US did **hope** that some Eastern European countries would be tempted to take up the aid, and in doing so, **weaken Soviet control** of Eastern Europe.

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The **Soviets** felt that the Plan was **exploitative** and a **political tool**, and it was. Soviet leaders claimed on several occasions that the Marshall Plan represented nothing more than an attempt for the US to buy allies with money.

- The Marshall Plan **divided Europe economically**. It was calculated that aid provided to Western Europe would **create a captive market** for US goods in the next 4 years, thereby **propping up** US farmers and businesses threatened by worldwide falling domestic demands after the end of the war.
- Up till 1953, **US\$17 billion** was sent into Western Europe in cash and kind to help rebuild their economies and raise the standards of living. US machinery helped European factories recover from the effects of WWII. US advisors also helped to rebuild infrastructure and transport systems.



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<sup>16</sup> Political cartoon by Leslie Gilbert Illingworth depicting the Eastern Bloc's reaction towards the Marshall Plan, March 1948

<sup>17</sup> Retrieved from <https://coldwarstudies.com/>

- **Yugoslavia** was the only Communist country which was willing to accept the Marshall Plan as it had fallen out in the Soviet Union in 1948 over Turkey crisis. Tito applied for and got Marshall Aid, after which Stalin kicked Yugoslavia out of Cominform.

#### c. Evaluation of the Marshall Plan

- **Economically:** The Marshall Plan was an enormous success. By 1952, Europe's industrial production had risen to 35% of its pre-war levels, the issue of restoring West Germany's economy was resolved. It also revived world trade.
- **Humanitarian:** The Marshall Plan brought long-term aid and prevented further social disarray.
- **Politically:** it prevented the spread of communism in Western Europe as the Marshall Plan provided the means to create healthy national economies that won over the working classes to liberal capitalist regimes.
- **Diplomatically:** The Marshall Plan caused a **crisis in US-Soviet relations\***. The **Soviet Union refused to participate in the Plan** and forbade its satellite states. It also **forced the Soviets to implement a rival plan** for its eastern bloc which created an **economic and political division across Europe**.

*\* Soviet reactions to US containment policy will be examined in detail in Lecture 1.4 as well as the establishment of NATO*

#### **Conclusion:**

If the Truman Doctrine was the US's containment's political directive, then the **Marshall Plan was its economic weapon**. It clearly outlined the superiority of US's economic system and capitalism in general, while at the same time **dividing Europe into two economic and political spheres**. This created a **bipolar continent** divided along **ideological and economic lines**.

Although the Marshall Plan was generally seen as a great success in rebuilding Europe, there were **criticisms** of US '**dollar diplomacy**' or '**chewing gum**' **imperialism** (US domination) as some felt that the **US had far too much control and say** over the countries' internal policies. Stalin accused the US for using the Plan for its own political and selfish reason - to dominate Europe and boost its own economy.

By April 1948, Europe was **firmly divided into two distinct economic and political blocs**: One dependent on the US, and the other on the Soviet Union. Ironically fulfilling Churchill's early prediction of an 'iron curtain descending across Europe.'



**Check point questions for self-review:**

- How would economic problems in Western Europe contribute to the spread of communism?
- What was the significance of the Marshall Plan in the course of events for the start of the Cold War?
- How was the Marshall Plan responsible for the outbreak of the Cold War?
- To what extent was the origins of the Cold War due primarily to economic reasons?

### Timeline of Key Events in 1946 & 1947

**Commented [LQPJ24]:** We spoke abt this - relook at the timeframe in Column 1 to reflect time period so as to encompass the accurate timeframes of the evidences in the same row

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Albania- communist govt took power.  
Sept 1946 - Bulgarian monarchy was abolished a communist government was elected and gradually eradicated its opponents.  
East Germany -Soviets set up a communist regime as part of occupation zone as agreed in Yalta conference.  
Nov 1946 Romania - a communist-led coalition government was elected with accusations of falsified results. The Communists gradually removed their coalition partners and abolished the Romanian monarchy.

Date	USA	Soviet Union	External
<b>Feb 1946</b>	Kennan's Long Telegram - USSR instinctive sense of insecurity, Soviet expansionism was dangerous	Stalin's election speech - communism vs capitalism, war was inevitable	While the war was still taking place, Soviet occupation troops assisted local communists in putting Communist dictatorships in Romania and Bulgaria in power.  At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union occupied Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland and eastern Germany.  Over one million Red Army soldiers remained stationed in Eastern Europe.
<b>Mar 1946</b>	Iran Crisis		
	Urged Iranian PM to resist Further Soviet advance.  Threatened to intervene  Shift in US policy to engagement	Initial refused to relinquish occupied Iranian territories.  Withdrew as did not want to risk military confrontation	Britain and Iran brought their case to UN to settle
<b>Mar 1946</b>	Churchill 'Iron Curtain' Speech		
	Public initially not convinced, but reinforced Truman's perception of SU's expansionist ambitions.  Signaled growing rift	Confirmed Stalin's suspicion of Western hostility	Greek Civil war started
<b>Apr-Aug 1946</b>	Turkish Straits Crisis		

Date	USA	Soviet Union	External
	US sent battleship <i>The Missouri</i> and then supported with aircraft carrier fleet.	Pressured Turkey for Russian ships to flow freely through the Turkish straits bec of danger to Baltic states if only sea-route was closed	Brought case to UN, but was vetoed by USSR.
June - Dec 1946	Baruch atomic plan		
	Development of nuclear weapons under UN control, but USA still have right to manufacture them.	Vetoed in UN. Perceived as way to preserve US nuclear monopoly.  Revved up nuclear programme - start of nuclear arms race.	Britain states it cannot support the Greek & Turkish civil wars against communist rebels.
1947	Truman Doctrine announced (Mar)  Major turning point in US foreign policy (paradigm shift) to Containment of Communism	Muted response from Moscow  Stalin no response	Economic crisis in Western Europe  Sovietisation of Eastern Europe
	Congress approves Truman's aid request for Greece & Turkey (22 May)	Mixed reaction: needed US aid, but wary of US 'dollar imperialism'.  Found the conditions unacceptable. Rejected the aid.	
	Congress deliberates over Marshall Plan (Aug)	Poland, Bulgaria, Romania have hard-line Stalinist regimes.  Perceived Marshall Plan as a political weapon to lure Eastern European countries away from Soviet sphere of influence.  COMINFORM created	
Existence of 2 distinct economic and political blocs by 1948			
1948	Congress approves Marshall Plan (Feb)	Stalin Kicked Yugoslavia out of COMINFORM bec Tito	Fall of Czechoslovakia in communist coup (last non-communist

Date	USA	Soviet Union	External
		<p>requested and received US aid.</p> <p>Began implementation of its own economic plan - COMECON</p> <p>More details in 1.4 - Soviet Response to the Containment plan</p>	government in Eastern Europe)

## ANNEX- IMPORTANT SPEECHES FROM 1946 - 1947

### 1. George Kennan's Long Telegram, Feb 1946

#### Extract :

***The USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence.*** At the bottom of the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.

Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighbourhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison for contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without of if foreigners learned about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for the first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevik regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced their country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security for their internally weak regimes.

This is why Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate the importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven by necessities of their own past and present position to put forward a dogma which pictures the outside world as evil, hostile, and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provided justification for that increase of military and police power in Russia state, for that isolation of Russian population from the outside world, and for that fluid constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries-old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused.

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But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and wanton outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.

*George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Bantam, New York, 1969), pp. 549-51*

## 2. Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech, March 1946

### Extract:

**From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent.** Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of central and eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone, with its immortal glories, is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation...

However, in a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the communist centre. Except in the British Commonwealth, and in the United States, where communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth column countries constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization...

On the other hand, I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable, still more that it is imminent. It is because I am so sure that our fortunes are in our own hands and that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have an occasion to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. ..

From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect for than for military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength. If the western democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, their influence for furthering these principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If, however, they become divided or falter in their duty, and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away, then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all.

*Congressional Record, 79<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session, A1146-7*

## 2. Stalin's Interview with "Pravda" Correspondent, March 13 1946

### Extract:

*On Churchill's Speech at Fulton*  
*March 13, 1946*

The other day a "Pravda" correspondent asked Comrade Stalin to clarify a number of questions connected with Mr. Churchill's speech. Below are given Comrade Stalin's replies to the questions put by the correspondent.

**Question:** *How do you appraise the latest speech Mr. Churchill delivered in the United States of America?*

**Answer:** I appraise it as a dangerous act calculated to sow the seeds of discord between the Allied States and hamper their cooperation.

**Question:** *Can Mr. Churchill's speech be regarded as harmful to the cause of peace and security?*

**Answer:** Unquestionably, yes. As a matter of fact, Mr. Churchill's position is now that of the incendiaries of war. And Mr. Churchill is not alone in this - he has friends not only in England but in the United States of America as well.

It should be noted that in this respect Mr. Churchill and his friends strikingly resemble Hitler and his friends. Hitler set out to unleash war by proclaiming the race theory, declaring that the German-speaking people constituted a superior nation. Mr. Churchill sets out to unleash war also with a race theory, by asserting that the English-speaking nations are superior nations called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world. The German race theory led Hitler and his friends to the conclusion that the Germans as the only superior nation must dominate other nations. The English race theory leads Mr. Churchill and his friends to the conclusion that the English-speaking nations, as the only superior nations, must dominate the other nations of the world.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Churchill and his friends in England and the U.S.A. are presenting something in the nature of an ultimatum to nations which do not speak English: recognize our domination voluntarily, and then everything will be in order - otherwise war is inevitable.

