H2 History (Paper 2)

Theme 2: Economic Development after Independence

Argument	Burma	Vietnam	The Philippines	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore
	I	1	1	Context		I	I
Foreign domination of economic resources	Foreign firms • East Asiatic Company of Burna (rice millers) • John Dickenson & Company (paper distributors) • Steel Brothers (rice, oil, timber, shipping)		1946 Philippine Rehabilitation Act Provided \$620m in aid 1948 Filipino participation in import trade hovered around 20%	Dutch plantations and firms • 300 Dutch plantations and 300 firms in other areas (e.g. mining, trade, finance, utilities) would later have to be expropriated by the government	Presence of local capital Active Chinese business class, e.g. Nai Let (cars), Nai Boonrawd (brewery), Nai Kokiang (cigarettes) 1929: over 20,000 rice traders and 12,000 timber traders	1971 • 63% of corporate wealth was foreign-owned, 35% to other Malaysians (largely Chinese), and 2% to Malays	
Political instability	1980s: 8888 Protests • Led to Western sanctions	Stable No change of government since independence 	1983: Aquino's assassination Triggered capital flight, which was catastrophic given dependency on foreign loans	Stable 30 years of Suharto rule	 1973-76: Political chaos Led to widespread capital flight 	Stable No change of government since independence	Stable No change of government since independence
Physical destruction of infrastructure	 Lost all its oil refineries, 90% of its boats and 70% of its roads 1950: GDP was a mere % of pre-war levels, with agricultural production only at 65% 	1964-75: 2nd Indochinese War • 7.5m tonnes of bombs were dropped, double that of WWII • Most bridges on the Hanot-Langson and Hanot-Vini lines were bown up • 29/00 provincial capitals were damaged, with 9 completely destroyed	WWII • 80% of Manila was destroyed				
Agrarian economic endowment	Rice • Total exports reached \$173m before the war	 Rice, rubber, coffee South Vietnam had fertile farmlands and a conducive climate 	Sugar, vegetable oil, fruits / nuts Early industrial manufacturing centred around the processing of export crops, e.g. sugar milling, vegetable oil production, cigar making	Plywood, rubber	Rice, teak, rubber, tin	Rubber, oil palm, tea, pineapples • 1957: 85% of export earnings derived from tin and rubber	Already export-oriented • 1950s: Exports were 127% of GDP • 1947: 31% services, 23% commerce, 17% manufacturing, 8% agriculture
Natural resources	Teak, oil, gems, silver • Shan state: abundant teak, oil, gems and silver	Coal, gold, zinc, iron, tin Concentrated in the North 		Oil • Indonesia was an oil exporter	Tin, rubber	Tin, rubber • 1957: 85% of export earnings derived from tin and rubber	None
Lack of skilled workforce	Limited education • Education was restricted to the elite, who were only offered low-ranking civil service positions	Brain drain • By 1982: A further 1m refugees had fled South Vietnam after the communist victory, including professions, intellectuals and technicians					
International shocks			Oil crisis • 1972-80: Oil prices surged	Oil crisis • 1972-80: Oil prices surged			1980s: Low petroleum prices • Hurt the shiprepairing and

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			10-fold from \$3 a barrel to \$30 High dependence on energy imports slowed growth Commodity collapse 1974-78: Sugar prices fell by 90% High dependence on commodity exports rendered the country hit by declining prices	10-fold from \$3 a barrel to \$30 • Benefitted Indonesia as an oil exporter			shipbuilding industries, which comprised 25% of the economy 1985: Singapore slid into a recession
Cold War Influence		Weakening Soviet aid • Soviet economic aid averaged 51bn, lower than the promised \$2.7bn Sine-Soviet Split • 1978: China cancelied all projects and withdrew all technicians after Vietnam joined Moscow's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia • Led to embargoes imposed by the US and its allies		Non-Aligned Movement • Initial receipt of Shn in military aid and \$215m in economic aid from the Soviet Union disappeared after Sukamo established himself as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement	 Thailand received \$650m in economic aid and \$10n in military aid, on top of spending from American servicemen stationed there 		
				Strategies			
Centralised economic planning	1947: Economic Planning Board Planned rural reforms	 1955: National Planning Board Five Year Plans from 1961 onwards 		1969: Repelita Plans	1959: National Economic and Social Development Board		1961-64 First Development Plan
Nationalisation	 1951: Defence Services Institute DSI formed the Five Star Line (freight lines and trucking) Burne Nation Company (nubilic roads) Rangoon Electric Works (electrical equipment) Continental Trading House (fisheries) 1963 Enterprise Nationalisation Law Stipulated that all major industries would be nationalised by June Bandans nationalised in Feb, with consumer industries in Aug 	1978: Major private enterprises placed under state control • "Youth squads" were sent uou at night to confiscate all goods on business premises • Only retail trade remained in private hands • 1980: Utilisation of industrial capacity was below 50%		Dutch plantations and firms 300 Dutch plantations and 300 limits in other areas (e.g., mining, trade, finance, utilities) would later have to be expropriated by the government Article 33 of the Constitution Strategic industries will remain under state control, e.g. Pertaminat for oil, ship and aircraft industries 1975: State firms produced 75% of coment, half of paper products and machinery, and 40% of food manufacturing 1976: State firms produced	By 1946: 30 state enterprises were started • Siam Steam Navigation Company bought over by the government • Thai Roe Company handled 70-80% of tice exports	1970s: Nationalisation of foreign firms PNB purchased controlling interests in the Guthrie Corporation became Malaysian Mining Corporation 1974: Petronas nationalised the oil industry	1960s: Shipyards • Jurong Shipyard • Keppel Shipyard 1969: Neptune Orient Lines 1969: Singapore Petroleum Company 1972: Singapore Airlines

