



CATHOLIC JUNIOR COLLEGE

JC2 Preliminary Examinations

Higher 1

HISTORY

8838/01

Paper 1 The Cold War and the Modern World (1945-1991)

28 August 2024
3 hours

No Additional Materials are required.

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

An answer booklet will be provided with this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer **two** questions.

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

This document consists of **5** printed pages and **1** blank page.

Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE KOREAN WAR

- 1 Read the sources and answer the questions that follow.

Source A

It is clear that the United States of America is presently distracted from Europe in the Far East. Does it not give us an advantage in the global balance of power? Let us suppose that the American government continues to be tied down in the Far East and also pulls China into the struggle for the freedom of Korea and its own independence. What might come of this?

First, America, just like any other country, cannot cope with China, a country with such large armed forces at the ready. It follows that America would overextend itself in this struggle. Second, having overextended itself in this matter, America would be incapable of a third world war in the near future. Therefore, a third world war would be postponed for an indeterminate period, which would provide the time necessary to strengthen socialism in Europe, not to mention that the struggle between America and China would revolutionize the entire Far East. Does all this not give us an advantage from the perspective of the global balance of power? It unquestionably does.

From a letter by Stalin to Klement Gottwald, leader of Czechoslovakia, 27 August 1950.

Source B

Of course, I consider also that the USA, despite its unreadiness for a big war, could still be drawn into a big war out of considerations of prestige, which, in turn, would drag China into the war, and along with this draw into the war the USSR, which is bound with China by the Mutual Assistance Pact.

Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not, because together we will be stronger than the USA and England, while the other European capitalist states (with the exception of Germany which is unable to provide any assistance to the United States now) do not present serious military forces. If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the USA and when the USA and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the continent in a form of the entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee.

From a letter by Stalin to Kim Il-Sung, October 1950.

Source C

Comrade Stalin confirmed to Kim Il Sung that the international environment has sufficiently changed to permit a more active stance on the unification of Korea. Internationally, the Chinese Communist Party's victory over the Kuomintang has improved the environment for actions in Korea. China is no longer busy with internal fighting and can devote its attention and energy to the assistance of Korea.

Now that China has signed a treaty of alliance with the USSR, Americans will be even more hesitant to challenge the Communists in Asia. According to information coming from the United States, it is really so. The prevailing mood is not to interfere. Such a mood is reinforced by the fact that the USSR now has the atomic bomb and that our positions are solidified in Pyongyang.

From a Soviet Communist Party report on Kim Il-Sung's visit to the USSR, April 1950.

Source D



Cartoon titled "I'll Make the Down Payment For You", published in an American newspaper, 31 January 1951.

Source E

The defensive perimeter runs from Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defence requirements.

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.

Should such an attack occur, one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from, the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations, which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression.

From a speech by US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, 12 January 1950.

Now answer the following questions:

- (a)** Compare and contrast the evidence in Sources A and B about Stalin's views on China's role in the conflict in Korea. [10]
- (b)** How far do Sources A-E support the assertion that the primary motivation behind Soviet support for North Korea's invasion of South Korea was to entangle the US in a war in Asia? [30]

Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

EITHER

- 2 How far did the issue of Taiwan affect the development of Sino-American relations from 1950 to 1991? [30]

OR

- 3 “Japan had little influence over the development of her relations with the US during the Cold War.” Discuss, with reference to the period 1952-1991. [30]

AND EITHER

- 4 “ASEAN was highly responsive to the challenges posed by the Cold War in Southeast Asia.” Discuss. [30]

OR

- 5 How far was Singapore’s foreign policy during the Cold War anti-Communist in nature? [30]

Acknowledgements for Sources:

Source A - <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/letter-filipov-stalin-soviet-ambassador-prague-conveying-message-cssr-leader-klement>

Source B - <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/letter-feng-xi-stalin-kim-il-sung-shtytkov>

Source C - <http://www.commonprogram.science/documents/25-4-1950.pdf>

Source D - <https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/herblock-gallery/communism.html#obj002>

Source E - <https://web.viu.ca/davies/H102/Acheson.speech1950.htm>

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Mark and Answer Schemes

Section A: Source-based Case Study

1a. Compare and contrast the evidence in Sources A and B about Stalin's views on China's role in the conflict in Korea. [10]

Success Criteria:

#1	Identify and explain a similarity in views between two sources, on a common basis of comparison and supported by source content.
#2	Provide reason for similarity, using Sourcing and/or Contextualisation.
#3	Identify and explain a difference in views between two sources, on a common basis of comparison and supported by source content.
#4	Provide reason for difference, using Sourcing and/or Contextualisation.

A Level Rubrics:

Level	Level Description	Marks
0	No evidence submitted or answer does not address the question.	0
1	The answer will describe the content of each source and is likely to be characterised by paraphrasing or quotation. Very simple comparisons may be made but these will not be developed (e.g., one source is from a speech and the other is from a letter). Answers that are simply based on contextual knowledge, with no source use, should be credited at this level. Towards the upper end of the level, there may be some attempt to explain the similarities and/or differences between the sources, but any explanation will be confused or partial.	1-3
2	The answer will use both sources. There will be clear explanation on the similarities and differences between the sources and this will be supported with source details. Towards the upper end of the level, the answer will use details from each source to explain the similarities and differences between the sources. Answers which explain either similarities or differences but provide critical insight into the reasons for the similarities or differences may be found in this level. Towards the lower end of the level, the answer may explain either similarities or differences between the sources. Alternatively, the answer could treat the sources separately with most or all of the comparison implicit.	4-7
3	The answer will make effective use of both sources. There will be clear explanation on the similarities and differences between the sources and this will be supported with source details. Insight into the reasons for their similarities and/or differences will be provided. Towards the upper end of the level, the answer will demonstrate developed evaluation of both sources, providing critical insight into the reasons for their similarities and differences. Towards the lower end of the level, the insight into the reasons for similarities and differences may be uneven. Alternatively, the answer may provide critical insight into the reasons for only either the similarities or differences.	8-10

Suggested Answer

Success Criteria	Answer
#1	Sources A and B are similar in showing that Stalin saw China's role in the conflict in Korea as highly critical to Soviet strategy . Stalin, in Source A, points out that China, a "country with such large armed forces at the ready" would pose major difficulties for the US. Similarly, Stalin, in Source B, points out that with China's involvement in the conflict in Korea, it would strengthen the Communist forces against the US, as can be seen in Stalin's claim that "together we will be stronger than the USA and England."