But the nations shed their blood during five years of fierce war for the sake of the freedom and independence of their countries, and not for the sake of replacing the domination of the Hitlers by the domination of the Churchills. Therefore, it is quite probable that the nations which do not speak English and at the same time constitute the vast majority of the world's population, will not agree to submit to the new slavery.

**Question:** *How do you appraise that part of Mr. Churchill's speech in which he attacks the democratic systems in the European states neighbouring with us and in which he criticizes*

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*the good-neighbourly relations established between these states and the Soviet Union?*

**Answer:** This part of Mr. Churchill's speech represents a mixture of elements of slander and with elements of rudeness and tactlessness.

Mr. Churchill asserts that "Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia - all these famous cities and populations around them lie within the Soviet sphere and all are subject in one form or another not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow." Mr. Churchill describes all this as boundless "expansionist tendencies" of the Soviet Union.

No special effort is necessary to prove that in this case Mr. Churchill is rudely and shamelessly slandering both Moscow and the above-mentioned states neighbouring with the U.S.S.R.

Firstly, it is utterly absurd to speak of exclusive control of the U.S.S.R. in Vienna and Berlin, where there are Allied Control Councils composed of representatives of the four states and where the U.S.S.R. has only one-fourth of the votes. It does happen that some people cannot help slandering, but even then there should be a limit.

Secondly, one must not forget the following fact. The Germans invaded the U.S.S.R. through Finland, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary. The Germans were able to effect their invasion by way of these countries because at that time governments hostile to the Soviet Union existed in these countries. Owing to the German invasion, the Soviet Union irrevocably lost in battles with the Germans and also as a result of German occupation and the driving off of Soviet people to German penal servitude, some 7,000,000 persons. In other words the Soviet Union lost several times more people than Britain and the United States of America taken together. Possibly some quarters are inclined to consign to oblivion these colossal sacrifices of the Soviet people which secured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union cannot forget them. The question arises, what can there be surprising about the fact that the Soviet Union, desiring to insure its security in the future, seeks to achieve a situation when those countries will have governments maintaining a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union? How can anyone who has not gone mad describe these peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as expansionist tendencies of our state? .....

Mr. Churchill further asserts that "the Communist Parties, which were previously very small in all these eastern states of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers, and seek everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments prevail in nearly every case, and thus far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy."

.... The growth of the influence of the Communists cannot be regarded as fortuitous. It is a perfectly legitimate phenomenon. The influence of the Communists has grown because in the hard years of fascist domination in Europe, the Communists proved reliable, courageous, self-sacrificing fighters against the fascist regime, for the freedom of the peoples. Mr. Churchill sometimes mentions in his speeches "the simple people of cottages," patting them on the back in a lordly manner and posing as their friend. But these people are not so simple as they



may seem at first glance. They, these "simple people," have their own views, their own policy, and they are able to stand up for themselves. It is they, the millions of these "simple people," who voted down Mr. Churchill and his party in England by casting their votes for the Labourites. It is they, the millions of these "simple people," who isolated the reactionaries in Europe, the adherents of collaboration with fascism, and gave preference to the left democratic parties. It is they, the millions of these "simple people," who tested the Communists in the fire of struggle and resistance to fascism and decided that the Communists fully deserved the people's trust. That is how the influence of the Communists has grown in Europe. Such is the law of historical development.

Naturally, Mr. Churchill does not like such a course of development and he sounds the alarm, appealing to force. But he similarly did not like the birth of the Soviet regime in Russia after the First World War. Then too he sounded the alarm and organised the military campaign of "14 states" against Russia, setting himself the goal of turning the wheel of history back. But history proved stronger than Churchillian intervention, and Mr. Churchill's quixotic ways brought about his utter defeat. I do not know whether Mr. Churchill and his friends will succeed in organizing after the Second World War a new military campaign against "Eastern Europe." But should they succeed - which is hardly probable, since millions of "simple people" are guarding the cause of peace - one can confidently say that they will be beaten just as they were beaten in the past, twenty-six years ago.

*Stalin's Interview with Pravda, in response to Churchill*

*Printed in the New York Times, March 14, 1946*

**4. President Truman's speech to US Congress where 'The Truman Doctrine' was announced, 12 March 1947**

**Extract :**

*President Truman deliberately set out in this speech before Congress on 12 March 1947 to dramatise the Soviet threat so as to ensure that the aid requested for Greece and Turkey should be voted. He divided the world into two camps and called on the American people to take up their world mission.*

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of the majority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

**I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.**

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own identities in their own way... The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world - and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

*Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S Truman, 1947, Reprinted in Walter LaFeber, The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-7: A Historical Problem with Interpretation and Documents (John Wiley, New York, 1971), pp. 154-6*

## 5. George Marshall's Speech in Harvard, June 1947 (Marshall Plan)

### Extract:

In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines and railroads was correctly estimated but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy.....

Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared, through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization, or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than had been foreseen.....

The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products - principally from America - are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character.

The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies the continuing value of which is not open to question.

Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. **Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.** Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full co-operation I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. **Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us.** Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be **some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government.** It would be neither

fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.

An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.

I am sorry that on each occasion I have said something publicly in regard to our international situation, I've been forced by the necessities of the case to enter into rather technical discussions. But to my mind, it is of vast importance that our people reach some general understanding of what the complications really are, rather than react from a passion or a prejudice or an emotion of the moment. As I said more formally a moment ago, we are remote from the scene of these troubles. It is virtually impossible at this distance merely by reading, or listening, or even seeing photographs or motion pictures, to grasp at all the real significance of the situation. And yet the whole world of the future hangs on a proper judgment. It hangs, I think, to a large extent on the realization of the American people, of just what are the various dominant factors. What are the reactions of the people? What are the justifications of those reactions? What are the sufferings? What is needed? What can best be done? What must be done?

Thank you very much.

*The "Marshall Plan" speech at Harvard University, 5 June 1947*

## Lecture 1.4: Soviet Response to US Foreign Policy

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## 1. Introduction

- The Soviet Union had an arguably historically uneasy relationship with the United States since 1917 when the Russian Revolution took place and Soviet communism was born. There was no chance of a genuine friendship between these two countries because the leaders of the new Soviet Union had extremely different beliefs from those of American politicians. Each believed that it was right and that other countries should follow their lead. The Soviet leaders were sure that their communist ideas would eventually spread to every country in the world, whilst the Americans felt that the answer to world problems was for other people to learn to live the American way. As a result, the US and USSR were very hostile to each other. In 1919, the USA joined Britain, France and other countries in an attempt to destroy Soviet communism by force. This use of force failed but the hostility remained.
- The hostility between the US and the Soviet Union was suspended in 1941 when they were linked by their common will to destroy Hitler. However, the end of the war produced a difficult situation. Nazi power had been destroyed, but what should replace it? In ~~any~~ many countries there were no proper governments. Decision had to be made about the future of these countries. Shortly before his death, Hitler ironically had predicted the start of the Cold War.
  - “After the collapse of the German Reich, and until there is a rise in nationalism in Asia, Africa or Latin America, there will only be two powers in the world: The United States and Soviet Russia. Through the laws of history and geographical position, these giants are destined to struggle with each other either through war, or through rivalry in economics and political ideas.” - *Hitler's Political Testament, April 1945*
- The Soviet leaders felt that their country had made by far the most important contribution in winning the war. Although the British and Americans had helped. Stalin believed, with some justification, that the Soviet Union had cut the heart of the German army. 10 million Germans, who represented 80% of German losses, died on the Eastern Front. Thus, the Soviet leaders believed their country had largely won the war, and thus had the right to shape the future of Europe.



The centre of Stalingrad after liberation

- However, the Soviet Union suffered much more than the other allies during the war. This made a difference to attitudes after the war. About 8 million Soviet soldiers had been killed by the Germans, as compared to 400,000 British and American soldiers. In addition to military casualties, as many as 25 million Soviet citizens had died due to shortages of food and harsh conditions of the war. Stalin was thus emphatically determined that this should never be allowed to happen again.<sup>18</sup>

- In 1914 and 1941 Germany had attacked Russia through Poland. In 1945, Stalin believed that there could be yet another attack through Poland. To stop this, he was thus determined to control Poland and other East European states. Before WW2, almost all of these countries had been governed by right-wing, anti-communist leaders. Hence, to Moscow, it seemed quite likely that if these countries were allowed to be independent, they would again become anti-Soviet.

In 1945, the US was by far the wealthiest country in the world. The Soviet government was convinced that American business leaders were planning to spread their power and increase their profits by buying up companies in other countries and selling American goods wherever they could. In this way a new American empire would be built. There would be no need for American troops to conquer new lands: American capitalism would do it instead. Hence, it fell to the Soviet leaders to prevent American business from dominating the world. The setting up of a group of friendly communist countries was one way of doing it.

- The division of Europe politically, economically and militarily could be seen in a series of key developments from 1947. The US introduced the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan which the Soviets responded by introducing COMINFORM in 1947 and then COMECON in 1949. Following a series of events which led up to the Berlin crisis of 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949 and when West Germany became a member of NATO in 1955, it was then matched by the formation of the Warsaw Pact.
- Thus far, we have examined historical events through Western perspective that the Cold War started because of USSR's expansionist ideology that follows its Marxist' ideology of 'worldwide revolution' and Stalin's aggressive actions in Eastern Europe. However, viewed from Moscow, the Cold War was due to their struggle for a peaceful co-existence with an increasingly aggressive and hostile western alliance that sought to threaten their national security.

