



RIVER VALLEY HIGH SCHOOL

Year 6 Preliminary Examination

In preparation for the General Certificate of Education

Advanced Level

HIGHER 2

HISTORY

9752/02

Paper 2 The Making of Independent Southeast Asia

(Independence – 2000)

18 September 2018

3 hours

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write in dark blue or black ink.

You may use a HB pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working.

Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid.

DO **NOT** WRITE IN ANY BARCODES.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer **two** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

All marks are stipulated at the end of the question.

This document consists of **6** printed pages.

Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

ASEAN'S MANAGEMENT OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE

- 1 Read the sources and then answer the questions which follow.

When answering Question 1 candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group.

Source A

19. With regard to the situation in the South China Sea, the Ministers encouraged the exercise of self-restraint by all countries concerned, and the promotion of confidence building measures (CBMs) in this area, and welcomed their commitment to resolving disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the recognised principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as to ensuring the freedom of navigation in this area. The Ministers recognised prior and continuing dialogue and consultations, particularly dialogue in the ASEAN-China Informal Consultations, the First Meeting of the Working Group of the ASEAN-China Senior Officials Consultations on the Code of Conduct in Kuala Lumpur on 26 May 2000, the exchange of views in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as in the Informal Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea. The Ministers welcomed the on-going efforts between ASEAN and China to develop and adopt the Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

Chairman's Statement of the 7th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Bangkok, 27 July 2000.

Source B

ASEAN's recognition of the value of engaging China was probably the single most important factor that allowed relations between the two sides to break new ground at their meetings in Singapore this week. Things could have gone horribly wrong if ASEAN had not displayed its classic brand of non-confrontational diplomacy. During China's one-on-10 dialogue with ASEAN, the Malaysian Foreign Minister made it a point to highlight Chinese efforts to ease the region out of the financial crisis. Singled out were China's promise not to devalue the *yuan*, its participation in the IMF aid packages and its creation of trade and investment opportunities through development programmes. Similarly, he offered thanks for China's positive attitude towards the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia, but urged the US to "seriously consider" acceding to it. China's response was to give a little way on the Spratlys issue by offering to look at ASEAN's Code of Conduct for the South China Sea when it was ready, provided that it was drafted as a guideline and not a legal document.

A newspaper article, entitled, "New Era in ASEAN-China Ties", published in The Straits Times, 29 July 1999.

Source C

ASEAN's plans for managing regional security in the post-cold war era are based, in part, on an overestimation of its influence over extra-regional actors and events. The great powers are now directly involved in shaping the regional environment of the Asia-Pacific, such as most prominently, in the case of the South China Sea dispute. These powerful actors are the most likely and immediate sources of conflict in the region for the foreseeable future. The coercive diplomacy that ASEAN effectively applied against Vietnam cannot work when dealing with large, powerful states, such as China or the United States in the management of the South China Sea dispute. Indeed, much of ASEAN's success in opposing Vietnam was attributable to the support of these same powerful states. If these states violate the norms of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), as has happened in recent times, ASEAN will have recourse to very few options.

An excerpt of an academic article that focuses on ASEAN's management of regional security, published in 'Pacific Affairs', 1998.


Source D

7. In the field of political and security cooperation, we have agreed that:

- ASEAN shall continue to play a central role, in cooperation with other participants, in developing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) into an effective and meaningful process for ensuring peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region;
- ASEAN shall seek an early, peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute and shall continue to explore ways and means to prevent conflict and enhance cooperation in the South China Sea consistent with the provisions of the TAC and the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea of 1992 as well as international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea;
- ASEAN calls on all non-Southeast Asian countries to associate themselves with the TAC. ASEAN recognises that such an association will contribute positively towards the security and stability of the region and is working actively to finalise the modality for doing so;
- ASEAN shall explore ways and means to enhance cooperation with the United Nations, with the view to promoting peace and stability in the region.

Bangkok Summit Declaration, at the 5th ASEAN Summit, December 1995.

Source E



An editorial cartoon on the South China Sea dispute in the 1990s, published in a Philippine-based online news site, April 2017.

Source F

The signing of the code of conduct (1995)* did not, however, signal an end to the dispute. A minor skirmish took place between Chinese and Philippine warships in January 1996, and between March and May of the same year it was reported that the structures on Mischief Reef had been upgraded. In April 1997, tensions rose again when eight Chinese naval vessels were sighted near Mischief Reef. At the same time, two vessels owned by the Chinese State Oceanic Administration were intercepted by the Philippine Navy near Scarborough Shoal, a small reef lying 130 miles west of Luzon (Scarborough Shoal is not part of the Spratly group, but its ownership is disputed by both the PRC and the Philippines). The captains of the Chinese vessels informed their Filipino counterparts that the PRC considered Scarborough Shoal its territory, a claim rejected by the Ramos administration. Not wishing to escalate tensions, the Chinese vessels withdrew.

An excerpt of an academic article that focuses on Chinese foreign policy in the South China Sea Dispute, 1999.

* This was a bilateral Code of Conduct signed by the Philippines and China in the aftermath of the Mischief Reef incident of 1995.

Now answer the following questions:

- (a)** Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B on the nature of ASEAN's relations with extra-regional powers. [10]
- (b)** To what extent do Sources A to F show that ASEAN's management of the South China Sea dispute was effective? [30]

Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

You must support each answer with examples drawn from **at least three** countries.

EITHER

- 2** “Authoritarian forms of government, more than democratic ones, were able to assert political stability.” How accurate is this assessment of the Southeast Asian nations from independence to 2000? [30]

OR

- 3** Assess the view that integrationist policies provided the key basis for national unity in Southeast Asian nations from independence to 2000. [30]

AND EITHER

- 4** “In the economic development of independent Southeast Asian nations, the role of the government was paramount.” Discuss. [30]

OR

- 5** Why were some Southeast Asian nations more devastated by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 than others? [30]

Copyright Acknowledgements

Source A © Chairman’s Statement, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 27 July 2000.

Source B © The Straits Times, 29 July 1999.

Source C © Shaun Narine, “ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security”, Pacific Affairs Journal, 1998.

Source D © Bangkok Summit Declaration, at the 5th ASEAN Summit, December 1995.

Source E © Scoopnest, April 2017.

Source F © Ian Storey, “Creeping Assertiveness”, Contemporary Southeast Asia Journal, April 1999.