



# TAMPINES MERIDIAN JUNIOR COLLEGE

## JC2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

CANDIDATE  
NAME

CIVICS GROUP

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### H1 HISTORY

The Cold War and the Modern World (1945–2000)

8838/01

10 September 2024  
3 hours

Additional materials: 12 Page Answer Booklet

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### READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name and Civics Group in the spaces at the top of the page.

Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.

You may use an HB pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working.

Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid.

### Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

### Section B

Answer **two** questions.

The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question.

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## SECTION A

You **must** answer Question 1.

### The Collapse of Communism in East Germany

- 1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow:

#### Source A

On November 4, 1989, a long, happy parade ended with a huge meeting at Alexanderplatz, East Berlin's central square, where some twenty speakers called for a political reform of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) — but not its abolition. Yet, the ruling Socialist Unity Party, the SED, had clearly lost control, and its opening of the Berlin Wall five days later marked the beginning of the end. On December 8–9 the party threw out its old leaders, chose new ones, formally rejected its claim to dominance, condemned “Stalinist methods” of the past, and soon added the words “Party of Socialist Democracy” to its title. The election on March 18, 1990, sealed the GDR's fate. In reunified Germany, if a factory was lucky, it was bought up by its former West German competitor, often some ruling giant, and used to make parts, taking advantage of the lower wages, longer hours, and intimidating pressures of threatening joblessness. By 1994, billions in the GDR's economic value had mysteriously been transformed into debt. This was blamed on GDR's inefficiency.

*Reflections of an American Communist who moved to live in Socialist East Germany in a 2014 interview*

#### Source B

In many parts of the country, there was a huge desire for the wall to come down, but very little hope, because we were very much aware that the Soviet Union had rudely crushed an uprising in East Germany in 1953. More than 10 percent of the East German population then had turned to the streets and had demonstrated for freedom, unity, and justice. There was very little hope that the Soviet Union would ever allow Germany to reunite.

The legacy of the fall of the wall is that a peaceful revolution can make a difference. Let's not forget, it was not the governments—it was courageous people first in Leipzig, then other cities, then in Berlin, all over the GDR, who demonstrated in October 1989. Also, it led to the all-German election on December 2, 1990, when those who had argued for German unification won an overwhelming victory. It changed everything in German politics. In new opinion polls, 70 percent of all people who lived in 1990 in East Germany believe that they have benefited from German unity, whereas some 17 percent believe they have not.

*An interview in 2019 with a West German diplomat who lobbied for reunification as a member of the West German mission to the UN in 1989*




### Source C

Trade on the black market represented a serious challenge to the party's power because it took place beyond the purview of the plan. On the one hand, the black market circumscribed the SED's ability to determine economic behaviour. Growing numbers of East Germans were engaged in transactions that circumvented the socialist state, while the state was forced to tolerate this behaviour because it helped overcome otherwise insuperable gaps in the supply of goods and services. On the other hand, the shadow economy undermined the value of the East German mark, itself a key instrument of state control over the economy. But black markets also represented an ideological challenge to socialism because they operated on capitalist lines. Trade on the black market employed alternate media of exchange, from social connections to western money, all of which competed directly with socialist ideals and socialist money.

*Academic, Making and Unmaking Money: Economic Planning and the Collapse of East Germany, 2007.*


### Source D



*Statistical Yearbooks of the German Democratic Republic, 1989 and Statistical Yearbook of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2017.*



**Source E**



*A cartoon of GDR by a Dutch cartoonist originally from Berlin 10 July 1989.*

**Now answer the following questions:**

- a) Compare and contrast sources A and B on evidence of views of German Reunification.

[10]

- b) How far do Sources A-E support the assertion that economic conditions in East Germany were responsible for the collapse of communism in East Germany?

[30]

## SECTION B: ESSAY QUESTIONS

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

### EITHER

- 2 To what extent was Nixon's visit to China in 1972 the trigger factor that led to the improvement in Sino-US relations? [30]

### OR

- 3 How far do you agree that the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1952 was the most significant reason for the rise in tensions between Japan and the US from 1952-1991? [30]

### AND EITHER

- 4 To what extent was ASEAN effective in addressing the challenges posed by the Third Indochina War from 1978-1991? [30]

### OR

- 5 How far do you agree that relations with the US had become increasingly important in Singapore's foreign policy from 1956-1991? [30]

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# J2 H1 Prelims 2024 Suggested Response

## Section A

(a) Compare and contrast sources A and B on **evidence of views on German reunification**.

<b>Similarity</b>	<b>(similar cause)</b> The sources are similar in the view that German reunification was driven by <b>popular pressure from the masses</b> .
<b>Source A</b>	Source A states 'Yet, the ruling party had clearly lost control and the opening of the Berlin Wall 5 days later marked the beginning of the end, when the party 'party threw out its old leaders, chose new ones, formally rejected its claim to dominance, condemned "Stalinist" methods..' this shows that it was <b>due to popular pressure and the massive demonstrations at the Berlin Wall that showed the desire of East Berliners to reunite</b> .
<b>Source B</b>	Source B states that "In many parts of the country, there was a huge desire for the wall to come down" And "let's not forget it was <b>not the governments</b> – it was the <b>courageous people</b> first in Leipzig than other cities, then in Berlin, and all over the GDR, who demonstrated in Oct 1989 that led to the election on Dec 2 1990 where those who had argued for German reunification won an overwhelming majority." <b>Demonstrating that it was the collective effort of the masses that led to German reunification</b> .
<b>Link</b>	Thus, both sources view German reunification as a result of <b>popular pressure to reunify Germany</b>

