

**9752/02 H2 History Paper 2 – Prelims**

1. Compare and contrast the evidence provided by Sources A and B on the issue of diversity among the economies of ASEAN's member states.

Level	Marks	Descriptor
L0	0	No evidence submitted or answer does not address the question.
L1	1–3	<p>The answer is likely to be characterised by paraphrasing or quotation and will be largely uncritical. Very simple comparisons may be made and these are not developed (e.g. that one source is a letter and the other is a speech). Answers that are simply based on contextual knowledge, with no source use, should be credited at this level. At the upper end of the level, there may be some attempt to explain how far the sources corroborate and/or differ (i.e. supported with source details), but any explanation will be confused or partial.</p> <p><i>E.g.: Sources A and B agree there was diversity in ASEAN's economies... Source A is from an academic and Source B is from the Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN.</i></p>
L2	4–6	<p>The answer will use both sources. There will be clear explanation on how far the sources corroborate and/or differ (i.e. supported with source details), though insights into why are less likely or are less successful. At the lower end of the level, there may be a tendency to treat the sources separately with most or all of the comparison implicit.</p> <p><i>E.g.: Sources A and B differ in that Source A says the diverse economies managed to 'prevent the organization from taking a coherent and coordinated position on regional financial reform' while Source B maintains that ASEAN 'had withstood and continue to withstand the challenges – both global and regional'. The sources differ because Source A is from an academic who is not from ASEAN and so would criticise the organisation. Source B is from an ASEAN insider and he will speak well of the organisation.</i></p>
L3	7–8	<p>The answer will make good use of both sources. There will be clear explanation on how far the sources corroborate and/or differ. The answer will demonstrate a sense of critical evaluation of the sources and provide some insights into why they are similar and/or different.</p> <p>Answers which argue that the sources entirely agree or disagree with each other (i.e. one sided) but demonstrate critical insight, may also be found in this level. Answers which are uneven (e.g. extracting information from a source at face value, and showing more critical insight in the analysis of the other source) may also be found in this level.</p> <p><i>E.g.: Sources A and B disagree on the impact that the diversity of economies had on ASEAN's regional economic cooperation. While Source A saw diversity as detrimental such that it managed to 'prevent the organization from taking a coherent and coordinated position on regional financial reform', Source B believes ASEAN succeeded despite this diversity because it 'had withstood and continue to withstand the challenges – both global and regional'.</i></p>

**9752/02 H2 History Paper 2 – Prelims**

		<p><i>As B involves the Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN speaking at a large-scale business conference, he would have greater incentive to laud the achievements of ASEAN to boost the confidence businesses would have in the organisation and possibly allow ASEAN to reap economic benefits. However, A is from an academic book and has no such incentive.</i></p> <p><i>Sources A and B agree that the economies in ASEAN were indeed diverse. Source A states that there were 'divergent economic policies and different levels of development' and B echoes this by saying that 'ASEAN members differed in their levels of economic development'.</i></p> <p><i>Both sources offer similar views because there were indeed many countries in ASEAN and they pursued different paths of economic development and this made it such that countries such as Singapore were more developed and others such as Burma lagged behind.</i></p>
L4	9–10	<p>The answer will make full comprehensive use of both sources. There will be clear explanation on how far the sources corroborate and differ. The answer will demonstrate a strong sense of critical evaluation of the sources throughout and provide insights into why they are similar or different.</p> <p><i>E.g.: Sources A and B disagree on the impact that the diversity of economies had on ASEAN's regional economic cooperation. While Source A saw diversity as detrimental such that it managed to 'prevent the organization from taking a coherent and coordinated position on regional financial reform', Source B believes ASEAN succeeded despite this diversity because it 'had withstood and continue to withstand the challenges – both global and regional'.</i></p> <p><i>As B involves the Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN speaking at a large-scale business conference, he would have greater incentive to laud the achievements of ASEAN to boost the confidence businesses would have in the organisation and possibly allow ASEAN to reap economic benefits. In contrast, A is from an academic book written in 2002 and has less incentive than A does to trumpet the achievements of ASEAN. This plausibly results in B discussing the detrimental effects that the diversity of economies has on ASEAN more openly than A does.</i></p> <p><i>Sources A and B agree that there was inherent diversity among the economies of ASEAN and this sometimes resulted in uneven development. Source A states that there were 'divergent economic policies and different levels of development' and B echoes this by saying that 'ASEAN members differed in their levels of economic development' and the economies of the newer ASEAN members were 'in transition and their levels of development are significantly lower than that of the original members'.</i></p> <p><i>Both sources offer similar views because there was indeed substantial diversity among the economies in ASEAN with differences existing already among the capitalist economies with Singapore and Malaysia's economic growth outstripping that of the Philippines and Indonesia in the post-independence period. This diversity was compounded when the relatively</i></p>

