

# TAMPINES MERIDIAN JUNIOR COLLEGE

## **JC2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION**

CANDIDATE NAME	
CIVICS GROUP	

#### **H1 HISTORY**

The Cold War and the Modern World (1945–2000)

8821/01

13 September 2023 3 hours

Additional materials: 12 Page Answer Booklet

## **READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST**

Write your name and Civics Group in the spaces at the top of the page.

Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.

You may use an HB pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working.

Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid.

Section A

Answer Question 1.

## Section B

Answer two questions.

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

This document consists of 6 printed pages and 1 blank page.

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#### **SECTION A**

#### You **must** answer Question 1.

#### SUCCESS AND LIMITATIONS OF SUSTAINING ALLIES

#### The Korean War

**1** Read the sources and answer the questions which follow:

#### Source A

Following our withdrawal from the Security Council, America became entangled in a military intervention in Korea and is now squandering its military prestige and moral authority. Few honest people can now doubt that America is now acting as an aggressor and tyrant in Korea and that it is not as militarily powerful as it claims to be. In addition, the United States of America is presently distracted from Europe in the Far East. Does it not give us an advantage in the global balance of power? It undoubtedly does.

Let us suppose that the American government continues to be tied down in the Far East and pulls China into the struggle for the freedom of Korea and its own independence. What might come of this? First, America, just like any other country, cannot cope with China, a country with such large armed forces at the ready. It follows that America would overextend itself in this struggle. Second, having overextended itself in this matter, America would be incapable of a third world war in the near future. Therefore, a third world war would be postponed for an indeterminate period, which would provide the time necessary to strengthen socialism in Europe, not to mention that the struggle between America and China would revolutionize the entire Far East. Does all this not give us an advantage from the perspective of the global balance of power? It unquestionably does.

Stalin's letter to the leader of Czechoslovakia, 27 Aug 1950.

#### Source B

We must remember that Stalin made decisions always to serve the Soviet Union's strategic interests. He would never decide solely to promote China's interest or to help North Korea. The key, in my opinion, lay in Lushun (Port Arthur) and the China Eastern Railway (CER). Both were of critical importance for the Soviet Union's access to the Pacific Ocean, a consideration that had long occupied a central position in Russian and Soviet security strategies in Asia.

Upon Mao's arrival in Moscow, Stalin initially showed no interest in signing a new treaty with China, in part because he feared that this would deprive Moscow of the privileges to use Lushun and CER. In early January 1950, Stalin yielded to Mao's persistent push and agreed to sign a new treaty. On January 26, Mao rejected Stalin's proposal of keeping Soviet's privileges to Lushun and CER. As a compromise, Zhou Enlai proposed that China would reclaim Lushun and CER in three years after treaty's signing. On January 28, Stalin accepted the Chinese proposal "in principle," but added a new clause: if a war occurred in East Asia, the Soviets would continuously be able to use both Lushun and CER. The Chinese agreed to this clause and Stalin got what he wanted.

Adapted from an article, written by leading contemporary Chinese historian,

## Source C

China's decision to enter the Korean War, despite Stalin's breaking of his promise of Soviet air support played a decisive role in convincing Stalin, that Mao and his comrades were "genuine internationalist Communists." Shortly after Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River, Stalin ordered the Soviet air force to help defend the Chinese supply lines. Thereafter, Soviet military and economic assistance poured into China, guaranteeing that Chinese logistical needs in Korea would be met while significantly enhancing China's overall capacity for domestic economic reconstruction. When Chinese troops successfully drove the enemy forces back to the 38th parallel, North Korea became a security buffer for China. All of this substantially strengthened the foundation of the Sino-Soviet alliance, as well as the CCP's new regime in China.

However, Mao never forgot Stalin's suspicion of the Chinese at so critical and historic a moment. Though the Chinese experience in managing the Korean crisis bridged Sino-Soviet differences for the moment, it sowed the seeds for the Sino-Soviet split a decade later.

Adapted from an article by a leading contemporary Chinese historian, entitled 'Re-visiting Stalin's and Mao's motivations in the Korean War, 2020

## Source D

By the end of 1949, Kim II Sung arrived to hold consultations with Stalin. The North Koreans wanted to prod South Korea with the point of a bayonet. Stalin couldn't oppose the idea. It appealed to his convictions as a Communist. Stalin persuaded Kim that he should think it over, make calculations, and then come back with a concrete plan. Kim went home and then returned to Moscow when he had worked everything out. He told Stalin he was certain of success, but Stalin had his doubts. He was worried how Americans would respond, but he was also inclined to think that if the war was fought swiftly, then war with the USA could be avoided. The war wasn't Stalin's idea, but Kim II Sung's. Kim was the initiator. But Stalin did not try to discourage him.

Adapted from Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs in 2004 about USSR's involvement in the Korean War.

#### Source E



Study the advanced production experience of the Soviet Union for the industrialization of our beloved country.

Chinese poster and banner produced in 1953.

#### Now answer the following questions:

- a) Compare and contrast sources A and B as evidence for Stalin's reason for drawing China into the Korean War. [10]
- b) How far do sources A-E agree with the assertion that the Soviet Union had successfully sustained its Communist allies in the Korean War? [30]

#### **SECTION B: ESSAY QUESTIONS**

You must answer two questions from this section.

## EITHER

2 'Ideological differences worsened Sino-Soviet relations more than personality clashes.'
How far do you agree with this statement? [30]

## OR

**3** How far do you agree that ASEAN's responses to the 2nd and 3rd Indo-Chinese war was effective?

## AND EITHER

4 'Great Power politics were more a curse than a blessing for United Nations peacekeeping from 1945-2000.' How far do you agree with this assertion? [30]

## OR

5 To what extent do you agree with the statement that "The UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon from 1979 - 1985 was a failure on all counts."? [30]

End of paper

[30]