<b>Why Similar</b>	<p>The sources are similar in their view that the East German government drove German Reunification because of their similar context.</p> <p>The similarities can be explained by understanding the <b>context of the rise of German popular movement</b> in East Germany where under Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost, East Berliners, already the most economically advanced in the Warsaw Pact had been severely affected by economic slow-down caused by Gorbachev's disastrous economic reform and with glasnost, was able to gain access to Western media to compare how more economically developed and wealthy the capitalists living in West Germany. This thus gave rise to further discontent and with the clear signal from Gorbachev on the abolition of the Brezhnev Doctrine, <b>it finally emboldened the people in East Germany to gather in mass demonstrations for greater reforms, leading eventually to the events of the fall of the Berlin Wall where it marked the start of German reunification</b>. Similarly, in West Germany, due to reformist Hungarian government that allowed East Germans to escape to the West through <u>Hungary's</u> newly opened border with <u>Austria</u>, <b>there were soon thousands of East Germans flocking into the West which hastened the West German government of Kohl to hasten the political process of reunification by flying to Moscow on 10 Feb 1990, seeking Gorbachev's</b></p>
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	<b>approval to press on for unity which was granted.</b> ( <i>The Moscow visit also underlined the fact that the two Germanys would not be able to unite without the approval of the four main World War II Allies – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union</i> )
<b>Explanation + substantiation</b>	Source A was a reflection of an American communist and Source B was an interview with a West German diplomat, both of whom were living in East Germany during the tumultuous time that led up to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the German Reunification. From contextual knowledge, the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 made it very clear to the East German politicians of the time that communism had failed and that a democratic vote would reflect the events of the fall of the wall which represented the people's interest in a united Germany. As such, both personalities would have had first hand experiences of the elections process in East Germany and would thus share the knowledge of how East German politicians that won the election were supportive of German reunification.
<b>Link</b>	Thus, the sources are similar.

<b>Difference 1</b>	<b>(different impact)</b> The sources differ in their view of the impact of German reunification. <i>Source A points out that it was not a total positive experience while Source B points out that it was largely positive.</i>
<b>Source A</b>	Source A states 'In reunified Germany, <b>if a company was lucky, it was bought up by its former West German competitor, and used to make parts, taking advantage of the lower wages, longer hours and intimidating pressures of threatening joblessness.</b> ' This shows that most East Germans did not benefit from the reunification as hoped for as they were <b>exploited by richer West German companies.</b> This was further evidenced when 'by 1994, <b>billions in the GDR's economic value had mysteriously been transformed into debt</b> ' suggesting that East Germany reserves were <b>defrauded by West Germany.</b>
<b>Source B</b>	In contrast, Source B paints a positive picture with "70 percent of all people who lived in 1990 in East Germany" believing that they had benefited from German unity.
<b>Link</b>	Thus the sources differ in addressing the impact of German reunification.

<b>Why different</b>	The sources differences can be explained when viewed by their purpose and context.
<b>Explanation + substantiation</b>	Source A comes from the personal reflections in 2014 of an American communist who had moved from America to settle in East Germany before reunification. As such he would have had strong beliefs in the ideals of socialism and being a member of the working class, would have had <b>first-hand experience of the reality of reunification for working class citizens</b> who suffered more in the first few years of reunification when East German state-owned enterprises, many of whom were already unproductive and in the aftermath of reunification were <b>unable to keep up with free-market of Germany,</b> leaving many <b>East Germans unemployed. Within a year after unification, the number of unemployed rose above 3 million. Industrial production in eastern Germany fell to less than half the previous rate, and</b>





	<p><b>the total regional product fell precipitously through 1991</b>, hence his critical view on reunification.</p> <p>Meanwhile, Source B was by a West German diplomat who was also a member of the West German mission to the UN to lobby for reunification. Given his position, he would want to proliferate the view/ <b>convince his view</b> that the German Reunification was indeed a success. Thus, he highlighted the positive view of the economy although he did objectively acknowledge a percentage of 17% of those living in East Germany who did not feel they benefited from unity. <b>As a member of the more privileged class of West Germans, he would not have experienced the deprivations of the ordinary East Germans, and hence would view reunification as an all-rounded success for East Germany.</b></p>
<b>Link</b>	Thus, due to their differing purpose of engaging with East Germany, the two interviewees had differing views of the impact of German Reunification.