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	All rice sold to Trade Corporation No. 1, and all imports and distribution handled by 24 The People's Stores Stores 1965 Law to Invest Powers to Construct the Socialist Economy Legalised state control of all economic resources and activities An extreme version of Indonesias Article 33 that only guaranteed government inducersion in strategic industrise State controlled 60% of manufacturing and 90% of legal trade						
Collectivisation	 1963 Tenancy Law Agrarian Committees reallocated land Peasants had to meet production quotas and deadlines, selling their produce to the state at fixed proces State dinated what peasants could grow in some areas 1962-73: Rice exports fell from 15m tonnes to 200,000 tonnes Once the world's largest oil exporter and the 'granary of the East'. Burma became a net importer of oil and rice 	 1965: 30% of peasant households were organised into collective farms State prices and therefore overall wages were low, hurting motivation Comparatively, 'five percent piolis', privately-owned by helds per hectare of state-run collective farms and up to 75% of peasants' incomes 1978: New Management System Work exchange teams were initiality formed (peasants with the government), before initiality formed (peasants with the government), before the apricultural equipment and livestock was seized 1976-79: Rice production field by 20% nationally (to 9.8m tonnes) and 60% in the Mekong Delta (to 38.000 tonnes) As a result, rice was a rationed at lowest wartine levels 					

Argument	Burma	Vietnam	The Philippines	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore
		 Even in 1986, rice output was far below that of 1942 By early 1980s: 10,000 out of 13,000 collectives in the South had collapsed 					
Anti-foreign nationalism	1958-60: DSI imposed high taxes on — and subsequently bought over — foreign firms • East Asiatic Company of Burna (rice millers) • John Dickenson & Company (paper distributors) • Siteel Brothers (rice, oil, timber, shipping) Comprehensive restrictive laws • Chinese squeezed out of the country • 1963-67: 100,000 Chinese left • Can talk about ENL and LIPSCE 1960s: Repartiation of Indians • 1960s: Indians had been forcibly repatriated from Burna, with an exodus of 300,000 Indians in 1964		1954 Anti-Chinese Retail Trade Nationalisation Act - Forced the Chinese out of corn and rice trading 1958 Congress Bill - Mardated that important - industries were 60% Filipino owned - 1948-65; Filipino participation in import trade increased by 3-fold to 70%	1957 onwards: Sukarno's expropriation of foreign firms 300 Unit bin plantions and 300 times in other areas (e.g. mining, trade, finance, utilities) were expropriated by the government	1952 Directive • Chinese to establish centralised associations for gold trading, jewellery trading and banking to control Chinese activities From 1947: Western companies threatened with closure and competition • E.g. Shell • 1964-72: Foreign capital comprised only 12% of total capital • 1976: 60% of 500 largest firms were fully Thai owned	1971-90 New Economic Policy • 63% of corporate wealth was foreign-owned, 35% to other Malaysians (largely Chinese), and 2% to Malays • 1970: 75% of households below the poverty line were Malay • Sought in increase local and Moght increase local and NEP characteristics before registration • Foreign ownership in economy fell from 63% to 33% 1970s: Nationalisation of foreign firms • London The became Malaysian Mining Corporation • 1974: Petronas nationalised the oil industry	
Protection of nascent industries						1958 Pioneer Industries Programme 9 1955-71: Number of firms granted pioneer status grew 14-fold to 246 1959-71: Consumer goods rose from 21.9% to 31.2% of industrial output	1959 Pioneer Industries Ordinance • Exempted pioneer product manufacturers from taxes for a stipulated period 1959 Industrial Expansion Ordinance • Offered income tax relief
Infrastructural development and support				Bulog Bulog coordinated rice procurement, distribution and pricing Sekneg State Secretariat (Sekneg) allocated construction contracts	1959: Board of Investment Created to promote investment 1959: Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand (IFCT) Provided Ioans for expansion of private industry	1971 onwards: Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) • Came up with land clearing and allocation schemes for the Malays 1971 onwards: Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority (RISDA)	1961: Economic Development Board (EDB) Served as a "one-stop investment agency": provided financial support and advice and developed industrial estates 1960s: Jurong Island