Success Criteria	Answer
#2	Sources A and B share similar views about the importance of China to the USSR and North Korea in the conflict in Korea due to their shared historical context . In October 1949, China became a Communist country, with the victory of the CCP in the Chinese Civil War. Following that, in February 1950, China signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the USSR, which contained a mutual assistance condition, should they be attacked by the US. Stalin's decision to approve Kim's invasion of South Korea was significantly shaped by Mao's willingness to assist Kim in this war. Thus, this explains why Stalin saw China as a critical piece of his strategy in Korea.
#3	However, Sources A and B differ in showing how Stalin intended to use China to shape the conflict in Korea . Stalin, in Source A, intends China to play the role of entangling the US in a long drawn-out war in Korea, thereby distracting the US from its interests in Europe. This can be seen where Stalin claims that "America would overextend itself in this struggle," and "be incapable of a third world war in the near future," giving time for the USSR to "strengthen socialism in Europe." In contrast, Stalin, in Source B, suggests a different role for China, which was to help North Korea win a quick war to reunify Korea, before "Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the USA."
#4	Sources A and B have different views on China's specific roles in the conflict in Korea because of their differing intended outcomes and audiences . Stalin, in Source A, was writing to Gottwald, the Czechoslovakian communist leader, in August 1950, after Truman had authorised US intervention to assist South Korea, riding on UNSC Resolutions 83 and 84, which were passed without Soviet vetoes due to Soviet boycott of the UN. Concurrently, Truman ordered the rearmament of NATO in Europe, out of fear of further Soviet aggression, which would threaten the security of the Eastern European bloc. These developments might have made Stalin's decision to support North Korea's invasion appear rather foolhardy, and hence, led to Stalin seeking to justify his decision to Gottwald as part of an apparent grand strategy to entangle the US in Asia. However, Stalin, in Source B, was writing to Kim in October 1950, after the US had conducted roll-back and beaten North Korean forces into retreat. With Chinese intervention poised to take place, Stalin was likely intending to reassure Kim that the USSR would ensure its ally achieve victory in this war, which explains the way he portrayed the role of China in the war.

1b. How far do Sources A-E support the assertion that the primary motivation behind Soviet support for North Korea's invasion of South Korea was to entangle the US in a war in Asia? [30]

Success Criteria:

#1	Unpack the given assertion. Identify possible arguments for and against it.
#2	Group the sources according to their claims with respect to the given assertion.
#3	Interpret and analyse the sources with respect to the given assertion.
#4	Evaluate the reliability/usefulness of each set of sources as evidence vis-a-vis the given assertion.
#5	Conclude which set of sources is preferred and how far the assertion can be supported.

A-Level Rubrics:

Level	Level Description	Marks
0	No evidence submitted or answer does not address the question.	0
1	The answer will make limited use of the sources. The sources may be paraphrased or described. Answers which are simply based on contextual knowledge with no source use should be credited at this level. Towards the upper end of the level, some relevant information from the sources may be extracted at face value to support and/or challenge the hypothesis, but the answer may be undeveloped.	1-6
2	The answer will use relevant information from sources at face value to support and/or challenge the hypothesis. Sources may be used in isolation. The answer may demonstrate some awareness of provenance of the sources, but evaluation of the sources is unlikely.	7-12

Level	Level Description	Marks
	Towards the upper end of the level, the answer will be balanced, using most of the sources. There may be some attempt at evaluation that is unsuccessful. Towards the lower end of the level, the answer may be one-sided or use a limited range of sources.	
3	<p>The answer will begin to treat sources as a set although they may still be taken at face value. It will demonstrate some understanding of the question. Some sources may be cross-referenced to support and/or challenge the hypothesis. There will be an attempt to evaluate sources through references to the source content and/or provenance, but the sources will not be placed in context.</p> <p>Towards the upper end of the level, the answer will make a case to support and challenge the statement in question, developing its points through accurate references to the source content and/or provenance. Such an answer is likely to use all of the sources and may make cross-references to support its ideas. Towards the lower end of the level, some sources may be neglected or used in a way which is not valid. The support/challenge element of the responses may also be uneven.</p>	13-18
4	<p>The answer will treat sources as a set and make good use of the sources. It will demonstrate a clear understanding of the question. Sources may be cross-referenced to support and/or challenge the hypothesis. There will be an attempt to evaluate the sources in context but there will be gaps, unevenness, and a lack of balance.</p> <p>Towards the upper end of the level, the answer may begin to formulate a judgement in relation to the question although this is likely to be partial and incomplete. Towards the lower end of the level, the answer will contain some evaluation of the source material but is likely to be uneven or lacking in balance.</p>	19-24
5	<p>The answer will treat sources as a set and make very good use of the sources. It will demonstrate a good understanding of the question. Sources may be cross-referenced to support and/or challenge the hypothesis. The approach will show critical awareness and the sources will be evaluated in context in order to make a judgement and reach a conclusion on how far the sources can be said to support the premise of the question.</p> <p>Towards the upper end of the level, the answer will present a sustained analytical argument and reach a supported conclusion. Towards the lower end of the level the answer will demonstrate many of these features but may be less even or convincing in their approach.</p>	25-30

Suggested Answer

Success Criteria	Answer
#1	The assertion “the primary motivation behind Soviet support for North Korea’s invasion of South Korea was to entangle the US in a war in Asia” suggests that Stalin approved Kim’s invasion plan fundamentally because he planned to use US intervention in Korea to draw China into the war, giving him the opportunity to entangle the US in a protracted war in Asia. <u>Sources that support this view will suggest that this was Stalin’s grand strategy to tie the US down in Asia, to enhance the USSR’s geopolitical and security interests.</u> <i>However, sources that challenge the view will suggest that this was not Stalin’s primary motivation, given that he had likely not taken the possibility of US intervention seriously.</i>
#2, #3	Sources A and D support the assertion by suggesting that Stalin had a grand strategy to use the war in Korea to pull the US into a major protracted war with China, thereby distracting the US from Europe and weakening its capacity to fight the Cold War globally. Stalin, in Source A , claims that he had predicted US intervention in Korea, and the war was designed to distract the US from its interests in Europe. This can be seen where Stalin claims that “America would overextend itself in this struggle,” and “be incapable of a third world war in the near future,” giving time for the USSR to “strengthen socialism in Europe.” This claim is reinforced by Source D , where the cartoon depicts Stalin smirking behind a dragon that represents China, which

