

README: There may be some Singlish and/or innuendos in these notes. Please do not be offended or taken aback by them. Thank you :)

Part I: Preah Vihear temple

- The temple was built by a Khmer king, the Khmers were direct ancestors of Cambodians
- Was taken over by Thais in the form of the Siamese empire, who saw themselves as the heir of the great Khmer empire
- **Historical animosities between Thais and Cambodians** resulting in war. Cambodians resented Thai dominance + assimilation of Khmers.

March 1907 Franco-Siam border treaty

- When France established colonies in Indochina, they claimed territory that was within Thai spheres of influence, which were perceived by many in Siam to be 'lost territory'***
- Boundary was decided along **watershed line** of the mountain range, and Preah Vihear was in Thai side of watershed
- But French surveyors placed Preah Vihear in Cambodian territory, and **Thai legend says fella was drunk got pretty girl then pen slip etc**
- Thais were not aware of this discrepancy until 1934 (VERY important to recognise that in 1934 they did **not raise a clear objection to this and nor did they conduct their own survey** (albeit they did not have the capacity to)

WW2 and post-war context

- Thailand seized the temple and surrounding areas, reclaiming some of its 'lost territories' as they collaborated with the Japanese
- Treaty of Washington returned border to pre-war status
- After Cambodia gained independence in 1953, Thai military moved into Temple area and Cambodia did not respond as they faced instability and turmoil
- Thailand **only asserted sovereignty** in **1956**, when officials raised the Thai flag at Preah Vihear. Also built a police border checkpoint

It is important to recognise the significance of the temple to both Cambodians and Thais

Cambodian motivations

- 1) Nation-building: Preah Vihear is seen as an **icon of ancient cultural grandeur of Khmers**, and is a representation of Khmer identity
- 2) Domestic politics: King Sihanouk (ruler of Cambodia at the time) was made King by the French in 1941, and campaigning for temple would give him more legitimacy

Thai motivations

- 1) Nation-building: Territory, religion and monarchy are main tenets of Thai nationalism, and losing Preah Vihear would therefore undermine Thailand's stability
- 2) They had already taken care of and maintained the temple for so long, so why give it up?
- 3) Unwillingness to give in to 'inferior race' - Khmers. Many prominent Thai nationalists saw the great monuments and temples built by the Great Angkor civilization to not be the works of Khmers, but of Khoms, who were unrelated to the Khmers. Henceforth, the tide of nationalism and that historical negationism was another reason why they did not want to give in to Cambodia.

Also, in between these motivations is CW

- Thailand was founding member of SEATO in 1954, Cambodia was 'neutral' as it saw SEATO as provocation of communists
- Thailand reinforced its border with Cambodia as a result
- PRC and Cambodia relations were getting warmer, and both issued a statement referring to 'hostile acts by Cambodia's neighbors', which led Thailand to declare state of emergency along its Cambodian frontier

Resolve disputes

- Cambodia submitted case to ICJ in 1959

At ICJ ruling,

- Thailand argued that 1907 treaty was not legally-binding as it was never agreed upon by joint commission, and cited their **de facto control and maintenance of temple**
- Nonetheless, ICJ highlights how Thai commission did not lodge a complaint to 1907 treaty, and they had accepted it for nearly half a century

Loss of Preah Vihear was seen as an insult by Thais, who were now 'bowing' to a 'weaker nation' that was once its protectorate

Thai did not respond to ruling in good faith

- Boycotted SEATO meetings
- But Thailand eventually acquiesced, but rather than taking Thai flag down temple, they removed the pole and moved it instead

To Cambodians though,

- ICJ decision was a great victory over a neighbour that oppressed them for centuries

Cambodia formally repossessed temple in 1963

- King Sihanouk announced Thais could come to temple without visa, and permitted Thailand to keep relics they took from the temple despite ICJ ruling
- Thailand closed access to temple from Thai border

In the 1960s and 1970s however...