**9752/02 H2 History Paper 2 – Prelims**

		<i>closed economies of Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia were added to the mix between 1995 and 1999. These economies from the latest additions to ASEAN tended to be among the weakest as they had pursued ideologies such as socialism that prevented their countries from benefiting more fully from global trade, thus creating a divide between the more advanced capitalist economies and the less advanced ones of the newer members.</i>
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**9752/02 H2 History Paper 2 – Prelims**

1 (b) How far do Sources A-F agree with the view that success was elusive in ASEAN's pursuit of greater regional economic cooperation?

Level	Marks	Descriptor
L0	0	No evidence submitted or answer does not address the question.
L1	1-4	<p>The answer will make limited use of the sources. The sources may be paraphrased or described. Some relevant information from the sources may be extracted at face value to support and/or challenge the hypothesis, but the answer may be confused or undeveloped.</p> <p><i>E.g. Source B shows ASEAN rose above the challenges to achieve regional economic cooperation. Source F shows they agreed to reduce tariffs on many products. Both agree with each other.</i></p> <p><i>Source E is a table of facts and shows ASEAN trade with each other existed so there is economic cooperation.</i></p> <p><i>Source C is from Lee Kuan Yew and he is asking ASEAN to commit to free trade so this is likely to be true.</i></p> <p><i>Source D says that things were bad in the 1970s and 1980s so ASEAN did not achieve cooperation.</i></p>
L2	5-10	<p>The answer will use relevant information from sources at face value to support and/or challenge the hypothesis. Sources may be used in isolation. The answer may demonstrate some awareness of provenance of the sources but evaluation of the sources is unlikely.</p> <p><i>E.g. Sources B and F challenge the view. Source B supports what Source F says, where the Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN highlights that ASEAN leaders responded to the Asian Financial Crisis by '[reducing] reliance on global demand and [increasing] regional trade', leading them to accelerate the actualization of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) from 2003 to 2002. Source F reflects how AFTA reduced ranging from 0% to 5% and adopting 'joint efforts to strengthen free trade promotion and negotiations on ASEAN agricultural products.</i></p> <p><i>Source F, being the 1992 ASEAN declaration that launched AFTA, is a primary source that is factual and shows ASEAN really cooperated.</i></p> <p><i>Source B is from a Deputy Secretary-General speaking at a large-scale business conference, resulting in him saying good things about ASEAN as he is pro-ASEAN.</i></p> <p><i>Source E is a mixed source. It shows that ASEAN-5 trade increased by less than how much they trade with the world, as the latter increased from 180.49 in 1992 to 311.34 in 1995. ASEAN-5 trade with the world significantly overshadowed trade among the ASEAN-5 into the 1990s.</i></p>

**9752/02 H2 History Paper 2 – Prelims**

		<p><i>Sources C supports the hypothesis. In Source C, Lee Kuan Yew acknowledged that more can be done to 'further stimulate intra-ASEAN trade'.</i></p> <p><i>Source D also observes that the 'results from the early economic cooperation initiatives of the late 1970s and the 1980s had been largely disappointing' due in part to 'ASEAN countries with large domestic markets' adopting 'inward looking and protectionist trade and industrial policies.'</i></p>
L3	11-15	<p>The answer will begin to treat sources as a set, although one or two sources may be neglected at the lower level. It will demonstrate some understanding of the question. Some sources may be cross-referenced to support and/or challenge the hypothesis. There will be an attempt to evaluate sources, but the sources will not be placed in context.</p> <p><i>E.g. Sources B and F challenge the view. Source B supports what Source F says, where the Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN highlights that ASEAN leaders responded to the Asian Financial Crisis by '[reducing] reliance on global demand and [increasing] regional trade', leading them to accelerate the actualization of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) from 2003 to 2002. Source F reflects how AFTA reduced ranging from 0% to 5% and adopting 'joint efforts to strengthen free trade promotion and negotiations on ASEAN agricultural products.'</i></p> <p><i>Source F, being the 1992 ASEAN declaration that launched AFTA, is a primary source that is factual and shows ASEAN really cooperated.</i></p> <p><i>Source B is from a Deputy Secretary-General speaking at a large-scale business conference, resulting in him saying good things about ASEAN as he is pro-ASEAN.</i></p> <p><i>Source E corroborates with Source A as ASEAN did not always succeed at regional economic cooperation. ASEAN-5 trade with the world increased from 180.49 in 1992 to 311.34 in 1995. ASEAN-5 trade with the world significantly overshadowed trade among the ASEAN-5 into the 1990s. Source A notes that when the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 hit the region, the new ASEAN member states whose economies were weaker than those of the original members 'pulled back from liberalization'.</i></p> <p><i>Sources C and D support the hypothesis. In Source C, Lee Kuan Yew acknowledged that more can be done to 'further stimulate intra-ASEAN trade'. Similarly, Source D observes that the 'results from the early economic cooperation initiatives of the late 1970s and the 1980s had been largely disappointing' due in part to 'ASEAN countries with large domestic markets' adopting 'inward looking and protectionist trade and industrial policies.'</i></p> <p><i>Sources A, D and E are credible. Sources A and D are by academics who would have done research and analyse with hindsight. Source D is based on facts and numbers always tell the truth.</i></p>