Success Criteria	Answer
	was going to unleash “full-scale war” on a scared Uncle Sam, implying that Stalin’s strategy was to use the war in Korea to draw the US into a long war with China, which the US did not desire.
#4	<p>Sources A and D do not provide convincing evidence to support the assertion. Source A was written in August 1950, after Truman had authorised US intervention to assist South Korea, riding on UNSC Resolutions 83 and 84, which were passed without Soviet vetoes due to Soviet boycott of the UN. Concurrently, Truman ordered the rearmament of NATO in Europe, out of fear of further Soviet aggression, which would threaten the security of the Eastern European bloc. These developments might have made Stalin’s decision to support North Korea’s invasion appear rather foolhardy, and in this context, led to Stalin seeking to justify his decision to Gottwald as part of an apparent grand strategy to entangle the US in Asia. Moreover, when cross-referred to Source C, Stalin approved North Korea’s invasion plan on the belief that with China turning Communist and signing a treaty of alliance with the USSR, the “Americans will be...hesitant to challenge the Communists in Asia.”. Thus, Source A does not provide reliable evidence to support the assertion. Source D is similarly problematic in its portrayal of the war. The cartoon was drawn in January 1951, after Seoul had changed hands for the third time, this time being re-taken by Communist forces, and the war had entered into a stalemate. In this context, the cartoon was meant as a commentary of the protracted war that had developed in Korea, perhaps seeking to sway American citizens against further entanglement in the war that was likely to be unwinnable. The cartoon also mirrors the prevalent perception at the time that the war was directed by Stalin’s attempt to spread Communism with China acting as the USSR’s proxy, and the fear that the US’ commitment to the KMT regime in Taiwan, which sought to reconquer mainland China, could drag the US into a bigger war with China. This perspective is similarly contradicted by Source A. It would be a stretch to argue that Stalin had a grand strategy to entangle the US in a protracted war with China. Thus, as a set of sources, Sources A and D are not too convincing in supporting the assertion.</p>
#2, #3	<p>In contrast, Sources C, E and B provide evidence to challenge the assertion by showing that Stalin had no such grand strategy of entangling the US in Korea and had likely not taken the possibility of US intervention seriously. Stalin, in Source C, explained his rationale for supporting Kim’s invasion plan as based on his belief that the US would not intervene in such a war. He reasoned that since “China has signed a treaty of alliance with the USSR, Americans will be even more hesitant to challenge the Communists in Asia.” This belief was bolstered by the USSR having acquired the atomic bomb and Soviet spy reports suggesting that the US government would not intervene. Stalin’s decision to support North Korea was also shaped by Acheson’s defence perimeter speech, in Source E, which suggests the US had left South Korea out of its defence perimeter, suggesting that the US would not intervene in a war in Korea. Furthermore, Stalin, in Source B, suggests that while he might have anticipated US intervention, he was of the belief that the Communist forces would be more than capable of defeating the US, as can be seen in Stalin’s claim that they should not fear the US, because “together we will be stronger than the USA and England” and Japan was yet to recover and rearm. There was no indication that he intended for the war to entangle the US in Asia as his primary goal.</p>
#4	<p>The evidence in Sources C, E and B is more convincing compared to that in Sources A and D. Source C was from a report on Kim’s visit to Moscow in April 1950. Prior to the visit, as early as March 1949, Kim had made earlier requests to Stalin to approve his invasion plan and was rejected by Stalin. Stalin only approved the invasion plan in reaction to changes in the geopolitical environment in Asia, such as China turning Communist in October 1949, and signing an alliance treaty with the USSR in February 1950. This gave Stalin more confidence that a war could be winnable with China’s involvement. In addition, the defence perimeter speech, in Source E, delivered in January 1950, convinced Stalin that the US would not intervene in a war in Korea. Thus, Sources C and E offer reliable evidence that Stalin did not plan for the entanglement of the US in Asia, given that his war decision hinged on the prediction that the US would not intervene. Source B provides useful evidence to further suggest that Stalin was largely reactive to US intervention. By October 1950, the US had conducted roll-back and beaten North Korean forces into retreat to the Yalu River, with North Korea poised to fall to US-led forces. This reversal was unanticipated given that in Source C, Stalin was confident of a quick victory. In this context, with</p>

Success Criteria	Answer
	Chinese intervention poised to take place, the letter by Stalin was likely intending to reassure Kim that despite the strategic error, the USSR would still ensure its ally achieve victory in this war, which explains the way he tried to justify in retrospect that he had anticipated US intervention and had put in place safeguards i.e., Chinese involvement against it. Thus, as a set of sources, Sources C, E and B provide more convincing evidence to challenge the assertion.
#5	In conclusion, <u>the evidence in Sources A and D is not too convincing to support the assertion. Source A's claim that Stalin had a grand strategy to entangle the US in Asia was largely a retrospective justification of the risky decision he took to support North Korea's invasion. Source D's portrayal of Stalin's role in engineering a protracted war between the US and China is also inaccurate upon evaluation.</u> <i>In contrast, Sources C, E and B provide more convincing evidence to challenge the assertion. Sources C and E offer reliable evidence that Stalin did not plan for the entanglement of the US in Asia, given that his war decision hinged on the prediction that the US would not intervene. Source D further suggests that Stalin had made a strategic error.</i> Thus, on balance, the sources that challenge the assertion are preferred and the assertion cannot be supported.

Section B: Essays

Success Criteria

Introduction	
#1a	I provided relevant background on the topic in the question (e.g., scope of discussion, definition of difficult terms).
#1b	I stated the criteria I will be using to develop my argument.
#1c	I mapped out the structure of how I will develop my argument to lead to my thesis statement.
#1d	I provided a thesis statement in response to the question.

Paragraph Development	
#2a	I provided a topic sentence that presents the main idea/point of the paragraph in relation to the question and thesis statement.
#2b	I elaborated on the topic sentence to provide a bridge to the evidence.
#2c	I analysed and evaluated historical evidence to substantiate my main idea/point.
#2d	I provided a linking statement to link the discussion back to the thesis statement and to transit to the next paragraph.

Conclusion	
#3a	I brought the reader back to the thesis statement.
#3b	I tied together the main ideas/points made in the body paragraphs.
#3c	I showed why my argument matters by making a clinching statement.

A-Level Rubrics

Level	Quality of the Answer	Marks
1	The essay will be characterised by significant irrelevance or argument that does not begin to make significant points. The essay may mention historical concepts, but these will not be understood. The answers may be largely fragmentary and incoherent. Towards the upper end of the level, the essay may show some awareness of relevant material.	1 – 8
2	The essay will not be properly focused on the requirements of the question. The essay may include references to historical concepts, but these may not be fully understood or effectively supported. The argument may be of limited relevance to the topic. Towards the upper end of the level, answers may begin to make some relevant points which are only partially supported. The answer may contain assertions. There may be commentaries that lack sufficient factual support. Towards the lower end of the level, there may be confusion about the implications of the question and many unsupported assertions.	9 – 12
3	The essay will offer some appropriate factual material but there will be little attempt generally to link factual material to the requirements of the question. The approach will be descriptive and lack analysis. The essay may include some references to historical concepts, but these will not be used to develop an analytical argument. The structure	13 – 16