(b) How far do Sources A-F support the assertion that **economic conditions in East Germany was responsible for the collapse of Communism in East Germany?**

Argument of source set	Support	Challenge
<b>Inference of sources</b>	<p>Sources C and D support the assertion that economic conditions in East Germany was responsible for the collapse of Communism in East Germany.</p> <p><b>Source C</b> addresses economic conditions in East Germany when it addressed the increasing attractiveness of the black market. It states “the shadow economy undermined the value of the East German mark” and that they “represented an ideological challenge to socialism because they operated on capitalist lines.” <b>This shows that East German economic conditions which drove its people away from socialism towards black markets led to the increased disillusionment of socialism which ripened their desire for political reform increasing embracing of capitalism and thus the demise of communism in East Germany.</b></p> <p>Likewise, <b>Source D</b> supports the assertion as it demonstrated the dire economic situation of East Germany. The graph shows that immediately from the point of the division of Germany, the East German economy deteriorates and only starts improving from the 1950s. While capitalist West Germany's GDP increased exponentially, Socialist East Germany's GDP improvements merely inched upwards comparatively. <b>This implies that economic conditions in East Germany were diametrically worse than West Germany and the clear contrasting conditions</b></p>	<p>Source A, B, E and F challenge the assertion that economic conditions in East Germany was responsible for the end of Communism in East Germany.</p> <p><b>Sources A and B challenge as they assert that it was due to pressure from people's movement, whereas Sources E and F suggest that it was to do with the impact of Gorbachev reforms and Western interference.</b></p> <p><b>Source A</b> counters the assertion because it asserts that the people's demand for political reform led to the collapse of communism in East Germany. It states that “a long, happy parade ended with a huge meeting at Alexanderplatz,...where some twenty speakers called for a political reform of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) — but not its abolition”. This shows that the peoples' demand for reforms rather than economic conditions in East Germany as responsible. From contextual knowledge, these reforms were in fact calling for reforms in line with Soviet Union's glasnost and thus it was people's demand for freedom and democracy that led to the collapse of Communism in East Germany.</p> <p><b>Source B</b> challenges the assertion because it argues that the people's power demanding German unification led to the end of communism in East Germany. Source B points to the “courageous people...in Leipzig,...other cities...in Berlin, all over the GDR, who demonstrated” in “peaceful</p>



	<p><b>in West Germany, were a trigger factor in leading to dissatisfaction that caused the collapse of communism in East Germany.</b> Thus, sources A, C and D support the assertion the economic conditions led to the collapse of communism in East Germany.</p>	<p>resolution” brought about the fall of the Berlin Wall and caused an “overwhelming victory” for the politicians who “argued for...unification”. From contextual knowledge, this unification meant the end of communism and Stalinist elements were removed from governance. Thus, it was the people’s desire for reunification that led to the end of communism in East Germany.</p> <p><b>Source E</b> is a cartoon that, paints a picture of the reaction of Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the SED, to the proliferation of protests. The different languages on the flag show that the protests referred to are that going on throughout Eastern Europe. The cartoon shows that Honecker had walled in East Germany and ignore the winds of change of the international political climate. This implies that it was his hardline attitude towards East Germany and refusal to acknowledge change and move with the times that led to the end of communism in East Germany.</p> <p>Finally, <b>Source F</b> quotes an interview by Margaret Honecker, wife of the leader of East Germany. It states that “she suggests that the demonstrations were driven by the GDR’s enemies” likely referring to capitalist states. Thus, it was external forces in the form of capitalist influences that led to the end of communism in East Germany.</p>
<p><b>Evaluation of sources</b> Evaluation of provenance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Context of source</li> <li>- What is the source and its likely purpose</li> </ul>	<p><b>Source C</b> <b>Evaluation of Provenance.</b> Source C is an academic source written in 2007. It demonstrates its benefit of hindsight given information about the black market “took place beyond the purview of the (SED) plan”, showing insight about how black markets acted as an</p>	<p><b>Source A</b> <b>Evaluation of Provenance.</b> Source A was a response by an American Communist who moved to live in Socialist East Germany to an interview in 2014. Given he had moved from capitalist America to socialist East Germany, it is likely that the purpose of the</p>