L4	16-20	<p>The answer will treat sources as a set and make very good use of the sources. It will demonstrate a good understanding of the question. Sources may be cross-referenced to support and/or challenge the hypothesis. The answer will demonstrate a critical evaluation of the sources in context to support and challenge the hypothesis (that is, balanced).</p> <p><i>E.g. Sources B and F challenge the view as they suggest that ASEAN had economic cooperation. Source F<sup>1</sup> was ASEAN's declaration on the adoption of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992. Thus, Source F reflects how AFTA reduced ranging from 0% to 5% and adopting 'joint efforts to strengthen free trade promotion and negotiations on ASEAN agricultural products. Source B supports what Source F says, where the Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN highlights that ASEAN leaders responded to the Asian Financial Crisis by '[reducing] reliance on global demand and [increasing] regional trade', leading them to accelerate the actualization of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) from 2003 to 2002. Both sources convey the idea that AFTA was a viable mechanism for engendering and ensuring greater regional economic cooperation within ASEAN.</i></p> <p><i>Source F, being the 1992 ASEAN declaration that launched AFTA, is reliable for showing that ASEAN members agreed in the area of regional economic cooperation. Source B has an incentive to disproportionately highlight the achievements of ASEAN as it is from a Deputy Secretary-General speaking at a large-scale business conference, plausibly resulting in his desire to emphasise how ASEAN has made significant strides in economic cooperation despite the diversity. Thus, it appears less likely that ASEAN was successful in its pursuit of regional economic cooperation.</i></p> <p><i>Source E agrees with B on the notion of ASEAN success. The idea of sharing 'one common vision' as referenced in B and the commitment to 'joint efforts to strengthen trade promotion and negotiations on ASEAN agricultural products' plausibly manifested in intra-ASEAN trade more than doubling between 1995 when ASEAN-5 trade amongst themselves stood at 33.51 and shot up to 69.95 in 1995. Thus, these figures in E corroborate the idea in B that ASEAN members increased regional economic cooperation in the face of the AFC.</i></p> <p><i>However, Source E ultimately supports the hypothesis as it corroborates with Source A in reflecting the ASEAN did not always succeed at regional economic cooperation. While trade among the ASEAN-5 may have increased from 33.51 to 69.95 from 1995 to 1998 but in the same period, ASEAN-5 trade with the world increased from 180.49 in 1992 to 311.34 in 1995. Thus, ASEAN-5 trade with the world significantly overshadowed trade among the ASEAN-5 into the 1990s and this dilutes the notion that ASEAN was successful in fostering regional economic cooperation. The great disparity between intra-ASEAN trade figures vis-à-vis ASEAN-5's trade with the world could be explained by A as it highlights how protectionism compromised ASEAN's pursuit of regional economic cooperation. Source A notes that when the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 hit the region,</i></p>
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<sup>1</sup> Note that F is analysed before B to show awareness of the chronology between sources, which is then used to show how they convey a common idea related to the hypothesis.