Level	Quality of the Answer	Marks
	will show weaknesses and the treatment of topics within the essay will be unbalanced. The writing may show some accuracy. Towards the upper end of the level, responses contain detailed factual material. However, attempts to argue relevantly are implicit or confined to introductions and conclusions. The approach will be descriptive rather than evaluative. Alternatively, responses may offer an analytical framework which contains some supporting material. Towards the lower end of the level, responses might offer some narrative or description relating to the topic but are unlikely to address the question directly.	
4	The essay will indicate attempts to argue relevantly, although often implicitly. The approach may be uneven and contain some analysis and explanation and some narrative or description. The essay will show evidence of knowledge of historical concepts and attempts may be made to use historical concepts to aid analysis. The structure of the argument could be organised more effectively. The writing will usually be accurate. Towards the upper end of the level, responses will make an explicit attempt to address the requirements of the question. Towards the lower end of the level, responses are likely to contain detailed factual material with some focused analysis, but the argument will be less coherent.	17 – 21
5	The essay will reflect a clear understanding of the question and a fair attempt to provide an argument and factual knowledge to answer it. The approach will contain analysis or explanation. The essay will show evidence of understanding of relevant historical concepts, and some use of these will be made in analysis. The essay will be largely relevant. Most of the argument will be structured satisfactorily but some parts may lack full coherence. The essay will achieve a genuine argument but may be uneven in terms of balance or depth in factual knowledge. The writing will be generally accurate. Towards the upper end of the level, the response will be analytical and well informed. It will attempt to make a judgement although this may not be fully supported or convincing. Towards the lower end of the level, responses might be less well-supported or contain sections of narrative or description which are not linked to the argument.	22 – 25
6	The essay will be focused clearly on the demands of the question. The approach will be analytical or explanatory, demonstrating clear understanding of historical concepts relevant to analysis and to the topic. The essay will be relevant. The argument will be structured coherently and supported by accurate factual material. The essay will make a judgement and reach a reasoned conclusion in response to the question. The writing will be accurate. Towards the upper end of the level, responses are expected to be analytical, focused and balanced throughout. Towards the lower end of the level, there will be some unevenness in analysis.	26 – 30

2. How far did the issue of Taiwan affect the development of Sino-American relations from 1950 to 1991? [30]

Question Analysis

Focus: Factors shaping the development of Sino-American relations (1950-1991)

Concept: Cause and consequence; change and continuity

Criteria:

- **Content criteria** – phases of Sino-American relations; Taiwan issue, Korean War; ideological, security and economic factors
- **Concept criteria** – Driving vs reinforcing; change of importance of Taiwan issue over time

Indicative Content

Introduction:

[#1a] The Taiwan issue was a major factor in shaping the development of Sino-American relations given the US' Cold War-driven relationship with the KMT regime in Taiwan, which was claimed by the PRC as her sovereign territory. [#1b] The essay will evaluate the extent to which the Taiwan issue affected the development of Sino-American relations by examining whether it was the driver in the ebb and flow of Sino-American relations from 1950 to 1991.

[#1c]

- On first look, the Taiwan issue was definitely significant in affecting the development of Sino-American relations, given its role in causing sustained Sino-American tensions in the 1950s and 1960s.
- However, it is debatable whether the Taiwan issue was the driver behind the ebb and flow of Sino-American relations in these two decades. The stakes of the US and China in the Taiwan issue must be understood in the context of the wider Cold War rivalry in the region, which was largely defined by the Korean War.
- Furthermore, the Taiwan issue became less of an obstacle, albeit still important, for Sino-American relations from the 1970s through to the 1980s, especially in view of the US' acceptance of the One China policy and amidst deepening Sino-American security and economic relations.

[#1d] Thus, while the Taiwan issue remained an important factor in shaping Sino-American relations from 1950 to 1991, its importance was derived from the broader Cold War rivalry that was more important in driving Sino-American tensions. Moreover, its importance as a point of friction waned over time in accordance with the improvement of Sino-American relations and the US' adoption of the One China policy from 1972.

Points of Argument:

POA1 [Argument for given factor]

[#2a/#2b] On first look, the Taiwan issue was definitely significant in affecting the development of Sino-American relations, given its role in causing sustained Sino-American tensions in the 1950s and 1960s. [#2b] Taiwan formed a major flashpoint for potential conflict between the US and China in this period, and the US' commitment to defend the KMT regime in Taiwan was a challenge to the PRC's sovereignty.

[#2c]

- The Eisenhower administration's Mutual Defence pact with KMT Taiwan signed in 1954 committed the US to the defence of Taiwan against Chinese threats. Of particular issue was Chiang Kai-shek's insistence on holding to the islands of Jinmen and Mazu off the Fujian coast, which while having no strategic value were deemed critical to KMT morale.
 - In the two Taiwan Straits Crises (1954 and 1958), this commitment led to the US moving the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits and threatening publicly to use nuclear weapons against the PRC if Chinese attacks on Jinmen and Mazu did not desist. The Eisenhower administration also rebuffed Chinese peace overtures in response to the two crises.
- The Kennedy administration adopted an even more radical position over Taiwan, deepening Sino-American antagonism in the 1960s.
 - Over Taiwan, Kennedy wanted the PRC to recognise the de facto independence of Taiwan. This was an even more radical position for the PRC to accept, given its sovereign claims over Taiwan as a province of China.

[#2d] Hence, the Taiwan issue formed a major point of division between China and the US and in the 1950s, even formed a major flashpoint between the two countries.

POA2 [Argument against given factor]

[#2a] However, it is debatable whether the Taiwan issue was the driver behind the ebb and flow of Sino-American relations in these two decades. The stakes of the US and China in the Taiwan issue must be understood in the context of the wider Cold War rivalry in the region, which was largely defined by the Korean War. [#2b] The Korean War set the contours of Sino-American relations and conditioned the confrontational way the US and China approached the Taiwan issue.

[#2c]

- The Korean War had largely determined the contours of Sino-American relations in the 1950s and 1960s, against which Sino-American divisions over the Taiwan issue should be understood.
 - The Korean War solidified the US government's global containment policy and due to Chinese participation in the Korean War, the US' perception of Communist China as the main expansionist threat in Asia. This perception would lead the US to maintain mutual defence pacts with several Asian countries, with Japan in 1952 South Korea in 1953, and Taiwan and SEATO in 1954, in a bid to encircle Communist China. This would explain the significance the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations accorded to Taiwan, which was primarily a tool to contain Communist China.
 - The Korean War also solidified Chinese perception that the US represented the main security threat to Chinese security, given that the PRC had entered the Korean War due to fears of US invasion via Korea. This also shaped their perception of US support of the KMT regime in Taiwan, as well as US support given to France in the First Indochina War and subsequently South Vietnam in the Second Indochina War, as potential bases from which the US could launch an invasion of China.

