


Name: _____ Class: _____



RIVER VALLEY HIGH SCHOOL
YEAR 6 Preliminary Examinations
in preparation for General Certificate of Education Advanced Level
Higher 2

HISTORY

Paper 1 International History, 1945 - 2000

9731

10 September 2012

3 hours

No Additional Materials are required.

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your index number and name on all the work you hand in.
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.
You may use a soft pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working.
Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer any **three** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work for each section securely.
All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

This document consists of **4** printed pages.



[Turn over

Section A

You must answer Question 1.

UN Peacekeeping and the United States

- 1) Read the sources and answer the question which follows.

When answering **Question 1**, candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group.

Source A

“The doctrines of both the United States and the United Nations were also clearly affected. President Clinton issued a policy directive in April 1994, shortly after U.S. forces left Somalia, that implied a sharp curtailment of American involvement in future armed humanitarian interventions and that marked a retreat from his administration's earlier rhetoric of assertive multilateralism. Similarly, in the 1995 (second) edition of *An Agenda for Peace*, the fundamental policy document on U.N. peacekeeping, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed less optimism about the possibilities for intervention than he did in the 1992 (first) edition, largely because of the United Nations' searing experience in Somalia. Continuing efforts by congressmen to cut or restrict U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping are also a direct response to the perceived failures in Somalia.”

Walter Clarke, former Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy, Somalia, 1996

Source B

“France's objective interests in Haiti were modest. Not surprisingly, as a result, the attention of its government to the Haitian crisis waxed and waned. In some countries, the national interest in Haiti was both constant and substantively consistent. For example, Canada saw in the Haiti crisis a critical test case for the Santiago Declaration and for a new democratic order in the Western hemisphere. It also saw in the crisis an opportunity to play a leading international role in a regional arena where it could do so, and a leadership role in keeping with its new membership in the Organization of American States...

Under [Venezuelan President Rafael] Caldera, the government seemed more concerned with reassuring Venezuela's own armed forces and to forestall a US-led military intervention in the Hemisphere than to buttress democracy in Haiti....

China eventually developed a strong interest in the crisis, seeing in it an opportunity to use its leverage as a UNSC permanent member to undermine [Haitian President] Aristide's relationship with Taipei, thus serving its foremost foreign policy objective, the diplomatic containment of Taiwan.”

David Malone, Canada's representative to the UN, 1998

Source C

A second reason for the consensus to reduce the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)'s role was that no country was willing to contribute its troops for an expanded operation or mandate. Although there was a brief discussion concerning the possibility of UNAMIR's intervening to halt the escalating bloodshed and to protect the civilian populations, I was (and still am) unaware of a single member state who offered their troops for such an operation. Consequently, those on the Security Council, largely the non-permanent members, who were arguing for an intervention force, had little ammunition. The Secretariat, who would be responsible for carrying out the mandate, was silent, and silence was widely interpreted as disapproval. No troop contributors were volunteering for an expanded force. Indeed, soon after the death of its soldiers, Belgium, which represented the backbone of UNAMIR, announced its immediate withdrawal, and no state offered replacement.

Michael N Barnett, former political officer, US mission to the United Nations, 1997

Source D

US participation in the United Nations Mission in Haiti was slow, conditioned by the debacle in Somalia in October 1993, and an initial rebuff of US and Canadian peacekeepers at Port-au-Prince in the same month. However the Clinton administration came under pressure from civil rights groups who objected to the fact that Haitians fleeing to the US were either repatriated or housed at the US base at Guantanamo, Cuba, whereas Cuban refugees were admitted to the US under the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act. The US Congress demanded that the Clinton Administration not only solve the unequal treatment of Haitian refugees, but also address the root cause for the refugees, the Haitian political system.”

An American historian, 2005

Source E

“Saving the lives of strangers caught in a maelstrom of violence is highly dependent on the gains that serve the national interests of states acting as humanitarian heroes. The willingness of Australia to lead the [UN operation in East Timor, INTERFET] was used to camouflage its self-serving goals. To advance its interests, Australia was left with no other option except to engage itself in East Timor and there could be no better way to attain these objectives than to exploit the humanitarian needs of the East Timorese people. Though the greater economic, political and geostrategic interests provide incentives for intervention, these interests are often cleverly camouflaged by moral imperatives. In order to gain support and legitimacy of the humanitarian intervention, Australia had to take the higher moral ground of saving East Timor instead of openly pursuing its selfish goals, otherwise the intervention would have had great difficulty in gaining international acceptance and support.

Australia had to address the East Timor intervention with tact and diplomatic skill. A unilateral intervention by Australia was out of the question, given its potential for regional and global condemnation no matter how carefully it is couched in humanitarian terms. The only way to go was through the United Nations and in building a coalition of willing states. Australia had the most to gain from stability in East Timor, thus it decided to lead the INTERFET and largely foot the operation’s bill, as well as committing the largest troop contingent.”

A South Korean political scientist, 2011.

Now answer the following question:

How far do sources A through E show that US support is necessary for successful UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era?

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

- 2 Assess the view that, “the Cuban Missile Crisis was an unmitigated success for the Soviet Union.”
- 3 “The failure of the policy of Détente is the critical factor in the demise of the Soviet Union.” How far do you agree?
- 4 Japan’s economic miracle can be explained, almost entirely, by the United States’ dominance of the global economy in the post-war era. How far do you agree?
- 5 To what extent was the Bretton-Woods system ultimately a victim of its own success?
- 6 Since 1971, religious fundamentalism has made the Kashmir conflict unresolvable. Discuss.