

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Class: \_\_\_\_\_



**JURONG PIONEER JUNIOR COLLEGE**  
**JC2 Preliminary Examination 2024**

**HISTORY**  
**Higher 1**

**8838/01**  
**27 August 2024**

Paper 1 The Cold War and the Modern World  
(1945 – 1991)

**3 hours**

Additional materials:          Answer Booklet

**READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST**

An answer booklet will be provided with this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

**Section A**

Answer **Question 1**.

**Section B**

Answer **two** questions.

The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question.

This document consists of 5 printed pages and 2 blank pages.

## Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

### MILITARY ALLIANCES IN EUROPE

- 1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow.

#### Source A



*A Soviet cartoon on the inclusion of West Germany into NATO, produced in 1955.*

### Source B

I feel that if (the integration between West Germany and the rest of western Europe) should take place and progress successfully, then we will see a steady social, political, military, and economic advance in Western Germany. This will greatly increase the pressure inside Eastern Germany for joining up with the other part of Germany. It might even become impossible for the Communists to hold the place by force.

While out of this situation there might develop conditions that could be almost provocative to a general war, this would come about only if the East--that is, Russia--conducted such a campaign of retaliation, repression, and cruelty that the whole Eastern world would break into flames.

However, this could not possibly come about until the West, with the great advantages of (NATO), and with greater unification of Western Europe, would have achieved a position of strength that would certainly deter any Russian plan to risk a global war.

*From a letter by President Eisenhower to Field Marshall Montgomery on the inclusion of West Germany into NATO, 14 July 1953.*

### Source C

It is a well-known fact that already at the end of 1954, the Council of the North Atlantic bloc spoke in favour of arming NATO troops with atomic weapons and increasing NATO's Western European air forces by one third, as well as expediting the remilitarisation of West Germany. It is worthy of note that certain circles in the United States of America are especially eager to remilitarise West Germany.

The dangers created by the aggressive military blocs and the resurrection of German militarism prompt us to consider the issue of joint activities under the Warsaw Treaty to broadly coordinate efforts to increase Warsaw Treaty member-states' defensive capabilities in support of international peace and security.

While planning these activities, we still think that the creation of a collective security system in Europe, based on the involvement of all European countries, regardless of differences in their social and governmental systems, remains the best means of ensuring the security of the countries of Europe.

*From a speech delivered by USSR Foreign Minister V M Molotov on the rationale of Warsaw Pact, 28th January 1956.*

**[Turn over**

### Source D

As an instrument of Soviet control, the Warsaw Pact had value as a device for monitoring political and military developments in member states. In the political field, it reminded the signatories of their common ideologies and purpose, underscored the importance of formal interstate ties, and created a mechanism providing a common political forum, over which the Soviet Union at first exercised complete control. In its military aspect, it would eventually lead to the solution of such problems as the status of Soviet troops in the bloc countries, and the consolidation of the Eastern European armies as an effective front line of defense for the Soviet Union.

*Appraisal of the Warsaw Pact made by America's Central Intelligence Agency,  
6 May 1966.*

### Source E

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 was crucial for NATO as it raised the apparent threat of all Communist countries working together and forced the alliance to develop concrete military plans. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was formed to direct forces in Europe and began work under Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower in January 1951. In September 1950, the NATO Military Committee called for an ambitious buildup of conventional forces to meet the Soviets.

The Warsaw Pact, formally the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance, was a collective defense treaty among the Soviet Union and seven other Soviet satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War. The Warsaw Pact was the military complement to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the regional economic organization for the communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact was created in reaction to the integration of West Germany into NATO in 1955 per the Paris Pacts of 1954, but it is also considered to have been motivated by Soviet desires to maintain control over military forces in Central and Eastern Europe.