<sup>18</sup> RIA Novosti archive, image #602161 / Zelma / CC-BY-SA 3.0

- The lecture will examine the developments of Eastern Europe in 1945-1947 and how Soviet policies and responses contributed to the emergence of bipolarity.



## 2. Soviet Response to the Truman Doctrine & Marshall Plan: 1945-1947

- Stalin's initial response to the Truman Doctrine was surprisingly muted as he still hoped for cooperation and co-existence with the West. In fact, Stalin still thought that Allied compromise on various issues regarding the future of Germany was still within reach. As such, there was no official counterblast, although Russian newspapers and magazines did criticize Truman's speech to Congress.
- Some historians have argued that it was the perceived threat of American expansionism in the Marshall Plan that precipitated Soviet leadership to take Truman's March 1947 speech more seriously and to associate both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan as parts of a larger American plan to deliberately construct an anti-Soviet bloc in Europe.
- In June, 1947, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Molotov attended a meeting in Paris to discuss the Marshall Plan even though the Soviets knew that the conditions attached to the Plan was unacceptable to the Soviets.

Some of these conditions were:

- Inflow of US goods and ideas into the Eastern bloc.
- Competition for Eastern Europe's resources (e.g. Polish food)
- External supervision: In exchange for aid, countries had to disclose information and be subjected to external supervision which proved unacceptable to the USSR.



These were seen as threats to Soviet control over Eastern Europe as they feared the states would break away.

The USSR denounced the Marshall Plan as an attempt to undermine the independence of the sovereign states and the harbinger of a divided Europe.

The Soviets thus forbade Eastern European states from attending the meeting.

The Russian cartoon on the left was published in 1949 entitled 'The American Bludgeon in the Solution of Market Problems' depicts an American holding a bat (symbolized the Marshall Plan) destroying Western Europe's tariff barriers and states' sovereignty.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Library of Congress Exhibition, For European Recovery: The 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Marshall Plan  
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#### THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET REJECTION OF THE MARSHALL PLAN:

- Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan **actually increased its chances of being accepted and passed by the US Congress**. Had the USSR agreed to be a part of the Marshall Plan, chances are that the Plan would not have been passed by Congress which was becoming increasingly anti-Soviet.
- The Marshall Plan convinced Stalin that a peacetime alliance with the West was no longer a viable option.
- The announcement of the Plan and its rejection by Stalin was a **KEY moment in US-Soviet relations as it marked the moment when compromise between the two sides was no longer possible and prompted a more aggressive Soviet policy in Europe**.

#### a. COMINFORM, Sept 1947

- The Soviets responded to the perceived change in the international situation by setting up COMINFORM (Communist Information Bureau), which was seen as a successor to the Communist International (Comintern) in September 1947.
- Its stated aim was to:
  - Bring about communist revolutions all over the world
  - Coordinate policies and tactics of Communist parties in both satellite states and in Western Europe.
- In essence, COMINFORM was a political tool of Soviet foreign policy as it allowed Moscow to closely monitor communist parties and governments in Europe.



During COMINFORM's first conference in Sept, 1947, Politburo member **Andrei Zhdanov** announced the Soviet Union's '**two camps theory**'. In this speech, Zhdanov unveiled both a **new political line** for the communist movement as well as a **radical turn in the Soviet foreign policy**.

<sup>20</sup>

In the speech, Zhdanov:

- Claimed that the **world had been divided into two camps** - an anti-imperialist and democratic camp led by the USSR and an anti-democratic and imperialist camp headed by the USA.
- Argued that the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were moves made by the US to create a western bloc in order to secure the economic and political enslavement of Europe.

<sup>20</sup> Screencast from YouTube video 'Seventeen Moments in Soviet History', April 2014

- Condemned the Western powers' desire to dominate the world and launch a new war, which the USSR had to prevent.
- Reprimanded communist parties in Western Europe for their cooperation with the non-communists. They were ordered to change their tactics and adopt a militant anti-government stance, especially towards the Marshall Plan. This was particularly important for the French and Italian communists who were thrown out of the local coalition governments.
- Henceforth, the **policy of cooperation** between moderate Socialist and Liberal parties **would be abandoned** and where possible, **Communist parties would seize power and create societies modeled on the Soviet system.**
- Zhdanov argued that the Truman Doctrine Marshall Plan were **signs of US attempt to dominate Europe** and accused the Americans of **preparing a new war to achieve world domination**. Thus, the **Soviet Union** was portrayed as a **defender of world peace** and the **Soviet bloc was justified** as it prevented the US from achieving its ambitions.

#### The Significance:

- This was deemed as the Soviet equivalent of the Truman Doctrine and indicated that the **Soviets no longer believed that cooperation was possible.**
- Although the speech was not delivered by the top leadership, it did **reflect the official Soviet position** for it was written in close consultation with Stalin.
- Communists started to organize anti-government strikes and protests which caused disruptions and **added to the atmosphere of tension.**
- However, this change in strategy misfired and the **Western European communists** found themselves increasingly **politically isolated and alienated.**
- Nonetheless, the left turn in Western European communist movements marked a **departure from the atmosphere of compromise** previously espoused by the Soviets.

#### **b. Communization / Sovietisation / Stalinization of Eastern Europe**

- The implementation of the Marshall Plan **pushed** the Soviet Union towards a greater communization / Sovietization / Stalinization of Eastern Europe. This marked a **radical turn** in Soviet communist policy. Stalin **initially started with a more moderate policy.** Before 1947, in the spirit of maintaining Allied unity, Stalin articulated that socialism in Europe was to be achieved **gradually over a long period.** He urged **restrained** political course in Eastern Europe, **reining in militant tendencies** of communist movements and urging a **moderate course** of political action.
- However, in the light of perceived threat of America, **Soviet policies hardened** as the USSR sought to counter American influence in Western Europe, whilst expanding its own influence and control over its Eastern European countries.

- The “communization” of the region involved the establishment of single-party communist control, which would include the **dissolution of opposition parties**, tighter **control over the media** and **communist domination** in all organizations.
- “Sovietisation” also happened in the sense that the **Soviet model of socialism - state-owned and controlled economies**, forced collectivization of agriculture, pervasive communist party presence in all aspects of life - was imposed.
- There was also an element of “Stalinisation”, because Eastern European regimes tended to be dominated by a **single, idolized party leader/ dictator** and the use of political terror (purges, arrests, show trials, executions).

#### The significance:

- Non-communists in these Eastern European states soon found themselves removed from power either through rigged elections, intimidation, arrests, show trials and or political purges (use of ‘salami tactics’).
- Even the local communist parties were affected as only Moscow-trained officials or close to Stalin came to power.
- By 1948, when the communists seized power in Czechoslovakia, the last vestiges of democracy disappeared in Eastern Europe, which effectively became a Soviet buffer zone, and the Eastern European states transformed into Soviet satellites.

#### **c. The Molotov Plan (1947) and COMECON (1949)**

- After the formation of COMECON, the USSR also concluded a series of **bilateral trade agreements with the Eastern European** states known collectively as the **Molotov Plan**. Stalin needed to show that the USSR would **not be outdone** by the USA and also a need to **mollify Eastern European states** (Czechoslovakia and Poland) that had expressed interest in the Marshall Plan (but were not allowed to take up.) Thus, the Molotov Plan was conceived and this could be seen as a **direct response to the Marshall Plan**.
- The Molotov Plan was later superseded by the **COMECON** (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) in Jan 1949.
- COMECON included Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union. Albania whilst part of the original group, did not participate after 1961. Yugoslavia also participated in part in matters of interest.
  - COMECON coordinated Five-Year Plans, encouraged specialization within national economies and sought cooperation in productions, especially in chemicals and engineering.
  - COMECON members **were NOT equal partners**, and the **USSR dominated the organization**, operating a pricing system that was favourable to itself, although it did provide credit to member states and gave access to Soviet raw materials and supplies in return for manufactured goods.

- COMECON was ratified in 1956 and it undertook large scale measures for organization of industrial production and coordination of economic developments through a series of 5-year plans (1956 - 1985). However, despite attempts at integration, most trade was strictly bilateral. After increasing 400% for its first 15 years, trade among COMECON countries declined.
- The Soviets also encouraged specialization within the communist bloc. For example some countries to focus on heavy industries while others concentrate on raw materials and food production. However, this was not actively welcomed by Eastern European states who saw it as Soviet interference in their internal affairs.
- Both the Molotov Plan and COMECON were attempts **to bind** the countries of Eastern Europe (and other communist states) into a **single economic unit**.
- The division of Europe into two separate economic blocs was imminent.

#### d. The Berlin Crisis (June 1948 to May 1949)

With the need to counter the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the Soviets took on an even harsher approach towards Germany from 1947, which culminated in the Berlin Crisis.

##### Background to the German issue

After the end of WWII, the Allies were determined to ensure that Germany would never be a threat to them again. However, beyond this, they could not agree on the future directions of Germany and had differences about the peace settlement for Germany and the rest of Europe.



Initial agreements on the partition of Germany were as follows:

- From the agreements at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam, the Big Three did effect the partition of Germany and the city of Berlin. The USA, USSR, Britain and France would be the occupying powers.
- The Allied Control Council (ACC) had supreme authority and consisted of the military governors of the four occupation zones. In Berlin there was the Allied Kommandatura consisting of the four military governors of the different zones.<sup>21</sup>
- Germany was to be treated as one economic unit and would eventually become one political unit.