		<p><i>the new ASEAN member states whose economies were weaker than those of the original members ‘pulled back from liberalization’. For example, Vietnam ‘delayed efforts to liberalize state-owned industry’.</i></p> <p><i>Sources C and D support the hypothesis by suggesting that protectionism was prevalent in the 1970s and the 1980s, thus impeding greater regional economic cooperation in ASEAN. In Source C, Lee Kuan Yew acknowledged that more can be done to ‘further stimulate intra-ASEAN trade’ and cautions ASEAN members against following ‘the paths which resorted to protectionism to solve their immediate problems.’ Similarly, Source D observes that the ‘results from the early economic cooperation initiatives of the late 1970s and the 1980s had been largely disappointing’ due in part to ‘ASEAN countries with large domestic markets’ adopting ‘inward looking and protectionist trade and industrial policies.’</i></p> <p><i>Sources A, D and E provide credible support for the idea that ASEAN’s pursuit of regional economic cooperation was elusive. Unlike Source B, they have less incentive to disproportionately credit or discredit the economic achievements of ASEAN. Significantly, Source E shows that ASEAN’s commitment to greater economic cooperation as seen in the Singapore Declaration of 1992 in Source F did not translate into economic success, where ASEAN-5 trade continued to pale greatly in comparison to ASEAN-5 trade with the world. A and D’s credibility are enhanced by the first-hand account of Source C where Lee Kuan Yew echoes the view of both sources that protectionism was hurting ASEAN. Lee Kuan Yew was well-placed to comment on the impediments that were preventing ASEAN from achieving a higher level of economic cooperation.</i></p>
L5	21-25	<p>The answer will treat sources as a set and make very good use of the sources. It will demonstrate a good understanding of the question. Sources may be cross-referenced to support and/or challenge the hypothesis. The answer will demonstrate a critical evaluation of the sources in context to support and challenge the hypothesis (that is, balanced).</p> <p><i>E.g. Sources B and F challenge the view as they suggest that ASEAN had adopted measures that facilitated a higher level of economic cooperation. Source F<sup>2</sup> was ASEAN’s declaration on the adoption of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992. Thus, Source F reflects ASEAN’s commitment to heightened economic cooperation as members committed to using the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme to establish AFTA by reducing tariffs ranging from 0% to 5% and adopting ‘joint efforts to strengthen free trade promotion and negotiations on ASEAN agricultural products. Source B shows the materialisation of the AFTA that was declared in Source F, where the Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN highlights that ASEAN leaders responded to the Asian Financial Crisis by ‘[reducing] reliance on global demand and [increasing] regional trade’, leading them to accelerate the actualization of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) from 2003 to 2002. Both sources convey the idea that AFTA was a viable mechanism for engendering and ensuring greater regional economic cooperation within ASEAN.</i></p>

<sup>2</sup> Note that F is analysed before B to show awareness of the chronology between sources, which is then used to show how they convey a common idea related to the hypothesis.