- Anti-communist government came to power through coup against King Sihanouk in 1970 and established Khmer Republic, and affirmed that the temple was not worth fighting over, as the real important issue was fighting against communism to both countries
- However, Khmer Rouge overran Khmer republic and established a communist state in April 1975
- Despite this, owing to end of Vietnam war and Thailand's willingness to integrate communist states in SEA, did not want it to become source of tension again

Late 1970s and 1980s

- Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, and issue waned into background

Late 1980s and 1990s

- Lacking USSR support, Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia, and PRC withdrew support for Khmer Rouge
- Temple was temporarily open from 1992 to 1993 and governments cooperated in its administration
- Thailand **granted tourist permits, Thai officials provided security and maintained facilities**

2000s onwards however

- They signed a memorandum of understanding in 2000 with respect to land border etc, which signaled positive....
- HOWEVER, Cambodia nominated Preah Vihear as a UNESCO heritage site in 2001
- UNESCO declared it a heritage site in 2008, and there were a variety of skirmishes from 2008-2011

Part II: Sabah dispute

- Two commissions of inquiry on public opinion with respect to merger
- **August 1962: Cobbold Commission** found most in favor, BUT it was not a referendum

- Both Pinay and Indo rejected the commission, but it was **ignored by Malayan leaders**
- July 1963: **Malaysia agreement**, stipulated **31 August 1963** as date of formation of merged Malaysia. NOTE THAT THIS WAS DELAYED because of the UN findings, which showed they cared about their neighbours

Both pinay and Indo reacted in anxiety, and pushed to find a solution; **Manila accords** in July 1963: In which UN Sec Gen was to investigate North Borneans' support for merger

- UN report found that most North Borneans were in favor of merger
- BUT Philippines and Indonesia rejected it by questioning the integrity of the findings given the fact that there was no merger
- Despite this, Malaysia went ahead and merged North Borneo together on **16 September 1963**

Phillipine claim

- Philippines maintained that 1878 treaty between **Dent brothers** and Sultan of Sulu was a '**lease**', and hence the Philippines would have inherited sovereignty over Sabah
- Anglo-American treaty of 1930 did NOT include Sabah as part of philippines

NOTE: Philippines' claim was not pursued until **1962**, which was done because

- President Macapagal wanted to demonstrate its **independence from USA**, and rid itself of the '**brown little brother**' stigma
- He needed a public relations victory in light of a corruption scandal involving his party + wanted to present himself as someone who was willing and able to defend national interests
- As such, Manila suspended relations with KL temporarily

Malaysian position

- Inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak enlarged Malaysia and enabled it to stand up to the might of Indonesia
- Communism was getting stronger in Singapore and Indonesia, and hence North Borneo offered a buffer against communism

Bilateral relations

- Despite the dispute, both pursued anti-communist rhetoric + Malaysia was drawn to Pinoy due to Konfrontasi

Emergence of tensions

- Jabidah Massacre 1968: Pinoy officers suppressed a Muslim Mutiny, and Malaysia discovered that they revolted upon learning that their mission was to infiltrate and fight a guerilla war in Sabah
- In June 1968, Philippines Congress passed a resolution delineating territorial boundaries to include Sabah
- July 1968 ASEAN committee in Bangkok were fruitless, and Malaysia broke off diplomatic relations and **boycotted all future ASEAN meetings as a result**

Resumption of bilateral relations

- Re-established in December 1969 at the **Third ASEAN ministerial conference**. Since then, Manila has not actively pursued its claim to Sabah
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- In October 1978, Marcos offered a border-crossing agreement and joint patrol, but this was rejected by Malaysia as the Malaysians were insistent that the Sabah claim must be renounced for any sort of agreements to work
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- In 1981, Mahathir came to power.. And said the above. ALSO in that year a report surfaced that cited the presence of Moro bases in Sabah, which hinted **Malaysian support** for Moro insurgents