*From an educational website on the origins of  
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 2017.*

Now answer the following questions:

- (a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources B and C on the inclusion of West Germany into NATO. [10]
- (b) How far do Sources A–E support the assertion that the formation of military alliances in Europe was caused by Soviet ambitions? [30]

**Section B**

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

**EITHER**

- 2** 'Sino-America relations after 1979 was predominantly influenced by China's security interests.' How far do you agree with this statement? [30]

**OR**

- 3** Assess the impact of the Yoshida Doctrine on the development of Japan-US ties during the Cold War. [30]

**AND EITHER**

- 4** 'The Third Indochina War ended due to the efforts made by external parties.' How far do you agree with this view? [30]

**OR**

- 5** To what extent was the fear of communism a consideration of ASEAN cooperation during the Cold War? [30]

**END OF PAPER**

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## Jurong Pioneer Junior College

### Mark Scheme for JC2 H1 History Preliminary Examination 2024

#### Section A: Source-based Case Study

- (c) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources B and C on the inclusion of West Germany into NATO. [10]

#### Success Criteria:

#1	Identify and explain a similarity in views between two sources, on a common basis of comparison and supported by source content.
#2	Identify and explain a difference in views between two sources, on a common basis of comparison and supported by source content.
#3	Provide reasons for similarity and/or difference, using Sourcing and Contextualisation.

Level	Marks	Descriptor
L3	8-10	<p><i>The answer effectively utilises both sets of sources, clearly explaining similarities and differences supported by source details. It provides insight into <b>the reasons for these similarities and differences</b>, such as strategic perceptions of threat and defensive measures. At the upper end, the response demonstrates developed evaluation of both sets, offering critical insight into why these perspectives emerged. At the lower end, while the insight may be uneven, there is still substantial analysis of either the similarities or differences between the sources.</i></p> <p>Both sources B and C agree that the inclusion of West Germany into NATO was meant to significantly strengthen the military capabilities of Western Europe. Eisenhower in Source B believed that the addition of West Germany would result in “military (advancement)” as well as placing Western Europe in a “position of strength” deterring possible invasion of Russia. Source C also concurs that “the remilitarisation of West Germany” together with equipping the western European states with atomic weapons and a larger air force would make NATO more formidable, thus capable of upsetting peace and stability in Europe. Produced within a decade after the conclusion of the Second World War, memories of the formidable Nazi war machine were still fresh in the minds of the policymakers, hence their common estimation of the significance of German membership in NATO.</p> <p>However, the sources disagree on the purpose of including West Germany in NATO as Source B believes that this would be for a peaceful objective because an unified Western Europe “would have achieved a position of strength that would certainly deter any Russian plan to risk a global war”, while Source C claims that the expanded NATO is meant to destabilise postwar peace in Europe through the creation of “aggressive military blocs and the resurrection of German militarism”. Both sources were produced to advance the interests of the superpowers respectively, and this accounts</p>



		for their differing views. Source B was Eisenhower's attempt to persuade a European military leader on the merits of including West Germany into NATO that this would benefit Europe as it could deter Soviet aggression. This was made before West Germany's inclusion in 1955. Source C however was Soviet's justification for the formation of the Warsaw Pact claiming that this must happen because of the threat posed by West Germany participation in NATO. 16 May 1955 was the date of Warsaw Pact signing and the USSR wanted to portray themselves as proponents of peace against a more aggressive Western Europe.
L2	4-7	<i>Answer will attempt to explain similarities and differences from source details but analysis is either superficial or only focus on either one of the sources and arguments.</i>
L1	1-3	<i>Answer will be descriptive with little, or no attempt made to explain the similarities and/or differences of both sources.</i>
L0	0	<i>Answer does not address the question.</i>

(d) How far do Sources A–E support the assertion that the formation of military alliances in Europe was caused by Soviet ambitions? [30]

**Success Criteria:**

<b>#1</b>	Interpret and analyse each source as evidence vis-à-vis the given assertion, using Sourcing, Contextualisation and Close Reading.
<b>#2</b>	Group the sources according to their claims vis-à-vis the given assertion, using Corroboration.
<b>#3</b>	Evaluate the reliability/usefulness of each set of sources, using Sourcing, Contextualisation and Corroboration.
<b>#4</b>	Make a judgement which set of sources is preferred as evidence and how far the assertion can be supported.