		<p><i>Source F, being the 1992 ASEAN declaration that launched AFTA, demonstrates the willingness of ASEAN members in committing to freer intra-regional trade in principle but this explicit commitment was compromised by ASEAN members' protectionist leanings. Source B has an incentive to disproportionately highlight the achievements of ASEAN as it is from a Deputy Secretary-General speaking at a large-scale business conference, plausibly resulting in his desire to emphasise how ASEAN has made significant strides in economic cooperation despite the diversity. Source B's credibility is further undermined by the fact that the economic achievements of AFTA were uneven at best, with several members choosing to adopt protectionist measures and this resulted in it needing to be relaunched in 1993. Thus, it appears less likely that ASEAN was successful in its pursuit of regional economic cooperation.</i></p> <p><i>Source E echoes some views in B and F on the notion of ASEAN success by highlighting how AFTA resulted in greater regional economic cooperation. The idea of sharing 'one common vision' as referenced in B and the commitment to 'joint efforts to strengthen trade promotion and negotiations on ASEAN agricultural products' plausibly manifested in intra-ASEAN trade more than doubling between 1995 when ASEAN-5 trade amongst themselves stood at 33.51 and shot up to 69.95 in 1995. Thus, these figures in E corroborate the idea in B that ASEAN members increased regional economic cooperation in the face of the AFC and reflects how the declaration in F materialised into increased economic cooperation within ASEAN.</i></p> <p><i>However, Source E ultimately supports the hypothesis as it corroborates with Source A in reflecting the ASEAN did not always succeed at regional economic cooperation. While trade among the ASEAN-5 may have increased from 33.51 to 69.95 from 1995 to 1998 but in the same period, ASEAN-5 trade with the world increased from 180.49 in 1992 to 311.34 in 1995. Thus, ASEAN-5 trade with the world significantly overshadowed trade among the ASEAN-5 into the 1990s and this dilutes the notion that ASEAN was successful in fostering regional economic cooperation. The great disparity between intra-ASEAN trade figures vis-à-vis ASEAN-5's trade with the world could be explained by A as it highlights how protectionism compromised ASEAN's pursuit of regional economic cooperation. Source A notes that when the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 hit the region, the new ASEAN member states whose economies were weaker than those of the original members 'pulled back from liberalization'. For example, Vietnam 'delayed efforts to liberalize state-owned industry'.</i></p> <p><i>Sources C and D support the hypothesis by suggesting that protectionism was prevalent in the 1970s and the 1980s, thus impeding greater regional economic cooperation in ASEAN. In Source C, Lee Kuan Yew acknowledged that more can be done to 'further stimulate intra-ASEAN trade' and cautions ASEAN members against following 'the paths which resorted to protectionism to solve their immediate problems.' Similarly, Source D observes that the 'results from the early economic cooperation initiatives of the late 1970s and the 1980s had been largely disappointing' due in part to 'ASEAN countries with large domestic markets' adopting 'inward looking and protectionist trade and industrial policies.'</i></p>
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		<p>Sources A, D and E provide credible support for the idea that ASEAN's pursuit of regional economic cooperation was elusive. Unlike Source B, they have less incentive to disproportionately credit or discredit the economic achievements of ASEAN. Significantly, Source E shows that ASEAN's commitment to greater economic cooperation as seen in the Singapore Declaration of 1992 in Source F did not translate into economic success, where ASEAN-5 trade continued to pale greatly in comparison to ASEAN-5 trade with the world. A and D's credibility are enhanced by the first-hand account of Source C where Lee Kuan Yew echoes the view of both sources that protectionism was hurting ASEAN. Lee Kuan Yew was well-placed to comment on the impediments that were preventing ASEAN from achieving a higher level of economic cooperation.</p>
L6	26-30	<p>E.g. Sources B and F challenge the view <b>as they suggest that ASEAN had adopted measures that facilitated a higher level of economic cooperation</b>. Source F<sup>3</sup> was ASEAN's declaration on the adoption of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992. Thus, Source F reflects ASEAN's commitment to heightened economic cooperation as members committed to using the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme to establish AFTA by reducing tariffs ranging from 0% to 5% and adopting 'joint efforts to strengthen free trade promotion and negotiations on ASEAN agricultural products. Source B shows the materialisation of the AFTA that was declared in Source F, where the Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN highlights that ASEAN leaders responded to the Asian Financial Crisis by '[reducing] reliance on global demand and [increasing] regional trade', leading them to accelerate the actualization of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) from 2003 to 2002. <b>Both sources convey the idea that AFTA was a viable mechanism for engendering and ensuring greater regional economic cooperation within ASEAN.</b></p> <p>Despite the positive portrayal of ASEAN's efforts at regional economic cooperation in Sources B and F, there is good reason to question the validity of the perspectives presented. Source F, being the 1992 ASEAN declaration that launched AFTA, demonstrates the willingness of ASEAN members in committing to freer intra-regional trade in principle but this explicit commitment was compromised not only by ASEAN members' protectionist leanings but also the additions of weaker economies belonging to Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia from 1995 and 1999 which made it harder for ASEAN to achieve the desired levels of regional economic cooperation given the greater unevenness across the economies within it. Source B has an incentive to disproportionately highlight the achievements of ASEAN as it is from a Deputy Secretary-General speaking at a large-scale business conference, plausibly resulting in his desire to emphasise how ASEAN has made significant strides in economic cooperation despite the diversity. Source B's credibility is further undermined by the fact that the economic achievements of AFTA were uneven at best, with several members choosing to adopt protectionist measures and this resulted in it needing to be relaunched in 1993. Thus, it appears less likely that ASEAN was successful in its pursuit of regional economic cooperation.</p>

<sup>3</sup> Note that F is analysed before B to show awareness of the chronology between sources, which is then used to show how they convey a common idea related to the hypothesis.