NOTE: PHILLIPINES STILL HAS NOT RENOUNCED SABAH CLAIMMMMMM

Issues that impacted the dispute

1) Clash of nationalism and religion

- Malaysia and Moros share affinity in religion. Malaysia was sympathetic towards their struggle for self-determination and status as a minority and to have their own state, particularly after the Jabitah massacre
- PM Tunku Abdul Rahman between 1968-1969 tried to raise **international support for Moro independence**, and even when he was SecGen of OIC (Islamic cooperation) he endorsed the 1972 Moro case submitted to him and persuaded other OIC members to support it
- Tun Mustapha Harun, Chief Minister of Sabah was Suluk, part of the larger Moro Muslim identity in the Philippines and was hence sympathetic towards the grievances of the Moros
- Tripoli agreement 1976 - outlined Libyan agreement to ***terminate funding for Moro rebels and encourage ceasefire etc.*** (Just remember libyans were involved as well)
- In 1980 and 1981 KL was alleged to tolerate the presence of Moro rebels... (Mahathir era policy)
- ALL THIS MADE MANY PINOYS FEEL IT WAS **imperative to incorporate Sabah and END the Malaysian interference**

2) Leaders' personal animosity

- President Macapagal and Tunku Abdul Rahman had ambitions to assert regional dominance and leadership, hence despises each other (early years)

- Tunku didn't have any affinity for Marcos, and no hopes for reconciliation after Jabidah massacre (1968 onwards)
- Mahathir and President Ramos (1992 onwards) however helped mend relations

Attempts to resolve the dispute

- Malaysia has insisted that it has honored its **financial obligations to Sulu heirs for the lease of Sabah**, and is prepared to negotiate with them directly, but this is seen as sidelining the **Filipino government**
 - The Malaysian government considers the Sabah dispute a creation of the Pinoys, hence the PINOYS would have to initiate any efforts of ending the dispute
 - What's MOST important is both governments have to deal with domestic politics as well which IS LIKE WAY its still persistent
 - NOTE THAT sabah case has never been brought to ICJ
 - This is because it has much larger stakes, and any losing party would have A LOT to lose
- 1) Phillipines' presidents attempts to renounce Sabah claim
- Marcos never officially renounced claim
 - Corazon Aquino proposed a variety of bills between 1987-1989, which were struck down by the senate for being 'unproductive to the wellbeing of the Philippines'
 - Fidel Ramos also did, BUT owing to the complexity of representative democracy, putting the Sabah issue to rest would be good for the country, but would be unpopular. Henceforth he also could not lay the issue to rest as senate struck down any proposals

With Ramos' visit to Malaysia in January 1993, Ramos signed agreements with the opening of 'extension offices', where PH would have one in Sabah and Malaysia in Mindanao, suggesting Filipino recognition of Malaysian sovereignty over Sabah and vice-versa for Malaysia with respect to the Phillipines

A variety of agreements signed during Mahathir-Ramos era of relations suggest strengthening of bilateral ties, HOWEVER it is still evident that no normalization will happen till Phillipines rescinds Sabah claim

LAST POINT Malaysia and Moro secession

- In the 1990s Malaysia became more subtle and diplomatic in handling the Moro insurgency
- In 1996, together with Indonesia, it brokered a peace agreement between the Fidel Ramos administration and MNLF, with hopes of autonomy for Muslim areas in the south
- But this did not last as Abu Sayyaf and MILF no longer regarded the MNLF as a representative voice