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Tone (optional)</li> <li>- Is it likely reliable?</li> </ul> <p>Evaluation of reliability:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Substantiate claim of reliability with CK/Cr to another source</li> </ul> <p>Evaluation of use:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- If useful, explain why in relation to Q.</li> <li>- If limited in use, use CK/CR to demonstrate what is missing.</li> </ul>	<p>“ideological challenge to socialism”. The source is thus likely reliable.</p> <p><b>Evaluation of Reliability</b></p> <p>Cross-referencing to Source D which shows us the shockingly low GDP per capita climb of the East German economy, it gives us an understanding of why the black market was so attractive to East Germans and why “the state was forced to tolerate this behaviour because it helped overcome otherwise insuperable gaps in the supply of goods and services”. This is further enhanced by contextual knowledge that East Germany had lacked basic low priced consumer goods like tomato sauce. The source is thus reliable.</p> <p><b>Evaluation of Use</b></p> <p>The source is very useful in demonstrating how economic conditions led East Germans to turn to capitalist means and the SED’s inability to do anything about it given the necessity of underhanded capitalism showed clearly that socialism and by extension communism, was failing in East Germany thus leading to its end.</p> <p><b>Source D</b></p> <p><b>Evaluation of Provenance.</b></p> <p>Source D is a graph from a Statistical Yearbooks of the German Democratic Republic, 1989 and Statistical Yearbook of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2017. Given it is a combination of statistics from East Germany and reunified Germany, it is likely reliable particularly because reunified Germany would have interest in its accuracy.</p>	<p>interviewee was to express his dissatisfaction with unification as it meant that East Germany became part of a capitalist system. <b>Despite his criticism, the source is reliable in its claim that it was due to people’s movement that pressured the hardline govt to adopt massive reforms. This is corroborated by CK and Source B that ever-larger demonstrations demanded a voice in government for the people, and in mid-November hardliner Krenz was replaced by a reform-minded communist, Hans Modrow, who promised free, multiparty elections. When the balloting took place in March 1990 the SED, now renamed the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), suffered a crushing defeat which saw eastern counterpart of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which had pledged a speedy reunification of Germany, emerged as the largest political party which marked the end of Communism in East Germany.</b></p> <p>The source is thus likely unreliable as there would have been dissatisfaction with the unification.</p> <p><b>Evaluation of Reliability</b></p> <p>The source is unreliable. Cross-referencing to Source D, it shows that upon reunification, there was a marked improvement in the GDP of those who lived in East Germany. The reliability of the source is further enhanced by cross-referencing to Source B which pointed out that “70% of all people who lived in 1990 in East Germany (believed) that they have benefited from German unity.” Contradicting Source A’s claim that “By 1994, billions in the GDR’s economic value had mysteriously been transformed into debt.”</p>
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	<p><b>Evaluation of Reliability</b> Contextual knowledge supports the poor economic conditions reflected. In 1979, East Germany experienced a severe shortage of ketchup, a scarce and highly desirable commodity. Later on in 1982, there was also a cattle crisis. By mid-1980s, working conditions had deteriorated to a point where theft was perceived by workers as appropriate compensation for being overworked and underpaid. Thus, the source is reliable.</p> <p><b>Evaluation of Use</b> The source is ultimately limited in use. As a graph solely focused on GDP, it can not help with conclusions about the end of communism in East Germany. Nonetheless, cross-referencing to Source C, we can see how both the people and the government were unable to rectify this situation and thus it led to a disillusionment with communism.</p>	<p><b>Evaluation of Use</b> The source is useful in pointing out that demands for political reform was a driving force for the end of communism in East Germany as it explains how this led to the ruling party of the time changing its rhetoric in order to appeal to a anti-communist majority.</p> <p><b>Source B</b> <b>Evaluation of Provenance</b> Source B is by a West German diplomat who lobbied for reunification as a member of the West German mission to the UN in 1989. This immediately demonstrates that he was pro-reunification of Germany and someone who lived in a capitalist state and likely believed in its benefits given his political view of reunification. The source thus has the potential to be biased against socialism but proves to be objective. In considering the impact of reunification, it quotes a statistic of East German satisfaction that acknowledges that 17% believed they did not benefit from reunification, showing an attempt at objectivity. The source is thus likely reliable.</p> <p><b>Evaluation of Reliability</b> The reliability of the source's <a href="#">claim that the collapse of the communism was due to people's movement</a> is supported by <b>contextual knowledge of the demonstrations</b> mentioned in Source B. The demonstrations mentioned in October 1989 in fact were the first where the Stasi was not ordered to harshly crackdown on demonstrators, supporting him saying that the people were "courageous". Furthermore, contextual knowledge also shows that the subsequent fall of the Berlin Wall as confidence of demonstrators grew and</p>
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		<p>control of the government eased did lead to the acceding of East Germany into the Federal Republic of Germany on 3 October 1990 before the 2 December elections. This supports what the source says about how the demonstrations led to an “all-German election” and those who “argued for German unification”, Helmut Kohl’s coalition party, “won an overwhelming victory” with 54.8%.</p> <p><b>Evaluation of Use</b>  Very useful in pointing out that the continued resilience of people’s power despite the 1953 crackdown and fears of continued hardline response in 1989, was what brought about the end of communism in East Germany.</p> <p><b>Source E</b>  <b>Evaluation of Provenance.</b>  Source E is a cartoon of GDR by a Dutch cartoonist originally from Berlin published on 10 July 1989. Depicted in the background was a <a href="#">Erich Honecker, the hardline leader of East Germany’s govt with his fingers stuffed to his ears, trying to ignore the loud calls of freedom, reunifications from demonstrators as he squats in the barricaded walled up section of East Berlin. The cartoon was published in July 1989 against the context of a tightening of Honecker’s policies in East Germany in a desperate attempt to stem the tide of East Germans escaping across to Austria via Hungary as well as banning publications of Soviet materials that advocated Glasnost, Perestroika. The author strove to mock Honecker of ignoring the increasing strident calls of political reforms.</a>  a representation of the successful and ongoing peoples power movements around Eastern Europe, making the source likely reliable as the</p>
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		<p>Sinatra Doctrine took effect and satellite state after satellite state broke away from USSR and turned democratic.</p> <p><b>Evaluation of Reliability</b>  The source's claims that it was indirectly due to Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and abandonment of Brezhnev Doctrine that led to the end of communism in East Germany is reliable. From contextual knowledge, Honecker was truly ignoring these movements. It took <b>Gorbachev's visit on 7 October 1989 to continue to persuade him to consider reforms</b> and when he insisted on not heeding this advice, <b>Gorbachev supported his removal on 18<sup>th</sup> October</b>. This depiction is thus reliable.</p> <p><b>Evaluation of Use</b>  The source is limited in use as while it shows that people were calling for freedom and economic reforms, it does not address how this led to the end of communism in East Germany adequately. Contextual knowledge would demonstrate that these movements led to pressure on the replacement of Honecker and then later to the build up of demonstrations that brought the Berlin Wall down and ended the communist regime.</p> <p><b>Source F</b>  <b>Evaluation of Provenance.</b>  Source F is an interview with Margot Honecker, wife of East German leader, Erich Honecker, by a German TV network in the wake of his death, 2012. What is most striking in the report on this interview is her <b>very biased tone</b> referring to East Germany as a "good place to live" and saying that the economic demise of the GDR was "simply untrue".</p>
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		<p>And claiming that the <b>reason that communism ended in East Germany</b> was due to <b>East Germany's enemies</b> stirring the population to demonstrations. She may imply that <b>Gorbachev was an 'enemy'</b> as it is true that Honecker was horrified at Gorbachev's political reforms. In addition, he was also the man that stripped Honecker of his premiership, stands to <b>corroborate the source's claim</b> that the <b>end of communism in East Germany was due to the impact of Gorbachev's reforms on the popular movements in East Germany.</b></p> <p><b>Evaluation of Reliability</b> Cross-referencing to Sources C and D, we can see that her belief that the economic demise of GDR was "simply untrue" was flawed. Furthermore, the exuberating reaction of thousands of East Germans upon the fall of the Berlin Wall is a testament to the fact that it was certainly not a "tragedy". The source is thus unreliable.</p> <p><b>Evaluation of Use</b> The source is ultimately quite useful in demonstrating to us what triggered the frustrations of East Germans against their politicians and their economy given her blindness to the realities of East Germany.</p>
<b>Conclusion</b>	<p><b>In conclusion,</b> the supporting set of sources were more reliable and useful in addressing the economic deterioration of East Germany as a reason for the fall of communism in East Germany. The set of sources which challenged, while informative, were at times unreliable. <b>Ultimately,</b> a more accurate assertion would be that East German will for reunification was the most fundamental factor driving the fall of Communism in East Germany while the influence of successful Eastern European popular anti-communist movements was merely a catalyst to this movement and the dissatisfaction with economic conditions in East Europe, an underlying factor.</p>	