	<p>Source E echoes some views in B and F on the notion of ASEAN success by highlighting how mechanisms such as AFTA has spurred ASEAN towards greater regional economic cooperation. The idea of sharing ‘one common vision’ as referenced in B and the commitment to ‘joint efforts to strengthen trade promotion and negotiations on ASEAN agricultural products’ plausibly manifested in intra-ASEAN trade more than doubling between 1995 when ASEAN-5 trade amongst themselves stood at 33.51 and shot up to 69.95 in 1995. Aside from the dip in this figure in 1998 due to the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), it quickly rebounded to its highest level in the 1990s – to that of 75.08. <b>Thus, these figures in E corroborate the idea in B that ASEAN members increased regional economic cooperation in the face of the AFC and reflects how the declaration in F materialised into increased economic cooperation within ASEAN.</b></p> <p>However, Source E ultimately supports the hypothesis as it corroborates with Source A in <b>reflecting the limitations of ASEAN’s efforts at regional economic cooperation.</b> While trade among the ASEAN-5 may have increased from 33.51 to 69.95 from 1995 to 1998 but in the same period, ASEAN-5 trade with the world increased from 180.49 in 1992 to 311.34 in 1995. Thus, ASEAN-5 trade with the world significantly overshadowed trade among the ASEAN-5 into the 1990s and this dilutes the notion that ASEAN was successful in fostering regional economic cooperation. The great disparity between intra-ASEAN trade figures vis-à-vis ASEAN-5’s trade with the world could be explained by A as it highlights how protectionism compromised ASEAN’s pursuit of regional economic cooperation. Source A notes that when the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 hit the region, the new ASEAN member states whose economies were weaker than those of the original members ‘pulled back from liberalization’. For example, Vietnam ‘delayed efforts to liberalize state-owned industry’.</p> <p>Sources C and D reinforce the perspectives in A by suggesting that <b>the issue of protectionism was a long-standing one that preceded the AFC and was prevalent in the 1970s and the 1980s, thus impeding greater regional economic cooperation in ASEAN.</b> In Source C, Lee Kuan Yew acknowledged that more can be done to ‘further stimulate intra-ASEAN trade’ and cautions ASEAN members against following ‘the paths which resorted to protectionism to solve their immediate problems.’ Similarly, Source D observes that the ‘results from the early economic cooperation initiatives of the late 1970s and the 1980s had been largely disappointing’ due in part to ‘ASEAN countries with large domestic markets’ adopting ‘inward looking and protectionist trade and industrial policies.’ Lee Kuan Yew was likely referring to how ASEAN countries in the 1970s and 1980s had been slow to liberalise due to the development gap that existed among member states, with some such as the Philippines stubbornly sticking with import substitution strategies.</p> <p>Sources A, D and E provide credible support for the idea that ASEAN’s pursuit of regional economic cooperation was elusive. Unlike Source B, they have less incentive to disproportionately credit or discredit the economic achievements of ASEAN. Significantly, Source E shows that ASEAN’s commitment to greater economic cooperation as seen in the Singapore Declaration of 1992 in Source F did not translate into economic success, where ASEAN-5 trade continued to pale greatly in comparison to ASEAN-5 trade with the world. The fact that ASEAN had to relaunch AFTA in 1993 attests further to the idea that AFTA was less than revolutionary in facilitating a heightened level of regional economic cooperation within ASEAN. A</p>
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	<p><i>and D's credibility are enhanced by the first-hand account of Source C where Lee Kuan Yew echoes the view of both sources that protectionism was hurting ASEAN. As one of the key leaders in ASEAN and a strong proponent of free trade, Lee Kuan Yew was well-placed to comment on the impediments that were preventing ASEAN from achieving a higher level of economic cooperation.</i></p> <p><i>Ultimately, the sources that support the view are preferred because they comprise the perspectives of academics whose insights are corroborated with the account of Lee Kuan Yew, a strong proponent of free trade and a prominent leader within ASEAN who noted how protectionism existed as early as the 1970s and 1980s, thereby undermining efforts at greater regional cooperation. In addition, their perspectives correspond with contextual knowledge such as how AFTA was considered a landmark economic agreement in 1992 in light of the overall lack of regional economic cooperation within ASEAN and how the entry of newer ASEAN members indeed impeded efforts at regional cooperation, particularly as these members needed more time to adhere to the CEPT Scheme's stipulations. In contrast, Sources A and D at best show that ASEAN made piecemeal efforts at advancing economic cooperation, such as the response to the Asian Financial Crisis which ASEAN responded inadequately to resulting in the devaluation of the Thai Baht affecting the rest of the region. D, as a statement of ASEAN's intent was eventually unfulfilled as shown in Source E where statistics revealed that ASEAN-5 trade continued to lag significantly behind ASEAN-5 trade with the world. Thus, the hypothesis should be modified to read, 'ASEAN's pursuit of regional economic cooperation ultimately remained elusive as it was largely absent in the first two decades of ASEAN's conception and even a significant agreement such as AFTA provided mixed results at best.'</i></p>
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## ESSAYS