[#2d] Hence, the Taiwan issue could be said to have been the driver behind Sino-American tensions although it was an important source of antagonism. The sustained Sino-American antagonism in the 1950s and 1960s was fundamentally driven by the US' Cold War containment policy as well as Chinese fears of US invasion.

POA3 [Argument against given factor]

[#2a] Furthermore, the Taiwan issue became less of an obstacle, albeit still important, for Sino-American relations from the 1970s through to the 1980s due to the larger security and economic interests at stake between the two countries. [#2b] The Taiwan issue receded into the background in view of the US' adoption of the One China policy and amidst deepening Sino-American security and economic relations after normalisation was achieved in 1979.

[#2c]

- Sino-American rapprochement was successfully achieved partly due to the US' willingness to concede on the Taiwan issue and China's willingness to tolerate ambiguity over US-Taiwan relations. This suggested that the Taiwan issue still remained important as an issue in Sino-American relations.
 - The US did not obstruct an Albania-sponsored General Assembly resolution to restore China's UN seat to the PRC, making it the sole legal China and displacing the Republic of China in Taiwan.
 - President Nixon's visit in February 1972 resulted in the Shanghai Communique, where the US affirmed there was One China while China conceded that the US could continue to maintain full diplomatic relations and a security treaty with Taiwan.
- Subsequently, to achieve Sino-American normalisation, the Carter administration made further concessions over the Taiwan issue.
 - The US ended official relations with Taiwan, withdrawing remaining troops from Taiwan, and terminating the mutual defence treaty. Tacit understanding was reached where Beijing would not renounce the use of force over the Taiwan issue while the USA could continue to sell arms to Taiwan.
 - That said, the passing of the Taiwan Relations Act by the US Congress against President Carter's wishes, obliging future Presidents to regard any use of force against Taiwan as a threat to US security did ruffle Chinese feathers.
- The US and the PRC developed deep security and economic cooperation over the course of the 1980s
 - By the second half of the 1980s, the PRC had become the 16th largest trading partner of the USA, and the USA was the PRC's 3rd largest; in addition, over 140 American firms had invested in the PRC.
 - There were also regular high-level exchanges, such as Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit to the USA and President Ronald Reagan's trip to the PRC, both in 1984, and President Li Xiannian's 1985 tour of the USA demonstrated the importance both sides accorded their relations.

- But the Taiwan issue continued to hang like a dark cloud over Sino-American relations due to the legacy of the Taiwan Relations Act and the Reagan administration's unofficial relations with the Taiwan government. That said, in 1982, Reagan was willing to suspend the sale of more advanced aircraft to Taiwan that it already possessed, in response to China's concerns, and this did suggest that the Taiwan issue had become less important a point of contention in their relations.

[#2d] Thus, it can be observed that the Taiwan issue, while remaining a dark cloud hanging over Sino-American relations, had become less influential in affecting Sino-American relations by the end of the 1980s.

Conclusion:

[#3a] In conclusion, the Taiwan issue's importance to shaping Sino-American relations evolved over time. [#3b] The Taiwan issue was definitely significant in affecting the development of Sino-American relations, given its role in causing sustained Sino-American tensions in the 1950s and 1960s. However, the stakes of the US and China in the Taiwan issue must be understood in the context of the wider Cold War rivalry in the region, which was largely defined by the Korean War. Furthermore, the Taiwan issue became less of an obstacle, albeit still important, for Sino-American relations from the 1970s through to the 1980s due to the larger security and economic interests at stake between the two countries. [#3c] Thus, the Taiwan issue remained an important factor that contributed to sustain Sino-American tensions, although its importance declined as Sino-American relations warmed and the Cold War came to an end.

3. “Japan had little influence over the development of her relations with the US during the Cold War.” Discuss, with reference to the period 1952-1991. [30]

Question Analysis

Focus: Factors shaping the development of Japan-US relations (1952-1991)

Concept: Cause and consequence; change and continuity

Criteria:

- **Content criteria** – phases of Japan-US relations; US’ Cold War strategy, Japanese domestic politics, Japan’s economic and security interests, Japan’s approach to relations with China and the USSR
- **Concept criteria** – large influence (able to drive/determine nature/terms of relations) vs small influence (unable to drive/determine nature/terms of relations)

Indicative Content

Introduction:

[#1a] The given view suggests that the US largely directed the development of Japan-US relations with Japan having little agency over how it developed from 1952 to 1991. [#1b] The essay will evaluate the extent to which Japan could exert control over the terms and nature of her relations with the US.

[#1c]

- On first look, it does appear that in the 1950s, Japan had little influence over her relations with the US, given that the Mutual Security Treaty defined the terms and nature of Japan-US relations in accordance with the US’ Cold War interests. That said, this belies the fact that Japan’s domestic politics and economic goals did shape the contours of bilateral relations.
- However, in the 1960s and 1970s, while the US continued to be the dominant actor in pushing Japan to play her part in the Cold War, Japan was able to significantly shape US foreign policy to benefit Japanese goals.
- Furthermore, in the 1980s, Japan’s status as an economic powerhouse and regional leader allowed her to exert major influence over bilateral relations with the US viewing Japan as an equal partner in the Asia-Pacific.

[#1d] Thus, while Japan did have little influence over the development of her relations with the US in the 1950s, Japan’s influence over bilateral relations steadily increased through the decades, such that she was able to exert a major influence on her relations with the US by the 1980s.

Points of Argument:

POA1 [Argument for given view, but nuanced]

[#2a/#2b] On first look, it does appear that in the 1950s, Japan had little influence over her relations with the US, given that the Mutual Security Treaty defined the terms and nature of Japan-US relations in accordance with the US’ Cold War interests. That said, this belies the fact that Japan’s domestic politics and economic goals did shape the contours of bilateral relations.

[#2c]

- From the start, Japan-US relations were framed by the US’ Cold War interests that defined the role Japan would play in the region and hence, the terms of their bilateral relations.
 - In the context of the Korean War and fear of Communism expansionism in Asia, the 1952 US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty laid the parameters of US-Japan relations under the Eisenhower administration, e.g., US administrative control of Okinawa, stationing of US forces in Japan, Japan was expected to rearm to support US containment policy in Asia.
- That said, this belies the fact that the Japanese government was able to subtly shape the contours of Japan-US relations in response to US demands for Japanese rearmament and for Japan to play a greater role in the Cold War.
 - For example, the Japanese government largely stonewalled US demands for rearmament to fulfil its security role in the Cold War due to domestic political sentiments that were characterised by strong pacifism and anti-Americanism, e.g., 1955 controversy over the expansion of Tachikawa air base that resulted in electoral gains for left-wing Socialist Party, 1956 mayoral elections in Naha (Okinawa) that saw an anti-American candidate elected.