<sup>21</sup> Retrieved from : <https://germanculture.com.ua/germany-history/postwar-occupation-of-germany/>  
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### Problems & Disagreements

Refer to Lecture 1.2 on divergent post war motives of USA and Soviet Union.

In short, Stalin wanted an economically weak, anti-Fascist state ruled by communists, with the extraction of maximum reparations to aid Soviet Union's war recovery. However, the western powers wanted a German economic revival as part of a larger European post-war recovery, balking at the Soviet's demand of heavy reparations (which had been a source of instability that created the conditions for the rise of Hitler after WW1).

These differences in their visions of post-war Germany would prove to be an **incendiary factor** in the breakdown of relations.

### Towards A Divided Germany

By early 1948, Stalin had control of much of Eastern Europe. The rise of Soviet power in the east persuaded the United States to revive Germany more quickly than had been planned.

The events of 1947 brought Germany's geopolitical importance sharply into focus. This was because **Germany straddled the frontier** between non-communist and Soviet-controlled Europe and was emerging as a **vital battleground in the Cold War**.

- America took the lead in arguing for an early end to military occupation and the combination of the three western occupation zones into a West German state which would become an American Ally and a solid buffer against communism in central Europe. This was because the alternative prospect of a single Soviet-dominated German state was alarming as it would give the Soviet Union control over the coalfields and heavy industries of the Ruhr and bring Soviet domination of the Eurasian land mass one step closer.

#### **U.S. Economic Assistance Under the European Recovery Program**

April 3, 1948 - June 30, 1952  
(Total Amount in Millions of U.S. Dollars, Source: USIA)

United Kingdom	3,189.8
France	2,713.6
Italy	1,508.8
Germany (West)	1,390.6
The Netherlands	1,083.5
Greece	706.7
Austria	677.8
Belgium/Luxembourg	559.3
Denmark	273.0
Norway	255.3
Turkey	225.1
Ireland	147.5
Sweden	107.3
Portugal	51.2
Iceland	29.3

- According to the strategy of containment, western Germany was seen as a **prime site for Soviet pressure**. Hence, **American counter-pressure** partly took the form of the Marshall Aid dollars.

West Germany was one of the **chief beneficiaries** of the Marshall Plan (the ECA channeled millions of dollars into the western zones).

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<sup>22</sup> World Economic Forum figures


- America's principle concern was that the Germans in the west would want to join those in the Soviet zone in a unified Germany under Soviet control. It thus believed that it was engaged in a battle with the Soviet Union for German public opinion.
- Accordingly, a number of steps were taken to win the support of the West German people:
  - In 1947, restrictions on industrial production were relaxed. This was designed to increase the supply of West German coal and steel needed to rebuild the economy of Western Europe; and a reminder to the Germans that the occupiers did not want harsh external controls over German everyday life for an indefinite period.
  - Day-to-day running of West Germany was increasingly shared between the occupying powers and the Germans themselves.
  - American policy moved quickly and in 1948, a constitution was drawn up for a new West German state that would come into existence in 1949.

Thus, the **long-term American goal of creating a democratic and economically viable West Germany to fortify Western Europe's frontier with the Soviet sphere was close to completion.**

#### Decision to form Bizonia and its significance

- The British and Americans found that the western zones in Germany could not produce enough food to feed themselves. The result was that the Americans had to feed the German population at their own expense. Britain introduced bread rationing at home in order to export wheat to Germany. It was estimated that the Britain and US needed to import \$700 million worth of foodstuff into their zones to prevent mass starvation.
- It was also calculated that if German industries continued to be dismantled (as agreed in the Potsdam Conference), Germany would not be able to produce exports needed to earn money for much needed food. The problem was exacerbated by the influx of millions of refugees from Eastern Germany and people expelled from Poland and Czechoslovakia.
- However, at the same time, the Soviets continued to strip their zone of its resources. For example, equipment, machinery, entire factories, and even qualified people like engineers and scientists. They also failed to account for much of what they took. This was because the Soviets viewed it as their right to do so, due to the extensive damage caused by the German army's 'scorched earth' policy. They felt that it was justified that Germany pay for what they had done in the form of heavy reparations.
- This angered the Western Allies because the US and Britain was paying for imports into their own zones while sending reparations to the Soviet zone. This resulted in a major rift between the Soviets and the Western allies when they decided to stop sending deliveries to the Soviets.





In **September 1946**, James Byrnes, the United States Secretary of State, addressed an audience in Stuttgart. This became known as the '**Speech of Hope**' because it promised Germans an **eventual return to self-government**. (See Annex on Byrnes speech)

- He acknowledged that the **Potsdam Agreement was not working**. In addition, he called for a **higher level of industrial activity** within Germany, **monetary reform** and for preparation to **form a German government**. He also **warned** that the **recovery of Europe** would be slowed down if **Germany remained impoverished**.

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- On **1 January 1947**, US and Britain then agreed to merge their two zones into **Bizonia** as the Americans viewed with alarm the perpetual instability caused by a divided Germany.
- With the creation of a budding Western German state, the US hoped that it could be used as a **springboard to challenge dominance in the eastern part of Germany** and also Europe. It must be noted that the ultimate aim was to ensure a free and independent Germany **aligned to western interest and not to the USSR**.

#### The significance:

- The creation of Bizonia and later Trizonia greatly **alarmed Stalin**. He saw it as another step towards a divided Germany with the wealthier, larger part of the country closely allied to the USA. Stalin **was worried** by the idea of a **successful, anti-communist government in West Germany**. In his mind, it raised the possibility of another German attack on Russia as in 1914 and 1941.

#### Immediate incident leading to the Berlin Blockade: Currency Reforms

- The spark for the Berlin crisis came in the form of the **currency reforms**. As the western zones were unified as one economic unit, there were plans for a new currency to establish financial stability in Germany.
- This was because under the pressure of inflation, food shortages and demoralization, the old Reichmark became worthless currency. The average German worker was earning 300-400 Reichmarks a month, but a single cigarette cost 25 marks and a pound of coffee went for 1,500 marks. Germans in many areas were operating a barter economy.
- On **18 June 1948**, the Western Allies introduced the Deutschmark in **West Germany** & in the **western zones in Berlin** on **23 June 1948** respectively in a bid to spur economic recovery. Every 100 old Reichmarks was now worth only 6.5 of the new Deutschmark. Even though savings and bank holdings were reduced, it also **wiped out the accumulated profit of the black marketers**, and completed the **integration of Germany into the West**. Control of the currency now translates into power of Germany at this point.

<sup>23</sup> Screencast of British Pathé, YouTube video, uploaded on Apr 13, 2014

Title reads: "World Affairs - Byrnes outlines new German policy". Stuttgart, Germany.

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- The Soviets declared the Deutschmark to be illegal in the Soviet zone. In response, the Soviets introduced the Ostmark in their zone, and likewise, the US and her allies also declared it as illegal currency in West Germany & West Berlin.
- **Two separate economies** now existed in Germany and Berlin.

#### The significance:

- Stalin **rightly interpreted currency reform** as the harbinger /sign of a **new West German state**. The Soviets were **horrified** at the prospect of a **reconstituted Germany**
- Even more disturbing was the **possibility of German rearmament** which had been forbidden under the Potsdam agreements.
- The specter of an economically strong and rearmed Germany **revived fears** of an invasion from the west.

#### Soviet Response: Berlin Blockade



- Soviet response was to **initiate** a land blockade of Berlin. Stalin realized that **Berlin** was the **most vulnerable point** at which he could apply pressure on the western powers.
- The problem for the three western powers was that **Berlin lay deep within the Soviet occupation zone** which had been **sealed off from the rest of Germany** since 1946. American, French and British forces in West Berlin and West Berliners therefore depended on the West for **vital supplies** which were delivered along road, rail and land **corridors**.
- West Berlin was a **symbol of Western**

**presence** in the **communist bloc** and it was the quintessential representation of freedom and ideals which were **antithetic** to those of the USSR.

- In June 1948, the Soviets **cut off all road, rail and inland waterway routes** to Berlin. They also **stopped supplying the Western sector** with food, electricity, gas and other necessities to **starve the Western Berliners into submission**.
- To Stalin the purpose was clear:
  - To **force** the Western Allies **cancel their plans for a West German state**.
  - Failing that, the Russians could at least **drive the western powers out of Berlin**.
- The blockade of the city of over 2 million people would last 11 months.

<sup>24</sup> Retrieved from: <https://foothill.edu/german-unification-study/historical.html>

### Western Response to the Berlin Blockade: The Berlin Airlift

- The Western Allies had 3 options once the Soviet blockade began:
  1. Send **military conveyes** to attempt to break through the Soviet lines. However this ran the risk of **starting a war** and was thus discarded.
  2. Surrender West Berlin to the Soviets. However, this option was never really considered as it would be detrimental to the prestige of US in the eyes of her allies in Germany and Europe.



3. Surmount the blockade.

This was decided that the Western Allies would supply Berlin by air. It was to be an unprecedented and extraordinarily logistical achievement as it was estimated that **4,500 tons of food** would need to be airlifted into the city **daily** to feed the city's population of over **2.1 million civilians and 6,000 troops**.

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- By the end of winter, the Allies were flying in almost **6,000 tons of supplies 24 hours each day**. On 16 April 1949, a record 1,398 flights came into Berlin (about 1 plane landing every minute) carrying a total of 13,000 tons of supplies and even chocolates.