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				Bimas Bimas, a state agricultural programme, provided credit and physical inputs (e.g. new seeds) to promote rice production • 1968-89: Rice production increased 2.5x from 12m to 29m tonnes • Mid-1990s: Indonesia had become self-sufficient in rice		Helped to finance better-yielding rubber crops for the Malays PERNAS and PNB Supplied bumiputera ventures with interest-free finance 1981: Heavy Industry Corporation of Malaysia Invested to bumiputera ownership in ventures like Kedah Cement, Pervaja Steel and Proton 1993: Malaysian Technology Development Corporation (MTDC) Invested in 8 local firms within the year	First factory was National from and Steel Mills (later NatStat) 200 factories by late 1960s Statutory boards 1988: Jurong Town Corporation (JTC) 1972: National Productivity Board (NPB) 1983: Trade Development Board (TDB) 1986: Small Enterprise Bureau (SEB) By 1990: 70 statutory boards
Rural or agricultural policies	Collectivisatii Land redistribution Aimed to redistribute 10m acres of land by 1955 1958: only 1.4m acres of the 10m acres was distributed, with marry plots too small to be productive Agricultural credit increased 3.5k to 157m kyat, with loans provided based on need rather than productivity <u>But</u> 1962-73: Rice exports fell from 1.5m tonnes to 200,000 tonnes Once the world's largest oil exporter and the 'granary of the East', Burm became a net importer of oil and rice	n, of course!	1955 Philippine Land Reform Act • Allowed the government to selze private land for redistribution • Largely blocked by the lustrado-dominated Congress 1965 Agricultural Land Reform Code • Established the Land Bank of the Philippines to facilitate the purchase and resale of land • Largely blocked by the lustrado-dominated Congress 1965 Agricultural Land Reform Code • Established the Land Bank of the Philippines to facilitate the purchase and resale of land • Largely blocked by the lustrado-dominated Congress 1960s: IR& • Mid-1960s: International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) created a high-yieding nice variety named IRB • 1972: Presidentificated in role self-sufficient in role usef-sufficient in role usef-sufficient in admobiling sover 7 hectares to sell to tenant	Bimas Bimas, a state agricultural programme, provided credit and physical inputs (e.g., new seeds) to promote rice production 1968-88: Rice production inpresend 2.6 k from 12m to 2006 becomes and 2.6 k from 12m to 2006 becomes all set of the 12m to 2007 becomes all set of the 2007 becomes all set of the 12m to 2007 becomes	 1957-73: Sarit and Thanom's agricultural promotion Constructed road networks and large-scale irrigation projects to increase productivity and the cultivation of new arease. Encouraged use of tractors, fettilisers and new crops, e.g. maize, cassava 1947-69: Expanded irrigated land from 600,000 hectares to 2.2m 1968: Export value of other crops surpassed rice 	1971 onwards: Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) • Came up with land cleans and allocation schemes for the Malays 1971 onwards: Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority (MISDO) • Helped Link Dol better-yelding nubber crops for the Malays	

Argument	Burma	Vietnam	The Philippines	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore
Export romotion	1988 Foreign Investment Law Allowed wholy foreign-owned enterprises Offered tax breaks and duty exemptions to attract FDI By 1993: 28 US firms and 80 Thai firms investing in the country Promoted unrestricted cross-border trade 1985-2003: Trade volume ballooned 6.8x 1997: Joined ASEAN EUIT 1990: Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Company Ltd (UMEHC) To be the controlling partner in all joint ventures with foreign firms U1997: Doly 5% of large firms were privately owned, with no large state enterprise privately owned, with no large state enterprise privated Used as the export of 28 goods E.g. teak, rice, oil, gems These constituted the bulk of what Burma produced and traded	 1981 onwards: Four major cities were permitted to set up import-export (IMEX) corporations 1987 Foreign investment Law Allowed foreign investors to operate through joint to operate through joint to discrete through joint to operate through joint to operate through joint to operate through joint to set through joint to the nationalisation were provided for 20 years 1991: \$173m invested across 34 projects by Vietnam's neighbours 1986-69: Economic growth doubled from 3% to 6% in 1990, before reaching heights of 9.5% in 1995 and 1995 (the highest in the world!) But 1997: State enterprises still accounts of 50% of the country's economic output 1995: Joined ASEAN 	farmers Blocked by Marcos' landowning political allies, and used primarily to punish opponents, e.g. Aquinos	 1967 Foreign Investment Law Provided foreign investors with tax concessions and a guarantee against expropriation Cotber 1988 Reform Package Losened banking regulations In two years, over 40 new private banks were given licenses 	 1960 Promotion of Investment Act Guaranteed private enterprises protection against state competition and state competition and state competition and state competition of profits etc. 1985: Bank of Thailand Established special credit facilities for exporters 1986:-89: Thailand stracted an average of \$900m in FDI, rising to \$2bn in 1990-96 	 1968 Investment Incentives Act Provided income tax relief for investment promotion 1971 Free Trade Zone Act exported >80% of outputs 1986 Promotion of Investments Act Granted incentives to foreign capital in R&D 	1976 Export Credit Insurance Scheme • Covered against risks for exporters 1976 Small Industries Finance Scheme • Provided credit for smaller industries
Financial policies for export promotion					1980s: Devaluation of the baht 1981: Further devalued amidst strengthening USD Late 1980s: Increased share of USD in the basket to take advantage of depreciating USD after the Plaza Accords	 1980s: Devaluation of the ringgit Periodically devalued by Mahathir to attract FDI 	
Privatisation and deregulation	1988 Foreign Investment Law Allowed wholly	1981 onwards: Four major cities were permitted to set up			1988: NESDB • Relieved of its role as	1983: Malaysia Inc • 1980-85: Public enterprises	1986 Public Sector Divestment Committee