- Moreover, the Japanese government's perception of what mattered more to Japan's security and economic interests meant Japan could exercise some say over her foreign policy despite the US' dominance in bilateral relations.
 - This can be seen in Hatoyama's pursuit of normalisation of relations with the USSR, despite it being out of line with the Mutual Security Treaty.

[#2d] Hence, while Japan was unable to significantly dictate the terms of her relations with the US in the 1950s, she was still able to chip away at the contours of Japan-US relations defined by the Mutual Security Treaty.

POA2 [Argument against given view, but nuanced]

[#2a] However, in the 1960s and 1970s, while the US continued to be the dominant actor in pushing Japan to play her part in the Cold War, Japan was able to significantly shape US foreign policy to benefit Japanese goals while developing her own approach of supporting the US in the Cold War. [#2b] This could be seen in the way the US' policy towards Japan underwent changes to accommodate Japanese interests, to sustain the alliance in the context of the Cold War.

[#2c]

- Strong domestic anti-Americanism as was observed in the massive Anpo protests against the revision of the Mutual Security Treaty and domestic resentment against Japan's support of US involvement in the Vietnam War had in fact forced the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to adjust their Japan policy to maintain positive relations.
 - The Kennedy administration, which was pursuing Flexible Response in the early 1960s, tolerated Japan's unwillingness to rearm and instead gave Japan full support for its economic development, such as opening US markets for Japanese products and tolerating Japanese protectionism against US products.
 - In response to Japan's domestic protests against the use of Okinawa as a base for the US air force deployed to Vietnam, the Johnson administration initiated the process to return Okinawa to Japanese administration to salvage the security alliance. Okinawa was officially returned by the Nixon administration in 1972.

[#2b] Japan was also able to develop her own brand of regional leadership to support the US' Cold War interests, while benefitting Japan's own security and economic goals.

[#2c]

- While Sino-American rapprochement by Nixon in 1972 caught Japan by surprise, this created space for Japan to accelerate its foreign policy to rebuild diplomatic and economic relations with China, which had been a key foreign policy goal since the 1950s. This process culminated in the 1978 China-Japan treaty of friendship and deepening economic relations. Stronger China-Japan relations proved significant in containing Soviet assertiveness in the 1970s.
- In the latter half of the 1970s, in the wake of the reduction of US commitments in Asia, the Ford and Carter administrations increasingly relied on Japan to fight the Cold War in Asia. Japan, with rising economic power and confidence, seized the opportunity to develop her brand of regional leadership that centred on driving the economic development of anti-Communist countries in Southeast Asia, as a bulwark to Communist expansionism.

[#2d] Hence, while the US continued to be the dominant actor in pushing Japan to play her part in the Cold War, Japan was able to significantly shape US foreign policy to benefit Japanese goals

POA3 [Argument against given view]

[#2a] Furthermore, in the 1980s, Japan's status as an economic powerhouse and regional leader allowed her to exert major influence over bilateral relations with the US viewing Japan as an equal partner in the Asia-Pacific.

[#2b] The Reagan administration saw Japan as its key partner in renewed Cold War confrontation with the USSR.

[#2c]

- While the Reagan administration did make more demand of Japan to increase its contribution to the security alliance such as compelling Japan to increase its substantive defence capability by specifying the roles and responsibilities of each nation, Japan reciprocated as an equal partner, rather than being compelled to.
 - The Nakasone government was proactive in deepening security relations, partly because of its own right-wing policy to gradually rearm Japan, such as exempting the US from an export ban of Japanese military technology (1983), approving the deployment of nuclear-capable US F-16 squadrons in Mikawa air base (1985), repealing the 1% cap on defence spending (1987).

[#2b] In addition, closer economic relations between the US and Japan also meant Japanese economic interests exerted significant influence over bilateral relations.

[#2c]

- US-Japan relations were significantly affected by bilateral trade frictions arising from Japan's trade imbalance with the US. In this context, Japan's economic policies had a significant influence over the state of bilateral relations.
 - The 1980s dispute over import of Japanese automobiles into the US was a case in point. While Japan conceded to US calls for "voluntary" restrictions on exports by committing itself to implementing voluntary export restraints for the coming three years from 1981, this was done from a position of strength rather than weakness.

[#2d] Thus, it can be seen that by the 1980s, Japan was able to exert major influence over the terms and nature of her relations with the US, compared to earlier decades.

Conclusion:

[#3a] In conclusion, the essay has shown that the given view is not entirely valid. [#3b] While, in the 1950s-1970s, the US was the dominant actor in pushing Japan to play her part in the Cold War, Japan was able to increasingly and significantly shape US foreign policy to benefit Japanese goals. By the 1980s, Japan's status as an economic powerhouse and regional leader allowed her to exert major influence over bilateral relations with the US viewing Japan as an equal partner in the Asia-Pacific. [#3c] Thus, the given view is rather simplistic in portraying Japan as a weak partner in Japan-US relations and ignores the amount of influence Japan had over relations with the US.

4. “ASEAN was highly responsive to the challenges posed by the Cold War in Southeast Asia.” Discuss. [30]

Question Analysis

Focus: Development of ASEAN security cooperation (1967-1991)

Concept: Change and Continuity; Impact/Effectiveness

Criteria:

- **Content Criteria**
 - Unity (ASEAN's ability to facilitate political cooperation) and Impact (ability to guard against great power interference), so as to safeguard the security of its member states amid the Cold War
 - Phases of ASEAN's development vis-à-vis security cooperation
- **Concept Criteria** – Nature of impact (responsive vs reactive); more change or more continuity

Indicative Content

Introduction

[#1a/#1b] To assess whether ASEAN was highly responsive to the challenges posed by the Cold War in Southeast Asia, this essay will first define “responsiveness” as ASEAN's ability to facilitate political cooperation and guard against great power interference in a proactive and effective manner. This criteria of unity and impact will be used to assess whether ASEAN could respond to the challenges in Southeast Asia - namely security concerns - posed by the Cold War.

[#1c]

- It can be argued that ASEAN was highly responsive to the challenges posed by the consolidation of Communism in Indochina and the Third Indochina War, as it took proactive and concerted efforts against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.
- That said, ASEAN did succumb to divisions in its response to the Third Indochina War and was ultimately dependent on the great powers to apply sufficient pressure on Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. This undermines the quality of its response.
- Furthermore, it is important to note that ASEAN's responses to the Cold War in Southeast Asia were initially muted and reactive. Even when it took more concrete efforts to cooperate in a bid to secure regional peace and security, these were again undermined by a lack of unity and impact and largely reactive to changing regional conditions.