## Section B

2. To what extent was Nixon's visit to China in 1972 the trigger factor that led to the improvement in Sino-US relations?

<b>Topic</b>	China and the Cold War
<b>Issue</b>	Factors influencing the improvement of Sino-US relations
<b>Assumption</b>	That Nixon's visit to China in 1972 <b>triggered</b> improved relations → it implies that this is a REASON for improved relations.
<b>Content</b>	<p>Nixon's visit to China was the first public, diplomatic attempt at relations that culminated in a treaty being signed and motivated future diplomatic engagement.</p> <p>However, it was not the trigger as there was evident interactions between China and US prior to this occasion.</p> <p>The essay should consider other events that <b>led to</b> improvement in relations such as:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. US inability to win the Vietnam War</li> <li>2. Sino-Soviet split leading to China's isolation</li> <li>3. Economic situation of both China and the US</li> </ol>
<b>Thesis</b>	<p><b>TS1: Nixon's visit to China was the first major step in the rapprochement between China and the US and certainly contributed to improved relations between the two nations as it catalysed diplomatic commitments between the two nations.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evi 1: The 2 governments negotiated the Shanghai Communique, an important step towards improving relations between the US and China where they agreed that neither they nor any other power should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific Region</li> <li>- Evi 2: The Communique was also important in the US acknowledging the One-China policy with regards to the political status of Taiwan although it did not endorse China's version of the policy, and agreed to cut back military installations on Taiwan.</li> <li>- Evi 3: The visit also clearly led to the improvement of economic ties as trade between China and the US grew around 25% that year.</li> </ul> <p><b>TS2: However, Cold War developments rather than Nixon's visit to China was the trigger factor that led to the improvement in Sino-US relations as it raised security concerns for both US and China that led to their mutual interest in rapprochement.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evi 1: The Sino-Soviet split which pushed China towards establishing bilateral relations with the US. Increasing tensions with USSR posed a threat to China's security – USSR crushed Prague Uprising in 1968, border clashes which included missiles armed with nuclear warheads</li> </ul>



	<p>directed at China. Sense of isolation due to Soviet policies. ☐ Sino-US rapprochement could mean a global anti-Soviet alliance.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evi 2: End of the Vietnam War – Nixon Doctrine – to lessen conflict, undermine alliances between communist countries, diplomatically isolate North Vietnam and increase US leverage against USSR. Needed China's assistance to exit Vietnam – encourage North Vietnam to make a deal with US on US terms thus there was interest in improving diplomatic relations with China</li> </ul> <p>A2: Cold War developments were more significant as a trigger factor than Nixon's visit to China as it was the fundamental reason for both countries to start looking for ways to re-establish ties. This is also evident from their efforts being made prior to Nixon's visit.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1969, US conciliatory gesture to relax certain trade restrictions that dated from the Korean War. China reciprocated in 1970 by opening the informal Sino-American talks in Warsaw</li> <li>- April 1971 Ping-pong diplomacy</li> </ul> <p><b>TS3: The economic interests of both China and US motivated an improvement in bilateral ties between the two nations.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evi 1: Economic potential with US ☐ Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in 1950s was unequal.</li> <li>- Evi 2: China's economic potential ☐ Large market, quarter of the world's population</li> </ul> <p>A2: Cold War developments remain a more crucial trigger given economic interests came secondary and at a later point in time.</p>
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3. How far do you agree that the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1952 was the most significant reason for the rise in tensions between Japan and the US from 1952-1991?

