



ST ANDREW'S JUNIOR COLLEGE
JC2 Preliminary Examination
General Certificate of Education Advanced Level
Higher 2

HISTORY

9752/01

Paper 1 Shaping the International Order, 1945-2000

3 September 2019

3 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Paper

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name and class on all the work you hand in.
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.
You may use a soft pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working.
Do not use paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer **two** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.
The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers.

Question No.	Marks
Section A	
1 (a)	/ 10
1 (b)	/ 30
Section B	
	/30
	/30
Total Marks:	/100

This document consists of 5 printed pages.

Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

THE END OF BIPOLARITY

1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow.

Source A

Our relations with socialist countries, including the allies of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, entered a difficult, critical stage. The transition to the principle of equality and mutual responsibility, which began in April 1985, gave us an opportunity to remove many layers and eliminate perceptions of our conservatism. Perestroika, the development of democratization, and glasnost, confirmed the role of the Soviet Union as the leader in the process of socialist renewal. More and more, we are influencing our friends by our own example, by political means.

The European socialist countries found themselves in a powerful magnetic field of the economic growth and social well-being of the Western European states. As a consequence, in a number of socialist countries, the process of rejection of the existing political institutions and the ideological values by the societies is already underway now.

Authoritarian methods and direct pressure have clearly outlived themselves. In the political sphere, even in the case of a sharp deterioration of the situation in one of the countries—and we cannot exclude such a possibility today—it is very unlikely that we would be able to employ the methods of 1956 and 1968, both as a matter of principle, but also because of unacceptable consequences. Therefore, essentially, our only methods of leverage could be our political and economic ties.

Memorandum from the CPSU's International Department, February 1989.

Source B

The Kremlin's pregnant silence these days, as Poland prepares to install its first non-Communist government since the early postwar years, is widely taken for tacit acceptance of the new Polish reality. That is probably right, but the silence should not be mistaken for indifference. Quietly, Moscow has sought and received assurances that the new Polish Government will maintain its ties to Moscow, especially its membership in the Warsaw Pact. Moscow's deliberate calm is the clearest evidence to date that the so-called Brezhnev doctrine has given way to a more practical and flexible approach that might be called the Gorbachev doctrine. Since February 1986, when Mr Gorbachev proclaimed "unconditional respect" for the right of every country "to choose the paths and forms of its development," the Soviet leader has become steadily more categorical in retracting meddling in the affairs of his neighbours.

From an article in the New York Times, 21 August 1989.

Source C

The defense policy of the United States is based on a simple premise: The United States does not start fights. We will never be an aggressor. We maintain our strength in order to deter and defend against aggression -- to preserve freedom and peace. For 20 years the Soviet Union has been accumulating enormous military might. They didn't stop when their forces exceeded all requirements of a legitimate defensive capability. And they haven't stopped now. During the past decade and a half, the Soviets have built up a massive arsenal of new strategic nuclear weapons -- weapons that can strike directly at the United States.

[Turn over

Tonight, consistent with our obligations of the ABM treaty and recognizing the need for close cooperation with our allies, I'm taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose -- one all people share -- is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

President Reagan's Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983.

Source D

Common sense also told us that to preserve the peace, we'd have to become strong again after years of weakness and confusion. So, we rebuilt our defenses, and this New Year we toasted the new peacefulness around the globe. Not only have the superpowers actually begun to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons -- and hope for even more progress is bright -- but the regional conflicts that rack the globe are also beginning to cease. The Persian Gulf is no longer a war zone. The Soviets are leaving Afghanistan. The Vietnamese are preparing to pull out of Cambodia, and an American-mediated accord will soon send 50,000 Cuban troops home from Angola.

We must keep up our guard, but we must also continue to work together to lessen and eliminate tension and mistrust. My view is that President Gorbachev is different from previous Soviet leaders. I think he knows some of the things wrong with his society and is trying to fix them. We wish him well. And we'll continue to work to make sure that the Soviet Union that eventually emerges from this process is a less threatening one.

President Reagan's Farewell Address to the Nation, 11 January 1989.

Source E

In 1990, the Berlin Wall was gone, the Warsaw Pact had disintegrated in all but name, and the Soviet Union was only months away from ceasing to exist as a nation. The United States won what was, for all practical purposes, the 'third world war.' Far from being accidental or, conversely, inevitable, this foreign policy triumph arguably resulted from a coherent strategic vision forged and implemented by American policy makers; a triumph of the West, and a triumph for the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan.

This track consisted of three major components: the military buildup, the re-establishment of containment, and the solidification of America's alliances. The Vietnam War had shattered the policy of containment. Only in the vacuum of American neo-isolationism was the string of Soviet advances from 1975 to 1980 possible. Thus, in the 1980s it was imperative for the United States to re-establish the credibility of containment. Reagan faced the most crucial test in Central America, from Nicaragua to El Salvador. The administration also developed a policy of attempting to roll back the periphery of the Soviet empire by assisting anti-Communist guerrillas.

From a journal article "Ronald Reagan and the Defeat of the Soviet Empire", 1997.

Source F

[Turn over



*Person in centre is Erich Honecker

By a Dutch-German cartoonist on the situation in the German Democratic Republic, 1989.

Now answer the following questions:

- (a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B on Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe. [10]
- (b) How far do Sources A-F support the assertion that the Cold War ended because the US won it? [30]

Section B**[Turn over**

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

EITHER

- 2** 'State, rather than non-state actors, facilitated the economic success of Taiwan to 1990s.' How far do you agree with this view? [30]

OR

- 3** 'The Crises Decades can be understood solely with reference to the US economy'. Discuss. [30]

AND EITHER

- 4** To what extent did the political effectiveness of the United Nations from 1945 to 2000 depend on great power interests? [30]

OR

- 5** To what extent did the reform of the membership of the Security Council enable it to address the challenge of the rise of regionalism and regional organisations? [30]

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