Image: second determines the second	Argument	Burma	Vietnam	The Philippines	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore
Vietnam became the world's	Argument	foreign-owned enterprises Offered tax breaks and duty exemptions to attract FDI By 1993: 28 US firms and 80 Thai firms investing in the	 Import-export (IMEX) corporations 1937 Foreign Investment Law Allowed foreign investors to operate through joint enterprises and foreign-owned companies Guarantees against mationalisation were provided for 20 years 1931: \$173m invested across 34 projects by Vietnam's neighbours 1986-96: Economic growth doublefrom 3% to 6% in 1990, before reaching heights of 9.5% in 1995 and 1996 (the highest in the world!) But 1997: State enterprises still accounted for 50% of the country's economic output 1981 Directive 100 Allowed households to diministication accounted for 50% of the country's economic output 1983 Directive 100 Allowed households to diministic for earket 1983: Agricultural production had a surplus for export the could be henceforth owned and inherited Requirement for collective labour, and sell excess surplus on the free market Equipment could be psopclation that it could be henceforth owned and inherited Requirement for collective labour was removed Equipment could be psopclation that could be surplus for exports outputs surplus of the state production nearket 1988-92: Rice exports doubles of the output state and the first and the market 1988-92: Rice exports doubles of the output state and the state production neares to double form 0.9m towneas to double form 0.9m to	The Philippines	Indonesia	supervisor for major government investment	accounted for 64.3% of public sector deficit • By 1992: 13 state	Privatisation of SIA, SBS,
Diversification 1990: Action Plan for Industrial 1983: Singapore Technologies								

Argument	Burma	Vietnam	The Philippines	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore
						Technology Development Projected the development of high-technology industries and human resources 1993: Malaysian Technology Development Corporation (MTDC) invested in 8 local firms within the year 1996: Multimedia Super Corridor Project Sought to build a knowledge-based economy	Corporation (STC) Sought to promote advanced technologies 1986: Total Business Centre Vision Singapore would provide a range of corporate services to companies headquarters here Since 1986: More than 60 MNCs have set up headquarters here, including firms in the electronics, construction, transportation and pharmaceutical sectors
Regionalisation							Johor Riau Growth Triangle Suzhou Industrial Park 1989-90: Total FDI from Singapore nearly doubled from \$8.7bn to \$16.9bn
Foreign borrowing			1970-806 1977-83: \$2 2bn debt ballooned to \$250n Debt service ratio exceeded 20% 1986: Poor use of borrowed funds left the Philippines with \$27bn of debt Debt repayment took up 10% of GDP during Aquino's term 1983 Had to seek 90-day moratorium on external debt repayments with the IMF	1980: E oreign loans constituted 42% of Indonesia's state development budget 1989: Indonesia had Asia's largest debt at \$58bn	1973-86 • External foreign debt grew from virtually zero to 38% of GDP		
Foreign aid	1972-78 • Foreign aid and loans reached \$460m, up from \$76m 1978-86 • Annual loans averaged \$350m	1954-68 1968 CIA estimate: \$3.2bn in aid from communist allies since 1954 1993 1993 23 donor states and agencies pledged \$1.86bn in loans	1946 Philippine Rehabilitation Act Provided \$620m in aid	1967: Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia • 14 nations (including the US and Japan) and international organisations formed the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a major funnel for aid • 1985-86: \$2.5 bn i aid	 1950-75: US aid Thailand received \$650m in economic aid and \$1bn in military aid, on top of spending from American servicemen stationed there 		
Foreign advice			 1970s-80s: World Bank Consultative Group formed under the World Bank to discuss needed capital 	1970s-80s: IMF • IMF played a central advisory role in Indonesia's financial reorganisation			1955: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Report • Stressed the importance of

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			inflows				expanding the industrial sector Government would facilitate infrastructural development and attract foreign investment Catalysed Prioneer Industrial Expansion Ordinance 1961: Winsemius Report Catalysed Development Plan 1961-1964 and establishment of EDB
Ethnic communities			Chinese • 1.3% of Chinese owned 50-60% of economy	Chinese • 1980s: 3.8% of Chinese controlled 73% of the economy • Chinese Indonesian capital accounted for 75% of private sector investments in the 1970s Indigenous • 1960s: 70% of rural labour force	Pre-WWII Chinese Pre-WWII Active Chinese businese class, e.g. Nai Lert (cars), Nai Kokiang (cigarettes) Post-WWII Chinese owned 81% of economy only 30 the 70 leading businese groups were non-Chinese Sophonphanic family founded the Bangkok Bank, financing over 42% of total exports Indigenous 1960s: 80% of rural labour force	Chinese • Malaysian Chinese owned 85% of private-sector capital	
Economic insularity*	Reduction of exports and trade • 1962-72: Overseas trade fell by 63% • 1980-87: Annual growth of exports fell to -4.7% • 1950s-90s: Exports declined from 21% of GDP to 1.3%			Sukarno's rejection of foreign aid • 1964: Told the US ambasador to 'go to hell with your aid' • Initial receipt of Ston in military aid and S215m in economic aid from the Soviet Union disappeared after Sukarno estabilished himself as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and the PKI took China's side in the Sino-Soviet split • 1957-65: GNP per capita declined • 1959-66: Value of exports fell by 25% from \$931m to			