HENCEFORTH, TENSIONS STILL LAST WOOOO

KONFRONTASI

Emergence: Mainly due to ideological differences la

- Indonesian war of independence made many Javanese despise and distrust the west, and thus Sukarno sought to eliminate any and all vestiges of colonialism from the region
- In the first decade of independence, Sukarno pursued a non-alignment policy
- In contrast to Indo, Malaysia did not see Western Imperialism in the same lens and was like its former colonial overlord, firmly anti-communist
- Moreover, Sukarno viewed Malaysia as a **neo-colonial construct**, owing to things such as
 - Dependence on west (British MNCs) in agriculture, mining, oil and gas
 - Anglo-Malayan defense agreement 1957
- Tunku viewed Sukarno's 'appeasement' of communists with suspicion
- He was alarmed that Sukarno allowed the PKI to grow so much such that they were the 4th largest political party in 1955

ALSO, aside from ideological reasons, the **differences in their decolonisation processes also played a large part**

- Indonesia prided itself on attaining independence against a backdrop of blood and war, whereas Malaysia achieved its independence merely through compromise and negotiation
- Malaysia's use of a federal system reminded the Indonesians of **Dutch colonial control**, who used it to DENY indonesians true independence

Sukarno especially hated Malaysia's defence links with the British, which perpetuated strong Western presence in the region.

Clash of ideologies in the larger context: **COLD WAR**

- The proposal for merger of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak which had influential communist parties, with **peninsular Malaysia** which had a firm anti-communist government was motivated by a desire to contain communism
- Sukarno was influenced by PKI, which was **heavily sponsored by the CCP of CHINA*****
- CCP was also against formation of Malaysia as it would mean a **stronger anti-communist** state in the region

PKI maneuvers

- PKI supported the Brunei revolt December 1962, which was done by TNKU, a militia supplied by Indonesia. Its purpose was to **attain immediate independence of North Borneo from the British**
- Revolt only lasted 8 days, with British troops forcing TNKU surrender
- Seen as interference in the eyes of Malaysians

Aside from PKI, the military also gained from being radical and opposition merger, as they would get greater funding and support from USSR

Sukarno's ambitions for greater Indonesia

- Sukarno sought to 'liberate' West Irian from the Dutch as they controlled it even after Indonesian independence, and a military operation was launched by Gen. Suharto in **January 1962**
- The operation was a success, and West Irian formally joined Indonesia
- The ending of the West Irian conflict meant that the military could see its form and function questioned, hence supporting a venture like **Konfrontasi** would **RESTORE army's prominence and MOST IMPORTANT: justify its large budget during a period of economic decline**

A school of thought attributes Sukarno's ambition to Malaysia to a **desire to politically unify all ethnic Malay peoples under Indonesian rule**

LEGIT JUST GREATER INDONESIA LA

Personality clashes and animosity

- Tunku Abdul Rahman and Sukarno despised one another
- Within a week of joining international society, Sukarno expected KL to give **full support of Indonesia's attempt to reclaim West Irian**
- Almost all countries in the Afro-Asian bloc supported Indonesia, and hence Malaysia was expected to offer wholehearted diplomatic support
- Yet Tunku did not reciprocate, and this irked Sukarno, which was seen as a strong indication of its **independence and regional assertion**, which threatened Sukarno

Konfrontasi as Sukarno's political tool

- Konfrontasi was useful in deflecting attention away from the problems in the Indonesian economy
- Sukarno resorted to a policy of popular mobilization, mass exhortation and nationalist heroics to distract the population from economic woes he was ultimately responsible for

- Sukarno also lacked a power base and was reliant on PKI for electoral support and the military to deal with opponents. As such, **Konfrontasi could also be seen as an effort to pacify BOTH the PKI and military** and secure his own position

Indonesian reaction to merger and outbreak of Konfrontasi

- Foreign minister of Indonesia declare in January 1963 Indonesia's drive to pursue confrontation with Malaysia
- Sukarno was encouraged by victories in West Irian, and hence engaged in cross-border raids into Malaysian territory
- First series of infiltrations were in April 1963
- Indonesia withheld diplomatic recognition and severed relations
- Attacks on Singapore trade offices in Jakarta, September 1963 banning of trade with Malaysia
- 11th march 1965 Macdonalds house bombing
- As part of the Anglo-Malaysian defense agreement, the British responded by sending their soldiers to defend Malaysia. 50,000 British and commonwealth forces were mobilized to contain Indonesian threat
- Indonesia withdrew from UN in Jan 1965 in response to Malaysia joining security council
- This isolated Indonesia internationally

