

A WORLD DIVIDED BY THE COLD WAR: KOREAN WAR

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2. Nature of the Korean War
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1. BACKGROUND TO THE KOREAN WAR

Chronology:

1948	July August	Separate Korean govts established in North and South Korea US formally recognized South Korea's independence and began to withdraw; the Soviets made similar arrangements.
1949	Sept October	Truman announced detonation of Soviet's first atomic bomb. People's Republic of China established
1950	12 Jan April 25 June 27 June 28 June 1 July 15 Sept 28 Sept 29 Sept 7 Oct 10 Oct 20 Oct 26 Oct Dec	Dean Acheson's Defense Perimeter Speech Syngman Rhee did badly in the South Korean elections North Korean forces invade South Korea UN Security Council voted in favor of sending UN forces to defend South Korea North Korean forces captured Seoul First UN forces arrive at Pusan in South Korea UN forces made surprise amphibious landing in Inchon UN forces re-captured Seoul Truman authorized MacArthur's advance north of 38 th parallel US forces cross the 38 th parallel Chinese govt threatened to enter war against the US UN forces captured Pyongyang Chinese troops entered the Korean War MacArthur recommends recapture of North Korea, defeat of Communism in China and even use of atom bombs against China.
1951	1 Jan 4 Jan March 24 Mar 11 April 23 June	Chinese troops crossed the 38 th parallel Chinese troops took Seoul Communist forces pushed back to the 38 th parallel MacArthur publicly criticized the idea of negotiating a deal with China Truman relieved MacArthur of the command of UN forces in Korea Armistice talks began, but no agreed ceasefire
1952	Nov	Dwight D. Eisenhower elected as President of the United States
1953	5 March 27 Jul	Death of Stalin Armistice signed at Panmunjom ended the Korean War

First time the Cold War became a "hot war" where physical fighting occurred

- Korea was divided at the 38th Parallel after WWII
- Both Korean leaders claimed the right to rule over the whole of Korea
USSR Influence: North - The People's Democratic Republic - DPRK (under Kim Il Sung)
USA Influence: South - The Republic of Korea (under Syngman Rhee)
- By 1950, both powers had withdrawn their troops having set up regimes in the 2 halves
- These 2 men wanted to unify their country under their own leadership through military means.
- North's Surprise Attack against the South, 1950
 - Kim Il Sung thought he had a good chance of unifying Korea after
 - (1) US troops withdrew from South Korea,
 - (2) Korea not mentioned in US' defense perimeter,
 - (3) Establishment of Communist PRC
 - Persuaded USSR and China to give him permission to invade South Korea, and received weapons and advisors from them
 - Capital of South Korea, Seoul, fell to North Korea in 3 days

- USA action: Authorised a force under the UN to be sent to Korea - 17 troops.
- Important: USA was the single biggest contributor to the UN budget and was therefore in a **powerful position to influence the UN decision**
- You see the final change in US policy - policy on Formosa coincides with policy on Korea. There is also the policy in helping French forces in Vietnam and Philippines against communist rule ∴ Truman Doctrine is being extended from Europe to Asia, and the **Cold War is made a global affair.**

American troops in Japan were ordered to Korea even before the UN had decided what course of action to take

- UN sent troops under the UN flag, with the huge bulk of troops American and the command of them given to American General Douglas MacArthur
- By end-August 1950, only Pusan in the south-east corner of South Korea had not fallen to the North
- September 1950: MacArthur launched an amphibious landing at Inchon 200 miles behind enemy lines and from here an incredible swift collapse of North Korean forces followed

MacArthur later chose to advance north towards the Chinese border at the Yalu River with the approval of the UN and Truman (Clear now that MacArthur and Truman were striving for a bigger prize - **to remove Communism from Korea entirely**)

- This provoked the Chinese to launch a massive attack, driving UN forces out of North Korea to the 38th Parallel again (end of November)
- The war became static warfare (reached a stalemate - 2 years of military diplomatic stalemate) as both sides were entrenched in their positions (April 1951)
- Peace talks started at Panmunjom and lasted for two years
- An armistice (ceasefire that is temporary, no stable element to it) was signed in 1953, but no peace treaty was signed

**For a quick background on what happened prior to 1950. Refer to Annex B - Creation of the 38th Parallel and US-Soviet Trusteeship.*


Main Issues to consider for the Korean War:

1. What was the **NATURE** of the Korean War?
 - a. What were the motivations of the various parties involved?
 - b. Was the Korean War a nationalist **civil war**, **Cold War Conflict** or a **regional conflict**?
2. To what extent was the Korean War a **TURNING POINT** in the Cold War?
 - a. What was the impact of the Korean war on regional and international relations and politics?

Interpretations

- Cold War 'revisionist' - scholars who assigned the US major share of the responsibility for the Cold War: usually focuses on economic motives for American policy & actions
- In Korea, most scholars attribute to the US - the desire to revive the Japanese industrial base - the 'great crescent' - (Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere?) - BUT ideological contest always more important - Japan was 1 of the crucial 5 centers of industrial productivity in Kennan's formulation

2. NATURE OF THE KOREAN WAR



Demonstration of powerful understanding:

1. Students can *identify* **multiple short-term and long-term causes and consequences** of an historical event and recognizes complex relationship.
2. Students can *analyze* the **causes** of a particular historical event, **ranking** them according to their influence.
3. Students can *identify the interplay* between the actions of **historical actors (agency)** and the **conditions at that time (context)**

ISSUE 1 : What was the NATURE OF THE KOREAN WAR?

- The nature of a conflict may evolve across the broad phrases of development - at its **origins**, the **course**, the **end**.
- To determine the nature of the Korean War, we will therefore have to look at the three separate phases of a conflict - origins, course, end and examine the motivations displayed by the various players, the level and type of involvement,

** The following are not exhaustive. It is possible to bring in other views from your own research. This is just a base for you to work from.*

MOTIVATIONS

	SOUTH KOREA	NORTH KOREA
IDEOLOGY ¹	Each produced ideological constructs to mobilise support and propagate this aim	
	<p>Syngman Rhee: A Nationalist?</p> <p><i>"One-People Principle", which maintained that 'our race has been one race, our territory has been one unity, and our Volkgeist has been one, and one has been our economic class'.</i></p> <p>The rhetoric was of organic wholeness, of racial and class homogeneity.</p> <p>Rhee had devoted his whole life to the cause of an independent Korea with the ultimate objective of personally controlling that country.</p>	<p>Kim Il Sung: A Nationalist?</p> <p>On the other side of the border, Kim called for the creation of 'a unified, self-reliant, independent state free of foreign interference' which would 'develop an independent economy, and economic foundation to make our Motherland a wealthy and powerful independent country'. He 'never believed in peaceful unification, and only stuck to the idea of armed unification.'</p>

¹ Ideology - set of aims/ideas/beliefs that directs one's goals, expectations, and actions (worldview)

	<p>POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE -</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Korean War resulted because of North and South Korea's own intentions to unify the country under a single ideology and a single government. • As both sides were unable to find alternative means to reunification, they resorted to force. The attacks made by both sides were planned and orchestrated by the Koreans themselves. Hence, they were clearly driven by local interests. • Before the war begun, both sides were already attacking each other along the border throughout 1949 and early 1950. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ These attacks were carried out independent of any instigation by the superpowers. • Both sides demonstrated an intent to establish ideological hegemony over Korea. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Before the war, Kim Il Sung in North Korea suppressed Capitalism by crushing the opposition which he did rather successfully by the summer of 1947 ◦ In South Korea, Syngman Rhee similarly suppressed Communism, driving Communist supporters into hiding in the hills. ◦ This proves that right from the outset, both North and South had the desire to unify Korea. As such, the Korean War was fought for local interests. • Kim Il Sung requested help from the USSR to achieve goals that were his own. The fact that he only requested for help from the USSR upon realizing that Rhee's successful suppression of domestic opposition in the South was making reunifying Korea through insurgency unlikely shows that the decision to involve the USSR lay with Kim Il Sung who was simply using the USSR to further his own local interests. <p><u>Who intervened first?</u></p> <p>While the USSR supported the actual invasion that was initiated by North Korea, both had before the war been supporting their respective ideologies.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>In the North</i>, the Soviets moved rapidly to create, and install a government, a Communist Party, suppressing a number of anti-communist riots and risings. • <i>In the South</i>, the Americans refused to recognize the broadly leftist "People's Republic" that had been proclaimed between the Japanese decision to surrender and their own arrival. Instead they supported anti-Communist Syngman Rhee who further repressed Communism. 	
	USA	USSR
	<p>POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE -</p> <p>USA intervened in the Korean War in order to secure its own ideological interests in the region.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After World War II, USA saw its role as the "Global Policeman" and sought to check Communist aggression. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Aimed to eliminate Communism whenever it reared its "ugly head" <p>-> Truman enunciated this view with this statement, <i>"It was also clear to me that the foundations and the principles of the United States were at stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea could be stopped."</i></p>	<p>POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE -</p> <p>The USSR supported North Korea's invasion of South Korea to further its own ideological interests.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thinking that they could not afford to lose, the USSR sought to spread Communism in Asia. Their established foreign policy was thus to overthrow Capitalism and support 3rd world revolutions. <p>➔ USSR's interest in the region is evident from the support it provided Communist elements in Asian countries following the end of World War II.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Firmly convinced by the Domino Theory which speculated that the fall of one country to Communism would cause surrounding countries to fall to Communism as well in a domino effect. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The USA saw the invasion by North Korea as further evidence of a Communist conspiracy direct from Moscow and thus feared that the fall of Korea would lead to the loss of the region of Asia to Communism. Ignorance of the US about Korean culture? "little China" - no understanding of independent Korean civilization <p>-> NSC-68 was signed in response to the outbreak of the Korean War and entailed a strategic appraisal of the world situation that expressed an alarmist mood and apocalyptic vision of the Soviet threat.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supported rearmament and universalisation of containment. This document thus illustrates the USA's fear of Communism spreading. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> USA saw Communism as an evil ideology that was inherently incompatible with, and in fact hostile to, their own of democracy and capitalism. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Thus they saw it as a threat to democracy and capitalism and intervened in order to prevent the spread of this "evil ideology", both to protect themselves as well as others. USA had adopted the mindset of a zero-sum game, where any gains made by the USSR would signify a loss for themselves. Best explained by Stephen Ambrose, "Millions of Americans wanted to accept their Christian obligation to free the slaves. Other millions wanted to destroy, not just contain the Communist threat."² 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It provided aid to Communist movements in countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam and China. In China, the USSR enabled the communist to capture Japanese arms as it withdrew from China. <p>→ The Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship it signed with Communist China in February 1950 is further proof of its ideological interests in the region.</p> <p>→ Of particular significance is the fact that Stalin agreed with Kim Il Sung in principle that Korea should be unified under Communism and sought to delay the invasion only to avoid the risk of a direct US-Soviet confrontation.</p>
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² Stephen Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*.