Argument	Burma	Vietnam	The Philippines	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore
				\$685m • 1965: 600% inflattion			
				Outcomes			
			Overall 5.8% growth across the region	n, compared to 3.5% growth across the	rest of the world!		
Overall growth	4.3	-	3.9	5.7	6.8	6.7	8.3
1960s growth	3.2	-	4.9	4.2	8.2	6.5	10.0
1970s growth	4.7	-	5.9	7.9	6.9	7.9	9.0
1980s growth	1.4	GDP per capita: \$230	1.8	6.4	7.9	6.0	7.4
1990s growth	7.4	8.2	2.9	4.3	4.4	6.6	7.0
1970 A/I/S	38 / 12 / 10		28 / 30 / 23	51 / 13 / 36 (1965)	30 / 26 / 18	32 / 25 / 12	2 / 36 / 21
1980 A/I/S	48 / 12 / 10		23 / 37 / 22	24 / 42 / 34 (1980)	25 / 30 / 20	23 / 36 / 22	1 / 39 / 29
1990 A/I/S	57 / 11 / 8		22 / 35 / 22	16 / 43 / 41 (1996)	13 / 37 / 27	19 / 42 / 24	0 / 35 / 27
1975 Pri Ind. / E.	47 (1980)			98	76	69	50
1994 Pri. Ind. / E.	57 (2000)			47	27	25	16
Other growth indicators		1990-95 • 1990-95: Industrial output increased by close to 15%, agricultural output by 6% and international trade by 1000%		 Poverty rate slashed from 60% to 11% 	1990-95 Remarkable 18.6% export growth rate	1990-95 • Remarkable 20% export growth rate	
Equity	 1972 Top quartile only made 5x as much as the bottom quartile 	1992 Gini coefficient was 0.35, which is considered very low 1990s 1998: Poverty in the southeast fell to 11.1%, while it remained at 60% in the north 1996: Polichame gap between wealtheast and poorest decile widened from 10.6x to 12x	1990s Top 10% owned 40% of national income	 Urban incomes went from 42% higher than rural incomes to 92% higher 	1965-2000 Gini coefficient rose from 0.41 to 0.52 2002 Rural poverty remains 4x of the urban rate	 1971-90: New Economic Policy Burniputera comenship grew from 2% to 20% Burniputera employment in agriculture tell from 66% to 28% 	1990 MOF Census • 20% of households have monthly incomes less than \$700, while the top 10% of households have monthly incomes of \$9700 and above
Nationalism			 Filipino participation in import trade increased by 3-fold to 70% 		1964-72 • Foreign capital comprised only 12% of total capital 1979 • 60% of 500 largest firms were fully Thai owned	1971-90: New Economic Policy • Foreign ownership in economy fell from 63% to 33%	
Excessive cronyism			Cojuangco • 1992: Conjuangco family's	Eka Tjipta Widjaja • Eka Tjipta Widjaja's Sinar	Sophonphanic family • Founded the Bangkok Bank,		

Argument	Burma	Vietnam	The Philippines	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore
			Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT) company Diversity of the telephone (PLDT) company Diversity of the telephone (PLDT) Diversity of the telephone (PLDT) Diversity of the telephone (PLDT) end (PLDT) of the telephone (PLDT) Benedicto received 14 billion persos in bailouts after sugar prices collapsed Lucio Tan • builoo Tan purchased prividisation only enabled elites to accumulate wealth	Mas Group expanded from edible oils to pulp and paper William Socijadjaja Group diversified into banking and real estate banking and real estate and state and state banking a	financing over 42% of total exports the industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand Pornprapha • Siam Motors		
Narrow industrial base			2000 2000: 3 main export commodities constituted 64.7% of total exports	1980s 1980s: 70-80% of export revenues came from primary exports, predominantly from petroleum, plywood and rubber 1980: Oil revenues contributed to 70% of export earnings			1986: Total Business Centre Since 1986: More than 60 MNCs have set up headquarters here, including firms in the electronics, construction, transportation and pharmaceutical sectors

Argument	Thailand	Indonesia	Malaysia	The Philippines	Singapore	Burma	Vietnam		
1996 growth	5.5	8.0	8.6	5.7	6.9	6.7	9.3		
	Economic Exposure								