Malaysian position and response to Konfrontasi

- Tunku refused to back down and sought to preserve state sovereignty
- Konfrontasi cemented Malaysia as a nation, as Malaysians rallied behind their country against the 'enemy'
- Malaysia portrayed Indonesia as an aggressor, and Sukarno's status as a regional leader declined due to his warmongering behavior
- By mid-1965, Indonesia was isolated by most of the non-communist world

Attempts to mend ties after Konfrontasi

- New order Regime eliminated PKI and focused on development of people and rejected aggressive nationalism. Came to power on 11 March 1966 after a coup, BUT Sukarno was still in charge until 12 March 1967 when Suharto replaced him

Ending Konfrontasi

- Indonesia suffered greatly as a result of Konfrontasi
- Alienated the west
- Undermined its position as a founding member of the non-aligned movement
- In sum, prevented Indonesia from winning recognition as a regional leader and beyond
- Also, Indonesia was in economic decline as a result of the war

- **Bangkok accord** on 1 Jun 1966, which committed Indo to recognise Malaysia diplomatically without any conditions
- This was REJECTED by Sukarno, as he did not have the political will to admit 'defeat'
- New order regime however DID
- **Jakarta Agreement** was signed by Tun Razak and FM for Indonesia on **16 August 1966, outlined normalisation of relations BUT exchange of ambassadors was only to be done after ascertainment of public will**

Sabah and Sarawak Elections in April 1967 endorsed status quo of Malaysia, and hence diplomatic relations were stored on 31 Aug 1967

- Done 3 weeks after founding of ASEAN
- New Order regime had shared ideology as Malaysia and trust deepened

NEEDED:

SUMMARY OF SG-MY WATER DISPUTE

1. The water itself: 2 deals signed in 1961 and 1962. Technically MY can negotiate price, but when they can they don't want. And then suddenly Mahatir say we exploiting them. At first still chill, but after AFC got really bad
2. The railway thing. Originally, railway runs from MY, into Woodlands, down to Bukit timah, then to Tanjong Pagar. So originally checkpoint was at Tanjong Pagar. At first Mahathir said ok, but again he suddenly turn angsty
3. In summary mahathir cb la

Basically, early on **owing to acrimonious separation whose arose due to differences in ideology pertaining to what Malaysia should be (Malaysia for malays vs Malaysia for malaysians) and PAP's decision to contest the 1964 General Elections in response to UMNO's inflammatory articles in Berita Harian → political challenge and hostility between Tunku Abdul Rahman and LKY**

→ Concept of historical overhang

Malaysia's characterisation of Malaysia-Singapore relations to be one of Abang-Adik clouded relations because Singapore believed it could assert itself and deserved equal respect owing to its prosperity and **having been able to create a prosperous city despite traumatic ouster and loss of critical hinterland**

Potential eval for a source: If Singaporean POV, they may not have the political understanding and nuance to recognise that the inflammatory comments made by state governments/Malaysian leaders was not representative of the larger society since Malaysia **had a federal system and a system of coalition parties, such that even within the ruling UMNO/Barisan Nasional coalition, differences could emerge**

1. Nevertheless, under Tun Razak and Hussein Onn relations were rather cordial and diplomatic relations were fine...until Mahathir

The water agreements supplied about half of Singapore's water demand, and hence could be used as the 'water card' could be leveraged upon to Singapore's hand and coerce it to take actions it did not want to (Israel relations, CIQ)

