



DUNMAN HIGH SCHOOL
Year 6 Preliminary Examination 2008

HISTORY

8814/01
9731/01

Paper 1 International History, 1945-2000

19 September 2008

3 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Paper
Cover Page

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name on all the work you hand in.
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.
Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer any **three** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.
All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

Section A

UN AND PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

1 Read the sources, and then answer the question.

Source A

12. The new breed of intra-state conflicts have certain characteristics that present United Nations peace-keepers with challenges not encountered since the Congo operation of the early 1960s.

44. In these circumstances, I have come to the conclusion that the United Nations does need to give serious thought to the idea of a rapid reaction force. Such a force would be the Security Council's strategic reserve for deployment when there was an emergency need for peace-keeping troops. The value of this arrangement would of course depend on how far the Security Council could be sure that the force would actually be available in an emergency. This will be a complicated and expensive arrangement, but I believe that the time has come to undertake it.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 'A Supplement to an Agenda for Peace', UN Report, 1995

Source B

For the government of the United States the events in Somalia were a watershed in its policy towards UN peacekeeping. By May 1994, when the genocide in Rwanda began, President Clinton had enacted a directive which placed strict conditions on US support for United Nations peacekeeping.

It has been stated repeatedly during the course of the interviews conducted by the Inquiry that the fact that Rwanda was not of strategic importance to Third world countries and that the international community exercised double standards when faced with the risk of a catastrophe there compared to action taken elsewhere.

*'Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the UN during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda'
commissioned by the UN in 2000*

Source C

It is already fourteen years since we witnessed the genocide in Rwanda, in which hundreds of thousands of people were hacked to death. But we can never forget – certainly I can never forget – how a UN peacekeeping force, which was neither mandated nor equipped to fight a war, found itself in the midst of that ultimate nightmare and unable to stop the slaughter. I undertook to acknowledge on behalf of the United Nations this failure and express deep remorse. At the request of the General Assembly I conducted a searching inquiry into the failure at Srebrenica, and on my own authority I commissioned an independent inquiry into the UN's actions during the Rwanda genocide. It was a moment of truth for the entire international community. It brought us face to face with our limitations.

Kofi Annan in a speech in 2008

Source D

Public revulsion in the United States forced a luckless Clinton administration to withdraw its troops from Somalia, a horrible failure. Subsequent peacekeeping everywhere had been put under a cloud. And relations between the UN and its most powerful member plummeted to a new low. Angry Congressmen stated that never again should “American boys” be placed under UN command, and they sought to embarrass their own government by withholding funds to the world body. Boutros-Ghali was never trusted by Washington again.

With regard to Bosnia, the problem was that none of the European armed services, not even the French and the British, had the logistical and military power to carry out the mission (UNPROFOR) in the face of rising local violence. The United States was pushing for serious air strikes to deter the Serbs, but the Europeans were bitterly opposed to the idea, because their lightly-armed peacekeepers were surrounded by murderous, heavily-armed belligerents, whereas the Americans adamantly refused to commit troops.

Paul Kennedy, a historian, in 2006

Source E

The lack of any UN system or resources for enforcement action dictated the need for the US-led alliance to achieve the goals of the Security Council in the Gulf, and later on in Somalia. Does this mean the Security Council is never to have some capacity to realize the most important provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter? The obvious point at which to start building such a capacity would be the Military Staff Committee, suitably supplemented to represent the changes in military and economic power since 1945; but there appears at present to be no interest whatsoever among the five Permanent Members in using the Military Staff Committee to provide the Security Council with at least some capacity for staff work and contingency planning under Chapter VII. The UN continues to lack a capacity of its own to mount an armed police action.

An essay by Brian Urquhart, published in 2007

Now answer the following question:

How far do Sources A – E show that the UN’s ineffectiveness in peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era was due to a lack of a permanent UN military organisation?

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

- 2 How did the opening of the Soviet archives after 1991 affect the debate about the origins of the Cold War?
- 3 Consider the view that the Cold War ended not because of American containment policy but because of the USSR's decision to stop fighting.
- 4 How far do you agree that the end of the Bretton Woods system was the turning point in the global economy from 1945 to 2000?
- 5 'Japan's economic success and its problems were more to do with domestic policies than the changing nature of the international economy.' How far do you agree with this view?
- 6 Why did attempts at solving the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1947 onwards fail?