Argument	Thailand	Indonesia	Malaysia	The Philippines	Singapore	Burma	Vietnam
Trade exposure					Mid-1990s: ASEAN trade • ASEAN accounted for more than 25% of Singapore's exports	By 1994: Banned 28 exports • E.g. teak, rice, oil, gems • These constituted the bulk of what Burma produced and traded!	1995: Trade volume was \$11bn • Less than 10% of Thailand's and 5% of Singapore's
	'		Fir	nancial Weaknesses	'		
Unrregulated financial liberalisation	 1990: Acceptance of IMF's Article VIII Removed all controls on forex transactions 1993: Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) Served as a conduit for short-term lending rather than fulfilling its regulatory purpose 42 licenses for forex activities were granted Thai banks were allowed to keep bad debt for 12 months without reporting 	October 1988 Reform Package - Loosened requirements for banking lecenses - In two years, over 40 new private banks were given licenses - 1988-94: Number of banks doubled from 124 to 244 BUPN - Government body to collect overdue debts, but failed to monitor the provision of credit - Liem's Sank Central Asia was owed 60% of its loan portfolio y other Liem companies, detk that was unikely to be repaid	1989 Banking and Financial Institutions Act Compelled Malaysian financial institutions to show the central bark BMM that they had sound financial practices and sufficient reserves Required BNM permission for toragn borrowing Published annual reports disclosing the level of non-performing loans	 1996: Boasted the lowest leverage ratio of 6.9 Compared to the double-digit leverage of Thailand, indonesia and Malaysia 1997: 45% of all liabilities were to Philippine nationals Compared to Thailand's 1% Since 1980s: Only 4 foreign banks and 1 local bank entered the market 	Since 1975: Reserve and liquid asset requirements • 6% reserves requirement for banks • Liquid asset requirements of 15% and 10% for banks and finance companies respectively		
High domestic interest rates	Interest rates on dollar loans were 4-6% lower than baht loans 1997: Only 1% of loans were owed to domestic nationals					T	
Fixed exchange rates	Since 1984: Pegged to a basket of currencies, including a large share of USD					*	
Indebtedness / %	53	57	40	50	8		
ST loans / %	66	59	56	<20			
1991-93 stock market increases / %	56	37	50	58	63*		
Stock market bubbles	1997 Trading in the shares of Finance One, Thailand's largest finance company, was suspended amid fears of default		 Overvalued stock market at 300% of GDP, making it the third-largest in Asia 				
Property bubbles	 8-20% of all commercial loans in Thailand went to the property sector 	 1994-97 Property loans grew by 35%, comprising 20% of all loans 	 Property loans accounted for 45-55% of all loans 1998 	 Real estate loans were limited to 20% of the bank's portfolio and 60% of the property value 	1996 • Decisively cooled property demand by introducing a 30-month deadline for property developers to		

Argument	Thailand	Indonesia	Malaysia	The Philippines	Singapore	Burma	Vietnam
	1996-97 • 1.5m sqm of office space became available on the Bangkok market 1997: Somprasong Land		 Total office space was expected to rise by 55% 		complete construction, alongside a new stamp duty for those who sold property within 3 years of purchase		
	 Property giant Somprasong Land defaulted on interest payments for a \$3.1bn loan 						
			Ec	onomic Weaknesses			
Overprotection	1985 • Effective rate of protection for Thai manufacturing was 52% • Twice that of Malaysia and the Philippines 1987-96 • Thai firms' productivity fell by 50% Mid-19905 • 70% increase in real wages	1997: Astra and Indomobil • In the automobile industry, Astra and Indomobil domination and high tariffs of 100-300% on imports limited the growth of engines					
Current account position	-7.9	-3.3	-4.9	-4.7	15.7		
	,		Gov	ernance Weaknesses			
Ballouts	1983-66 • Whon three leading Thai banks ran into trouble, the government suppled over 12b baht 1996: Bangkok Bank of Commerce Received 120bn baht in bailouts a Saxena had lies with the "Group of 16" • This is no split of the fact that it had engaged in fraud/unte behaviour, making bad loans to Chat Thai politicians 1997: Bank of Thailand provided over 1 trillion baht in bailouts		Mid 1980s • 3 Malaysian banks deemed too weak were forced to reduce scale and capital educe scale and capital 				
Lack of accountability	1996: Bangkok Bank of Commerce • Received 120bn baht in bailouts as Saxena had ties with the "Group of 16" • This is in spite of the fact	1992: Bank Summa Even though Bank Summa made 55% of total loans to insiders, flouting the 10% limit on related party lending, none of its management and					