	UNITED NATIONS	CHINA
	-	-
POLITICS ³	SOUTH KOREA	NORTH KOREA
	-	-
	USA	USSR
	POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE - US credibility at stake <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Korea was a test of US credibility to resist communism across the world. ○ US inaction in Korea might provoke a mood of defeatism in Western Europe and Japan; they might lose confidence in the US and see the USSR as a more reliable ally. 	-
	UN	CHINA
	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Needed Soviet military assistance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ For invasion of Taiwan
ECONOMIC & SECURITY	SOUTH KOREA	NORTH KOREA
	-	-
	US	USSR
	Strategic - The USA's decision to intervene in the Korean War can be argued to be based on their consideration of the security threat to themselves that the USSR posed. Economic - Also, as the capitalist U.S. economy was dependent on an access to free markets, USA sought to protect their own economic interests in Asia by preventing Communism from taking root in countries there.	Strategic - It was in the USSR's strategic interests to force USA to intervene in the Korean War as it would divert and tie down US resources in the Far East, thus placing the Soviet Union in a stronger position in Europe. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Furthermore, the Korean War proved Chinese loyalty to Stalin through China's support in helping North Korea and also deepened Sino-US estrangement. Economic - Stalin held out a high price if the USSR was to help.
	SECURITY	STRATEGIC
	The concrete expression of the policy of containment with hostility was a series of alliances ringing China: with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Formosa. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In February 1949, the US State Department's Policy Planning Staff (still headed by Kennan) declared that the loss of South Korea would affect Japanese, Indian and Australian security; the region was, 	36,000 died and 92,000 were wounded compared to the 315 USSR personnel that died. The Korean War served to create strains in the Western alliance. The 1951 UN resolution condemning Chinese aggression, where Britain, India and various western European powers

³ Politics – ideas of how governments should be run; debate among parties/governments having or hoping to achieve power

	<p>therefore, “a vital sector on the line of containment”.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In June, the National Security Council found that the fall of China threatened all of South-East Asia and Secretary of State Acheson subsequently wrote that the USA would not allow another Asian nation to fall to the communists. <p>Truman’s memoirs testify to the strategic importance of Korea to USA.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Truman recalled, “Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted... If this were allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third World War, just as similar incidents had brought on a Second World War.” <p>As such, NSC-68 was signed after the outbreak of the Korean War. It supported rearmament and universalisation of containment in order to deal with the security threat posed by the Soviet Union.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ It also entailed a strategic appraisal of the world situation and reflected the view that there was a need to avert the loss of any further territory and resources ○ This illustrates the USA’s desire to protect its own security interests in the region. 	<p>believed that the UN resolution was too partisan and unhelpful to secure any negotiated settlement.</p> <p>The USSR’s strategic interests in prolonging the conflict was evident in Stalin’s reluctance to compromise in negotiating a settlement to the Korean War, especially over the issue of prisoner repatriation which was only settled after Stalin’s death in 1953.</p>
	<p>ECONOMIC</p>	
	<p>In response to Kim Il Sung’s requests for Stalin’s support in his schemes to unite Korea, Stalin requested, in February 1950, for a yearly minimum of 25,000 tons of lead.</p> <p>USSR - practical considerations were a factor</p> <p>Especially after economic devastation of World War II and the Cold War it was fighting with the USA, it needed to secure strategic advantages to ensure its survival.</p>	
	<p>STRATEGIC</p>	
	<p>This evaluation of Korea as being important to USA’s security in the region was due to the fact that Japan was an important military base to support and fund USA’s strategic interests in the Asia Pacific region.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Following the Japanese surrender in World War II, the United States Armed Forces acquired the overall administrative authority in Japan. All of the Japanese military bases were taken over by the United States Armed Forces which thus established a military presence in the region. ○ The importance of Japan in supporting USA’s strategic interests in the Asia Pacific region could be observed from the Korean War itself 	

	<p>where the USA relied on military forces from Japan because of its geographical proximity to Korea.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The first significant foreign military intervention was the American Task Force Smith, part of the U.S. Army's 24th Infantry Division based in Japan. <p>As such, USA wanted to protect Japan which it saw as a bulwark of its dominance in the Asia Pacific region. Thus it intervened in the Korean War as according to the Domino Theory, other countries would fall swiftly unless a stand was made at Korea.</p>	
	ECONOMIC	
	<p>Firmly convinced by the Domino Theory which speculated that the fall of one country to Communism would cause surrounding countries to fall to Communism as well in a domino effect.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In the context of the Korean War, USA feared that fall of Korea would lead to the loss of the region of Asia to Communism. ○ As Communism and Capitalism were inherently incompatible ideologies, the former advocating the opposite of capitalism, a command economy, the USA feared that the loss of Asia to Communism would also mean a loss of access to free markets. <p>Furthermore, Japan was a conduit for USA products and an extension of USA's market to Asia. Japan's close proximity to Korea, together with the reasoning of the Domino Theory, made the USA fearful that the fall of Korea would threaten their economic interests in Japan. As Japan was an important economic trade partner in terms of exports to the USA, the USA was prompted to prevent such a scenario from occurring.</p>	
	UN	China
	-	<p>Mao who had not planned on intervening at first, <u>now felt compelled</u> to do so.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The presence of American troops on the Chinese border was a threat to national security. ○ The success of the UN forces might also encourage his political opponent - feared that Jiang might attempt a counter-revolution and invade

		Mainland China with the support of the US armed forces.
PERSONAL	RHEE	KIM
	<p>Wanted to protect his political position</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The 1950 electoral defeat that Rhee suffered demonstrated his faltering grip on power ○ To divert public attention away from growing scandals that plagued his repressive regime ○ Wanted war with North Korea to garner US military and diplomatic assistance 	-
	TRUMAN	STALIN
	<p>Truman was under domestic pressure</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Accused by the Republicans for being too soft on communism. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Eastern Europe's loss to communism between 1945-8 ▪ The 'loss' of China in 1949 ▪ The detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 <p>With China's fall to Communism in 1949 and widespread paranoia as a result of Joseph McCarthy's accusations that the State Department had more than 200 communists on the payroll, Truman's anti-communist credentials were increasingly called into question.</p> <p>The influence of domestic pressure on Truman's decisions can be seen in his decision to rollback Communism in North Korea rather than stop after having defeated the North Koreans in the Southern territories.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ With off-year elections coming up in November, Truman was pressured to demonstrate his anti-communist credentials. 	-
	-	MAO
		<p>Wanted to repay Kim</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Mao and Kim were old allies; fought together in the Chinese civil war

American Interpretations

- 1960 - Allen Whiting's China crosses the Yalu

Primary blame assigned to the Soviets

No access to Chinese sources

Only after political solution failed in late August did China begin military preparations in early Sept

Focused on analysis of environment in which Beijing leadership made decisions; emphasized

Chinese perception of US threat to China's national security.

- UN crossing the Yalu river was the trigger - passive reaction.
- China still devastated by civil war & economic problems,

Therefore, US at fault

- Next 20 yrs to the 1980s
 - main motivation for Chinese role was Beijing's concern about
 - its own national security interests & physical safety
 - Korea's proximity to Manchuria
- Bruce Cummings, The Origins of the Korean War (1981, 1990) - civil war, local ambitions & animosities between Syngman Rhee & Kim Il Sung
- Difficult for US historians to re-interpret Korean War using American sources - limited & selective access to Communist archives in Russia, China & the 2 Koreas - how exhaustive and/or representative??

- John Lewis Gaddis - Leading Cold War historian (Gaddis - 1997, We now know) - Possible for Stalin & Mao to be both communist revolutionary ideologues AND nationalists support for Kim could be geopolitical/strategic
- End/results of Cold war & origins/evolution different - not conflate the 2 -

Earlier, post-revisionism, 1970s & 1980s - emphasis on geopolitics & balance of power - Realism

End of Cold War - Triumphalism of Western democratic values & ideology - the better ideology won!!

"scholarly diplomatic counterpart of Francis Fukuyama's The End of History" - Melvyn Leffler

Gaddis' attribution of ideology of Communist 'revolutionary romanticism' to both Mao or Stalin - mistaken?? -

Gaddis wrote of Stalin, Mao, Kim & Ho that while no communist monolith under Moscow, "there was a common sense of ideological euphoria - a conviction that the forces of history were on their side...."

However, complexity -

- Their actions & policies also resulted from
 - Conception of China as 'Middle Kingdom' & Russia as 'imperial dynasty
 - product/result of Russian & Chinese experience in the recent past; paranoia; devastating loss during WWII for Russia; China's 19th Century humiliation

INVOLVEMENT

USA	USSR
<p>USA demonstrated its new policy of total commitment by sending air and naval forces to South Korea.</p> <p>On 27 June 1950, the US sponsored a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for military action against North Korea</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The resolution was passed (by the US, UK and France) only because the Soviet Union was boycotting meetings of the Security Council in response to the American refusal to accept newly communist China as a permanent member ▪ Three days later, Truman ordered American troops stationed in Japan into Korea. <p>US soldiers formed part of a UN army which included South Korean forces and contingents from 15 other countries.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Although outwardly a UN exercise, intervention in Korea was essentially an American operation, as argued by some historians. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The US committed 260,000 troops; UN soldiers from other nations never exceeded 35,000 • South Korean Army and UN forces placed under the unified command of General Douglas MacArthur, who was directly accountable to Truman. <p>The extent of USA's involvement in the Korean War is apparent from the fact that the USA made up most of the U.N. force and that the U.N. force was under the command of a U.S. General, Douglas MacArthur.</p>	<p>Stalin's initial refusal to allow Kim to invade</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the late 1940s, Kim had repeatedly asked for permission from Stalin, and later from Mao, to launch an attack on South Korea to reunite the Korea peninsula under the Red Flag. Needed Soviet help - throughout 1949 - poorly trained troops, inadequate weaponry • But Stalin resisted the idea, doubtful of US response. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Stalin was still respecting agreements made with the US at the end of the war, ○ And in early 1949 he was preoccupied with the crisis in Berlin. ○ 5 March 1949, Stalin told Kim, rebuff, - "The 38th parallel must be peaceful. It is very important ○ March 1949, Stalin - only after attack from S, could Kim launch re-unification invasion; 'then your move will be understood and supported by everyone' • Despite several further requests by Kim, Stalin again concluded in September 1949 that the risks of American intervention were too great, and he once more vetoed an invasion. <p>Stalin gives the 'green light' to Kim</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As early as January 1950, Stalin had cautiously agreed to Kim's invasion plans. • In April 1950, Kim went secretly to visit Stalin in the Kremlin. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ By this time, after the Communist victory in China and the Soviet development of an atom bomb, Stalin felt more confident that America would hesitate to intervene in a distant war, even if the result could be another Communist victory in Asia. ○ Stalin felt that the international situation was going his way and finally gave Kim the green light as part of his larger strategy of seizing opportunities in East Asia • 30 Jan, Stalin, "he must understand that such a large matter regarding South Korea...requires thorough preparation. It has to be organized in such a way that there will not be a larger risk. If he wants to talk to me on this issue, then I'll always be ready to receive him and talk to him....<i>I am ready (prepared) to help him in this matter.</i>" http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112136

<p>Prompted by -</p> <p>Truman was prompted by a desire to <u>teach communist aggressors a lesson</u></p> <p><i>"If we let Korea down, the Soviets will keep right on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another... If we were to let Asia go, the Near East would collapse and there's no telling what would happen in Europe"</i></p> <p><i>"[Korea] is the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough enough now, if we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won't take any next steps".</i></p> <p>Expected a <u>quick victory</u> and the prospect of a <u>united Korea within the US orbit</u></p> <p>As restoration of the 38th parallel as the border between the North and South would always leave South Korea open to attack from the north; roll-back would <u>drive communism out of the Korean peninsula permanently</u> and result in a morale-boosting victory in the Cold War.</p> <p>Decision to cross the 38th parallel was based on <u>intelligence reports that neither the Soviet Union nor China would intervene</u> in the war. Those reports turned out to be flawed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Abandoned the original war aim of simply expelling the North Korean forces from South Korea ○ Authorised the crossing of the 38th parallel ○ The North Korean capital, Pyongyang, fell; MacArthur raced towards the Yalu River which separated North Korea from China. <p>The US was no longer pursuing a policy of containment, but one of <u>roll-back</u>; the recovery of territory under communist control</p> <p>In Washington, a flustered Truman briefly considered using atomic weapons against the Chinese to force their withdrawal from the Korean peninsula.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ However, Stalin warned Kim that Russia would not intervene directly in the conflict <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ He told Kim, 'If you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger'. You have to ask Mao for all the help." Mao had 'good understanding of Oriental matters. ○ Besides giving the green light to Kim, he also encouraged Ho Chi Minh to intensify the Viet Minh offensive in Indochina as victories in both places would maintain the momentum generated by Mao's victory in 1949 and counter America's attempt to bring Japan into its system of post-war military alliance ○ Moreover, this strategy would mean that the bulk of the work was not done by soldiers from the Soviet Union <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stalin, however, did send military supplies and advisors to North Korea in May and June <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A special protocol was signed between Moscow and Pyongyang in which the Soviet Union agreed to supply military and technical assistance. ○ By the spring of 1950, large numbers of tanks, cannons, machine guns and planes had been delivered to North Korea. ○ But Stalin still wanted to avoid direct military confrontation with the United States; he did not want to become involved in another war so soon after the end of WWII. ○ Stalin gave his final go ahead but maintained a tight rein over the North Koreans by even dictating the date of the invasion - 25 June - on pretext of responding to an armed incursion from the South. • As soon as the conflict had started, Stalin had withdrawn Soviet military advisers from Korea and recalled ships headed for North Korea with military supplies. • In 1950, he broke his promise to Mao to provide air cover and military supplies for the advancing Chinese armies. • Though he did later give some help to the Chinese and the North Koreans, caution was the keynote of the Soviet approach. • Stalin had carefully avoided any action which might result in war with the US. • For eg. Russian pilots flying Mig-15s were under orders not to enter South Korean airspace, while Russian intelligence officers who interrogated UN prisoners of war wore Chinese uniforms.
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Later rejected that option as he was afraid that it might lead to an all-out war with the Soviet Union. <p>Truman and Acheson made the crucial decision to abandon the objective of unifying Korea by military means and reverted to the original American war aim of restoring the 38th parallel as the border between North and South Korea.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The US decided to fight a <u>limited war</u> in Korea: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ This means to <u>confine the conflict</u> to one country and pursue a <u>specific objective</u> which was the independence of South Korea. ○ Such a war <u>minimized the risk of a confrontation</u> with the Soviet Union. ○ This strategy of limited war suited Stalin as he <u>never wanted war with the US.</u> <p>Influenced the resolution process -</p> <p>Election of President Eisenhower</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Elected in early 1953 ▪ Determined to end the stalemate ▪ Increasingly restless and disillusioned US population were turning against the war, especially with the increasing casualty rates. ▪ At one point a million US troops were ranged against communist forces numbering 865,000 ▪ The US lost 33,629 men in battle; South Korea 415,000 and the UN allies 3,000 ▪ The total communist dead and wounded was an estimated 2 million 	<p>Influenced the Resolution Process -</p> <p>Peace talks began in July 1951 but dragged on for 2 years. Stalin was influencing negotiations from afar and urging Mao and Kim to extract further concessions from the US in return for an end to the war.</p> <p>Armistice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The death of Stalin in March 1953 and compromise on the matter of repatriation eventually resulted in an armistice in July 1953. • Under the terms of the ceasefire, a line corresponding roughly to the 38th parallel was confirmed the boundary between North and South Korea. • Three years of fighting had changed nothing.
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UNITED NATIONS	CHINA
<p>See above under USA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Feb 1951: Operation Killer launched (powerful counter-attack) ○ March 1951: Operation Ripper ○ Superior firepower and command of the air enabled UN troops to re-cross the 38th parallel; battle front stabilized along a line 150 miles long north of the parallel 	<p>The Chinese were informed of Stalin's green light for invasion and also extended their support to North Korea. 'If necessary, we can throw in for you Chinese soldiers, all of us are black, Americans will not see the difference'</p> <p>Mao assured North Korea's ambassador that there was little to fear from the Americans, because 'they would not start a third world war over such a small territory'. Prepared to use military means if peaceful unification was not possible (March 1950)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Mao sent a few 'volunteers' across the border and they helped to halt MacArthur's advance; then they deliberately withdrew into the mountains as a test of American intentions. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Such a tactic allowed for US face-saving. • Reflected caution in Chinese foreign policy. • US squandered this opportunity to resolve this conflict quickly. <p>Influenced the Resolution Process -</p> <p>Issue of repatriation of POWs: The North Koreans and the Chinese rejected the principle that POWs should not be returned to their native countries against their will. This was an obstacle in the peace talks that began in July 1951.</p>