Band	Marks	Quality of the Answers
0	0	No evidence submitted or response does not address the question.
1	1-8	The essay will be characterised by significant irrelevance or argument that does not begin to make significant points. The essay may mention historical concepts but these will not be understood. The answers may be largely fragmentary and incoherent.
2	9-12	The essay will not be properly focused on the requirements of the question. There may be many unsupported assertions and commentaries that lack sufficient factual support. The essay may include references to historical concepts but these may not be fully understood. Where appropriate, the essay may mention the existence of other historical interpretations but this may not be explained. The argument may be of limited relevance to the topic and there may be confusion about the implications of the question.
3	13-15	The essay will offer some appropriate factual material but there will be little attempt generally to link factual material to the requirements of the question. The approach will lack analysis. The essay will include some references to historical concepts but these may not be used to develop the analysis. Where appropriate, the essay may mention the existence of other historical interpretations, though this may be implicit. The quality of the description or narrative, although sufficiently accurate and relevant to the topic if not the particular question, will not be linked effectively to the argument. The structure will show weaknesses and the treatment of topics within the essay will be unbalanced. The writing may show some accuracy but there will also be frequent errors.
4	16-18	The essay will indicate attempts to argue relevantly, although often implicitly. The approach will depend more on some heavily descriptive or narrative passages than on analysis or explanation, which may be limited to introductions and conclusions. The essay will show evidence of knowledge of historical concepts and attempts may be made to use historical concepts to aid analysis. Where appropriate, the essay may mention the existence of other historical interpretations but the nature of these interpretations may not be fully understood. Factual material, sometimes very full, will be used to impart information or describe events rather than to address directly the requirements of the question. The structure of the argument could be organised more effectively. The writing will usually be accurate.
5	19-21	The essay will reflect a clear understanding of the question and a fair attempt to provide an argument and factual knowledge to answer it. The approach will contain analysis or explanation but there may be some heavily descriptive or narrative passages. The essay will show evidence of understanding of relevant historical concepts, and some use of historical concepts will be made in analysis. Where appropriate, the essay mentions the existence of other historical interpretations and offers some relevant knowledge of, or evidence for, these interpretations. The essay will be largely relevant. Most of the argument will be structured satisfactorily but some parts may lack full coherence. The essay will achieve a genuine argument but may lack balance and depth in factual knowledge. The writing will be generally accurate.

**9752/02 H2 History Paper 2 – Prelims**

<b>Band</b>	<b>Marks</b>	<b>Quality of the Answers</b>
6	22-25	The essay will be focused clearly on the demands of the question but there will be some unevenness. The approach will be mostly analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative, demonstrating secure understanding of historical concepts relevant to analysis and to the topic. Where appropriate, the essay will discuss competing historical interpretations and offers good knowledge of or evidence for these interpretations. The essay will be mostly relevant. Most of the argument will be structured coherently and supported by largely accurate factual material. The writing will be mostly accurate.
7	26-30	The overall quality will show that the candidate is in control of the argument. The approach will be consistently analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative, demonstrating clear and accurate understanding of historical concepts relevant to analysis and to the topic. The essay will be fully relevant. It will be supported by carefully selected factual material and ideas closely focused on the topic and argument made. Where appropriate, the essay will effectively assess the strengths and limitations of competing historical interpretations. The argument will be structured coherently. The writing will be accurate.

**2. To what extent was the use of force necessary for maintaining political stability in post-independence Southeast Asian states?**

Stronger answers might frame their answer using chronological developments of Southeast Asian governments as demarcated by three distinct phases—the immediate post-independence years where parliamentary democracy was prevalent; the 1960s to 1970s where some turned to maximum governments; and the 1980s that saw the (sometimes brief) return to parliamentary democracy in countries that were previously ruled by maximum governments. Using this chronological frame would enable candidates to ascertain what allowed for better maintenance of political stability over an extended period of time. This is consistent also with the concept of ‘change and continuity’ where candidates could explain how the extended use of force preserved maximum governments for a substantial period of time—especially in the cases of Ne Win’s Burma (1962-1988) and Marcos’ Philippines (1965-1986)—but eventually, these resulted in the masses unceremoniously unseating these leaders through revolutions.