It was estimated that the Allies had flown in a total of **2.3 million tons of supplies**.



### The significance in the Cold War:

- This was the first **flashpoint** of the Cold War in Europe.
- To the US & Western Allies:

<sup>25</sup> Retrieved from: <https://www.german-way.com/history>

- It was a **major propaganda victory for the Americans** through the airlift, uniting the people and governments of Western Germany and Berlin with the Western Allies. It also was a **testament to the world and Soviet Union** of Western technological superiority. It was the **first demonstration of USA's containment policy**.
- Withdrawal from Berlin would also have **depressed the morale of the West Germans**. It was important to reassure West Germans that **America could act not only as their financial sponsor but as their protector against Soviet military power**. Only then would the **West German populace be willing** to live in a state that belonged to America's emerging informal sphere of influence in Western Europe.
- Soon after the beginning of the Soviet blockade, the Western Allies decided to launch a **'counter-blockade'** on goods going from the Western zones into the East. It has a very **detrimental effect on the Soviet zone**, especially during the harsh winter months as it was **deprived of basic necessities like coal and steel** which were only available in the western zones.
- To **deter Soviets** from hasty action and interfering with the airlift, the **US** moved a number of **B-29 bombers** capable of **carrying atomic weapons** at long range to bases in **Britain**.
- To Stalin:
  - The blockade was part of **Stalin's broader strategy** of conducting a 'war of nerves' with the West. In other words, he was **trying to gain territorial advantage and extract concessions by all means short of war**. In his memoirs, Khrushchev described his country's action as 'prodding the capitalist world with the tip of the bayonet'. Kennan characterized Soviet tactics as a 'kind of squeeze play'.
  - The Soviets **did not intend to spark a war** and took pains to **ensure that none of the aircraft employed in the airlift was brought down as a result of Soviet actions**. No one wanted to fire and take the responsibility of starting hostilities.
  - Stalin would **not risk a war** - one which the Soviet Union would almost certainly lose (the Americans had nuclear advantage at this point) simply to prevent the emergence of a West German state
  - As a result, the Soviets were outmaneuvered by the Eastern allies and **ended up looking like bullies** trying to starve a city. It **reinforced the perception that the Soviet Union was a belligerent nation to be wary of**. Its own Soviet sector was **hurting more**. Its zone came to a standstill economically due to the counter-blockade and strained relations.

- The Soviets, operating outside the framework of American loan credits, and facing the Western alliance, **saw themselves to be increasingly threatened by the West's expanding power in Europe.**
- In **May 1949, Stalin backed down and ended the Blockade.** The Blockade had been defeated by the remarkable logistical feat of the airlift and the **Soviets had been unable to delay the US policy of creating a West German state within the Soviet territory.**
- The **Berlin Blockade** made clear to the Americans that the **Soviet Union was the new enemy.** It **intensified the feeling of military insecurity** in northern, western and southern Europe and there was **now pressure for a security alliance to defend the region, culminating in the establishment of NATO on 4 April 1949.**



▪ It did not help that the **US's nuclear monopoly ended in 1949.** Before the summer was over, American patrol planes detected radiation over the North Pacific. Soviet scientists had successfully tested their atom bomb. **Both superpowers now had nuclear parity.**

▪ The crystallization of a 'them' versus 'us' (bipolar) syndrome had taken place, and this would be seen in the military division of Europe into two armed camps, as well as the division of Germany into two halves aligned to their respective blocs.

▪ The Berlin crisis marked the **first of numerous episodes of brinkmanship** between the two superpowers.

#### e. The Formation of Two Separate Germany (West Germany - FRG & East Germany - GDR)

The Berlin fiasco hastened the formation of two separate Germanys. Shortly after the Berlin crisis, on 23 May 1949, the new Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) came into being.

##### West Germany (FRG):

- In **September 1949**, the first freely elected government was sworn into office. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was created. The first Chancellor was Konrad Adenauer. West Germany would eventually **be independent in 1955** and was **subsequently accepted into NATO.**

- The creation of West Germany was seen as a **victory over Soviet expansionism**. The **economic miracle** that she became also bore witness to the **success of the Western capitalist and political model**.
- US, British and French forces remained on German soil as a **safeguard** against German aggression, as well as **against an invasion of Western Europe by Soviet land forces**.

#### East Germany (GDR):

- A month later, on 7 Oct 1949, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) was formed from its former Soviet occupation zone.
- Stalin's hand had been forced by the US - he had to give East Germans a state of their own in order to retain their support.
- East Germany remained firmly within the Soviet sphere (satellite state); it was a one-party state governed by the reconstituted German Communist Party and large numbers of Soviet troops were stationed there.
- It was not recognized by the West with no diplomatic ties to any Western European states and US.

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<sup>26</sup> A couple showing their children to their grandparents on the other side of the wall, 1961. Retrieved from: <https://walls.overlandexhibits.com/wall-totem/>

The partition of Germany was thus complete and this was followed by the setting up of a **frontier between the two Germanys lined with barbed wire fences, watch towers, mine fields and armed patrols**. It appeared to be an attempt by the East German state to keep people out, but in reality it kept its own people in.

Thus, Germany would remain divided till 1989. Some historians have argued that the **partition of Germany** could be seen as a **microcosm of the division of Europe**. The Cold War meant that neither superpower would allow the whole of Germany to fall within the other's sphere of influence. Both the US and the USSR therefore decided that having half of Germany was better than having none.

#### f. Formation of the Warsaw Pact, May 1949

##### Background - Formation of NATO

In **January 1949**, Truman announced his intention to provide military aid to Western Europe. In the **last days of the Berlin Blockade on 4 April 1949**, the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** was signed in Washington by the US, Canada and 10 West European governments.



- All signatories agreed to come to the aid of each other if attacked.
- A common cause was formally recognized.
- American leadership of the West was duly confirmed.
- Consolidated the evolving American sphere of influence in Europe.

The treaty provided for **collective self-defense** in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Though not explicitly stated, it was **clearly a warning against Soviet expansionism**. The treaty was also designed to encourage political, economic and social cooperation.

##### American Motives:

- Before 1949, the US had a long history of isolationism; unwilling to commit troops abroad on a permanent basis. The US had joined NATO firstly for political and secondly for military reasons.
- US membership was a **precondition for French and British consent** to a West German state.

- The creation of NATO would tie a relatively strong **Britain more closely to a still recovering Western Europe**, **calmed French security fears against the Germans** and offered anxious **West Germans protection against the Soviet Union**.
- NATO membership brought several military advantages to the US:
  - The **US did not have to take on sole responsibility** for the defense of Europe in an unlikely event of Soviet invasion.
  - The US acquired **valuable bases** from which air attacks **against the USSR** could be launched.
  - Developed a **framework for an eventual West German contribution** to European defense.

#### Soviet Counter to the Expansion of NATO: The Warsaw Pact, 1955

Just as the Soviets had responded to the US's Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan with COMEFORM and the Molotov Plan (and COMECON), there was a need to respond to the new threat of NATO.

Having friendly neighbors was important to the Soviets as a means of increasing their ability to resist economic, political and military pressure from the West. However, it must be noted that there was **no immediate response**. The Warsaw Pact was only signed in **1955, six years after the formation of NATO**. Some historians have argued that it could be because Stalin was assured that the Red Army was already well entrenched in the Eastern European states after WW2, and therefore no further action was required to guard Soviet security. From 1948, the Eastern Bloc regimes signed bilateral military treaties with the USSR but there was **no collective security organization** established as yet.

However, **further developments in the Cold War** however ensured that a Soviet response became unavoidable in time to come.

- In **1950**, the outbreak of the **Korean War** made people in Europe fear a similar invasion by the **Communists in East Germany on West Germany**. As a result, during the Paris meetings in 1954, it was decided that **West Germany** was to be **remilitarized and included in NATO and the Western European Union**.
- The **admission and remilitarization of Western Germany into NATO** in May 1955 **greatly alarmed** the Eastern Bloc since NATO was the bedrock of Western defense policy in Europe. The USSR was **concerned at the prospect of being surrounded by anti-Communist alliances**, whilst the other Eastern Bloc regimes had their own concerns; if the Cold War heated up, their countries would probably in the line of fire.
- As a result of those fears, the Warsaw Pact Treaty was signed in May 1955 by the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania.



The Warsaw Pact was:

- A **military alliance** of Eastern and Central European Communist states with the objective of **counter-balancing the perceived threat of NATO** and addressing the concerns over the integration of West Germany into NATO.
  - Member states would consult on issues of mutual interest and to **give all necessary assistance in the event of an attack on any one of them in Europe.**
  - Signatories also appeared to **settle international disputes by peaceful means**, seek disarmament, cooperate in economic and cultural activities and work for a general European treaty of collective security.
  - **Relations among member states** were to be based on **mutual non-interference in internal affairs** and a **respect for national sovereignty**. However, this seemed to have been **violated when Warsaw Pact forces invaded Hungary** to put down the Hungarian Uprising in 1956, and again in 1968 when there was an invasion of Czechoslovakia to put out the Prague Spring movement.
- To Western observers and critics of the USSR, the use of Warsaw Pact forces in that manner reflected Soviet obsession with total control over their satellite state



#### The Significance:

- The **signing of the Warsaw Pact** constituted the **final formalization of the division of Germany and of Europe into mutually exclusive blocs**. East European states came to rely on Soviet forces for military protection and the Warsaw Pact helped to strengthen the USSR's position in the region, just as NATO helped to consolidate American leadership of the other half of Europe.