3. CONSEQUENCES OF THE KOREAN WAR

Key Question : What was the Impact of the Korean War on the development of the Cold War?

Sub-Question -

Did the Korean War see continuity or change in America's conduct of the Cold War?

AMERICA

* Below, you see how the Korean War affected America's conduct of the Cold War in the political and military dimensions. Did it change US conduct in the other dimensions as well?
Please work on your independent research.

<p>POLITICAL</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Unknown' or 'forgotten' war - sandwiched between WWII & Vietnam war Its inbetween-ness? - not glorious, not disaster • Argument that in fact Korean war had greater <i>transformative</i> impact (than Vietnam) on US foreign policy & projection of power overseas; Vietnam changed the domestic political landscape From small standing army to large standing army & permanent military bases overseas; After WWII, vast demobilization in Truman administration - from over 14m military personnel to about 1m • Containment changed from Kennan's original intent - Focus of the original 1947 strategy on 5 advanced industrial structures -> military-industrial state (\$175 billion annually to \$650billion in 1951 [2010 current dollars]) - From emphasis on economic aid, military advice and use of the UN (Kennan's original) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➔ Therefore Korean war globalized & militarized containment • Implications for future US in Vietnam - 29 Jun, military aid for French in Vietnam • Inability of US to understand Chinese mind-set & history; excessive concentration on USSR - Eurocentric <p>----</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ US containment policies began to extend to the developing world. ▪ Had two seemingly contradictory effects. <p>1. Fostering of anti-communist alliances within the developing world</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Truman ordered increased military and economic aid to developing countries near China and the USSR. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Included the Philippines, Vietnam, Pakistan, Iran and Yugoslavia. <p><u>A) Indochina seen as the key to the Southeast Asian region</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Although the US had already supported the French in Indochina before 1950, in the aftermath of the Korean War, the first US military advisers were sent to Vietnam. • In an attempt to eliminate communism in Vietnam, the US threw its weight behind the French in their war with the Vietminh. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ US view that Ho Chi Minh was an agent of Moscow was confirmed by events in Korea. ◦ By early 1950s, US was spending \$1 billion a year in military assistance to the French.
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	<p><u>B) Formally integrated other parts of the developing world into existing or new security arrangements</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In July 1951, Greece and Turkey joined NATO • US signed defence treaties with the Philippines (1951), Korea (1953), Taiwan (1954) and Pakistan (1954). • By the middle of the 1950s, the US had 450 military bases in thirty-six countries across the world. <p>2. Acceleration of trends towards <u>'neutralism' or non-alignment</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Korean War made many world leaders wary of the superpower rivalry. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Included India, Indonesia, Egypt and Yugoslavia. ○ India's neutralism heightened the importance to the US of Pakistan as a Cold War partner in the developing world. <p>3. Development of <u>Sino-US enmity</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Korean war ended hopes of US-China accommodation - introduced new stage of Sino-American relations for next 20 yrs ▪ The war witnessed the <u>arrival of China as a major player</u> on the world stage ▪ US began to regard China as a big threat; almost as big as the Soviet Union ▪ During and after the war, the US led an international effort to isolate China, to embargo strategic materials and to prevent China from gaining a seat in the United Nations. ▪ In response to the perception of the Chinese threat, Truman also <u>resumed military aid to Taiwan</u>. ▪ Between 1949 and 1950, the US had given up on Chiang Kai-shek and had no formal plans to help him resist an invasion by Mao's forces. ▪ But in June 1950, Truman immediately ordered the US Navy's 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Straits to defend the island against possible communist invasion. ▪ The Korean War also <u>scrapped any remaining chance that the US might recognise the PRC</u>. ▪ US recognised Taiwan as the only official Chinese state until 1971, when recognition was accorded to PRC. ▪ The denial of Taiwan to China was an important means of limiting the power of Chinese communism in Asia.
MILITARY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Engagement in Korea had <u>necessitated a substantial rise in US defence production</u>. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Output in 1953 was seven times greater than in 1950, but this massive increase in US defence capabilities occurred not only for the narrow purpose of fighting the war in Korea. ▪ Working on the false assumption that Stalin had directed Kim to invade South Korea, policy-makers reasoned that Soviet-inspired aggression in Korea might be followed by similar moves elsewhere in the world. ▪ The US must therefore be ready to <u>fight a series of limited wars</u> against communism around the globe. ▪ If necessary, <u>Communism must be contained by military means</u>. ▪ This strategy presupposed a <u>permanent expansion of America's armed forces</u> and a constant state of military readiness. The United States must attempt to achieve near-parity in conventional forces with the Soviet Union and maintain <u>nuclear superiority</u>.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Truman now <u>supported the increases in military spending proposed in NSC-68</u> which he had been unwilling to endorse prior to the Korean War. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A member of the State Department commented, <i>"We were sweating over NSC-68 and then, thank God, Korea came along"</i>. ○ In 1950, Truman asked Congress for \$10 billion to spend on America's armed forces, \$260 million for the hydrogen bomb project and \$4 billion in military aid for US allies. <p>Korea marked the <u>militarization of the Cold War</u>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Before Korea, the avoidance of committing US troops to a war on the Asian land-mass had been an axiom of American diplomacy ▪ After Korea, the US was ready to deploy troops anywhere in order to defend the 'free world.' ▪ Would find expression again in another part of Asia - Vietnam. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Washington now believed that the US could only circumscribe Soviet power from a position of military strength, which meant enlarged conventional forces and continuing superiority in strategic weapons. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Since Western Europe was regarded as the most likely area for Soviet expansion, <u>NATO was immediately strengthened</u>. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Given an expanded secretariat and unified command structure working under the US Supreme Commander. ○ Four US divisions were also despatched to Europe as reinforcement. ○ In 1951, it was enlarged to include Greece and Turkey. ○ Military bases in Turkey gave the US the capability of launching air raids against the southern Soviet Union and was a useful platform for blocking any attempted Soviet advance on the oilfields of the Middle East. • US encouraged its NATO partners to <u>increase their military spending</u> in an attempt to make NATO an effective shield against Soviet aggression. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Between 1951-55, US sent \$25 billion in aid to its NATO allies, but only provided these allies increased their own defence budgets. • <u>NATO leaders also agreed to West German armament</u>. • West Germany was seen as central to NATO expansion. • US wanted West Germany to share in the defence of western Europe. • By 1955, West Germany joined NATO, thus resulting in the integration of West Germany into the international Cold War balance of power. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The <u>USSR also saw extensive military build-up</u>, with a larger proportion of its GNP being used for military expenditure. • By 1953, the USSR had built their first hydrogen bomb. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When Germany was integrated into NATO, the <u>USSR formed the Warsaw pact</u>. • Contributed to a greater and more costly escalation.
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Other Consequences?

China's Perception of Itself

- in fighting the US-led UN forces, China succeeded in confronting coalition of Western forces successfully - 1st time in modern history
- Leading role in 1954 Geneva Conference
- Revolutionary leader of 3rd World
- Central role in Bandung Conference
<http://history.arts.cornell.edu/faculty-department-chen.php> - Chen Jian

4. CHECK POINT A

To what extent, then, was the Korean War a pivotal event in the Cold War?

- Definitely had a major impact on the Cold War.
- - Has been argued that the Berlin Blockade 'drew the line' in Europe in that it resulted in two German states and the formation of NATO.
 - ***The Korean War had the same importance in Asia and led to major commitments from both sides, in Korea, to Japan, Taiwan, China and Vietnam.***
- But it marked an acceleration but not a reorientation of American policy.
 - Measures such as the reinforcement of NATO, West German rearmament, and increased aid to anti-communist regimes in Southeast Asia had all been under active consideration before hostilities in Korea, but all these occurred sooner than they otherwise would have done as a result of the Korean War.

[T]he Korean War had dramatically sharpened the American purpose, even while giving that purpose a global purpose. By going global, the Cold War brought a new intensity, a new Germany, and a new militarisation, back to the heart of Europe. That was not all. For the second time, the US and Soviet Union were learning how to manage the state of crisis between them. The blockade of Berlin had been countered in a way which avoided direct military confrontation. The Korean War, which saw major US casualties and direct clashes between US and Soviet warplanes, was also managed in a way that avoided a wider war. Stalin's limited objective of using the Soviet MiGs to defend the Yalu crossings and sustain the Chinese armies was in effect accepted by the US, and the Korean War ended in an uneasy draw. In Germany, with the Berlin air lift, and in Asia, with the blind eye turned to General Lobov's MiGs, Washington and Moscow alike were learning to operate in a new strategic environment in which the need to prevent a crisis from expanding into full-scale war was more important than any local victory. The Cold War, as a system of international control, was becoming an institution

Martin Walker, *The Cold War and the Making of the Modern World*

A WORLD DIVIDED BY THE COLD WAR: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

CONTENTS OUTLINE

1. Background to the Cuban Missile Crisis
2. Nature of the Cuban Missile Crisis
3. Consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis
4. CHECK POINT B

1. BACKGROUND TO THE CMC

Chronology:

1959	Jan 1	Fidel Castro assumes power after the Cuban Revolution
1960	Dec 19	Cuba openly aligns itself with the Soviet Union and their policies
1961	Jan 3	The U.S. terminates diplomatic relations
	Apr 17	"The Bay of Pigs" - A group of Cuban exiles, backed by the US, invades Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in a failed attempt to trigger an anti-Castro rebellion
	June 3-4	Khrushchev and Kennedy hold summit talks in Vienna regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis
1962	Aug 31	Senator Kenneth Keating tells the Senate that there is evidence of Soviet missile installations in Cuba
	Sep 11	Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, warns that an American attack on Cuba could mean war with the Soviet Union
	Oct 14	A U-2 flying over western Cuba obtains photographs of missile sites
	Oct 14-17	The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly advise Kennedy to make an air strike (the discussions are referred to as the EX-COMM's)
	Oct 18	Gromyko assures Kennedy that Soviet Cuban aid has been only for the "defensive capabilities of Cuba."
	Oct 20	ExComm voted in favour of a blockade
	Oct 22	Congressional leaders are shown the photographic evidence of the Soviet missile Cuban installations and the President addresses the nation regarding the Cuban crisis
		U.S. military forces go to DEFCON 3
	Oct 23	Kennedy receives a letter from Khrushchev in which Khrushchev states that there is a, "serious threat to peace and security of peoples." Robert Kennedy speaks with Ambassador Dobrynin
	Oct 24	Soviet ships, en route to Cuba, reverse their course except for one. US Military forces go to DEFCON 2
	Oct 25	JFK sends a letter to Khrushchev placing the responsibility for the crisis on the Soviet Union
	Oct 26	Khrushchev sends a letter to President Kennedy proposing to remove his missiles if Kennedy publicly announces never to invade Cuba
	Oct 27	An American U-2 is shot down over Cuba killing the pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson A U-2 strays into Soviet airspace, near Alaska, and is nearly intercepted by Soviet fighters Kennedy sends Khrushchev a letter stating that he will make a statement that the U.S. will not invade Cuba if Khrushchev removes the missiles from Cuba
	Oct 28	Khrushchev announces over Radio Moscow that he has agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba In return the US agrees to the withdrawal of US nuclear missiles from Turkey ending the Cuban Missile Crisis

- A key moment when the Cold War changed from being a confrontation focused on the perimeters of the USSR and China to a global one
- The crisis over the Soviet deployment of intermediate and medium range nuclear missiles in Cuba was one of the most dangerous moments of the Cold War and is considered a turning point in history.