1961 and 1962 water agreements

1. 1961 water agreement, **which expired in 2011**, allowed Singapore to draw untreated water at the price of 3 Malaysian cents for every 4,500 liters → Malaysia could then buy back treated water at 50 Malaysian cents for every 4,500 liters
2. 1962 Water agreement, which **expires in 2061, provides for Johor to supply 1.1 billion litres of water to Singapore daily**
3. Both treaties provide for a revision of the rates each country pays for water in 25 years → price revision is core of the dispute
4. **Malaysia did not review the rates in 1986 nor in 1987 (because it was deemed prudent to do so since Johor and other areas in Malaysia continued to face water shortages and by raising the price of water, Singapore would in turn raise the price of treated water it sold to Malaysia)**
5. But because SG was not as badly impacted as MY during AFC AND because it was already far more affluent → they sought to raise prices **especially considering that they believed it was only fair since the 1961 and 1962 water agreements were negotiated during a period of uncertainty for SG** → Hence they should reciprocate

November 1986 water agreement also saw the use of water card

1990 Lingui Dam agreement (24 November 1990)

1. Singapore constructed a dam at Sungai Linggiu → provided RM 320 million in compensation, annual rent and borne the cost of building and maintaining the dam
2. In return, Singapore could purchase treated water from Malaysia generated by this dam → WHICH would be over the 1.1 billion litres in the 1962 agreement **such that the dam eventually became Singapore's primary source of water**

AFC caused a poor economic outlook and climate in Malaysia → poor economic climate necessitated government to raise revenue and thus more inclined to raise price of water

January 1998 diplomatic faux pas

1. In a defamation suit against Tang Liang Hong (opposition party leader), Lee and 7 other PAP MPs described Johor as an area infested with crime and social issues → which inflamed tensions and Badawi (Malaysia PM) summoned the Singapore high commissioner in Malaysia to explain the affidavit and demand an apology from Lee
2. Which he did, and **in 28 March 1998** → Malaysian cabinet accepted his apology

Mahathir's aggressive foreign policy with respect to SG can partly be explained by how **he sought to distract the population from his power struggles such as Ops Lalang and crush domestic opposition, particularly due to the rise of Anwar and the AFC**

CIQ facilities dispute

Points of Agreement

1. Malaysia owned 200 hectares of land in 3 railway stations as well as the land adjoining the railway tracks that ran from JB to Singapore → and the land was jointly agreed to be developed by a holding company in which MY held 60% of shares and SG held 40% (negotiated by finance minister Tun zainuddin)
2. But however in July 1998 → he reneged on the agreement and instead proposed redeveloping the railway tracks and the land **to become part of a trans-Asian rail network AS WELL AS DEVELOP RAILWAY LAND IN BUKIT TIMAH THAT WAS NOT COVERED BY 1990 POA**
3. Singapore could not accept Mahathir's proposal since it sought to maintain adherence to the inked agreements

Moreover, dispute also arose due to the relocation of CIQ facility

Initially, Malaysia's CIQ was in Tanjong Pagar and Singapore thus sought to move it to Johor as it had no legal basis for being in Singapore and more importantly, **sought to prevent entry of illegal immigrants and smuggling of drugs**

Between 1992 to 1997, SG government was building a new CIQ facility in Woodlands seeking to relocate them away from Tanjong pagar to Johor (**Malaysia previously agreed to the relocation exercise**)

BUT then in 1998, it withdrew from the arrangement

1. Singapore protested this since rail passengers entering Singapore **via the Woodlands checkpoint would HAVE to be granted access to Singapore despite not first properly exiting Malaysia** → which created security and legal concerns

For Mahathir he sought greater economic competition with Singapore (Vision 2020 which sought to modernise Malaysia to become a developed country by 2020)

1. In infrastructural development → upgrade sea and air ports to funnel sea, air and cargo traffic away from Singapore
2. In 1999, Port Tanjung Pelepas was opened to rival Singapore's Keppel Harbour → and successfully attracted Maersk Sealand in 2000 which **was the world's largest container ship operator**

