

Section A

You must answer Question 1.

Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia

- 1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow.

Source A

The Indonesian response to the Malaysian threat was not a proportional response, since there is no convincing evidence that Malaysia could threaten Indonesia more than Malaya could. In fact, because the British had problems retaining its unrestricted use of the Singapore military base after the creation of Malaysia, it is far easier to make the case that Malaysia threatened Indonesia even less than Malaya. Furthermore, British military bases had existed in North Borneo before the formation of Malaysia. If the baseline threat posed by Malaya against Indonesian security was a sufficient cause for war for Indonesian armed retaliation, then Indonesia would not have signed the 1959 Friendship Treaty with Malaya, nor would it have waited till the 1962 West Irian conflict to end before expressing defensive concerns about the formation of Malaysia.

From an academic paper written by a Singaporean, 2001.

Source B

We feared not the amalgamation of 10 million people, but it became obvious that Malaysia was not to be a friendly neighbour. One article in the treaty of formation states that the new country 'will afford to the UK the right to continue to maintain military bases there and permit that government to use those bases as it may consider necessary for the preservation of peace in Southeast Asia.' Fresh in our minds are those foreign personnel operating from bases in Singapore who supported the rebels against us in 1958. Is that not ground for us to be wary, particularly when these colonies which ring us have been hastily cemented together by steamroller tactics? Particularly when British military installations on that soil make it clear that Malaysia is not truly a sovereign Asian nation? Colonialism was not retreating in my backyard, just changing shape.

From Sukarno's autobiography, 1965.

Source C

We are not only disclaiming the territories outside the former Netherlands East Indies, though they are of the same island, but – more than that – when Malaya told us of its intentions to merge with the three British Crown colonies of Sarawak, Brunei, and British North Borneo as one Federation, we told them that we had no objections and that we wished them success with this merger so that everyone might live in peace and freedom. I may tell this Assembly that three quarters of the island of Borneo is Indonesian territory, while the remainder constitutes the aforementioned British Crown colonies. But we still told Malaya that we had no objections to such a merger, based upon the will for freedom of the peoples concerned.

Speech by Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio to the United Nations General Assembly, 20 November 1961.

Source D

Based on the July 1963 Manila Accord, Indonesia and Malaysia had agreed to request the UN to ascertain the wishes of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak, and also deemed it desirable to send observers to witness the UN carrying out its tasks.

However, British obstruction delayed the Indonesian observers from joining the UN mission. Hardly was the problem concerning the observers over when Kuala Lumpur announced that the formation of 'Malaysia' would be proclaimed on 16 September 1963, without the slightest regard for the results of the UN's investigations. This provocative act constitutes a violation of the Manila Joint Statement, which stipulated that the ascertainment of the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak had first to be made before the 'Federation of Malaysia' could be proclaimed. At the end of 1963, the Indonesian government declared its support for the struggle of the North Kalimantan people against British neo-colonialism.

From an official Indonesian publication entitled 'Why Indonesia Opposes British-Made 'Malaysia'', September 1964.

Source E

It is not true, as the Indonesians have complained, that Indonesia was not informed of our intentions to form a federation of Malaysia – as can be seen in Dr. Subandrio's statement to the UN General Assembly on 20 November 1961, in which he wished Malaysia success.

When and why were expressions of 'success' for Malaysia converted into threats to 'crush' Malaysia? It is my belief that the anti-Malaysian stand of the Indonesian leaders derives in part from the necessity to sustain the illusion that they are still locked in mortal battle against colonialism. With the West Irian issue resolved and therefore the anti-colonial struggle ended, a new anti-colonial menace had to be created. What was once approved by Dr. Subandrio became a neo-colonialist plot to encircle Indonesia.

From a speech by S. Rajaratnam, the Singapore Minister for Culture, to the Singapore National Union of Journalists, February 1964.

Source F

Doubts have been expressed about the need to retain our base at Singapore and the wisdom of assuming that we shall still be able to keep it in the 1970s.

Our military presence in Singapore enables us to discharge our obligations under SEATO. But the only safe assumption to make is that long before 1970 we shall be able to use Singapore for SEATO purposes only to the extent that the Malaysian government agrees with those purposes and is willing to let us use the base for them. And Malaya is not a member of SEATO. For so long as the Tunku stays in power, we shall probably be able to retain our Singapore base, but when he goes, our tenure of it may become insecure.

From a memorandum by a senior official overseeing Britain's relations with its former colonies to a government committee studying the issue of British military withdrawal from the Far East, March 1963.

Now answer the following questions:

- (a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources C and D on the Indonesian government's response to the formation of Malaysia. [10]
- (b) How far do Sources A-F support the view that Indonesia was primarily to blame for Konfrontasi? [30]

Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

You must support each answer with examples drawn from **at least three** countries.

EITHER

- 2 'The political stability of authoritarian governments in Southeast Asia from independence-2000 was just a façade.' How far do you agree with this assessment? [30]

OR

- 3 To what extent were there more similarities than differences in the language policies aimed at national unity that Southeast Asian states adopted from independence-2000? [30]

AND EITHER

- 4 'Government strategies in the financial sector best account for the economic development of Southeast Asia from independence-2000.' Discuss. [30]

OR

- 5 How effective were Southeast Asian governments in responding to the Asian Financial Crisis? [30]