- US had always seen Latin America as her sphere of influence.

The **Monroe Doctrine (1823)**, promulgated by President Monroe, stated that European powers (i.e. France & Spain) must not interfere in Latin America

- “American continents... are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisations by any European power.”
- How this translated in the 20th century:
 - American stance was that communist states must not be allowed to be established along US borders.
 - Pro-American regimes were to be maintained in that region.

In the post-WWII period, several security treaties were signed to preserve US dominance.

The **Rio Pact (1947)** was signed;

- An attack on any one country in the Americas would be treated as an attack on all.
- Justified US intervention in Latin America:

“... the obligation of mutual assistance and common defence of the American republics is essentially related to their democratic ideals and that an armed attack by any State against an American state shall be considered as an attack on all American states.”

The **Organization of the American States (OAS)** was formed in 1948.

- Its charter stated that international communism was incompatible with American freedom.

Both the Rio Pact (1947) and the OAS (1948) were designed to exclude communism from the Western Hemisphere. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the US intervened in the following countries to strangle communist regimes and forces: Guatemala, Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Grenada.


- Particularly for Cuba, US had traditional American interests in it.

US had controlled Cuba, an island just 90 miles from the US mainland, since the Spanish-American war of 1898.

- Since 1934, the island had been ruled by General Fulgencio Batista, a US-sponsored military dictator.
- The US and Cuba had close economic and political ties during Batista's reign:
 - Cuba was a playground for rich US tourists.
 - Most of Cuba's assets were owned by US corporations: telephone and electric services (90%); public service railways (50%); raw sugar production (40%).
 - In 1953, Cuba ranks 3rd in Latin America in terms of the value of US direct investments.
 - It was exploited by big American companies such as the United Fruit Company, Texaco and the big American banks.

2. NATURE OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Demonstration of powerful understanding:



1. Students can *identify* **multiple short-term and long-term causes and consequences** of an historical event and recognizes complex relationship.

2. Students can *analyze* the **causes** of a particular historical event, **ranking** them according to their influence.

3. Students can *identify the interplay* between the actions of **historical actors (agency)** and the **conditions at that time (context)**

Similar to the Korean War.

- The nature of a conflict may evolve across the broad phrases of development - at its **origins**, the **course**, the **end**.
- To determine the nature of the Cuban Missile Crisis, we will therefore have to look at the three separate phases of a conflict - origins, course, end and examine the motivations displayed by the various players, the level and type of involvement.

* The following are not exhaustive. It is possible to bring in other views from your own research. This is just a base for you to work from.

MOTIVATIONS

	USA	USSR	CUBA
ECONOMIC	<p>POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE -</p> <p>USA was involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis as it was trying to protect its own economic interests.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> After successfully ousting the US-backed Batista, Castro introduced revolutionary land reforms that nationalized American land in sugar plantations without compensation, and also took over many American based companies. Furthermore, the geographical proximity of Cuba to the Panama Canal threatened USA's economic interests. As the Panama Canal ferried USA exports from the Caribbean to the Pacific Ocean, it was a vital trade route and the fall of Cuba to Communism meant that its security was jeopardized. <p>-> Thus USA thus sought to undermine Castro's regime by cutting off trade in arms and imposing economic sanctions which would have serious ramifications for the Cuban economy as it depended heavily on sugar exports to the USA.</p> <p>This prompted Castro to look for a new market and the obvious choice was Russia.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Thus Castro asked the USSR to purchase Cuban sugar and for a loan of \$100 million. However this only exacerbated the conflict as the USA feared that Cuba might become part of the Soviet bloc, thus threatening its own ideology and security. Also, the fact that USA had actually tried an invasion showed Cuba and Russia that they were provoked enough 	-	<p>POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE -</p> <p>Castro's nationalization of American based companies and sugar plantations was part of his progressive social reforms in which land, businesses and companies owned by upper- and middle-class Cubans were seized. It was also to correct the island's economic problems which Castro perceived to be a result of dependence on America.</p> <p>The Soviet Union was willing to provide Cuba with the economic subsidies, protection, an international sponsorship the island needed.</p>

	<p>to act. This together with overt American hostility made Castro feel threatened.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Thus Castro was prompted to seek help from USSR, leading to the installation of nuclear missiles as a defensive measure against American invasion, and this led to Cuban Missile Crisis. 		
POLITICAL / IDEOLOGICAL	<p>POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE -</p> <p>USA was involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis as it was trying to protect its own ideological interests.</p> <p>The USA had long considered Latin America to be within its sphere of influence. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 had enshrined in United States policy the fixed aim of protecting the freedom and independence of the Americas from outside intervention in the affairs of the region's states.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Since Communism was recognized as "outside intervention", the USA had to step in to fulfill its own obligations when Castro decided to conduct his revolution by taking over, and then working through, the Communist Party. Also, by seeking Soviet backing through the provision of economic and military aid, USA increasingly feared that Cuba might become a part of the Soviet bloc, thus adding to their fear that their ideology in the region might be compromised as Soviet missiles could provide a shield to protect the spread of Communism in South and Central America. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> If US failed at its own doorstep, US allies would doubt its ability to meet the communist challenge in Europe, Middle East and Asia US concessions and tolerance would only encourage Soviet aggression elsewhere (<i>recalling the lessons of appeasement and the Munich Agreement of 1938</i>). This would fall in line with USA's Domino Theory. 	<p>POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE -</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> USSR's sponsorship of Castro in 1960 was part of Khrushchev's broader strategy of promoting communism in the developing world. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> February 1960: In a trade agreement with the Soviet Union, the latter extended \$100 million in credits to Cuba and promised to buy 5 million tons of Cuban sugar over the next three years. USSR was involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis as it helped install missiles in Cuba to further its own political and ideological interests. <p>Cuba was important to Khrushchev ideologically as the gift of missiles would demonstrate Communist solidarity and USSR's willingness to support Communism.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Keeping Cuba secure and free from USA aggression ensured that revolutionary movements in other countries were not set back but were instead inspired by Cuba's continued success as a Communist revolutionary movement that was successful in resisting American imperialism. 	<p>POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE -</p> <p>Castro's decision to accept Soviet missiles was also based in part on his desire to protect Communist ideological interests.</p> <p>Castro allowed the missiles to be placed in Cuba because he wanted to boost the strength of the Communist bloc in the Cold War competition with the West.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> He believed that his actions would help the Communist bloc establish nuclear parity with the USA and also demonstrate Communist solidarity.

<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Feared a renewed Soviet blockade of West Berlin; felt that Soviet gambit of stationing missiles on Cuba was a smokescreen for a move against West Berlin (<i>Kennedy had committed himself to defending West Berlin when he declared: "Ich bin ein Berliner!"</i>). <p><i>Geoffrey Roberts, "He (Khrushchev) was used to the idea of living with US nuclear airbases and missile units on his doorstep in Europe and Turkey, but the Americans were not accustomed to the idea of Soviet missiles in their backyard."</i></p> <p>-> In order to protect their ideology in the region, USA also sought to overthrow the Communist regime through various initiatives such as the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961 and Operation Mongoose (also known as the Cuban Project)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">○ <i>In the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion</i>, USA sent Cuban exiles and refugees who were armed and trained by the CIA to start a counter-revolution, hoping that the invasion would lead to a popular uprising against Castro.○ <i>Operation Mongoose</i> entailed aggressive covert operations against Castro's communist government. They included sabotage actions against key installations such as electric power plants, oil refinery and railway bridges. Under Operation Mongoose, there were also hundreds of attempts to assassinate Castro.	<p>Furthermore, it was also in Khrushchev's political interests to ensure that Cuba did not fall to USA while under Soviet security as this would diminish Soviet stature throughout the world.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ This was especially important as other countries might reject Russia's overtures as empty promises. <p>-> USSR thus provided economic and military aid to support Communism in Cuba in order to serve its own ideological interests.</p> <table><tr><th>Economic aid</th><th>Military aid</th></tr><tr><td>USSR purchased Cuban sugar and gave Cuba a loan of \$100 million to purchase industrial equipment from itself</td><td>Installed intermediate range nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter American aggression, as well as SAM-2 and SAM-3 air defence weapons to defend Cuba</td></tr></table>	Economic aid	Military aid	USSR purchased Cuban sugar and gave Cuba a loan of \$100 million to purchase industrial equipment from itself	Installed intermediate range nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter American aggression, as well as SAM-2 and SAM-3 air defence weapons to defend Cuba	
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<p>STRATEGIC</p>	<p>POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE -</p> <p>USA decided to impose a naval blockade on the shipment of military equipment to Cuba to protect their own security interests.</p> <p>Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe could not be launched directly against USA but Cuba was in USA's "backyard" and the Soviet missiles installed there posed a direct threat to USA's security.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Photographs taken from a U-2 flight on 14 October revealed unmistakable evidence of construction of ballistic missile launch facilities in western Cuba. These facilities enabled Soviet medium range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads capable of massive destruction to reach most of the large cities in the USA, including New York and Washington, as well as the US space centre at Cape Canaveral. Since Cuba was only ninety miles from Florida, the most many Americans could expect in the event of a nuclear strike was at most a three minute warning. <p>-> They represented an <u>unprecedented threat to national security</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> On 22 October 1962, Kennedy therefore announced the imposition of "quarantine" around Cuba. The US Navy prevented Soviet ships from entering the area with the threat of military action. <hr/> <p>Possible Counter-Perspective?</p> <p>From a strict security perspective, the importance of this can be questioned.</p> <p>The Russians had 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and some 190 intercontinental bombers, and could destroy the USA anyway.</p>	<p>POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE -</p> <p>USSR's decision to place missiles on Cuba was also because Khrushchev wanted to protect USSR's own strategic interests.</p> <p>Khrushchev needed to achieve nuclear parity with the USA as the USA had already placed Jupiter Missiles in Turkey which was within range of USSR whereas they had no missiles in Eastern Europe that could reach USA.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fifteen Jupiter Missiles became operational in Turkey October 1962; thirty were based in Italy the previous year. <p>There had also been sixty Thor Missiles in the UK following a 1957 agreement; but they were removed in the second half of 1962</p> <p>Together with Khrushchev's own intelligence services reporting rumours of a surprise nuclear first strike being planned for 1961, as well as Kennedy's own proclamation that he believed the USA was entitled to use a nuclear first strike, the security threat to USSR seemed very real.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Khrushchev was also especially scared since Kennedy was surrounded by hardliners who might have pushed him to start the First Strike <p>This intention of USSR was quite clear from the fact that missiles installed in Cuba were clearly not just for self defense and had the ability to reach all of USA.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Khrushchev said, <i>"They'll accept it, like we had to in Turkey. Then we'll be able to negotiate with America on a basis of parity."</i> 	<p>POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE -</p> <p>The involvement of superpowers in the Cuban Missile Crisis was the result of Cuban attempts to advance their strategic interests.</p> <p>It can be argued that Kennedy's aggressiveness stimulated Cuban insecurity and helped to push Castro to seek closer ties to the USSR in order to preserve his revolution.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The economic sanctions imposed by the USA jeopardized Cuba's economy, thus forcing it to turn to USSR for aid. Hostile attempts made by the USA (Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose, missile installations.) <p>-> prompted Castro to seek Soviet assistance in protecting Cuba from an invasion by USA.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> can be argued that Castro was not Communist initially, but decided to align himself with the Soviets because US economic sanctions made it necessary for him to seek assistance from the USSR.
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	<p>As Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of Defence, concluded, <i>'A missile is a missile. It makes no difference whether you are killed by a missile fired from the Soviet Union or from Cuba.'</i></p>	<p>Furthermore, negotiations following the naval blockade also revealed Khrushchev's desire to protect USSR's strategic interests.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> On 26 October, Khrushchev sent a letter to Kennedy, agreeing to remove all missiles from Cuba if the USA agreed to withdraw its missiles from Turkey. <p>Dunbabin - "Cuba could have been more easily, and safely, protected by the less provocative stationing only of conventional Soviet troops... It seems most likely that Khrushchev found the opportunity to improve his strategic position vis-à-vis the USA irresistibly attractive."</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> acceptance of Marxism-Leninism in Dec 1961 allowed for closer economic links and defence arrangements with USSR.
PERSONAL	<p>POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE</p> <p>For Kennedy, he wanted to prove early in his presidency that he was tough on communism.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> He had criticized Eisenhower's passive policy towards Cuba and had accused him of both a 'missile gap' and the 'loss' of Cuba. <p>Mid-term Congressional elections were weeks away and Democrats wanted to preserve slender majority in both Houses by acting decisively.</p> <p>-> Need for Kennedy to counter political critics and opponents in Congress who raised questions about his youth, experience and ability to stand up to Khrushchev.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Another Cuban fiasco would be politically devastating to Kennedy and his Democratic Party. 	<p>POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE -</p> <p>By 1962, Khrushchev was in desperate need for a dramatic strategic coup and propaganda victory against the US for the following reasons:</p> <p><i>Berlin Crisis of 1961</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Twice before in 1958 and 1961, initial wild aggressive threats of closing all communication routes to West Berlin ended in a compromising and humiliating Soviet back-down. Building of the Berlin Wall by the East German government to prevent the exodus of East Germans to the West was seen by hardliners in the USSR as a result of Khrushchev's weak stance against US presence deep within the Soviet sphere of influence. 	<p>POSSIBLE PERSPECTIVE -</p> <p>Castro had resented the Americans for providing aid to Batista's government during the revolution.</p>