Argument	Thailand	Indonesia	Malaysia	The Philippines	Singapore	Burma	Vietnam
	that it had engaged in fraud/uet behaviour, making bad loans to Chat Thai politicians	shareholders were punished 1994: Bapindo • State bank Bapindo sustained losses as it made large loans to the Golden Key Group despite Eddy Tansil, a principal shareholder, having no experience in petrochemicals • No punishment				-	
1998 Corruption Report	1.61			2.40			
				External Events			
Appreciation of the USD	1996-97: USD gained 35% relative to Bank of Thailand had spent \$2	o the Japanese yen 20bn defending the baht in the first half o	of 1997				
Rise of competitors	1993: Formation of NAFTA • Reduced barriers to trade in N	lorth America made Southeast Asian exp	ports less competitive				
		uan made Chinese exports more comp for exporters, further strengthening Chir					
	1995: Weakening of the Japanese e	conomy made Japanese exports mor	e competitive				
Speculation	George Soros Soros spent \$1bn shorting the baht, forcing the Bank of Thailand to spend \$2000 defending the baht in the first half of 1997 Mahathir singled out Ceorge Soros as a key speculator that attacked the ringgit						
				Responses			
Constrained by vested interests	Six-party coalition government! Chart Pattana opposition • Mar 1997: FM Amnuay identified 10 weak firms for copial base strengthening, but Chart Pattana politicians collapsed the plan since they had vested interests • June 1997: New FM Thanong altempted to scompanies, but Chart Pattana politicians once again resisted the plan Failed petrot tax • Thanong attempted to impose a petrol tax to demanded by IMF austerfly measures, but this was	Suharto's cronyism! Flipflop on infrastructural projects Orginally postponed large-scale infrastructural projects totalling 39 tillion rupiah, but gave the green light to eight of these projects in November Reopening of banks I fis banks were originally of back, but the two worked by his family were soon reopened Bambang Suharto sued the government for closing his bank and transferred the assets to another bank 1998 Budget					

Argument	Thailand	Indonesia	Malaysia	The Philippines	Singapore	Burma	Vietnam
	resisted and overturned FM Thanong resigned, and PM Chavait followed in November Thaliand went through 4 FMs in 6 months during the crisis	Made no mention of plans to combat cronyism, indicating that Subnato was not serious about reform Social Adata Subnatorial Filled by cronies and family, with Tutut the Minister for Trade Trade					
Pre-emptive response			Aug 1997: Bank Negara Malaysia gave up defending the ringgit abruptly • Compare to Singapore's managed depreciation! • Credit ratings fell from investment grade to junk • KLSE and the ringgit lost more than 50% of their values	May-June 1997: Proemptive rate hikes Raised interest rates by 1.75% and 2% to cool the overheating economy, taking early action to avert crisis 11 July 1997: Early pivot away from defanding the peg Gave up defending the peso early, after devoting SZbn out of its \$110n in reserves This came only 9 days after Thailand abandoned its peg	Managed depreciation • MAS permitted a managed depreciation of the SCD by 20%, ensuring its financial stability while preserving reserves		
Damage mitigation / stabilising policies			Sept 1998: Capital controls Fixed the exchange rate at RM.38.00 to 1 USD, preventing short-selling RM500 and 1000 notes were removed from All Malaysian overeas investments of RM10.000 or more needed approval Travellers into and out of Malaysia were not allowed to carry more than RM1000 Trading curbs on the 100 component stocks of the KL Composite Index		Liberalised financial sector Halved the minimum cash balance for banks from 6% to 3% to allow them greater flexibility \$10.5bn cost cutting package contribution to CPF from 20% to 10% Introduced a monthly variable component to wages to enhance employer flexibility with wage bills 40% property tax rebate and 10% corporate tax rebate introduced to boost respective sectors		
Financial restructuring	Oct 1997 Aid Package • Financial Sector Restructuring Authority was established Chuan Leekpal's reforms • 56 of 91 insolvent finance companies were shuttered	Jan 1998: Presidential Decree No. 27 • Established the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency Habible's reforms • 1999: State closed 66 insolvent banks and took	Regulations against non-performing loans Government investment arm Danaharta bought non-performing loans Apr 1999: Banks were not permitted to lend to controlling stakeholders				

Argument	Thailand	Indonesia	Malaysia	The Philippines	Singapore	Burma	Vietnam
IMF measures	4 banks were taken over by the government Bankruptov jegialaion was arended to make it easier to liquidate companies Forced banks to make full disclosure of bad loans Oct 1997 Aid Package MiF aid package worth	over 12 others 1999: Bank Indonesia, the central bank, was given full independence from political interference Dec 1999: Financial Sector Policy Committee • Designed to lead Indonesia's financial restructuring efforts Oct 1997 Aid Package • IMF aid package worth	1999: IMF filpflop • IMF commended Malaysia	Mar 1998 • IMF aid package worth			
	 \$17bn was agreed upon Financial Sector Restructuring Authority was established But high interest rates prescribed to stem capital flight put greater financial flight put greater financial or the brink of insolvency, increasing the risk of default IMF package seen as aid to the rich 	\$37bn was agreed upon But removed subsidies on key goods like fuel and electricity, exacerbaing social unrest and political instability But high inters frates But high inters frates but high inters frates flight put greater financial pressure on banks already on the brink of insolvency, increasing the risk of default 1998; Rupiah reached its lowest rate in July Feb 2000 Aid Package • New agreement with the IMF to provide S5bn in capital	for its implementation of capital controls, a move it condemned a year earlier	 \$1.3bn was agreed upon But high interest rates prescribed to stem capital hight put greater financial pressure or banks already on the brink of insolveroy, increasing the risk of default 1999: Peso reached its lowest rate in September 			
				Consequences			
Quarters in recession	6	5	5	3	2	0	0
1998 GDP growth	-7.6	-13.1	-7.4	-0.5	-2.2	5.8	5.8
Jul-Jan currency depreciation	-55	-84	-45	-39	-19		
Stock market collapse	-76 (Bangkok SET)	-65 (Jakarta SE Composite)	-79 (KL Composite)	-67 (SE Composite)	-62 (Straits Times Index)		
Capital flight		1997-98: \$200bn					
Increasing inequality	 Household expenditure for rural populations fell by 3%, while urban expenditures increased by 3.8% 			1996-98 • Richest decile's income share increased by 3.6%, while the poorest 5 deciles' share declined by 2.3%			
Uneven impact	1996-98 In central Thailand, rural incomes grew by 13% while	 While household expenditure fell 30% and 					