Level	Marks	Descriptor
L5	25-30	<p><i>The answer will treat sources as a cohesive set, making effective use of them to cross-reference and support or challenge the hypothesis. It will demonstrate a clear understanding of the question, critically evaluating sources in their historical context to form a judgement on how far they support the premise. The approach will exhibit critical awareness, integrating sources to present a sustained analytical argument. Towards the upper end, the answer will reach a well-supported conclusion. Towards the lower end, the answer will still demonstrate many of these features but may be less consistent or convincing in its approach.</i></p> <p>Sources B, D, and E collectively argue that Western alliances, especially NATO, were formed as a strategic response to counter Soviet ambitions and maintain a balance of power. The sequencing from early Cold War concerns (Source B) to a mid-Cold War assessment (Source D) and retrospective analysis (Source E) demonstrates a consistent Western perception of the Soviet threat. As evidenced by President Eisenhower's 1953 letter (Source B) and the CIA's 1966 appraisal of the Warsaw Pact (Source D), indicates a</p>

		<p>strategic effort to counteract Soviet ambitions. Eisenhower emphasized integrating West Germany into NATO to strengthen Western Europe and deter Soviet aggression. This move aimed to create a robust political, military, and economic bloc capable of withstanding Soviet pressure, reflecting a proactive strategy against the perceived Soviet threat. Similarly, the CIA described the Warsaw Pact as a tool for Soviet control over Eastern Europe, underscoring the need for NATO to counterbalance Soviet influence. The retrospective overview from the Luxembourg Centre for Contemporary and Digital History (Source E) ties these perspectives together by highlighting events such as the Berlin Blockade, the Soviet atomic bomb test, and the Korean War as catalysts for NATO's formation, suggesting that NATO was established to counter perceived Soviet threats.</p> <p>Sources supporting the statement in question are generally reliable and accurate. Source B is a primary material shows western perspective on the reason for the formation of NATO even though it is laden with Eisenhower's intent to overstate the benefits of including West Germany into NATO to a probably wary Montgomery, a European military commander still reeling from the effects of the Nazi-initiated world war. Written in 1953, the president was eager to beef up Europe's military defence against an aggressive USSR and conveyed accurately why the American government believed that West Germany is therefore key to NATO. Sources D and E, albeit produced within and beyond the Cold War period, reflect insightful assessment on why the Warsaw Pact was formed, namely, to strengthen Soviet control over its satellite states. This corresponds with my contextual knowledge that unlike NATO, all military forces of the Warsaw Pact members came under unified Soviet command and have been used mainly to suppress dissents within the bloc such as the 1956 Hungarian Uprising, Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Source E in its first paragraph also justifies from hindsight Source B's intent that Soviet ambition motivated NATO's formation.</p> <p>On the other hand, sources A and C suggest that Soviet actions were defensive reactions to Western military developments, framing the formation of alliances like the Warsaw Pact as responses to perceived threats rather than ambitions for expansion. The Soviet perspective, as presented by Molotov in his justification of the formation of the Warsaw Pact (Source C) and a Soviet cartoon from the same year (Source A), frames their actions as defensive responses to Western military expansions. The Warsaw Pact is depicted as a necessary measure to counter the threat posed by NATO and the remilitarisation of West Germany, presenting Soviet actions as protective rather than aggressive. The Soviet cartoon further critiques NATO's assurances about West Germany's rearmament, reflecting widespread distrust and viewing Western moves as provocative. These narrative challenges the idea that Soviet ambitions were the primary driver of military alliances, instead portraying Soviet measures as reactions to Western provocations.</p> <p>This set of sources which challenges the statement in question and blames the formation of military alliances in Europe on western aggression accurately portray Soviet fears over NATO's inclusion of West Germany</p>
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		<p>even though they are unreliable historical materials. Source A is a political cartoon produced in the year of West Germany's NATO membership to convey strong Soviet opposition to the event, hence certain aspects of the caricatures are exaggerated. From my contextual knowledge, West Germany has received no atomic weapon from the Americans, and neither was the Nazi Party revived. Source C is a speech produced after West Germany's NATO membership to justify the formation of Warsaw Pact against NATO's expansion. It is propagandistic and claims that the USSR is "in support of international peace and stability", "regardless of differences in (European) social and governmental systems". From my contextual knowledge, the USSR has been intolerant of ideological variants within its own bloc and was quick to vilify even communist states like Yugoslavia and Albania. While both sources are not reliable in describing historical circumstances then, they are very useful at showing Soviet perspective that the west is to be blamed for the formation of military alliances in Europe.</p> <p>The Western narrative of deterrence against Soviet expansion (Sources B, D, and E) is paralleled by the Soviet narrative of defensive measures against Western aggression (Sources A and C). Both sides perceived the other as a significant threat, leading to a reactive cycle of military preparations and alliances. Eisenhower's strategic concerns and the CIA's analysis align with the historical context provided by the Luxembourg Centre, showing a consistent Western perception of the Soviet threat. In contrast, the Soviet preamble and cartoon suggest that Soviet actions were driven by the need to safeguard against Western provocations, presenting a coherent counter-narrative.</p> <p>Therefore, the sources collectively indicate that the formation of military alliances in Europe during the Cold War was driven by mutual perceptions of threat and the need for security rather than solely by Soviet ambitions. Both Western and Soviet actions were significantly influenced by the perceived threats from the other side, resulting in a continual escalation of military preparations and alliances.</p>
L4	19-24	<i>The answer will treat sources as a set and effectively utilize them to support and challenge the hypothesis. It demonstrates a clear understanding of the question by cross-referencing sources. There will be attempts to evaluate the sources in context, though the evaluation may have gaps, unevenness, and a lack of balance. Towards the upper end, the answer may begin to formulate a judgment related to the question, albeit partial and incomplete. At the lower end, the evaluation of sources may be present but uneven or imbalanced.</i>
L3	13-18	<i>The response begins to treat sources as a set, demonstrating an understanding of the question. Some sources are cross-referenced to support and challenge the hypothesis, with attempts to evaluate through source content and provenance. Towards the upper end, the response supports and challenges the statement with accurate references, using all sources and making valid cross-references. Towards the lower end, some sources may be neglected or used invalidly, and the support/challenge may be uneven.</i>
L2	7-12	<i>The answer integrates relevant information from sources to both support and challenge the hypothesis, considering the context and perspectives. It</i>