	<p>Kennedy also regarded the crisis as a personal confrontation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ He interpreted Khrushchev's decision to send nuclear weapons to Cuba as a further test of his (Kennedy's) character by the Soviet leader. <p>Robert MacNamara: <i>"I don't think there's a military problem here... this is a domestic political problem."</i></p> <p>(His decision was also consistent with the view at the time that the US had the right to overthrow hostile regimes so close to home.)</p>	<p><i>Soviet nuclear inferiority</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ USSR was unable to match the US in ICBMs. ○ US nuclear arsenal of ICBMs, SLBMs, strategic bombers and overseas nuclear bases in Europe was a vastly superior force in terms of striking power and forward attack forces. <p><i>Sino-Soviet antagonism</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Chinese were increasingly harping on Soviet weakness, constantly accusing Khrushchev of capitulating to the American imperialists as they felt that too little support was given by the Soviets to developing world movements of national liberations so Soviet hardliners were constantly pressing Khrushchev to stand up to the US. <p>Given the above considerations, Khrushchev was looking for an opportunity to alter the strategic balance and he found it in the Caribbean.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ He was tempted by the idea of having Soviet nuclear missiles within striking range (90 miles) of US territory because that meant that the Soviets could leapfrog NATO and face the soft underbelly of America. ▪ With the ability to threaten the US, Soviets would be in the position to intimidate the US over Berlin in any future German confrontation, and Soviet prestige in the communist world would also rise. 	
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INVOLVEMENT

USA	<p>During the Outbreak & the Course</p> <p><i>Cuban Revolution</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Traditionally, the US had bought Cuba's sugar crop, but now that the USSR had also opened its market to Cuban sugar, it represented an economic competition between two divergent systems: capitalist and communist. Castro's confiscation of US assets in Cuba and his recognition of Communist China also aroused US fears that he might become Moscow's newest ally in the developing world. The CIA had set up a Cuban task force in December 1959 and in March 1960, Eisenhower had approved plans for an invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro expatriates trained by the CIA. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The CIA was already attempting to defeat Castro's revolution from within. It organized an air-drop of supplies to anti-Castro rebels in the south-east part of the island in September 1960. Eisenhower severed diplomatic relations in 1961. <p><i>Operation Zapata</i></p> <p>Kennedy approved the invasion plan (Operation Zapata).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 400 strong invasion force comprising of Cuban exiles and refugees who were armed and trained by the CIA, landed at the Bay of Pigs on 17 April, 1961. They were sent to start a counter-revolution, hoping that the invasion would lead to a popular uprising against Castro. <p>However, Kennedy imposed clear limits on the action, that the US would not provide air support.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Absence of air cover meant that they were unable to establish a beachhead. 1,189 paramilitaries surrendered to the Cubans and only 14 were rescued. <p><i>Operation Mongoose, 1961</i></p> <p>After Bay of Pigs episode, US adopted a three-pronged approach that was a classic example of flexible response that entailed aggressive covert operations against Castro's communist government:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Covert action <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CIA sought to destabilise Castro's government by sabotaging petroleum installations and sinking Cuban merchant vessels in the Caribbean and organising anti-Castro elements in Cuba into a counter-revolutionary movement Encouraged CIA to develop plans to assassinate Castro (removing Castro became an obsession for the Kennedy brothers) Economic and diplomatic isolation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strict embargo on all Cuban imports Feb 1962, expulsion of Cuba from Organisation of American States (OAS) Military pressure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feb 1962, US forces conducted amphibious exercises near Puerto Rico in the Caribbean, unsuitably codenamed 'Ortsac' aimed at <u>overthrowing</u> an imaginary dictator Was a contingency plan for an invasion of Cuba
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1962, ExComm & Naval Quarantine

- 16 Oct 1962, Kennedy assembled a team of advisers to manage the crisis: the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm).
 - Key members: Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor and Director of the CIA John McCone

Initial debate within the ExComm focused on two possible options:

a. Naval blockade of Cuba

- supported by civilian members of the ExComm

b. Air strikes against the missile sites

- surgical air strikes to be followed by invasion of the island
- supported by military members of the ExComm

20 Oct, ExComm voted; by a narrow majority, decision was made for a blockade.

▪ *Why a blockade?*

Air strikes and conventional invasion considered too provocative as Soviet technicians would be killed and Khrushchev might be pressured by his colleagues in the Politburo to escalate the situation in Berlin, Turkey or even start a Third World War.

22 Oct, Kennedy announced the blockade in a television address to the US public.

- He had described the measure as a 'quarantine' because under international law, a blockade could be seen as an act of war.
 - Ships approaching Cuba (within 500 miles) would be searched by the US Navy and those carrying military equipment would be asked to return to their port of origin; all non-military supplies would be allowed through.
- **Aim of blockade:** to
 - a) *prevent warheads and other components necessary for launching the missiles from reaching Cuba.*
 - The blockade had also *b bought Kennedy and his advisers valuable time to deliberate on next course of action to defuse and resolve crisis.* Finally, c) *it gave Kennedy the leverage to demand the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba.*
- US action was supported by NATO and OAS; Kennedy rejected a three-week truce proposed by UN Secretary-General U Thant.

(Soviet Reponse -

- No formal contact between Washington and Moscow in early days of the crisis.
- Khrushchev ignored the quarantine and instructed Soviet forces on Cuba to adopt a state of full alert.
- Soviets also denied the presence of missile sites on the island (*until US ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, revealed the photographs to the Security Council that proved otherwise*).
- Khrushchev was at his most bellicose, although he was never going to launch Soviet missiles unilaterally
- However, if US had invaded Cuba, and Khrushchev did believe that invasion was imminent, then USSR would have retaliated with the nuclear attack.

Khrushchev: *"They can attack us...and we shall respond. This may end in a big war."*)

	<p><i>Articulating of Possible Nuclear War</i></p> <p>Kennedy warned that the US “would regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States”, requiring a full retaliatory response on the Soviet Union.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Was invoking the Rio Pact. ▪ The Joint Chief of Staffs instructed the Strategic Air Command to go DEFCON 2 for the only time in history. Interestingly, the message, and the response, were deliberately transmitted unencoded, unencrypted, in order to allow Soviet intelligence to capture them. ▪ Quarantine came into effect on morning of 24 Oct but several Soviet ships maintained their course for Cuba and were even escorted by a Soviet submarine. ▪ US aircraft carrier the <i>USS Essex</i> was poised to intercept the Soviets vessels at the quarantine line; events reached a critical point. ▪ The world held its breath while they stood at the threshold of a nuclear holocaust. <p>During the Resolution Process Messaged to the Soviet leader proposing steps for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba under supervision of the United Nations, and a guarantee that the United States would not attack Cuba.</p> <p>US naval quarantine continued until the Soviets agreed to remove their IL-28 bombers from Cuba and, on November 20, 1962, the United States ended its quarantine. U.S. Jupiter missiles were removed from Turkey in April 1963.</p>				
USSR	<p>During the Outbreak and the Course</p> <p>July 1960 Khrushchev threatened to use nuclear weapons against the US if it invaded Cuba.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Only days before Kennedy assumed the presidency, Khrushchev praised Castro’s policies and accepted Cuba as a full member of the Soviet bloc. (Castro proclaimed, ‘Moscow is our brain and our great leader’.) <p>USSR had provided economic and military aid to support Communism in Cuba in order to serve its own ideological interests.</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="384 1332 1343 2022"> <thead> <tr> <th data-bbox="384 1332 587 1361">Economic aid</th><th data-bbox="587 1332 1343 1361">Military aid</th></tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td data-bbox="384 1361 587 2022"> USSR purchased Cuban sugar and gave Cuba a loan of \$100 million to purchase industrial equipment from itself </td><td data-bbox="587 1361 1343 2022"> <p>By the end of 1960, Cuba was receiving substantial arms shipment from the Soviet Union.</p> <p>Apr 1961, Soviets had already shipped 125 tanks and 925 anti-aircraft guns to Cuba.</p> <p>May 1962, Soviets deployed 4 motorised regiments, 2 tank battalions, a Mig-21 fighter wing, 12 anti-aircraft missile batteries, tactical nuclear cruise missiles and offensive R-12 and R-14 medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) on Cuba. (Totally unprecedented move for USSR to station nuclear missiles outside its own territory).</p> <p>Over 40,000 Soviet military personnel were garrisoned on the island</p> </td></tr> </tbody> </table>	Economic aid	Military aid	USSR purchased Cuban sugar and gave Cuba a loan of \$100 million to purchase industrial equipment from itself	<p>By the end of 1960, Cuba was receiving substantial arms shipment from the Soviet Union.</p> <p>Apr 1961, Soviets had already shipped 125 tanks and 925 anti-aircraft guns to Cuba.</p> <p>May 1962, Soviets deployed 4 motorised regiments, 2 tank battalions, a Mig-21 fighter wing, 12 anti-aircraft missile batteries, tactical nuclear cruise missiles and offensive R-12 and R-14 medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) on Cuba. (Totally unprecedented move for USSR to station nuclear missiles outside its own territory).</p> <p>Over 40,000 Soviet military personnel were garrisoned on the island</p>
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	<div data-bbox="598 219 1334 501"> <p>Since Aug 1962, Soviets were secretly building MRBM and IRBM sites in Cuba.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Director of the CIA had speculated the presence of ballistic missiles on Cuba as early as Aug 1962 but no concrete proof till Oct. ▪ 14 Oct, when a US U-2 spy plane photographed launch pads for medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles being constructed by the Soviets on Cuba. ▪ Two days later (<i>16 Oct</i>), Kennedy was shown aerial photographs of missile launch sites on Cuba. </div> <div data-bbox="384 611 676 640"> <p>During Resolution Process</p> </div> <div data-bbox="384 667 1334 750"> <p>Soviets also took Cuban interests into consideration when they informally suggest on 26 October that they would withdraw the missiles in exchange for an American assurance that Cuba would not be invaded.</p> </div> <div data-bbox="384 779 1347 835"> <p>However, the USSR unilaterally agreed to remove Cuba's ultimate deterrent in what appeared to be an imminent threat of American invasion.</p> </div>
CUBA	<div data-bbox="384 889 616 918"> <p>During the Outbreak</p> </div> <div data-bbox="384 945 1291 1028"> <p>Possibly forced USA's hand in retaliating with the nationalization of American sugar plantations and American based companies in an area perceived to of America's economic concern.</p> </div> <div data-bbox="384 1057 1347 1113"> <p>Arguably, Castro set the stage for the Cuban Missile Crisis by providing Khrushchev with the means with which to successfully challenge U.S. missile dominance during the Cold War.</p> </div> <div data-bbox="384 1140 587 1169"> <p>During the Course</p> </div> <div data-bbox="384 1196 1334 1805"> <p>Cuba did have some influence on Soviet's action during the course of the crisis.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ On October 26th, Castro wrote a letter to Khrushchev warning the Soviet Premier that U.S. "aggression" was imminent. Of chief concern to the Soviets was Castro's belief that the U.S. attack would occur within the next 24 hours and that this information corresponded to other reports the Soviets had received. Also contained in Castro's letter was a recommendation that, should the American's attack Cuba, that the Soviets launch a nuclear strike against the United States. This recommendation coupled with the shooting of the American U-2 on the 27th increased Khrushchev's concern regarding any future action Castro would take. ▪ Subsequently, on October 28th, a message was sent by Khrushchev to Kennedy indicating that the missiles were to be dismantled and removed. Although it is clear that the agreement to remove the missiles rested on negotiations conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union, the impact of Khrushchev's concern for Castro's growing restlessness cannot be overlooked. Tensions in the crisis were growing at a rapid rate. Khrushchev knew Castro expected an American invasion, was willing to conduct a nuclear strike and was eager to strike back at the Americans. Armed with this information, it is not surprising that he opted to end the missile crisis peacefully before it escalated into a nuclear war. </div>