[#1d] As such, while ASEAN did grow increasingly responsive to the challenges in Southeast Asia posed by the Cold War over time, the quality of these responses can be questioned.

Points of Argument

POA1 [Argument for the given view]

[#2a/2b] It can be argued that ASEAN was highly responsive to the challenges posed by the consolidation of Communism in Indochina and the Third Indochina War, as it took concerted efforts against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

[#2c]

- ASEAN's response was swift, unanimous, and uncompromising, collectively issuing a statement in January 1979 to condemn the invasion as it was a clear violation of the fundamental principles of non-intervention and non-use of force.
- With the goal of denying legitimacy to the Vietnamese-installed Phnom Penh government and to ensure the international isolation of Vietnam, ASEAN played a key role in lobbying the UN to act in Cambodia and was able to focus international attention to the conflict and employed collective diplomacy.
 - It took decisive action by adopting several joint statements which affirmed the right of the Cambodian people to self-determination and also demanded the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodian territory
 - It later also sponsored another GA resolution on Cambodia and called for an international conference on Cambodia. In addition, it had also sponsored the continuing presence of anti-Vietnamese Khmer

liberation forces along the Thai-Cambodian border and brought together 3 forces under the framework of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea

[#2d] As such, ASEAN's strong activism during the Third Indochina War suggests that it was highly responsive to the challenges posed by the Cold War in Southeast Asia. Not only did it act as a regional lobby that served its role in conflict management, but ASEAN's efforts had also brought its member states together in asserting their desire for regional security.

POA2 [Counter-argument]

[#2a/2b] That said, ASEAN did succumb to divisions in its response to the Third Indochina War and was ultimately dependent on the great powers to apply sufficient pressure on Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. This undermines the quality of its response.

[#2c]

- Within ASEAN, there were differing views and perspectives regarding the Vietnamese threat.
 - Singapore and Thailand were the staunchest critics of Vietnam and Thailand was extremely concerned due to its common border with Cambodia. As such, border incursions had strengthened Thailand's claim that Vietnam had expansionist intentions and Thailand was handling refugees at its border.
 - On the contrary, Malaysia and Indonesia took a softer approach towards Vietnam, and were seen as more willing to accommodate Vietnam's security interests. Both countries saw Chinese and Soviet involvement in the conflict as a real threat
- The differing threat perceptions ultimately served as a major hindrance for ASEAN to sustain a common diplomatic position in managing the crisis with Malaysia and Indonesia proposing to acknowledge Vietnam's worries (The Kuantan Principle) and Singapore and Thailand rejecting it.
- This disunity within ASEAN was accentuated when Thailand took unilateral action by establishing bilateral channels with Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, promising them economic benefits in exchange for peaceful borders and commercial relations.
 - Thailand's recognition of the Hun Sen regime, which the rest of ASEAN member states deemed as illegitimate, proved that ASEAN did not actually have a coordinated and cohesive response to the crisis at all
 - In order to maintain the facade of solidarity, ASEAN had to recognize in negotiations that the PRK was administratively in charge of Cambodia.
- Furthermore, the eventual Vietnamese withdrawal and resolution of the conflict in 1991 was more a result of changing international circumstances and UN intervention, rather than ASEAN's responses.

[#2d] As such, while ASEAN was responsive to the Third Indochina War, the quality of its response in terms of the unity and impact it created is debatable.

POA3 [Counter-argument]

[#2a] Furthermore, it is important to note that ASEAN's responses to the Cold War in Southeast Asia were initially muted and reactive to changing conditions. Even when it took more concrete efforts to cooperate in a bid to secure regional peace and security, these were again undermined by a lack of unity and impact. [#2b] Given the ongoing Vietnam War as well as presence of domestic communist movements, the individual member states were concerned with managing their own political and economic conditions in order to contain communist insurgencies.

[#2c]

- For example, the Philippines and Thailand both experienced communist insurgencies from the Marxist New People's Army and Communist Party of Thailand, respectively. These countries sought military and economic aid from their long-term ally, the US, in order to manage this threat and also offered support to the US in its war against communist North Vietnam. Hence, ASEAN members were not collaborating to respond to the threat of the Cold War, but rather choosing to rely on their existing bilateral relations as a security guarantee.
- In 1971, the ASEAN ministers gathered in Kuala Lumpur and released the official Declaration of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), which publicly declared the intention to "keep the region free from any form or manner or interference by outside powers" and "broaden the areas of cooperation" between themselves.
 - While this was done to present a neutral stance amidst the increasingly bipolar world, it was ultimately not an effective response as it was non-binding and highly ambiguous, with no clear guidelines on follow-up

action in cases of violation nor mention of foreign military bases and defense arrangements with foreign powers.

- Due to these limitations, many members demonstrated a lack of commitment with ZOPFAN – countries like Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore retained their bilateral military agreements with the US, which was inconsistent with the neutral regional stance that ZOPFAN was meant to promote.
- Subsequently, ASEAN attempted to establish certain standards and principles for its member states through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), including mutual respect for independence and sovereignty, non-interference, and settlement of disputes by peaceful means. This was a significant response on ASEAN's part as it was finally the first binding treaty that all the signatories legally committed themselves to and it also established a framework for non-intervention. However, the TAC was also limited in effectiveness.
 - Non-signatories did not have a legal requirement to follow the standards and principles set out by the TAC. ASEAN was thus unable to fulfill its objectives of keeping peace and security in the region, as seen when Vietnam invaded Cambodia.

[#2d] Therefore, even though ASEAN had become more responsive to the Cold War challenges in the 1970s as compared to the earlier stages of its formation, it was still limited as it lacked enforceability and was unable to achieve the objectives that it had set out to achieve.

Conclusion

[#3a] In conclusion, the essay has shown that the given view is not entirely valid. [#3b] While ASEAN did grow increasingly more responsive to the challenges posed by the Cold War, and their high responsiveness was especially seen towards the Third Indochina War, the quality of these responses was consistently diminished by their lack of unity and impact. [#3c] Thus, it is fairer to say that while ASEAN grew more responsive over time, these responses were not necessarily effective in managing the threats that the Cold War posed in Southeast Asia.

5. How far was Singapore's foreign policy during the Cold War anti-Communist in nature? [30]

Question Analysis

Focus: Development of Singapore's foreign policy (1965-1991)

Concept: Cause and Consequence; Change and Continuity

Criteria:

- **Content Criteria**
 - "Anti-Communist": political and ideological opposition to communist countries, specifically the USSR and China
 - Singapore's foreign policy approaches: Non-alignment; realism; regional cooperation
 - Phases of Singapore's foreign policy
- **Concept Criteria** – Primary vs secondary considerations; did considerations change over time or remained the same?