SG responded with all this by diversifying her water supply

1. In 1991, SG signed an accord with Indonesia that allowed it to draw up to 4500 million litres of water daily from Bintan
2. Increased water catchment areas domestically, developed desalination plants and NEWater

2000 Package deal (Comprehensive settlement in August 2000)

1. Price of untreated water increased to 45 sen per 1000 gallons in return for assured water supply beyond 2061 → and water supply beyond 2061 at 60 sen per 1000 gallons of water

Third-Indochina War

Background

- In 1949, the French ceded lower Cambodia to new state of Vietnam. This inflamed tensions between the two
- Despite historical animosities, relations between Cambodia and North Vietnam were cordial and even cooperative during first and second Indochina wars as Cambodia was part of non-aligned movement and sympathetic to communists
- Rise of Khmer Rouge meant closer **ideological alignment**, but relations worsened as Khmer Rouge discriminated against Vietnamese (Pol Pot ethnic cleansing etc)
- Tensions peaked in 1978 with Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia

Historical animosity

- For centuries, Vietnam has invaded and subjugated Cambodian lands. Vietnam-Cambodia border has seen more battles than any other border in Asia
- Vietnam established 'settler villages' throughout the Mekong Delta in the 1600s, and had annexed the region by the end of the century
- French colonisation was both blessing and curse for Cambodians

- Blessing in that they were not completely **swallowed** by Vietnam BUT they lost territories
- Moreover, French had preferential policy for Vietnamese, who were seen as hardworking and industrious, whereas Cambodians were viewed as lazy and incompetent
- Thereby, they sought **Vietnamese to be civil servants to administer Cambodia**

Ideological alignment - Sihanouk socialist inclinations and relations with communist North Vietnam

- Sihanouk supported Vietnamese communists during Vietnam war
- Sihanouk allowed Vietnamese communists to use Cambodia as a place to supply their arms for their supporters in South Vietnam.
- The Khmer Republic was declared after a coup against Sihanouk by Lon Nol, and relations became poor again in 1970
- However, due to economic problems, the Khmer Rouge successfully overthrew the Khmer Republic and a communist state took root

Regional developments

- In the 1960s, Sino-Soviet split took place, making SEA a battleground between USSR and China for communist influence
- USSR supported Vietnam, China supported Cambodia (Pol Pot)
- Animosity between Vietnamese and Cambodians were enhanced as a result of these powerful states' backing

TENSIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND VIETNAM + VIETNAMESE ALIGNMENT WITH USSR

- Vietnamese were wary of Chinese attempts to influence Vietnam, and they regarded the urging of the Chinese to accept **partition at 17th parallel during 1954 Geneva Conference as betrayal**
- Territorial disputes over islands in South China Sea
- November 1964 Vietnamese delegation visit to Moscow made the USSR government agree to provide **37 million rubles in aid to Vietnam, which was to be delayed till 1980**. This drew Vietnam closer to USSR

CAMBODIAN ALIGNMENT WITH CHINA

- Growing tensions with Vietnam and warmer Vietnam-USSR relations motivated China to cultivate closer relations with Cambodia, whom both saw Vietnam as an enemy
- In 1956, China pledged 8 million pound sterling in aid to build factories
- Following 1970 coup, Sihanouk lived in Beijing in a palatial estate gifted by CCP
- Gave immense aid nearing \$1US billion in 1975, Khmer Rouge were armed with Chinese-manufactured arms

Background of Vietnam-**Khmer Rouge** relations

- Pol Pot maintained Cambodian communists' right to act independently, and the interests of 'Vietnamese brothers' should not dominate their own policy
- Hanoi were not fond of this, and sought to introduce 'necessary people' to eventually remove Pol Pot

Pol Pot's pursuit of a pure society

- Displacement of Cambodians owing to the Khmer Rouge genocide created a security threat for Vietnam
- New society purified society along racial, social and political lines
- Also executed anyone suspected of having connections with former Cambodian government officials or foreign governments
- 50-70% of Cambodia's working-age men were executed