	<p>During Resolution Process</p> <p>Appears to be sidelined. Castro was arguably caught unaware when Khrushchev agreed to the dismantling of the Soviet weapons. Castro was not consulted by the US nor USSR on a course of action impacting the welfare of Cuba.</p> <p>In retaliation, Castro, within hours of hearing of the agreement, broadcast the terms of "five conditions" under which Cuba would consider to resolve the crisis. The five conditions included:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ending the U.S. economic blockade of Cuba, 2. ending all subversive activities against Cuba, 3. halting all "piratical attacks" against Cuba from U.S. bases, 4. respecting Cuban airspace and territorial waters, 5. and returning the naval base at Guantanamo Bay to Cuba. <p>United States ignored the five conditions.</p> <p>It was only after continued intervention by the United Nations and negotiations between Moscow and Havana that Castro finally agreed to allow the withdrawal of the missiles.</p>
UNITED NATIONS	<p>Appealed to Kennedy and Khrushchev to allow time to resolve the crisis peacefully shortly after the blockade took effect on Oct 24.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ This was successful as the time proved critical in allowing both leaders to face down their hardliners. <p>UN sent request for moderation by the Soviets to keep their ships away so that an agreement could be worked out.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ US Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson "At a critical moment – when the nuclear powers seemed set on a collision course – the Secretary-General's intervention led to the diversion of the Soviet ships headed for Cuba and interception by our Navy. This was the indispensable first step in the peaceful resolution of the Cuban crisis." <p>During the hottest phase of the crisis, after a US U-2 spy plane was shot down, Thant's initiatives exerted a powerful pacifying influence, especially on John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Dean Rusk.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All three argued with their colleagues in favour of restraint rather than escalatory actions against Cuba. The President, in particular, cited Thant's efforts as the basis for a hoped-for peaceful settlement, requiring some US restraint. <p>During the Resolution Process</p> <p>UN assisted the parties to deal with the two main concerns of the conflict, namely the missiles in Cuba and Cuba's security concerns.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In particular, the Secretary-General Thant played a key role in being able to propose a reasonable solution that was palatable to both. He suggested that the Russians dismantle their missiles in exchange for an American guarantee that the United States would not invade Cuba. ▪ This became the basis for the superpower agreement, accompanied by a secret commitment made through Attorney-General Robert Kennedy to remove US missiles from Turkey.

When agreement was finally reached and Castro threatened to upset it, Thant shuttled to Cuba at the end of October and convinced Castro to tone down his rhetoric.

- In support of Thant's mission, Kennedy lifted the U.S. blockade and aerial overflights for two days.
- Though Castro refused a UN supervisory force, which Kennedy and Khrushchev had agreed upon, Thant helped find a way to verify the missile removal. He facilitated high-level Soviet and American negotiations at the UN to work out a plan so that the returning missiles on Soviet ships could be viewed by US planes and ships.

Walter Dom,

"It was the week that a UN Secretary-General (U Thant) helped the superpowers to pull back from nuclear annihilation"

3. CONSEQUENCES OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Key Question :

What was the Impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis on the development of the Cold War?

Sub-Question - What was the impact of the CMC on the respective key players?

<p>For Cuba</p>	<p>Castro's prestige within Latin America suffered significantly following the crisis,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ it was also apparent that, as Mark Falcoff commented, "Castro was...cut down to size." <p>And even more importantly, it appeared that the Soviets had betrayed Cuba's loyalty not only by leaving the island "defenseless" in the face of an anticipated U.S. attack, but also that Castro's five conditions, proposed after the deal with the U.S. was struck, were not even addressed.</p> <p>Overall, the Cuban factor was largely side-lined as superpower rivalry overshadowed the crisis in Cuban nationalism.</p> <p>US policy towards Cuba remained unaffected by the crisis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Kennedy briefly explored the possibility of negotiations with Castro via unofficial contacts. - But in June 1963, he ordered the resumption of Operation Mongoose. - Acts of economic sabotage on Cuba, piracy against Cuban vessels and isolated coastal raid were orchestrated by the CIA. - Plans to assassinate Castro (Operation Condor) also remained in place. - The ousting of Castro remained a priority of the Kennedy administration. <p><i>Failure of the US to appreciate the real reasons behind the Cuban revolution had resulted in an emotional, knee-jerk action against a much-vilified dictator; to Castro, the Cuban Missile Crisis remains an unresolved chapter in Cuban history.</i></p>
<p>For the US</p>	<p>US retained its strategic advantage:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Although the Jupiters were already an outmoded weapons system by 1962 and were 'more or less worthless', their presence in Turkey was mainly of symbolic value. ▪ Their removal did not alter the strategic balance since the latest generation of ICBMs and the submarine-based Polaris missile system enabled the US to reach targets deep within the USSR without positioning missiles on the Soviet border. <p>Kennedy claimed a political and personal victory:</p> <p>Strengthened Kennedy's image domestically and internationally as he achieved the evacuation of the missiles from Cuba and avoided nuclear war with the USSR.</p> <p>Helped mitigate negative world opinion regarding the failed Bay of Pigs invasion.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The failed Bay of Pigs invasion was a major blow to US Administration because it punctured Kennedy's electoral rhetoric. ▪ Made them look like "<i>fools to our friends, rascals to our enemies, and incompetent to the rest</i>" ▪ A humiliating personal rebuff for Kennedy, who however, managed to salvage some credibility when he took full responsibility for the operation in a TV broadcast. ▪ Compromised US's moral position in the world and made it impossible for Kennedy to protest to similar violations by the communists ▪ Also increased the suspicion of Latin American states towards the US.

	<p>US softened its stance towards the USSR:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The US Administration learnt to be a little softer in their pronouncements and less strident in their assertions. ▪ Took a more moderate tone towards the Soviets. ▪ However, Republic critics and some historians have challenged the positive interpretation of Kennedy's 'flexible response' strategy. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In 1964, Nixon blamed Kennedy for having "pulled defeat out of the jaws of victory" as he could have called Khrushchev's bluff and overthrown Castro. ○ Revisionist historians have also criticised the unnecessary escalation of the crisis.
For the USSR	<p>Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba could be viewed as a public embarrassment for Khrushchev. Khrushchev was dismissed from his position as Soviet leader in 1964.</p> <p>In reality, <i>Khrushchev gained more and lost little</i>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Soviet missiles had not been in Cuba before the crisis, so removing them did not make much of a difference. • In return, he extracted from Kennedy an undertaking in public not to invade Cuba and a commitment in private to decommission the Jupiters in Turkey. • The Soviet ploy of installing missiles on Cuba forced Kennedy into concessions he would otherwise not have made. <p><i>Note :</i> The missiles on Turkey were actually of mainly symbolic value.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ They were outmoded by 1962; Kennedy himself acknowledged that they were 'more or less worthless'. <p>So their removal did not later the strategic balance since the latest generation of ICBMs and submarine-based Polaris missile system enabled the US to reach targets deep within the Soviet Union without positioning missiles on its borders.</p> <p>One could therefore argue that the Jupiter trade was an apparent rather than real concession.</p>

The broader implications were as such :

- Although the US and the USSR remained adversaries, the Cuban Missile Crisis was a decisive event in Cold War history.
- Being at the brink of a nuclear holocaust and staring into its yawning chasm convinced both sides of the need for:

a. *Greater caution with respect to nuclear brinksmanship*

The ploy of nuclear war-mongering, even if one did not intend to actually use nuclear weapons, had brought home to both sides the dangers of nuclear brinksmanship.

- The crisis served as a clear reminder of the parameters of the Cold War.
- Tacit assumption that although nuclear weapons were to be manufactured and maintained as a deterrence, they were never to be used first.
- Both superpowers also supported a UN resolution prohibiting the deployment of weapons in outer space (i.e. the militarisation of outer space/ the 'space race').
- June 1963, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed, in which US, USSR and Britain agreed to cease atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons.
- Although underground testing was still permitted, the treaty was an important breakthrough as it paved the way for more significant agreements on nuclear non-proliferation, e.g. NPT (1968), SALT 1 (1972), SALT II (1979), INF (1987), START (1991).

b. *Negotiation on Matters of Mutual Interest*

- The crisis alerted both sides of the need for negotiation rather than military action.
 - Inaugurated a major thaw in US-Soviet relations, which was the basis of the later policy of détente (easing of tension).
 - A 'hot line' between Moscow and Washington was set up in 1963.
 - *Communication between the two capitals had been slow during the crisis.*
 - *Long intervals in formal contact and mutual ignorance of the other side's real intentions only increased the likelihood of one side declaring war before it was absolutely necessary.*
 - *Telephone link between the two capitals would allow secure and rapid communication at the highest level in an emergency.*
- In all, *a new spirit of cooperation between the superpowers emerged after the crisis.*

4. CHECK POINT B

1.

What was really at stake in the Cuban Missile Crisis?

Prestige, propaganda and positioning in the global Cold War

Why?

Missiles in Cuba did not significantly alter or add to the Soviet threat because of:

- the nature of the missiles on Cuba
- US striking capability on the USSR and
- the counterproductive effect of the episode on the USSR

The threat was genuine, the drama intense but much of it was exaggerated. Why?

- US was humiliated by the Bay of Pig incident and was over-compensating for the political fall-out
- USSR was embarrassed by the Berlin Wall episode, the nuclear inferiority and the ring of nuclear bases on the edge of Soviet sphere of influence in Europe; Khrushchev's solution was for the USSR to act like a superpower until it could catch up

➔ *To conclude, paranoia and uncertainty, coupled with issues of prestige and power, was the lethal combination that almost led to nuclear destruction.*

2.

How similar were the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis?

The Impact of the Spread of the Cold War beyond Europe

Contents Outline

1. Stabilization of the Cold War in Europe
2. Small States Become Pawns in Superpower Rivalry
3. Danger of Superpower Conflict in a Nuclear Age
4. Détente: A Thaw in Superpower Relations
5. Conclusion

1. Stabilization of the Cold War in Europe

1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE

- Since the end of WWII, both US and USSR had been jockeying for influence and dominance in Europe.
- By late 1947, this struggle ended in a stalemate and the continent was divided by an “iron curtain” between Western and Eastern Europe.
 - US containment policy since 1947 prevented the much-prophesized fall of Western Europe to communism
 - Soviet military presence and their control of the communist parties in Eastern European states kept a tight rein and destroyed any remaining pockets of pro-West, anti-communist democratic opposition there.
- Although the center of the conflict shifted from Europe to Asia, there were sporadic crises in Europe throughout the rest of the Cold War era.
- The death of Stalin and the process of de-Stalinization also led to instability within the Soviet bloc and the policy of peaceful co-existence with the West.
- But in general, the status quo continued in Europe and the frontier between the American sphere of influence and the Eastern bloc remained unchanged till the fall of communism.
- Despite the apparent stability, the most important thing to note about Eastern Europe under Soviet rule is that there was a lot of simmering discontent over Soviet oppression within the various Soviet satellite states and such dissatisfaction over the lack of democracy and prosperity would boil over and contribute to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.