Stronger answers would also demonstrate an understanding of the concept of ‘cause and effect’, particularly in being able to explain how the use of force alone could not allow post-independence Southeast Asian states to maintain political stability. More significantly, it was the judicious use of force where students were able to look at how historical actors responded more appropriately to the prevailing conditions, such as the political challenges posed by rival parties, that better facilitated the maintenance of political stability. Conversely, the extended and sometimes indiscriminate use of force could eventually result in a groundswell of discontent that either enabled rival forces to unseat the incumbent government or see mass demonstrations generating significant political instability.

In terms of the structure, stronger answers would display coherence from the Introduction through to the Conclusion, demonstrating control of the argument and avoiding situations where the answers may fail to articulate the overall direction of the argument in the Introduction, treat paragraphs as distinct silos from each other, and/or contain paragraphs that contradict each other.

**3. ‘Education alone was vital for fostering national unity.’ Discuss this statement with reference to post-independence Southeast Asian states.**

Stronger answers would explain why education alone was insufficient for fostering national unity and instead, it was the judicious application of policies—such that the needs and interests of the general population including the minorities were taken into consideration—that better enabled governments to foster national unity. As a general approach, candidates could argue that assimilationist approaches tended to fare more poorly than multicultural ones in fostering national unity.

Candidates needed to deal with the factor of education in sufficient depth and avoid conflating it with language policies. For example, while bilingualism can be seen as a fundamental tenet of education in Singapore, the focus should be analysing how that provided greater equity to schooling, exposure to a common curriculum and even ultimately, entry to the job markets in future. Conversely, should candidates analyse bilingualism as a policy that enabled all ethnic groups to speak English as a common language in schools and thus better identify with each other, this would be largely irrelevant to showing how education helped to foster national unity.

Candidates with a better understanding of the topic would also be able to explain how the overarching attitudes of the government influenced the success of the respective policies. In addition, the properly contextualise the outcomes, candidates would also consider the differing attitudes of minorities and their responses to the state’s policies that resulted in varying outcomes across Southeast Asia.

**4. How far do you agree that industrialisation was key to the economic success of post-independence Southeast Asian states?**

Stronger answers would be able to utilise the chronological development of most capitalist Southeast Asian economies to evaluate the extent to which industrialisation was integral to economic success. While the time frame is not stipulated in the question, a stronger answer would likely address the entire duration of independence to 2000 to provide a more robust analysis over an extended period of time.

Candidates should define economic success using a set of criteria that would then allow them to weigh the relative roles that different factors played in the economic fortunes of the respective Southeast Asian economies. Candidates would ideally avoid positing industrialisation as a miraculous factor that allowed for economic success as long as countries adopted it. Rather, they would consider the varying contexts within which industrialisation and other factors contributed to the economic growth and/or decline in post-independence Southeast Asian states.

Weaker answers may discuss economic growth and decline without demonstrating a sound understanding of what industrialisation entailed and the different phases i.e., agricultural, import-substitution industrialisation, and export-oriented industrialisation. Candidates with a weaker understanding may also view things in terms of binaries e.g., positing that agricultural policies and industrialisation existed independent of each other instead of rightfully acknowledging that transiting to industrialisation did not entail the complete abandonment of the agricultural economy.

**5. 'The consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis can be understood solely by examining the role of external actors.' Discuss this statement with reference to events from 1997 to 2000.**

Stronger answers would apply a sound understanding of 'cause and effect' and note that the role of external actors tend to be 'short-term' and 'trigger' factors while internal factors tended to be 'foundational/long-term' and 'short-term' ones. While candidates have liberty to argue that external actors played a pivotal role in influencing how the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) unfolded in the region, it would demonstrate sounder logic to give greater credence to foundational/long-term factors.

At a basic level, candidates should also extend the discussion beyond economic consequences to include political and social ones. Stronger answers would disagree with the statement due to its extreme stand that posits mono-causality and recognise that it was often multiple factors that influenced the consequences of the AFC.

Candidates should demonstrate a sound understanding of chronology and utilise the causes of the AFC judiciously – to explain and contextualise the varying consequences that the AFC had on the respective Southeast Asian countries. For example, countries such as Indonesia that had weaker fundamentals than those such as Singapore experienced more far-reaching and deep-seated consequences.