<b>Topic</b>	Japan and the Cold War (1952-1991)
<b>Issue</b>	Factors shaping Japan-US Relations
<b>Assumption</b>	US-Japan Security Treaty of 1952 was the main cause of a rise in tensions between Japan and the US
<b>Content</b>	<p>US-Japan Security Treaty of 1952's main contention was that US was paying for the bulk of Japan's defensive needs. This upset both the liberals in Japan and was not the preferred situation of the US although they were willing to do so given the imminent communist threat.</p> <p>However, other areas of tension grew more prominent over time. Students should consider:</p>



	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Japan's foreign policy with China which US viewed with suspicion</li> <li>2. Japan economic miracle as an economic threat to the US</li> </ol>
<b>Thesis</b>	<p><b>TS1: US-Japan Security Treaty of 1952 did contribute to the rise of tensions between Japan and the US from 1952-1991 as it led to continued disagreement over the extent of Japan's responsibility over its own defence capabilities.</b></p> <p>The treaty solidified the strategic alliance between the two countries during the Cold War, ensuring that the United States could maintain military bases in Japan in exchange for guaranteeing Japan's security. However, there was always underlying tension about how much responsibility Japan should have in financing its own defence capabilities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evi 1: In 1952, US suggested in a force-level plan, that Japan develop a 300 000-man ground force with ten divisions. Yoshida reacted negatively believing that recovery of economic strength and provision of stability in social welfare was a priority.</li> <li>- When US demanded that Japan increase its police reserves from the current 75 000 to somewhere in between 150 000 to 180 000 during 1952, Yoshida countered with a proposal for 110 000. He did however, agree to establish a National Safety Force.</li> <li>- Evi 2: In 1980, facing numerous international crises, the Carter administration, in its remaining days, somewhat unsympathetically requested that Japan increase its defence spending after the death of Ohira, Carter's close friend. At the end of December, when the Japanese government decided on a 7.6% increase in its 1981 defence budget, the US government, which had strongly hoped for a 9.7% increase, publicly stated that it "could not but be disappointed"</li> </ul> <p><b>TS2: Japan's economic status in the 1970s which posed it as a competitor the US economy and led to a balance of payments deficit of the latter led to far greater tensions and antagonistic retaliatory measures on US part thus making it the most significant reason for a rise in tensions between Japan and the US.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evi 1: In order to get the support of southern textile makers in the 1968 presidential election, US President Nixon had promised some sort of restriction on the export of textiles from Japan. Textiles had at one point been Japan's main industry, but by 1970, Japan was no longer competitive and Japanese textiles no longer represented a major threat to the US market. The conflict over textiles reflected the fact that the US economy had lost its absolute predominance and that Japan's weight in the international economy had increased so much that its economic</li> </ul>



	<p>conduct could not help having international political implications ☐</p> <p>First real example of economic friction between the US and Japan. Ironically, this quota may not have been needed in the first place as American AND Japanese textile industries began losing out to cheaper imports from Southeast Asia. While this textile wrangle did not make much sense, it left deep scars of disillusionment and distrust in the minds of officials on both sides of the Pacific, not least in the mind of the American President Nixon.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evi 2: In 1976, as Japan's commodity prices stabilised and economic growth recovered after the oil crisis of 1973, the trade surplus began to grow enormously. Japan's rate of growth was 6.3% in 1976 and its balance of payments stood at over \$4.6 billion. Europe and the US criticised Japan's flood of exports, with an American steel company eventually charging a Japanese steel company with dumping activity in violation of the GATT agreement.</li> </ul> <p>A2: Japan's economic status was a more significant reason that the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1952 as it led to greater tensions than the latter.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- US response to disagreement to raising defence expenditure was to accommodate it all the way till Nakasone's administration. The lack of will to increase expenditure did not directly impact the US politically.</li> <li>- However, Japan's economic success had direct competition with American companies leading to accusations about US lack of protectionist policies. It shook the political support of the US government by its own people leading to antagonistic retaliatory measures such as the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988). Such retaliatory measures demonstrate higher tensions than the aftermath of the US-Japan Security Treaty.</li> </ul> <p><b>TS3: Japan's foreign policy with China also led to some tensions with the US given the strained relationship that US had with China till 1972.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evi 1: 1962, Japan China re-established relations Liao-Chengzhi Agreement – allowed for resumption of commercial exchanges. Semi-formal trade through private entities. 2 governments did not recognize each other formally. US not happy with Stronger Japan-China relations. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs gave Tokyo a warning suggestin that PRC intended to spread communism through trade relations. When Liao-Chengzhi Agreement (1962) was signed, President Kennedy said Japan and China were going through a “belligerent phase”</li> </ul>
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	<p>and called for Japan to work together to prevent the “domination of Asia by a Communist movement” (From lecture slides)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evi 2: Long Term Trade Agreement (Feb 1978) China could export raw materials such as petroleum while Japan provided advanced science and technology. 1984, bilateral trade comprised 3% Japan’s external trade while it accounted for 26% of China’s. Japan became China’s largest trading partner. US admired Japan’s economic model but was concerned about its dominance in trade with China giving it huge influence in the region. US wary of Japan transferring advanced tech to China potentially being used militarily</li> </ul> <p>A2: Japan’s economic status was a more significant factor than Japan’s foreign policy towards China as while US was sceptical of the latter, it observed that the improved economic relations between China and Japan was in its interest of empowering Japan’s economy to act as a bulwark against communism and thus did not retaliate significantly. Furthermore, it was short-lived scepticism since US itself established relations with China by 1972, noting the economic benefit it had.</p>
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4. To what extent was ASEAN effective in addressing the challenges posed by the Third Indochina War from 1978-1991?