1.2 MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN EASTERN EUROPE?

- During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Stalin had ruthlessly exploited Eastern Europe, stripping it of food and goods, forcing Soviet-style collectivization of agriculture, purging, deporting and executing those who criticized Soviet policies. Come 1953, living standards in Eastern Europe were dropping rather than rising as compared to the West, and resentment against the Soviets had developed to the point of insurrection. Rebellions against communist rule and the Soviet alliance in Eastern Europe in the 1950s provided opportunities for US intervention in the region which the Soviets had considered as their rightful sphere of influence. These uprisings threatened to loosen the Soviet Union's hold on these states and weaken the Eastern bloc.
- Unfortunately, in all these cases, the Americans did not fulfill their pledge of supporting the “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures”. Rebellions in East Germany in 1953 and Poland and Hungary in 1956 were tacitly encouraged by the Americans, but not exploited as an opportunity to challenge the USSR and force the withdrawal of those states from the Eastern bloc.

Question to ponder: Why didn't the USA step in to help the 'free people' who were rebelling against Soviet control in Eastern Europe? Also, recall how did the Communist gain control in these Eastern European states?

1.2.1 The East German Revolt, 1953

- Shortly after Stalin's death in June 1953, workers mounted a month-long anti-Soviet demonstrations in East Berlin and went on a general strike to demand reduced work norms, increased food rations, economic and political freedom, union with West Germany and withdrawal of Soviet troops.
- Insurrection was put down by Soviet troops and tanks.
- To forestall further unrest, the Soviets made economic concessions in East Germany and other satellite states.
- The only action taken by the US was to broadcast the demands of the East German protestors across Germany on the airwaves of the American-sponsored Radio Free Europe.

1.2.2 The Hungarian Uprising, 1956

- On 27 Oct, 1956, following demonstrations by students and workers who were demanding democracy, Imre Nagy was reinstated as premier and **he immediately called for the evacuation of Soviet troops from Hungary; the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and demanded reforms and free elections.**
- Slowness in Soviet reaction led to the belief that the revolution was successful.
- The Soviets realized that if Hungary succeeded in gaining independence from the USSR, the other Eastern European satellites would quickly defect and the Warsaw Pact would disintegrate.
- On 4 Nov, 200,000 Red Army troops and 4,000 Soviet tanks entered Budapest to "help the Hungarian people crush the black forces of reaction and counter-revolution"
- Hungary served as a warning to any other state which might consider leaving the Soviet bloc.
- Although Nagy had appealed to the UN and the western powers for help, the Americans did no more than broadcast anti-Soviet propaganda and the demands of the rebels on Radio Free Europe.

1.2.3 Czechoslovakia: The Prague Spring, 1968

- Poor standards of living under Soviet-style communism made many people in Czechoslovakia extremely disappointed and prompted calls for reforms. People resented a lack of democracy and freedom of speech.
- In Jan 1968, a new communist leader, Alexander Dubcek was appointed. He was determined to revamp communism and introduce "**socialism with a human face**".
- In the early months of 1968, Dubcek **introduced a number of reforms** such as the liberalization of the economy, allowing foreign travel, abolishing press censorship etc. But he stopped short of introducing western-style capitalism and breaking free of the Warsaw Pact.
- The Soviet PM, Brezhnev, was worried that this was a prelude to Czechoslovakia leaving the Soviet bloc, and was not prepared for this to happen because of the country's strategic position: it would provide the Americans with a corridor along which they could march from West Germany to Soviet Ukraine.
- He also didn't want the Czechs to set a negative example to people in other communist Eastern European states.
- So in August 1968, Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces invaded Prague and Dubcek was removed from power.
- During this crisis, the US was unable to take any action to stop the invasion because they were bogged down in Vietnam and distracted by race riots in the black districts of American cities.
- As a consequence of The Prague Spring, the USSR under Brezhnev introduced the **Brezhnev Doctrine** in which there would be **limited independence for the Communist parties in Eastern Europe**, and these Eastern European countries were not allowed to **leave the Warsaw Pact, disturb a nation's communist party's monopoly on power, or in any way compromise the cohesiveness of the Eastern bloc.**

Something to think about: Did these events in Eastern Europe foreshadow the collapse of the Soviet Union?

The important thing to note about the various incidents in Eastern Europe from the 1950s to the mid-1980s is that they revealed the extent to which the people in the Eastern bloc were deeply resentful of Soviet hegemony.

The only thing preventing the collapse of the Soviet bloc was the brutal use of armed force to suppress dissent. So when Gorbachev introduced glasnost and perestroika and allowed for reform in the USSR and its satellite states, the Soviet control over Eastern Europe collapsed.

1.3 THE GERMAN QUESTION RESOLVED?

1.3.1 Soviet recognition of West Germany

- After Stalin's death, Khrushchev adopted a policy of peaceful co-existence; an attempt to reduce hostility between the superpowers in light of the possibility of nuclear war (*such a war will annihilate the USSR and ensure the destruction of socialism*).
- Khrushchev's argument for doing so was as such: the triumph of socialism over capitalism would be inevitable, and hence there was no need to be achieved by war or violence.
- In May 1955, West Germany joined NATO and this membership was accepted by both France and the Soviet Union. The latter officially recognized the existence of the West German state during a visit by Chancellor Adenauer to Moscow in 1955.

1.3.2 The Second Berlin Crisis, 1958

- The existence of the western zones in Berlin remained a threat to the stability of East Germany because the city acted as a magnet for people wishing to escape to the west.
- Alarmed by the mass exodus, Khrushchev decided to attempt to force the Western powers to hand West Berlin over to the East German government.
- The US refused to comply and tension mounted as negotiations between the western powers and the Soviets achieved nothing:
 - Eisenhower warned that a Soviet takeover of West Berlin ran the risk of massive retaliation.
 - The Soviets withdrew the ultimatum and opened discussions with the US in 1959.

1.3.3 The Berlin Crisis, 1961

- In June 1961, **Kennedy and Khrushchev** held a summit in **Vienna**.
- One of the key issues raised at the Vienna summit was the future of Berlin.
- Khrushchev was genuinely worried about the **defection of skilled labor to the West which was hurting the East German economy.**
- The summit broke up without an agreement and the USSR issued another six-month deadline for the withdrawal of Western troops from Berlin.
- In August 1961, the Berlin crisis entered a new phase:
 - The uncertainty over the future of the city had accelerated the flow of refugees from East Germany; on 12 August alone, 4,000 refugees had fled to the West.
 - On 13 August, the East Germans sealed off West Berlin; barbed wire fences were erected along the boundary between the eastern and western sectors of the city.
 - On the night of **17 August**, they built a **concrete wall to divide Berlin and closed the escape route.**
- Tension mounted when the US commander in Berlin moved tanks equipped with bulldozer blades to the site of the Wall, while on the other side, Soviet tanks moved in to position.
- A classic Cold War confrontation ensued until both sides agreed to withdraw; in the end the Berlin crisis did not erupt into war.
- After 1961, tensions over Berlin slowly eased.
- ***After this crisis, the Soviets never again tried to revise the post-war settlement of Berlin and the status of the city ceased to be a major issue in US-Soviet relations.***



Fig 1: Berlin Wall being built

2. Small States Become Pawns in Superpower Rivalry

Issues to consider:

1. Which were the other states which got involved in the Cold War conflict?
2. Why did these states get involved?
3. What attraction did they hold for the superpowers?
4. Did superpower conflict always overshadow local agendas and concerns?

2.1 CONTAINMENT IN PRACTICE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBAL COLD WAR

- As the respective spheres of influence came to be mutually-recognised in Europe, the superpowers turned their attention elsewhere to curtail each other's attempts to upset the balance of world power.
- The Cold War spread to most of the major regions of the world for various reasons - ideological, political, strategic and/or economic reasons.
- The following list of small states which got caught up in superpower rivalry is not exhaustive, but gives a good idea of how extensive the Cold War conflict became:
 - Europe: Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary
 - Mediterranean: Greece Turkey
 - Northeast Asia: Korea, China, Taiwan
 - SEA: Vietnam, Laos
 - Latin America: Cuba, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Grenada, Panama
 - Middle East: Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan

2.2 Case Study 1: Vietnam

Background

- Vietnam had been a French colony before WWII
- The French pulled out in 1954 after a bitter war of national liberation
- Vietnam was then divided along the 17th parallel between a communist state led by Ho Chi Minh in the North and an anti-communist state headed by Ngo Dinh Diem in the South

American involvement

- At first, the US displayed little interest in the region, but after the "loss" of China and the Korean War, Indochina became an integral part of the global battle to contain Soviet expansion.
 - Indochina was now viewed by the US with great strategic importance - it held the key to SEA, guarding the entrance to the rice-bowl of the region (Thailand, Burma, Indonesia) which as a whole was vital to American interest.
 - Indochina was also an important location for US military bases, a supplier of raw materials and a marketplace for Japanese goods.
- By the end of 1954, American military advisers were sent to train the South Vietnamese army while American economic assistance was supplied to South Vietnam in ever-increasing amounts.
- Meanwhile, the USSR and China also began to furnish economic and military assistance to North Vietnam.
- After 1958, the Vietcong (South Vietnamese guerillas), helped by the North Vietnamese army, attempted to overthrow the government in the South
- US involvement in Vietnam escalated and intensified with each Administration, spanning the presidencies of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon.
- The conflict came to be known as the "Vietnam Quagmire" and the US only managed to extricate itself from the conflict after Nixon embarked on "Vietnamization".
- The US signed a peace treaty with North Vietnam in 1973 and pulled out, leaving the communists to eventually overrun South Vietnam in 1975.

Significance of the Vietnam War?

It is important to note that the Vietnam War, apart from being hugely unpopular amongst the US domestic public, also dealt a huge blow to US credibility and self-confidence over its Cold War policy.

Following the Vietnam debacle, the US actively pursued the policy of détente in a bid to establish peaceful relationships with the two great communist powers - USSR and China.

2.3 Case Study 2: The Middle East

Background and superpower involvement

- Both the US and USSR tried to influence the states in the Middle East
- The US encouraged and supported the new Jewish state of Israel that was set up in 1948
- Some Arabs, including the governments of Egypt, Syria, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) looked to the Soviets for help in their conflict with Israel
- With US money and weapons, Israel was able to defeat its Arab enemies in a series of wars (1948-9, 1967, 1973)
- The US government enabled Israel and Egypt to sign a peace treaty.

Significance of the Middle East Conflict

- Conflict in the Middle East is extremely complex and will be discussed further in Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation
- The Middle East is of interest to the superpowers because of its oil resources and both wanted to establish a foothold in the region by wooing the Middle Eastern States
- This region is a good counter-example to show that the superpowers were not always at a vantage point
- Some small states do play off the superpowers against each other to further their own interests (e.g. Egypt and the Aswan High Dam project - that was to gain economic assistance and loans) precisely because they recognize the existence of intense superpower rivalry.

2.3 Case Study 3: The Third World

- In the 1970s, the Soviets took advantage of the declining American power due to the Vietnam War and expanded their influence in Third World countries
- **Angola**
 - USSR supported the Marxist-oriented Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
 - With the collapse of the Portuguese colonial government in Angola in 1974-5, the MPLA became involved in a civil war with US- and South African-backed liberation movements
 - USSR and Cuba backed the MPLA politically and sent military supplies.
 - Soviet and Cuban aid proved decisive in the MPLA victory and a radical left-wing regime was established in Angola
- **Horn of Africa**
 - Mid to late 1970s, USSR intervened in the Horn of Africa
 - In 1977-8, Somalia attacked Ethiopia
 - Soviets and Cubans provided military aid, advisers and ground troops to Ethiopia
 - This proved decisive and Ethiopia came to be governed by a left-wing dictatorship.
 - Soviets gained a socialist ally in Africa as well as useful port facilities for its growing navy.