		<i>balances the use of sources, acknowledging their provenance and offering some evaluation, though not always successfully. Towards the lower end, the response may appear one-sided or limited in source use.</i>
L1	1-6	<i>The answer will briefly reference the sources, paraphrasing or summarising their content. While contextual knowledge might be used, it will be minimally integrated with the sources. Some relevant information may be extracted from the sources but not deeply analysed.</i>
L0	0	<i>No evidence submitted or the answer does not address the question.</i>

## Section B: Essays

### Success Criteria

Introduction	
#1a	I defined vague or debatable terms in the questions to scope my response
#1b	I provided relevant criteria to provide a framework for my response
#1c	I outlined the key arguments (balanced) I intended to make in direct response to the question
#1d	I stated my stand, in alignment with my key arguments
Paragraph Development	
#2a	I started my paragraph with a topic sentence that conveys the main point of my argument in direct response to the question
#2b	I explained and elaborated on the topic sentence to further develop my argument
#2c	I supported my argument with an analysis of relevant historical evidence
#2d	I closed my paragraph with a linking statement that connects to the question and my stand
Conclusion	
#3a	I reiterated the outline of my key arguments in direct response to the question
#3b	I restated my stand, in alignment with my key arguments.

### A-Level Rubrics

Level	Marks	Descriptors
6	26-30	<p>The essay will be focused clearly on the demands of the question. The approach will be analytical or explanatory, demonstrating clear understanding of historical concepts relevant to analysis and to the topic. The essay will be relevant. The argument will be structured coherently and supported by accurate factual material. The essay will make a judgement and reach a reasoned conclusion in response to the question. The writing will be accurate.</p> <p>Towards the top of the level, responses are expected to be analytical, focused and balanced throughout. At the lower end of the level, there will be some unevenness in analysis.</p>