Indicative Content

Introduction

[#1a/#1b] To assess whether Singapore's foreign policy during the Cold War was anti-communist in nature, this essay will examine the different phases of Singapore's foreign policy from 1965 to 1991, as well as the factors that shaped it. "Anti-Communist" in this context would refer to political and ideological opposition to communist countries, specifically the USSR and China.

[#1c]

- It can be argued that Singapore's foreign policy from the late 1960s was anti-Communist in nature, as it increasingly identified the USSR as the prime threat to regional order and took steps to condemn its entry as a regional actor.
- That said, it must be acknowledged that Singapore started out with a foreign policy of non-alignment and continued to maintain tentative ties with the USSR until the early 1970s. Though these stances were recalibrated over time, this was arguably more due to specific fears of Soviet influence rather than anti-Communism itself.
- Furthermore, Singapore showed increasing willingness to engage with the People's Republic of China (PRC), first economically and eventually on an official diplomatic level. This implied that its foreign policy was fundamentally realist, rather than anti-Communist, in nature.

[#1d] As such, while Singapore's foreign policy during the Cold War did take an anti-Communist slant from the late 1960s, it is more accurately described as being realist in nature.

Points of Argument

POA1 [Argument for "anti-Communist" view]

[#2a] It can be argued that Singapore's foreign policy from the late 1960s was anti-Communist in nature, as it increasingly identified the USSR as the prime threat to regional order and took steps to contain its entry as a regional actor.

[#2b/2c]

- Nixon's announcement of American strategic retreat from Asia and Brezhnev's proposal for a Soviet-led collective security system in Asia alarmed Singapore's leaders as an indication of a Soviet initiative to step into the strategic void that was likely to be created by the US' departure.
- These fears were reinforced when Soviet-backed Vietnam achieved reunification in 1975 and the USSR deployed personnel to the former American naval and air bases in Cam Ranh Bay and Danang in Vietnam.
- Given Singapore's domestic experience of a communist opposition movement, the Barisan Sosialis, and its leaders' belief in the Domino Theory possibly materialising in Southeast Asia, it thus became rather vociferous in calling for measures to counter the growing Soviet influence in the region.
- This anti-Communist stance of Singapore's foreign policy intensified after the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship was signed in 1978 and Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December that same year. Vietnam's actions were interpreted by Singapore as part of a grand Soviet design for Indochina, and it thus pushed back strongly against the USSR's entry as a regional actor.

- In 1980, Singapore boycotted the Olympic Games in Moscow, provoking the Soviet government to cancel on short notice a planned visit to Moscow by Lee Kuan Yew.
- Throughout the 1980s, the USSR was depicted as a political demon in Singapore's media and government statements.

[#2d] These historical tensions between Vietnam and Cambodia, which could be traced back to pre-colonial interactions, can thus be seen as setting the stage for conflict to break out between both parties.

POA2 [Counter-argument]

[#2a] That said, it must be acknowledged that Singapore started out with a foreign policy of non-alignment and continued to maintain tentative ties with the USSR until the early 1970s. Though these stances were recalibrated over time, this was arguably more due to specific fears of Soviet influence rather than anti-Communism itself.

[#2b/2c]

- In the immediate post-independence period, given the context of Singapore's geographical limitations and prevalent security threats, its leaders decided that a policy of non-alignment would best serve its goals of survival and security.
 - Non-alignment was seen as a favourable foreign policy to ensure that Singapore would gain full international recognition, such as membership in the UN.
- Furthermore, Singapore took a realistic view of the USSR, seeing it as a permanent fixture actively engaged in competing with its global rivals - the US and China - in Southeast Asia. It thus sought to maintain a level of engagement with the USSR rather than taking an anti-Communist stance.
- In addition, Singapore saw the potential for economic development through cultivating relations with the USSR.
 - In May 1966, Lee and S Rajaratnam went on a trade mission tour of the USSR and various Eastern European countries, culminating in a trade agreement.
 - Singapore also provided ship repair facilities for Soviet merchant vessels and permitted Soviet naval vessels to sail through the Singapore Straits en route to the Indian Ocean.
- While Singapore began to overtly distance itself from the USSR by the end of 1972, taking actions such as revoking the use of Singapore's facilities by Soviet naval vessels, this was arguably more due to the aforementioned fears of the USSR filling the power vacuum in the region left by the US' strategic retreat rather than anti-Communism itself.

[#2d] As such, it can be argued that Singapore's foreign policy was driven more by realism than anti-Communism, as it developed tentative relations with the USSR in its early years and only turned away from it due to perceived shifts in the regional balance of power.

POA3 [Counter-argument]

[#2a] Furthermore, Singapore showed increasing willingness to engage with the PRC, first economically and eventually on an official diplomatic level. This implied that its foreign policy was fundamentally realist, rather than anti-Communist, in nature.

[#2b/2c]

- Initially, Singapore took a hostile stance towards China due to suspicions about the security threat it could potentially pose to Southeast Asia. Singapore was also eager to distance itself from China in order to deter accusations from Malaysia and Indonesia that its majority Chinese population made it an agent of influence for China in the region.
- However, with the softening of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s, Singapore made tentative inroads into establishing ties with China, especially in pursuit of economic benefits.
 - S. Rajaratnam visited Beijing in 1975 with a view to develop economic relations, especially since China had expressed interest in purchasing machinery and oil rigs from Singapore.
 - Trade links were strengthened after Deng Xiaoping inaugurated his economic reforms in 1978.
- After Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, Singapore found common tactical cause with China as both countries were concerned about the projection of Soviet influence in the region. Despite some challenges in persuading China to adopt ASEAN's position, which Singapore had played a leading role in shaping, both sides continued to strengthen their partnership, particularly in trade and economic cooperation.
 - Singapore's Finance Minister Hon Sui Sen signed a trade agreement with Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping in December 1979, which paved the way for an acceleration in trade and economic cooperation.

- Further trade agreements were concluded over the years.
 - In Oct 1990, Singapore officially normalised relations with China, after Indonesia did so first.
- [#2d] It can thus be seen that Singapore's foreign policy was shaped by realist goals of seeking countervailing power to maintain the regional balance of power and thereby safeguard its own security and economic interests, rather than anti-Communism.

Conclusion

[#3a] In conclusion, I do not agree with the simplistic notion that Singapore's foreign policy during the Cold War was anti-Communist in nature. [#3b] While Singapore appeared to take an increasingly overt anti-Communist stance from the late 1960s, with its sharp criticism of and distancing from the USSR, this was arguably driven by realist concerns about Soviet influence disrupting the balance of power in Southeast Asia. Singapore's increasingly close relations with the PRC over time also challenge the view that its foreign policy was anti-Communist in nature. [#3c] Hence, it is more accurate to see Singapore's foreign policy as guided by realism rather than anti-Communism.