Argument	Thailand	Indonesia	Malaysia	The Philippines	Singapore	Burma	Vietnam
	urban incomes fell by 10%	42% in Jakarta and West Java respectively, it only fell 10% in rural Sumatra					
1998 Agricultural growth	3.1	1.7					
1996-98 Construction employment	-34	-16	-13	-8			
1996-98 Unemployment	+3.3	+2.4	+4.2	+5.9	-0.7		
Poverty	1996-2000 Poverty rates climbed from 35% to 42%	1998 Poverty rates climbed from 10% to 14% 1998 Half the population fell below the poverty line, with per capita GNP shrnking from \$1200 to \$450					
Education cuts	1998 Education budgets declined 6% in accordance with IMF guidelines	1998 Dropout rates for male youth increased by 46%, or 80% in the poorest quartile		1997-99 • Secondary school enrolment fell by 7.9%			
Crime	1998 Crime rates increased 25.7% relative to 1997, including murder and theft	May 1998 Pogroms • Tens of thousands of Chinese fled Indonesia • Over a thousand were killed 1998 Looting • Coffee plants in East Java were looted, leading to a 20% decrease in revenue					
Social instability	Oct 21 Demonstrations • Thousands of white-collar workers gathered outside Parliament House Parliament House public call from the King for restraint	May 1998 Pogroms • Tens of thousands of Chinese filed Indonesia • Over a thousand were killed May 1998: Trisakti University protests violently suppressed, killing 4 students • Trisakti University protests violently suppressed, killing 4 students • Resultant rioling in Jakarta left 500 dead Outer Islands tensions • 1999: Conflict broke out between Christian and Muslim communities in the Maluku Islands					

Argument	Thailand	Indonesia	Malaysia	The Philippines	Singapore	Burma	Vietnam
		 1999: Dayaks and Malays attacked ethnic Madurese migrants in West Kalimantan 					
Political upheaval	Oct 1997: FM Thanong resigned • Thailand went through 4 FMs in 6 months during the crisis Nov 1997: PM Chavalit resigned	May 1998: Suharto resigned • Trisakti University protests violenty suppressed, killing 4 students R esculant noting in Jakarta left 500 dead signalling bis intention to run for President 4 months priort	1996: Anwar vs Mahathir Anwar and his supporters decried comption, cronyism and nepolism under Mahathir's rule Anwar advocatellife ioans with tathched conditions of austerity, while Mahathir found fMF ioans urpalatable Sept 1996: Mahathir fired Anwar and expelled him from U.NNO, having him arrested for corruption and sodomy Anwar's supporters formed the Reformasi movement 1999: Anwar's suf bounded the National Justice Party, forming the coalition Barisan Alternatif with other opposition parties to challenge Mahathir in the electors	1998 Elections • Estrada peacefully succeeded Ramos without incident	2001 Elections • PAP secured 75% of the vole, up from 65% 4 years earlier		
	·	·		Recovery			
Return to strong positive growth	1999 • 4% GDP growth	2000 • 4.9% GDP growth	1999 6.1% GDP growth	1999 3.3% GDP growth	1999 5.4% GDP growth		
Stock market recovery			2007 • Reached 1997 levels only in 2007				
Stopped drawing on IMF loans	Sept 1999 • Used only \$14bn out of the offered \$17bn in aid	2004 • Indicates the prolonged nature of the economic crisis					
				Legacy			
Financial restructuring	Oct 1997 Aid Package Financial Sector Restructuring Authority was established Sector Chuan Leekpai's reforms 56 of 91 insolvent finance companies were shuttered 4 banks were taken over by the government Bankrupcy legislation was amended to make it easier to liquidate companies Financial Companies	Jan 1998: Presidential Decree No. 27 Established the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency Habibie's reforms 1999: State closed 66 insolvent banks and took over 12 others 1999: Bank Indonesia, the central bank, was given full indergendence from political indergenence	Regulations against non-performing loans Government investment arm Danaharta bought non-performing loans Apr 1999: Banks were not permitted to lend to controlling stakeholders				

esia	Malaysia	The Philippines	Singapore
al Sector Policy lead Indonesia's tructuring efforts			
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Elections ould be freely			
nilitary in			

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