### **3. OVERALL CONCLUSION**

- It could be argued that **American policies incited Soviet retaliation** in the form of rival policies in the ideological, economic and strategic sphere. If the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, COMINFORM and COMECON reflected **ideological, strategic and economic aspects** of the Cold War, the **Berlin Crisis (and the resultant formation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact)** added a **military** dimension.
- However, it must also be noted that **each side's actions and reactions** were largely **dictated by BOTH their perceptions of each other and key developments of the time**. For example, why did the US develop its containment policy in the first place? Why was the Soviets convinced that their previous policy of peaceful co-existence had to change? In addition, in view of the mutual **misunderstanding and deep seated suspicions**, is it not surprising then that relations worsened over time?
- **Both the USA's containment policy and USSR's Sovietisation policy** effectively resulted in the rise of a **bipolar system, beginning with Europe** which has now been effectively divided into two **political, economic and military spheres**.
- Whilst **containment in Europe was largely successful**, it **hardened the divisions** within Europe. These Cold War confrontations without a direct hot war between the two, **set the tone for the extension of the Cold War outside Europe** thereafter.

### Timeline of Key Events in 1947 to 1956

Date	USA	Soviet Union	External
Mar 1947	<p>Truman Doctrine announced</p> <p>Major turning point in US foreign policy (paradigm shift) to Containment of Communism</p> <p>Imported \$700 million worth of foodstuff into zones in Germany to prevent mass starvation</p>	Muted response from Moscow	<p>Economic crisis in Western Europe</p> <p>Intensified strip of Soviet zone in Germany of resources</p>
Jan 1947	US & Britain agreed to merge two zones into Bizonia	Raised alarm. Sees prospects of revitalized West Germany.	
June 1947	George C. Marshall proposes the Marshall Plan in the same year as the Truman Doctrine, proposing that the US grant financial aid to countries in need to preventing them from succumbing to Communism.	<p>Perceived Marshall Plan as a political weapon to lure Eastern European countries away from Soviet sphere of influence.</p> <p>Intensified Sovietisation of Eastern European states</p>	Poland, Bulgaria, Romania have hard-line Stalinist regimes.
Sept 1947		<p>Zhdanov's 'Two Camp' Speech Equivalent of Truman Doctrine. Indicated that Soviets no longer believed that cooperation with West was possible</p> <p>COMINFORM</p>	<p>Sovietisation / Stalinization of Eastern Europe</p> <p>Fall of Czechoslovakia in communist coup (last non-communist government in Eastern Europe)</p>
Feb 1948 - Jan 1949	Congress approves Marshall Plan after Czech coup	<p>Rejects Marshall Plan, forbids Eastern European states to accept.</p> <p>Began implementation of its own economic plan - The Molotov Plan</p>	
Jun 1948	Introduced DM in Berlin (23 June)	<p>Introduced Ostmark in East Germany</p> <p>Soviet blockade of land routes into West</p>	Deutschmark crisis German currency reforms
24 June 1948	<b>Berlin Blockade started - USSR cuts off all routes connecting West Germany and West Berlin</b>		
25 June	Berlin Airlift started		

Date	USA	Soviet Union	External
Jan 1949	Western counter-blockade of East Germany	COMECON created	Berlin Blockade ongoing
Apr 1949	NATO formed (4 April)		
11 May 1949	<b>Stalin backs down. Berlin Blockade ends</b> <b>Berlin Airlift continued until Sept to build up supplies in West Berlin in case of another blockade</b>		
23 May 1949			Independent West Germany formed (23 May 1949)
Aug 1949	Shocked that US nuclear monopoly has ended	USSR successfully exploded its 1 <sup>st</sup> atomic bomb (29 Aug)	
Oct 1949	Shocked at the fall of China to communism. Public opinion was that US govt did not 'try' enough.	East Germany formed (7 Oct)	Mao Zedong declared creation of Communist China (1 Oct)  Greek civil war ended
Nov 1949	Exploded its 1 <sup>st</sup> hydrogen bomb. Power was estimated to be 500x more powerful than atomic bombs over Japan		
1954-1955	Sept Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed  23 Oct 1954 - West Germany officially independent with rights to remilitarize and rearm itself		April 1955 - Non-aligned movement was started
1955 - 1956	May 5, 1955 - West Germany joins NATO	14 May 1955 - Creation of Warsaw Pact	
1956		1956 - instability in the Soviet satellite states	1956 - Popular uprisings against Communist governments in Hungary and Poland

## ANNEX- IMPORTANT SPEECHES FROM 1946 - 1947

### 1. Soviet Ambassador to the US, Nikolai Novikov telegram to Stalin, 27 Sept 1946.

Describes the advent of a more assertive US foreign policy. Novikov cautions the Soviet leadership that the Truman administration is bent on imposing US political, military and economic domination around the world. This telegram has, since its discovery in the Russian archives, been labelled the Soviet equivalent of US Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan's "Long telegram." -

#### Extract:

Reflecting the imperialistic tendency of American monopoly capital, US foreign policy has been characterized in the postwar period by a desire for **world domination\***. This is the real meaning of repeated statements by President Truman and other representatives of American ruling circles that the US has a right to world leadership [*rukovodstvo*]. All the forces of American diplomacy, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, industry, and science have been placed at the service of this policy. With this objective in mind broad plans for expansion have been developed, to be realized both diplomatically and through the creation of a system of naval and air bases far from the US, an arms race, and the creation of newer and newer weapons.

\* Emphasis here and from this point on indicates where V. M. Molotov underlined the original document.

1a) US foreign policy is being pursued right now *in a situation quite different* from that which existed in the prewar period.

This situation does not completely match the expectations of those reactionary circles who hoped during the Second World War that they would be able to remain apart from the main battles in Europe and Asia for a long time. Their expectation was that the United States of America, if it was not able to completely avoid participation in the war, would enter it only at the last moment when it might be able to influence its outcome without great effort, completely securing its own interests. It was intended thereby that the main rivals of the US would be crushed in this war or to weakened to a great degree and that due to this circumstance the US would *be the most powerful factor* in deciding the main issues of the postwar world. These expectations also were based on the assumption quite widespread in the US during the first period of the war that the Soviet Union, which had been attacked by German fascism in June 1941, would be weakened as a result of the war or even completely destroyed.

c) On the other hand, the expectations of those American circles have not been justified which were based on the Soviet Union being destroyed during the war or coming out of it so weakened that it was forced to bow to the US for economic aid. In this event it could have dictated such conditions which would provide the US with an opportunity to carry out its expansion in Europe and Asia without hindrance from the USSR.

In reality, in spite of all the economic difficulties of the postwar period associated with the

enormous damage caused by the war and the German fascist occupation the Soviet Union continues to remain economically independent from the outside world and is restoring its economy by its own means.....

In addition, *at the present time the USSR has a considerably stronger international position than in the prewar period*. Thanks to the historic victories of Soviet arms the Soviet armed forces are on the territory of Germany and other former enemy countries, a guarantee that these countries will not be used again to attack the USSR. As a result of their reorganization on democratic principles, in such former enemy countries as *Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Romania* regimes have been created which have set themselves the task of strengthening and maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union. In the Slavic countries - Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia - liberated by the Red Army or with its help, democratic regimes have also been created and are consolidating which maintain relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of friendship and mutual aid agreements.

The enormous relative importance of the USSR in international affairs in general and in European affairs in particular, the independence of its foreign policy, and the economic and political aid which it gives neighboring countries, both allies and former enemies, is leading to a growth in the influence of the Soviet Union in these countries and a continuing strengthening in them of democratic trends.

Such a situation in eastern and southeastern Europe cannot fail to be viewed by the American imperialists as an obstacle in the path of an expansionist American foreign policy.

2a) Right now US foreign policy is not being determined by those circles of the Democratic Party which (as when Roosevelt was alive) try to strengthen cooperation between the three great powers which composed the basis of the anti-Hitler coalition during the war. When President Truman, a politically unstable person with certain conservative tendencies, came to power followed by the appointment of Byrnes as Secretary of State it meant *the strengthening of the influence of the most reactionary circles of the ....*

3. The increase in peacetime military potential and the organization of a large number of naval and air bases both in the US and beyond its borders are clear indicators of the US desire to establish world domination.

For the first time in the country's history in the summer of 1946 Congress adopted a law to *form a peacetime army not of volunteers but on the basis of universal military conscription*. The size of the Army, which is to reach 1 million men as of 1 July 1947, has been considerably increased. At the end of the war the size of the US Navy was reduced quite insignificantly compared to wartime. At the present time the US Navy occupies first place in the world, leaving the British Royal Navy far behind, not to mention other powers.

*The colossal growth of expenditures for the Army and Navy*, comprising \$13 billion in the 1946-1947 budget (about 40% of the entire budget of \$36 billion) and is more than 10 times the corresponding expenditures in the 1938 budget, when it did not even reach \$1 billion.

These enormous budget sums are being spent along with the maintenance of a large Army, Navy, and Air Force and also the creation of a vast system of naval and air bases in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. According to available official plans, in the coming years 228 *bases*, support bases, and radio stations are to be built *in the Atlantic Ocean* and 258 *in the Pacific Ocean*. The majority of these bases and support bases are located outside the United States. The following bases exist or are to be built on islands in the Atlantic Ocean: Newfoundland, Iceland, Cuba, Trinidad, Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Azores, and many others; in the Pacific: former Japanese mandated possessions - the Marianas, and the Caroline and Marshall Islands, Bonin Ryukyu, the Philippines, the Galapagos Islands (which belong to Ecuador)....