<b>Topic</b>	ASEAN and the Cold War (1967-1991)
<b>Issue</b>	Effectiveness of ASEAN’s response to Cold War Developments, specifically the Third Indochina War
<b>Assumption</b>	ASEAN was effective in responding to the challenges posed by the Third Indochina War
<b>Content</b>	<p>Challenges posed by the Third Indochina War:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Threatened the sanctity of sovereignty upheld by ASEAN as Vietnam had invaded Cambodia</li> <li>2. Threatened ASEAN’s ability to maintain regional stability</li> <li>3. Threatened ASEAN’s ability to remain united in ensuring its political clout on the international stage</li> </ol> <p>ASEAN’s successful responses:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Condemnation of Vietnam for invading Cambodia (united response to military threat)</li> <li>- Lobbying for UN resolution for Vietnam’s withdrawal (united political clout, successful)</li> <li>- ASEAN’s support for CGDK</li> <li>- ASEAN’s role in the peace process (Jakarta Informal Meeting I and II)</li> </ul> <p>ASEAN’s unsuccessful responses (disunited/not heeded):</p>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Different perceptions of regional security threats by ASEAN member states</li> <li>- Internal disagreements within ASEAN (eg. Conduct of secret talks between Thailand and China. Indonesia's dual-track diplomacy)</li> </ul>
<b>Thesis</b>	<p><b>TS1: ASEAN was effective in managing the threat against sovereignty as was evident from its united front against Vietnam's military aggression.</b> The KPNLF on the other hand received some military support from the ASEAN members.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evi 1: Singapore, for instance, was reportedly supplying weapons to the KPNLF while Malaysia was also reported to have provided jungle warfare training to the KPNLF troops.</li> <li>- Evi 2: Thailand played a key role in facilitating the supply of military aid to the KPNLF from the ASEAN members and the United States.</li> </ul> <p><b>TS2: ASEAN was effective in overcoming the threat posed to regional security by the Third Indochina War by drawing international attention and pressure on the Vietnamese aggressors.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evi 1: To defend Cambodia, ASEAN made a joint statement that declared the incursions of Vietnamese forces into Cambodia "directly affect the security of the ASEAN member states." ASEAN rallied together as a strong diplomatic force in the United Nations to promote the notion that the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was illegal. Although the USSR vetoed a resolution drafted by ASEAN in the UN Security Council in March 1979 since they were the direct ally of Vietnam, the General Assembly, in November 1979, adopted ASEAN's draft resolution by an overwhelming vote.</li> <li>- Evi 2: ASEAN also sponsored the International Conference of Kampuchea (ICK) under UN auspices in 1981 and declared through the conference for an UN-arranged and supervised free election allowing all Cambodians to exercise the right to self-determination. In addition, ASEAN sponsored an anti-Vietnamese Cambodian coalition government-in-exile, The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).</li> </ul> <p><b>TS3: However, ASEAN's effectiveness wavered in the face of the Third Indochina War's challenge to its unity as it struggled between a concerted effort and its member states prioritizing national interests.</b></p>



- Evi 1: Malaysia and Indonesia, increasing concerned that the Cambodian conflict would further threaten regional security, proposed at a bilateral summit in Kuantan (1980) a peaceful Thai-Cambodia border by accepting a Vietnamese sphere of interest in Cambodia if Vietnam were to reduce its strategic links with and dependence on the USSR. They also feared that China's anti-Vietnam policy could lead to a more entrenched Soviet-Vietnam alliance, including the Soviet acquisition of the military bases in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay. This was known as the Kuantan Principles. However, Thailand and Singapore objected to the Kuantan Principles since there was no consensus amongst ASEAN countries. The preference was to stick to the terms declared during the International Conference of Kampuchea that required all foreign forces to withdraw from Cambodia.
- Evi 2: Indonesia set up the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM 1 and 2) in July 1988 and February 1989, a series informal negotiations between the different warring factions in Cambodia and the Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh. Thailand was initially not keen to negotiate with pro-Vietnamese Cambodian government as negotiations would mean granting recognition which Thailand did not want to do so. However, under the new Thai Prime Minister, Chatichai Choonvan, Thailand made a unilateral decision to negotiate directly with Vietnam without the need for ASEAN's backing in August 1988. Chatichai proclaimed that he wanted to turn battlefields of Indochina to marketplaces. Then, much to the unhappiness of Indonesian and Singaporean government, Chatichai invited Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen (who had replaced Heng Samarin in 1985) to visit Thailand.

