


Candidate Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Class    Adm    No

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## 2018 Preliminary Exams Pre-university 3

### H2 HISTORY

The Making of Independent Southeast Asia

9752/02

20<sup>th</sup> September 2018

3 hours

Additional Materials:    Answer Paper

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### READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name and class on all the work you hand in.  
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.  
You may use a soft pencil for any diagrams or graphs.  
Do not use paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Begin each question on a fresh sheet of writing paper.

#### Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

#### Section B

Answer **TWO** questions.

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question.

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This question paper consists of 5 printed pages.

[Turn over

## Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

1. Read the sources, and then answer the question which follows.

When answering **Question 1** candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the Sources both individually and as a group.

### ASEAN and the Cambodian Crisis

#### Source A

The United States sees ASEAN's unity and decisiveness as an example to other free people. The ASEAN collective voice of responsible international behaviour has been amplified throughout the world, and I am here to listen to you. Support for and cooperation with ASEAN is a linchpin of American Pacific policy. Nowhere has your leadership been more inspiring than in moulding the world's response to the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, you recognised the threat and acted quickly. ASEAN's efforts are consistent with American desires to bring peaceful resolution to the tragic cycle of events that has plagued the Cambodian people. We continue to believe in a negotiated settlement with ASEAN is in Vietnam's interest and in the best interest of everyone in the region.

*Address by US President Ronald Reagan at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 1986.*

#### Source B

Then came ASEAN's first big test. Even when ASEAN submitted a resolution to the United Nations calling on the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia, the Vietnamese really thought that ASEAN would make a lot of noise and then we would accept the situation. However, ASEAN worked together and despite early bias in favour of Vietnam and the Russians in the United Nations, we were able to get majority support for our resolution against a Vietnam which for years had been an object of adulation in the Third World. Since 1979, the fact that ASEAN is able to mobilise more support in the United Nations against the combined lobbying of Vietnam and its communist allies is proof that ASEAN is not ineffectual. It is an ASEAN effort. We asked the Americans and our Western friends not to take the lead in this matter but to follow us.

*Memoirs of Mr. S. Rajaratnam, Singapore's former Foreign Minister, published in 1987.*

### **Source C**

Last summer's international conference on Cambodia began on a note of anxious hope, yet ended without breaking the 11-year-old stalemate in Indochina. As long as Hun Sen was viewed as an illegitimate of an occupying army, it was difficult for ASEAN to make any significant accommodation with Phnom Penh and Hanoi for fear of legitimising a precedent that allows neighbour states to invade each other at will. Indonesia, as ASEAN's official spokesman had been advocating more openness and flexibility many years. Along with Malaysia, Indonesia is profoundly suspicious of China's long-term ambitions in Southeast Asia. Both see that a strong Vietnam can be either a vital ally against China or a serious danger if driven into China's arms. In 1987 Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach and Indonesia's then-Foreign Minister Mochtar posed a formula to negotiate a Cambodia settlement; only to see it torpedoed by Thailand and Singapore. Within a year, however, Thailand's position had shifted, opening the way for the held summit in Jakarta in July 1988.

*Academic article by an international policy journal, 1989.*

### **Source D**

The second Jakarta Informal Meeting was held from 19-21 February, 1989, preceded by the second meeting of the Working Group of the JIM which convened from 16-18 February 1989. Both meetings were attended by Delegations from Brunei Darussalam, the four parties of Kampuchea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the Republic of Indonesia.

The proceedings throughout the Meeting were characterized by a frank and constructive atmosphere, with all sides showing seriousness of purpose and effort to identify areas of common ground and to promote convergences of view on the issues discussed. All participants agreed to build upon the progress already achieved at the first Jakarta Informal Meeting in terms of agreed understandings and approaches towards solution and, hence, to direct their further efforts towards addressing and resolving those substantive issues and aspects on which there were still divergences of view among them.

*Statement by the Chairman of the Jakarta Informal Meeting, February 1989.*

### **Source E**

It is the Soviet life-line to Hanoi that encourages Hanoi to play the political maverick in Southeast Asia: it is the same life-line that allows an impoverished and war-wrecked nation like Vietnam to undertake expensive military adventures like the invasion of Kampuchea. Only last year, a seemingly concerned Moscow was mouthing remarks about settling the Kampuchean issue peacefully. Last week, that same country was threatening ASEAN with subversion. So blatant a threat comes as no surprise to countries such as Malaysia. With Soviet ambitions once more laid bare for all to see, Malaysia and her ASEAN neighbours should be ever-vigilant

against the Soviets, despite all Moscow's blandishments. We shall never knuckle down to the threats of either the Soviets or their proxy.

*Excerpt from a Malaysian newspaper, The Star, 1986.*

### **Source F**

Both China and the Soviet Union have given assurances that they are willing to help resolve the war in Cambodia, the Indonesian Foreign Minister said today. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, the architect of the Vietnamese-Cambodian talks that begin Monday, said in an interview that both Moscow and Beijing have expressed support for his peace efforts.

"The Chinese position has changed," said Mr. Alatas. "There is greater flexibility on some of the issues." As for Moscow, he said, "We also welcome strong signals from the Soviet Union that they, too, are interested in bringing about a peaceful solution."

"We haven't set our hopes very high, but I'm not a pessimist," Mr. Alatas. "We hope that after one day, people don't say it's no use."

*A New York Times article, 1988.*

Now answer the following questions:

- a) Compare and contrast the evidences in Sources A and B on ASEAN's international standing during the Cambodian Crisis.

[10 marks]

- b) How far do Sources A to F support the view that ASEAN was effective in managing the Cambodian Crisis?

[30 marks]

## Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

### EITHER

2. How important was the role of leaders in shaping the political structures of independent Southeast Asia?

[30 marks]

### OR

3. Assess the significance of culture and language in the fostering of national identity in post-independent Southeast Asia.

[30 marks]

### AND EITHER

4. How far do you agree that the role of the government was necessary and effective in the economic development of independent Southeast Asia?

[30 marks]

### OR

5. To what extent do you agree that Southeast Asian states had failed to respond effectively to the Asian Financial Crisis?

[30 marks]

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### Copyright Acknowledgements

Question 1 Source A	© Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986, 1 Jan 1988.
Question 1 Source B	© S. Rajaratnam: the prophetic and the political, S. Rajaratnam, Heng Chee Chan, Obaid Ul Haq, ISEAS, 1 Feb 2007.
Question 1 Source C	© Ending the Cambodian Stalemate, John McAuliff and Mary Byrne McDonnell World Policy Journal Vol. 7, No. 1. 1989.
Question 1 Source D	© Consensus Statement of the Chairman of the Jakarta Informal Meeting Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 11, No. 1, June 1989.
Question 1 Source E	© Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 8, Singapore University Press, 1986.
Question 1 Source F	© "On Eve of Cambodia Talks, Indonesia is Upbeat, The New York Times, July 24, 1988, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/24/world/on-eve-of-cambodia-talks-indonesian-is-upbeat.html">https://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/24/world/on-eve-of-cambodia-talks-indonesian-is-upbeat.html</a> , accessed, 10 <sup>th</sup> August 2018.