All these facts clearly show that their armed forces are designed to play a decisive role in the realization of plans to establish American world domination.

4. a) One of the stages in the establishment of American world domination is their *agreement with Britain about a partial division of the world on the basis of mutual concessions*. The main lines of the clandestine agreement between the US and Britain about the division of the world, as the facts indicate, are that they have agreed that the United States include Japan and China in the sphere of its influence in the Far East whereas for its part the US has agreed not to hinder Britain in solving the Indian problem or the strengthening of [British] influence in Thailand and Indonesia.....

However, it ought to be borne in mind that such facts as the visit of the American battleship **Missouri to the Black Sea Straits**, the visit of an American fleet to Greece, and the great interest which American diplomacy shows in the problem of the Straits have a **dual meaning**. On the one hand, it means that the US has decided to consolidate its position in the Mediterranean to support its interests in the countries of the Middle East and that it has chosen the Navy as the tool of this policy. On the other hand, these facts are a military and political demonstration against the Soviet Union. The strengthening of the US position in the Middle East and the creation of the conditions to base the US Navy at one or several places in the Mediterranean (Trieste, Palestine, Greece, Turkey) will therefore mean the appearance of a new threat to the security of the southern regions of the Soviet Union.....

7a) The "*hard-line*" policy with respect to the USSR proclaimed by Byrnes after the rapprochement between reactionary Democrats and the Republicans is right now the main impediment in the way to cooperation between the great powers. It is mainly that in the postwar period the US has no longer been pursuing a policy of strengthening the cooperation of the Big Three (or Four) and, on the contrary, is trying to undermine the unity of these powers. The *goal* which is being set in the process is *to impose* the will of other countries on the Soviet Union. The attempt being made by several powers to undermine or completely *eliminate the veto principle* in the United Nations Security Council with the blessing of the United States is a move in this direction. This would give the United States an opportunity to create narrow groups and blocs among the great powers directed primarily against the Soviet Union and thereby split the united front of the United Nations. The

renunciation of the veto by the great powers would turn the United Nations into an Anglo-American private domain in which the United States would have the leading role.

b) The current policy of the American government with respect to the USSR is also directed at limiting or displacing Soviet influence from neighboring countries. While implementing it the US is trying to take steps at various international conferences or directly in these very same countries which, on the one hand, manifest themselves in the support of reactionary forces in former enemy or allied countries bordering the USSR *with the object of creating obstacles to the processes of democratizing these countries* but, on the other, in *providing positions for the penetration of American capital into their economies*. Such a policy relies on weakening and disbanding [*razlozhit*] the democratic governments in power there which are friendly to the USSR and then replacing them with new governments which would obediently carry out a policy dictated from the US. In this policy the US receives full support from British diplomacy.

c) One of the most important links of overall US policy directed at limiting the international role of the USSR in the postwar world is *policy with regard to Germany*. The US is taking steps in Germany with special persistence to strengthen reactionary forces in order to counteract democratic restructuring, accompanied by completely insufficient steps regarding demilitarization... d) The numerous statements by American government, political, and military leaders about the Soviet Union and its foreign policy in an exceptionally hostile spirit are quite typical of the current attitude of American ruling circles toward the USSR. These statements are echoed in an ever more unbridled tone by the overwhelming majority of the American press. *Discussions about a "third war"*, meaning a war against the Soviet Union, even a direct call for this war with a threat to use the atomic bomb, this is the substance of statements about relations with the Soviet Union by reactionaries at public meetings and in the press. At the present time the advocacy of a war against the Soviet Union is not just the monopoly of the extreme right and the yellow American press which is represented by the Hearst and McCormick newspaper syndicates. This anti-Soviet campaign also includes such more "serious" and "respectable" publications of the conservative press like the New York Times and New York Herald Tribune. The numerous articles by Walter Lippmann in which he almost undisguisedly calls on the US to launch a strike on the Soviet Union in the most vulnerable places of the south and southeast of the USSR are characteristic of such publications of the conservative press.

The primary goal of this anti-Soviet campaign of American "public opinion" consists of exerting political pressure on the Soviet Union and forcing it to make concessions. Another, no less important goal of the campaign is a desire *to create an atmosphere of a fear of war* among the broad masses who are tired of war, which would make it easier for the government to take steps to maintain the great military potential in the US. It is in such an atmosphere that the law was passed in Congress about introducing peacetime military conscription, an enormous military budget was adopted, and plans are being developed to build a far-flung system of naval and air bases.



Retrieved from: <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/>

## 2. Zhdanov's 'Two Camps' Speech, at the founding of COMINFORM (Communist International Organisation), 18 Sept 1947

### Extract :

A new alignment of political forces has arisen. The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct become two major trends in post-war international policy, corresponding to the division of the political forces operating in the international arena into **two major camps**: the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other. The principal driving force of the imperialist camp is the U.S.A. Allied with it are Great Britain and France. ... The imperialist camp is also supported by colony-owning countries, such as Belgium and Holland, by countries with reactionary anti-democratic regimes, such as Turkey and Greece, and by countries politically and economically dependent on the United States, such as Near-Eastern and South American countries and China.

The cardinal purpose of the imperialist camp is to strengthen imperialism, to hatch a new imperialist war, to combat socialism and democracy, and to support reactionary and anti-democratic pro-fascist regimes and movements everywhere.

The anti-imperialist and anti-fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp is based on the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies [of Eastern Europe]. It also includes countries that have broken with imperialism and have firmly set foot on the path of democratic development, such as Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Indonesia and Vietnam are associated with it; it has the sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria. The anti-imperialist camp is backed by the labor and democratic movement and by the fraternal Communist parties in all countries, by the fighters for national liberation in the colonies and dependencies, by all progressive and democratic forces in every country. The purpose of this camp is to resist the threat of new wars and imperialist expansion, to strengthen democracy and to extirpate the vestiges of fascism. ...

The expansionist ambitions of the United States find concrete expression in the "Truman Doctrine" and the "Marshall Plan". ... The main features of the "Truman Doctrine" as applied to Europe are as follows:

1. Creation of American bases in the Eastern Mediterranean with the purpose of establishing American supremacy in that area.
2. Demonstrative support of the reactionary regimes in Greece and Turkey as bastions of American imperialism against the new democracies in the Balkans. ...
3. Constant pressure on the countries of the new democracy, as expressed in false accusation of totalitarianism and expansionist ambitions, in attacks on the foundations of the new democratic regimes, in constant interference in their domestic affairs, in support of all anti-national, anti-democratic elements within these countries, and in the demonstrative breaking off of economic relations with these countries with the idea of creating economic difficulties, retarding their economic development, preventing their industrialization, and so on.

The "Truman Doctrine," which provides for the rendering of American assistance to all reactionary regimes that actively oppose the democratic peoples, bears a frankly aggressive character. ... Progressive public elements in the U.S.A. and other countries vigorously protested against the provocative and frankly imperialistic character of Truman's announcement.

The unfavorable reception with which the "Truman Doctrine" was met accounts for the necessity of the appearance of the "Marshall Plan," which is a more carefully veiled attempt to carry through the same expansionist policy.

The vague and deliberately guarded formulations of the "Marshall Plan" amount in essence to a scheme to create a bloc of states bound by obligations to the United States, and to grant American credits to European countries as a recompense for their renunciation of economic, and then of political, independence. Moreover, the cornerstone of the "Marshall Plan" is the restoration of the industrial areas of Western Germany controlled by the American monopolies.

It is the design of the "Marshall Plan" to render aid in the first place, not to the impoverished victor countries, America's allies in the fight against Germany, but to the German capitalists, with the idea of bringing under American sway the major sources of coal and iron needed by Europe and by Germany, and of making the countries in need of coal and iron dependent on the restored economic might of [West] Germany. ...

The need for mutual consultation and voluntary coordination of the action between individual [European Communist] parties has become particularly urgent at the present juncture. ... Upon the communists devolves the special historical task of leading the resistance to the American plan for the enthrallment of Europe, and of boldly denouncing all supporters of American imperialism in their own countries. ... The communists must be the leaders in enlisting all anti-fascist and freedom-loving elements in the struggle against the new American expansionist plans for the enslavement of Europe.

Retrieved from : <http://educ.jmu.edu/>



### 3. BYRNES' 'SPEECH OF HOPE' ON GERMAN AUTONOMY (1946)

*In September 1946 James F. Byrnes, the United States Secretary of State, addressed an audience in Stuttgart. This became known as the 'Speech of Hope' because it promised Germans an eventual return to self-government:*

"I have come to Germany to learn firsthand the problems involved in the reconstruction of Germany - and to discuss with our representatives the views of the United States Government as to some of the problems confronting us. We in the United States have given considerable time and attention to these problems because upon their proper solution will depend not only the future well-being of Germany, but the future well-being of Europe...

The American people want peace. They have long since ceased to talk of a hard or a soft peace for Germany. This has never been the real issue. What we want is a lasting peace. We will oppose soft measures which invite the breaking of the peace.

In agreeing at Potsdam that Germany should be disarmed and demilitarized, and in proposing that the four major powers should by treaty jointly undertake to see that Germany is kept disarmed and demilitarized for a generation, the United States is not unmindful of the responsibility resting upon it and its major Allies to maintain and enforce peace under the law.