Khmer Rouge's discriminatory policies against ethnic vietnamese

- Khmer Rouge believed all minorities threatened the regime
- Chinese, Cham Muslims, and Vietnamese were all threats
- Khmer Rouge purged Vietnamese-trained personnel within its ranks
- In 1977, Khmer Rouge ordered mass execution of **ALL REMAINING PEOPLE of Vietnamese ancestry**, killing all remaining ethnic Vietnamese

Attacks and border intrusions by Cambodians

- In an effort to regain areas of the Mekong Delta, Khmer Rouge soldiers raided nearby strategic islands in May 1975
- Vietnam was also however guilty, as they captured a Cambodian island in June 1975

By 1978, border skirmishes were commonplace

Cambodia severed diplomatic relations with Vietnam on 31 December 1977

Vietnamese interference in Cambodian affairs and escalation of tensions

- At this point in time, Cambodia was characterized by extreme paranoia
- Khmer Rouge abolished money, private property and imposed collectivisation
- 1.5 million people lost their lives between 1975 and 1979

FUNSK was made up of both communists and non-communists, backed by both Vietnam and USSR to eliminate Pol Pot

Pol Pot viewed FUNSK as interference in Cambodia's internal affairs, yet Vietnam saw it essential

The war itself

- Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978 with soviet support
- The Vietnamese installed a pro-Vietnamese puppet government
- Occupation lasted 10 years

Cambodian response + International response to invasion

- Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) called for emergency meeting at UN
- 4 members of SC supported ceasefire draft, but was vetoed by USSR
- By January 1980, only 29 countries established relations with the PRK (puppet state), with 80 countries still recognising legitimacy of Khmer Rouge
- In ASEAN, Vietnam was condemned for invading Cambodia, which was in part motivated by Thai fears of Vietnamese expansionism
- US imposed sanctions on Vietnam and blocked IMF loans (think about it from CW anti-USSR views)

Efforts at national reconciliation

- Jakarta informal meetings provided platform to build consensus and discuss Cambodia's future
- France facilitated the Paris Peace Conference began in July 1989 and culminated in the Paris Peace Agreement 1991

Emergence of coalition government in Cambodia

- Despite PRK's popularity, it was still viewed as a puppet government and hence civil war persisted with Khmer Rouge
- Khmer Rouge was joined by Sihanouk to form CGDK (Coalition government for democratic Kampuchea)
- CGDK had pro-Thai anti-communist factions, which made ASEAN and US more willing to support it financially and militarily
- Within Cambodia, PRK's authority declined
- Many Cambodians were disgruntled at how under PRK, every Cambodian minister had a Vietnamese adviser, and the Vietnamese influence was apparent
- Support for CGDK thereby grew both at home and on international front, and were seen as legitimate representative of Cambodia

Vietnamese withdrawal and move towards national reconciliation

- K5 Plan, aimed to seal guerilla infiltration route, to secure Cambodian-Vietnamese border prior to withdrawal
- Vietnam had spent 1/3 of its budget on the Cambodian invasion, which was bad for their economy. I'm
- In 1985, Hanoi announced they would withdraw by 1990

As said earlier

Jakarta Informal Meetings

- Both PRK and CGDK met for Jakarta Informal Meetings
- These settled conversations....., 3 main meetings. And set the process for national reconciliation

Paris Peace Agreement 1991

- Provide ceasefire, ensure right to self-determination through free and fair elections + cessation of military assistance and withdrawal of foreign forces still present

End of cold war

- Loss of SOviet support meant occupying Cambodia would become untenable economically and militarily
- Vietnam wanted to attract FDI and hence HAD to come out of isolation

UNTAC UN translational authority in Cambodia oversaw free and fair elections in Cambodia, finally settling the crisis