In both Angola and the Horn of Africa, Soviet actions arose out of calculated opportunism rather than a systematic programme of Soviet aggression and expansionism. But this was lost on the Americans who were increasingly disillusioned with détente as the Soviets seemed to profit more from it.

3. Danger of Superpower Conflict in a Nuclear Age

Issues to consider:

1. Why did the arms race continue?
2. How did the arms race affect international politics?
3. Were there moves towards arms control?
4. Were these measures successful?

3.1 THE ARMS RACE

3.1.1 Overview

- Throughout the Cold War, the USA and the USSR competed to out-do each other in terms of the quantity and quality of their weapons and armed forces
- For the most part, the Americans had the upper-hand but they were constantly fearful of being overtaken by the USSR
- By 1971, the Soviets did catch up, but at the expense of the already vulnerable Soviet economy.

3.1.2 Growth of Nuclear Forces

- In the late 1950s, Americans believed that a “**missile gap**” existed between them and the USSR.
- Why? → In **1957**, the Soviets launched sputnik, the first ever satellite, and in 1961, Soviet cosmonaut, Yuri Gagarin, became the first man in space → Both these events increased American fears
- BUT! Both governments secretly knew that the Americans were still the more powerful nuclear force. Via the use of U-2 spy planes, the US uncovered that the Soviets only possessed a limited number of ICBMs
- After the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was a **desire on both sides to avoid a similar nuclear crisis**. In Aug 1963, the Soviets, Americans and British agreed that they would not carry out further tests in the air or underwater
- However, under Brezhnev, Soviet nuclear spending increased. The Soviets made use of the opportunity that America was bogged down in Vietnam to catch up, and by 1971, they had managed to do so in terms of the number of nuclear missiles.
- **1976** was also a key year to the transition to a new, post-détente era
 - In that year, Moscow began the deployment of SS20s in Eastern Europe, an act which did much to undermine the achievements of détente
 - SS20s were a new range of medium range missiles intended as a replacement for an earlier generation of IRBMs and as a means of maintaining the nuclear balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
- In **Dec 1979**, **NATO** countered the aggressive Soviet move by pushing the US for deployment of American IRBM (Pershing) and Cruise missiles in Western Europe, which could hit targets in the USSR
 - Moscow refused to remove their SS20s except on the basis of compensatory reductions in nuclear forces on the Western side
- NATO offered the **zero-zero option**, but this was rejected by the Soviets
- The Cold War heated up once again in Europe, with the Americans and the Western Europeans growing extremely anxious and questioning of Soviet intentions and the Soviet Union’s commitment to a European détente.

3.2 Arms Limitation

3.2.1 Overview

- The following proposals were made with regards to arms control and reduction:
 - The Baruch Plan, 1946
 - Rapacki Plan, 1957
 - Antarctic Treaty, 1959
 - The Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963
 - Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968
 - SALT I, 1972
 - ABM Treaty, 1972
 - SALT II, 1979
 - INF Treaty, 1987
 - START I, 1991
- Not all of these treaties and plans were successful in limiting the proliferation of nuclear arms.

There is no need to know all of these proposals and agreements in detail. Just read up on them briefly and understand the context in which they were made. An example is discussed below.

3.2.2 The SALT Agreements

- After 1971, there was a period of détente or cooperation
- Soviet leaders were alarmed at the cost of the arms race and the Americans wanted better relations with the communist world as they tried to end the Vietnam War.
- In 1972, they both finally agreed to limit the use of ICBMs when they signed the SALT I Agreement.
- Under this, the superpowers laid down rules for the conduct of nuclear warfare; committed both powers to do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war.
- Although SALT I was a great breakthrough, many nuclear weapons were not covered by the treaty; both superpowers retained enough nuclear resources to destroy each other and the world many times over.
- In 1979, SALT II talks took place and agreement was reached covering a wider range of nuclear weapons; but this agreement never came into force because after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Americans refused to ratify the treaty

3.2.3 Breakdown in Arms Control Agreements

- Carter wanted to start immediately to limit arms and decrease America's arms sales overseas because he didn't want American to remain the arms merchant to the world
- Wanted to complete the SALT II treaty in 1977
- However, negotiations ended up dragging on for more than a year because Carter demanded to have more arms than the Soviets did; he also invoked Soviet resentment at his public support for a Russian dissident and linked the SALT talks to human rights
- It was not till June 1979 that Carter and Brezhnev met in Vienna to sign the SALT II Treaty. However, the treaty was inadequate in limiting arms proliferation and hence sharply criticized
- Carter soon lost faith in the treaty, and agreed to a programme of installing US Pershing and Cruise missiles in Western Europe and did not push for ratification of the SALT II Treaty by Congress
- So far from eliminating nuclear weapons, the Carter Administration continued to increase US nuclear arsenal at about the same rate as the Nixon and Ford Administrations.

3.3 Limited War to Avoid Direct Confrontation

- As both sides were fully aware of the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction, nuclear weapons were used as a threat and deterrence rather than an active military option
- During the Korean War, Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam War, the US considered the use of nuclear weapons, but never actually used them
- The new concept of "limited war" where neither side resorted to "all means possible" to achieve 'total victory' became common in military jargon

4. Détente in Superpower Relations

Issues to consider:

1. How did détente come about?
2. What role did each superpower play in bringing about an improvement in relations?
3. Why was the China factor significant?
4. How did détente and the China factor contribute to the ending of the Cold War?

4.1 OVERVIEW

- **DÉTENTE** = Relaxation of tension in the world in the 1970s
- **Why?**
 - Both superpowers **forced to rethink some of their strategies** of conducting the Cold War, where previously there had been serious tension in a series of confrontations that threatened to escalate into nuclear war
 - Both were **suffering from the enormous escalating costs** of sustaining a prolonged Cold War and had to find alternative means to wage the Cold War such that it did not become mutually exhausting
- With détente came more **arms control agreements**, which was welcomed by both the US and the USSR
- Efforts were also made to strengthen economic relations and promote economic and technological exchange between both eastern and western blocs
- Détente was an opportunity to reduce international tension
- Better relations were established across the Iron Curtain
- However, these achievements proved to be **temporary** and did not end the Cold War

4.2 MOTIVATIONS FOR DÉTENTE

4.2.1 American Motivations

1. **Growing defence expenditure**
 - Defence expenditure was growing faster than the economy itself
 - Korean War = \$70 billion
 - Vietnam War = \$172 billion
 - Clandestine operations, alliance building, spending for the UN and NATO and weapons production accounted for trillions of dollars
 - Voice of America's network of radio stations cost \$640 million in the 1970s alone
2. **Declining American economy**
 - The US government came to be increasingly reliant on deficit spending
 - US economy was in a bad shape with falling productivity levels and decreasing rates of personal savings
 - Rise in Japanese and West German competitiveness also contributed to the slowdown of the US economy
 - Exacerbated by the oil crises in the 1970s
3. **Change in US foreign policy priorities**
 - US public opinion was no longer in favor of adventurism in foreign policy → they had lost confidence in the govt following Vietnam and Watergate.

4.2.2 Soviet Motivations

The Soviets were originally suspicious of US' offer of arms negotiations and the notion of détente for they had achieved nuclear parity and had the largest standing army. BUT...

- 1) **Domestic pressures:**
 - Faced with a stagnating/ declining economy
 - Lives of the people could not be improved as long as valuable resources were used for defence purposes
 - Détente helped ease the burden on the Soviet economy and allowed for more trade and high technology input from the West
- 2) **Long-held Soviet desire for Western recognition of her sphere of influence in Eastern Europe**
 - This could be achieved with a quid pro quo or linking deal with the Americans
 - US would acknowledge USSR's strategic control of Eastern Europe in exchange for agreement to arms control negotiations
- 3) **Both superpowers were to recognize mutual interests in the Third World**
 - Desire for global recognition of Soviet superpower status
- 4) **Irreparable relations with China also led to a keener interest in détente**
 - USSR couldn't afford to be left out when Sino-American rapprochement was taking place
 - USSR now had to rethink their strategy in a multi-polar world where China had emerged as a major power to be reckoned with, especially after cracks in Sino-Soviet relations reached new depths due to frequent border clashes in the 1960s
 - Détente with the US presented an opportunity to help USSR deal with a new hostile China

4.2.3 Chinese Motivations

- **Sino-Soviet split → WHY?** Differences between Mao and Khrushchev (both personally and ideologically), competition to dominate the communist and Third World, China's development of the nuclear bomb, tension due to the Brezhnev Doctrine (this stipulated that the freedom of action of socialist states was limited by their obligation of loyalty to the USSR) and Sino-Soviet border disputes.
- China projected herself as a power to be reckoned with and rightly so because of her increasingly independent stand and newly acquired status as a nuclear power
- By the 1970s, Mao was aware that China's international isolation was a huge drawback
- Accommodation with the US would be beneficial to its own interests and represent somewhat of a rejection of the USSR (a situation of choosing between the lesser of two evils)
- Sino-American rapprochement and détente would also be useful in helping China in its dealings with the USSR

4.3 SOME DEVELOPMENTS IN DÉTENTE



4.3.1 Sino-American Rapprochement: Triangular Diplomacy

- In the 1960s, the relationship between the USSR and China had deteriorated rapidly because the Chinese felt that the Soviets were not strong and credible enough to lead the communist world
- The fear of a Soviet invasion of China was very real given the Soviet military buildup on the Chinese border following border skirmishes
- The Sino-Soviet split presented Nixon with the opportunity of exploiting the situation. Nixon had hoped to force the Soviets to adopt a more moderate Cold War policy by improving Sino-American relations: if the Soviets had a threatening and aggressive posture, it might intensify Sino-US cooperation which the Soviets did not want. In other words, Nixon had hoped to use this to arm-twist the Soviets into settling issues in Europe and proceed with arms control talks.
- High points of Sino-US rapprochement include: the US table tennis team's visit to the Championship in Beijing (April 1971), heralding the start of ping-pong diplomacy; China's entry into the UN (Oct 1971) and Nixon's visit to China (Feb 1972)

4.3.2 The Moscow Summit, May 1972

- Nixon's visit to China and subsequent rapprochement between China and the US were cause for concern to the Soviets
- Moscow agreed to sign the SALT I Treaty at the Moscow Summit in 1972. The USSR and the US also concluded other agreements on miscellaneous matters such as space cooperation and trade
- The Moscow Summit and its outcome marked the establishment of a working relationship between the US and the USSR. This was a significant shift away from confrontation

4.3.3 Washington Summit and the Arab-Israeli War, June and Oct 1973

- Brezhnev visited Washington in June 1973, and there the Soviets and the US concluded a series of agreements on trade and also one on the prevention of a nuclear war.
- When the Arab-Israeli war broke out in 1973, the US and the USSR both worked together to bring about a cease-fire that was desirable to both but also continued to support and supply their allies in the conflict. This nearly resulted in a near-nuclear confrontation

4.3.4 Gerald Ford and the Vladivostok Summit, Nov 1974

- Ford, who took over the American presidency from Nixon, was also committed to détente. Ford and Brezhnev signed a new framework agreement at the Vladivostok Summit to limit arms.
- The SALT I Agreement was reached to equal limits for missile launchers, strategic bombers and warheads.
- However, negotiations dragged on for a few years because of some American senators who refused to accept the proposals

4.3.5 The Helsinki Summit, 1975 - the High Point of Détente?

- The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was one where 33 European countries and the US and Canada met to settle post-war boundaries
- The USSR wanted the West to recognize European boundaries established after the war;
- The US saw this as an opportunity to get concessions from the USSR in return.
- **Results?**
 - Borders of Europe became inviolable; both sides stressed the need for peaceful resolutions of conflicts and all countries accepted the existence of the Soviet bloc
 - Trade, technology and cultural exchanges between East and West established
 - Humanitarian issues - freedom of speech and movement across Europe - agreed upon

5. Conclusion

- Détente was a fresh change from the tension of the 1950s and 1960s where nuclear war and destruction were real possibilities
- The fact that superpower relations were stabilized and real attempts at peaceful co-existence was practiced were signs of tremendous achievements
- Yet some had pointed out the lack of substantial progress on key issues:
 - Arms limitation was agreed upon but expenditure also increased in this period
 - Détente also did not fully reduce international tension for the Sino-Soviet dispute remained and conflicts intensified in the Third World
 - Soviet expansion in Angola, Iran and Afghanistan would lead to mistrust and the crisis in Poland all served to effectively derail earlier efforts at détente
- Was the result really surprising? Perhaps not, because détente was not the means to the end of the Cold War, but merely its continuation by other means.

So when détente was no longer useful, it fell apart.