Freedom from militarism will give the German people the opportunity, if they will seize it, to apply their great energies and abilities to the works of peace. It will give them the opportunity to show themselves worthy of the respect and friendship of peace-loving nations - and, in time, to take an honourable place among members of the United Nations.

It is not in the interest of the German people or in the interest of world peace that Germany should become a pawn or a partner in a military struggle for power between the East and the West...

We favour the economic unification of Germany. If complete unification cannot be secured, we shall do everything in our power to secure the maximum possible unification...

It is the view of the American Government that the German people throughout Germany, under proper safeguards, should now be given the primary responsibility for the running of their own affairs.

More than a year has passed since hostilities ceased. The millions of German people should not be forced to live in doubt as to their fate. It is the view of the American government that the Allies should, without delay, make clear to the German people the essential terms of the peace settlement which they expect the German people to accept and observe. It is our view that the German people should now be permitted and helped to make the necessary preparations for setting up a democratic German government which can accept and observe these terms.

From now on thoughtful people of the world will judge Allied action in Germany not by Allied promises but by Allied performances. The American government has supported and will continue to support the necessary measures to de-Nazify and demilitarize Germany, but it does not follow that large armies of foreign soldiers or alien bureaucrats, however well motivated and disciplined, are in the long run the most reliable guardians of another country's democracy.

All that the Allied governments can and should do is to lay down the rules under which German democracy can govern itself. The Allied occupation forces should be limited to the number sufficient to see that these rules are obeyed...

The United States cannot relieve Germany from the hardships inflicted upon her by the war her leaders started. But the United States has no desire to increase those hardships or to deny the German people an opportunity to work their way out of those hardships so long as they respect human freedom and cling to the paths of peace.

The American people want to return the government of Germany to the German people. The American people want to help the German people to win their way back to an honourable place among the free and peace-loving nations of the world.”

## Lecture 1.5: Historiography of the origins of the Cold War: Schools of Thought

SCHOOL OF THOUGHT	LEADING PROPONENTS	CONTEXT	IN A NUTSHELL
Traditional / Orthodox	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>George Kennan</li> <li>Herbert Feis</li> <li>William McNeill</li> <li>Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.</li> </ul>	<p>1940s to 1960s</p> <p><b>Political Context:</b> Very much a product of the early Cold War climate.</p> <p>Reflected particularly in the US 'Red Scare' in the 1950s.</p> <p>Influenced by George Kennan and Winston Churchill</p>	<p><u>Pro-American Outlook</u></p> <p>USSR was primarily responsible for the Cold War due to:</p> <p>(1) Totalitarian nature of the Communist system, resulting in SU's expansionist ambitions to spread Communism as far as possible</p> <p>(2) SU failure to adhere to wartime agreements</p> <p>(3) Aggressiveness in SU actions</p> <p>- Soviet policy fundamentally hostile; would only cooperate with the West where necessary.</p> <p>In US opinion, there was a global communist threat to independent but internally weak nations, including Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia, in the aftermath of the war.</p> <p>➔ Thus, US security policies were seen as reasonable and necessary, defending the world from the rogue Russians.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The US only turned aggressive in response to Soviet expansionism.</li> <li>The US had initially wanted international cooperation and negotiation.</li> <li>Because US leaders had no clear vision of the postwar world, they were prepared to make political</li> </ul>

			<p>concessions in return for short-term military gains.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Asserted that Roosevelt had misjudged Soviet policies and attitude, and thus thought that it was legitimate for the USSR to ask for Eastern Europe.</li> </ul>
<b>SCHOOL OF THOUGHT</b>	<b>LEADING PROPONENTS</b>	<b>CONTEXT</b>	<b>IN A NUTSHELL</b>
<b>Revisionist</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Henry Wallace</li> <li>▪ William Appleman Williams</li> <li>▪ Gabriel Kolko</li> <li>▪ Lloyd C. Gardner</li> <li>▪ Gar Alperovitz</li> <li>▪ Barton Bernstein</li> <li>▪ Thomas G. Paterson</li> </ul>	<p>1960s to 1970s</p> <p><b>Political Context:</b> Mirrored the doubts that sprung from the Vietnam War.</p> <p>US public opinion turned against the US administration because of the high casualty rates of the long-drawn out conflict, that was deemed as unnecessary.</p> <p>Since the US was wrong about the Vietnam War, could it also have been wrong about the Cold War?</p>	<p><u><b>Defence of USSR; USA to be blamed Too</b></u></p> <p><b>USA is as largely responsible as the USSR for the cause of the Cold War.</b> Mirror image of the traditionalists</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Possible to defend and explain USSR's actions rather than condemn them, under the argument that USSR was not acting aggressively but <b>defensively</b> out of <b>concerns for its security</b>. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ After WWII, the USSR was economically and militarily destroyed; priority after the war economic reconstruction and security of borders; had neither resources nor time for communist expansion.</li> <li>○ The US was inflexible in its vision of the postwar world and therefore pressure placed on the Soviets only served to make them more determined to protect themselves from American control or intimidation.</li> <li>○ Soviet leadership could not tolerate threats to its security</li> </ul> </li> </ul>



			<p>interest in Eastern Europe, especially since American trade and investment was frequently accompanied by militant anti-communism.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ USA's motivations were not as altruistic -</li> <li>• Desire to create friendly capitalist states all around the world, i.e. for foreign markets and access to raw materials (whereas the USSR was seen as being concerned with security interests). Marshall Plan viewed as veiled form of economic imperialism, and meant to craft spheres of influence for herself.</li> <li>• Focus on 'open door' policy became the ideological goal of an open and global capitalist system which predicated the future prosperity of the US.</li> <li>• <i>Pax Americana</i>: US power to ensure global peace.</li> </ul>
Post-Revisionist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ John Lewis Gaddis</li> <li>▪ Geir Lundestad</li> <li>▪ Melvyn Leffler</li> <li>▪ Wilfred Loth</li> <li>▪ Fred Holliday</li> </ul>	<p>1970s to 1980s</p> <p><b>Political Context:</b></p> <p>Could be argued that it reflected the <b>détente policies</b> of those years.</p> <p>With détente, blame had to be attributed a little more evenly than had been done by</p>	<p><u><b>Bridging the gap and synthesizing the first 2 views</b></u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Equal blame accorded to both superpowers (mutual accountability) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Cold War as an <u>interactive affair</u>.</li> <li>- No one was to blame; it was a result of <u>miscommunication, misjudgment and missed opportunities</u>.</li> <li>- Mainly because both sides lacked the experience in dealing with each other.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

		<p>the earlier schools of thought.</p> <p>Benefit of hindsight</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <u>Avoids a mono-causal explanation</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The <u>relative importance</u> of the different factors varied from one historian to another</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ - While most of the post-revisionist scholars felt that one factor is most responsible for the Cold War, they <u>did not absolutely absolve the other factors</u> (Focuses on 'what' rather than 'who' was responsible)</li> </ul> <p>These factors included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Conflicting ideological systems</li> <li>○ Power politics</li> <li>○ Different war experiences and postwar conditions led to different needs</li> <li>○ Different political cultures:</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ USSR: Decisions told to the people after decided by the Politburo</li> <li>▪ USA: Congress split into the Republicans and the Democrats; Truman had to secure votes</li> <li>○ Different personalities of the leaders</li> <li>○ Irrational thinking and fear of the other</li> </ul>
Post-1991 Interpretation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Vladislav Zubok</li> <li>▪ Constantine Pleshakov</li> <li>▪ John Lewis Gaddis</li> </ul>	<p>Late 1980s to 1990s</p> <p>Collapse of the USSR; opening up of Soviet archives</p> <p>Effect of Gorbachev's <i>glasnost</i></p>	<p><u>Either side not entirely responsible for onset of conflict, but Soviets, in particular, Stalin, more accountable for the ensuing problems</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Stalin was in a much better position to compromise than his Western counterparts, given his much broader power within his own regime than Truman, who was often undermined by vociferous political opposition at home.</li> </ul>

		<p><b>Political Context:</b></p> <p>New findings on the Cold War - the collapse of the USSR and greater access to the Soviet archives.</p> <p>Clearer understanding of Soviet foreign policy.</p> <p>Provides a more balanced history of the Cold War (from a Soviet perspective since all three schools prior centred on Western views)</p> <p>New take on Stalin's role in the Cold War - a fanatic belief in Communism, lots of personal faults and mistakes, but - above all - a genuine desire to avoid confrontation with the USA.</p>	<p>Gaddis wrote in his 1997 book, <i>We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History</i>:</p> <p><i>Geography, demography, and tradition contributed to this outcome but did not determine it. It took men, responding unpredictably to circumstances, to forge the chain of causation; and it took [Stalin] in particular, responding predictably to his own authoritarian, paranoid, and narcissistic predisposition, to lock it into place.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Increasing focus on clash of ideologies</li> <li>- American interests in national self-determination, postwar order and stability clashed with the security needs and ideological beliefs of the Soviet Union.</li> <li>- The US could not stand by and conduct normal relations with a state that prevented free and open elections in other countries as well as access to the world's markets. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ For the US, the struggle was to determine the ideological fate of a group of nations.</li> <li>○ The Soviets refused to acquiesce and allow hostile capitalist states to encircle her and threaten her security.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
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**Check point questions for review:**

- What are the flaws in each historical interpretation?

- Which historical interpretation is the most convincing in explaining the outbreak of the Cold War?