A2: Thus, while ASEAN may take the credit for initiating the international spotlight that allowed a peace process to begin the Third Indochina War, it was less effective than effective in managing the challenges posed by the war in the long-run. It's push for sovereignty was not truly met by Vietnam but rather, mounting economic difficulties in Vietnam led to its government announcing that it would withdraw its troops unilaterally from Cambodia by September 1989. Furthermore, the unity that allowed it political clout was short-lived with Thailand acting on its own and thus the ability to end the conflict was left in the hands of the UN Security Council which passed a resolution for a peace process as ASEAN grappled with the factionalism it faced in the aftermath of the JIM Talks. **Nevertheless, credit must be given to ASdEAN for performing a strong diplomatic role in the early years but eventually due to diverging perspectives, the UN and the P5 members, which carried stronger diplomatic clouts, took the initiative to resolve the conflict demonstrating**



	<b>that ASEAN was more ineffective than effective in addressing challenges posed by the Third Indochina War.</b>
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5. How far do you agree that relations with the US had become increasingly important in Singapore's foreign policy from 1956-1991?

<b>Topic</b>	Singapore and the Cold War (1965-1991)
<b>Issue</b>	Criteria-based → Degree of importance of relations with US to Singapore over time.
<b>Assumption</b>	Singapore's relations with the US has become increasingly important
<b>Content</b>	<p>Incidents that reflect importance of relationship:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Singapore's anti-communist and pro-Western position → The communist threat in the region brought the relationship into importance.</li> <li>- Singapore's support for the US involvement in the Vietnam War (although attempted to balance perceptions of alignment)</li> <li>- Singapore's continual support for the US' presence in the region</li> <li>- Economic ties</li> </ul> <p>Incidents that reflect less importance of relationship:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Early tensions with the US → establishing itself as a neutral, sovereign state was more important than relations with the US.</li> </ul>
<b>Thesis</b>	<p><b>TS1: Singapore's relations with the US had become increasingly important in its foreign policy from 1967 as was evident by its encouragement of the US military presence in the region to counter the communist threat.</b></p> <p>Evi 1: After 1967, Lee openly supported US military intervention in Vietnam, describing it as a great American contribution aimed at providing valuable breathing space to the non-communist Southeast Asian countries. The increasing importance of the relationship was also evident in Singapore's willingness to be identified with America's military enterprise in providing rest and recreational facilities for its servicemen from Vietnam during the late 1960s. Associating further, it allowed South Vietnamese officers who were supported by the US to Singapore for training in the Johore Jungle Warfare School in August 1965.</p>





	<p>Evi 2: Furthermore, Singapore demonstrated the importance of a relationship with US by offering its naval and air bases to be utilized by the US for the maintenance and repair of US military vessels deployed in Vietnam from the late 1960s.</p> <p><i>Worthy to note that while the relationship with the US was clearly important, the ship and aircraft repair facilities remained open to the USSR and Chinese vessels on a commercial basis as well.</i></p> <p><b>TS2: Singapore's relations with the US had become increasingly important in its foreign policy as was evident from the increasing military presence and diplomatic exchanges throughout the 1990s to keep a balance of power in the region and establish security.</b></p> <p>Evi 1: At the end of the Cold War, when Washington announced that it would withdraw from long-held military bases in the Philippines after failing to reach an agreement with the government in Manila on their continued tenure, Lee Kuan Yew made clear his view in Tokyo in May 1991 that the peace and security in Europe and Asia depended on the balance of power that a US military presence in both regions was necessary for. Beyond words, PM Lee also signed a memorandum of understanding with America's Vice-President Dan Quayle that offered an enhanced use of facilities in Singapore to America's military aircraft and naval vessels as a contribution to sustaining its forward military position in Southeast Asia in November 1990.</p> <p>Evi 2: In 1998, Singapore entered into an agreement with the US whereby its capital ships would be able to berth at the new Changi naval base on its completion after 2000 demonstrating the continued importance of keeping US presence, this time economically, in the region. This increasing importance of bilateral ties in the economic sphere was also evident in September 1998 when Prime Minister Goh called on President Clinton at the White House for discussions on the Asian economic crisis.</p> <p><b>TS3: Arguably, Singapore's relations with the US were less important in its foreign policy compared to its will to establish itself as an independent sovereign state without external influences in the early years of its independence where it distanced itself from the US to achieve international recognition establish its sovereignty.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evi 1: When Singapore separated from Malaysia in Aug 1965, the Second Indochina War was well underway. Not long after 9 Aug, US forces and the Vietnamese Communists confronted each other in two major military campaigns. Singapore, in response, started to establish an increasingly non-aligned position on the global stage in order to ensure</li> </ul>
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	<p>full international recognition. Lee Kuan Yew's calculated outburst in displaying opposition to any American military involvement in Singapore was an example of this non-alignment effort to distance itself from the US.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evi 2: Lee Kuan Yew also adopted a somewhat strident anti-American stance, giving public assurances that the US would be denied access to Singapore's bases and temporarily soured relations between US and Singapore officials.</li> </ul> <p>A2: Ultimately, the relationship with US did become increasingly important as this diplomatic tension was short-lived. Singapore had distanced itself from the US with the intention of garnering international support from Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries to speed up its entry into the UN. Once it was admitted on 21 September 1965, with overwhelming support from the NAM Afro-Asian countries, Singapore's actual recognition of US importance became evident with its increasing visits to Washington and encouragement for US presence in the region. In the wake of rising Cold War threats.</p>
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