Level	Marks	Descriptors
5	22-25	<p>The essay will reflect a clear understanding of the question and a fair attempt to provide an argument and factual knowledge to answer it. The approach will contain analysis or explanation. The essay will show evidence of understanding of relevant historical concepts, and some use of these will be made in analysis. The essay will be largely relevant. Most of the argument will be structured satisfactorily but some parts may lack full coherence. The essay will achieve a genuine argument but may be uneven in terms of balance or depth in factual knowledge. The writing will be generally accurate.</p> <p>Towards the upper end of the level, the response will be analytical and well informed. It will attempt to make a judgement although this may not be fully supported or convincing. Towards the lower end of the level, responses might be less well supported or contain sections of narrative or description which are not linked to the argument.</p>
4	17-21	<p>The essay will indicate attempts to argue relevantly, although often implicitly. The approach may be uneven and contain some analysis and explanation and some narrative or description. The essay will show evidence of knowledge of historical concepts and attempts may be made to use historical concepts to aid analysis. The structure of the argument could be organised more effectively. The writing will usually be accurate.</p> <p>Towards the top of the level, responses will make an explicit attempt to address the requirements of the question. Towards the lower end of the level, responses are likely to contain detailed factual material with some focused analysis, but the argument will be less coherent.</p>
3	13-16	<p>The essay will offer some appropriate factual material but there will be little attempt generally to link factual material to the requirements of the question. The approach will be descriptive and lack analysis. The essay may include some references to historical concepts, but these will not be used to develop an analytical argument. The structure will show weaknesses and the treatment of topics within the essay will be unbalanced. The writing may show some accuracy.</p> <p>Towards the top of the level, responses contain detailed factual material. However, attempts to argue relevantly are implicit or confined to introductions and conclusions. The approach will be descriptive rather than evaluative. Alternatively, responses may offer an analytical framework which contains some supporting material. Towards the lower end of the level, responses might offer some narrative or description relating to the topic but are unlikely to address the question directly.</p>
2	9-12	<p>The essay will not be properly focused on the requirements of the question. The essay may include references to historical concepts, but these may not be fully understood or effectively supported. The argument may be of limited relevance to the topic.</p>

Level	Marks	Descriptors
		Towards the upper end of the level, answers may begin to make some relevant points which are only partially supported. The answer may contain assertions. There may be commentaries that lack sufficient factual support. At the lower end of the level, there may be confusion about the implications of the question and many unsupported assertions.
1	1-8	The essay will be characterised by significant irrelevance or argument that does not begin to make significant points. The essay may mention historical concepts, but these will not be understood. The answers may be largely fragmentary and incoherent. Towards the upper end of the level, the essay may show some awareness of relevant material.

**2 'Sino-America relations after 1979 was predominantly influenced by China's security interests.' How far do you agree with this statement? [30]**

The period from 1979 to 1991 was transformative for Sino-American relations, marked by the establishment of formal diplomatic ties, significant bilateral engagements, and evolving geopolitical dynamics. The statement that China's security interests predominantly influenced Sino-American relations underscores the central role of China's security and strategic concerns in shaping bilateral interactions. A nuanced examination reveals that these security interests only improved ties when they were compatible with U.S. interests. For instance, at the height of the Sino-Soviet and U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the second Cold War in 1979, Sino-American relations were strong as both nations found common ground in countering Soviet influence. Conversely, when Chinese security concerns conflicted with American priorities and policies, bilateral relations deteriorated, as evidenced by the strained relations following the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident. Hence this essay agrees with the statement, arguing that China's security interests were indeed the major factor in Sino-American relations, significantly impacting their trajectory even determining the development of other areas of their relationship, such as economic, political, and cultural exchanges, based on their alignment or misalignment with U.S. policies.

Between 1979 and 1989, Sino-American ties improved significantly due to China's pressing security needs for a powerful ally to counter the Soviet threat. The formal establishment of diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979, marked a critical turning point, as both nations shared a strategic interest in containing Soviet influence. This mutual objective was underscored by the 1979 Joint Communiqué, where both countries declared their opposition to hegemonism, implicitly targeting the Soviet Union. China's security interests during the Third Indochina War (1978-1991) further brought it closer to the United States. China's concern over Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the subsequent establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Phnom Penh led to a convergence of interests with the U.S., which also opposed Vietnamese expansionism. Both nations found common ground in supporting the Khmer Rouge and other anti-Vietnamese forces to counter Soviet-aligned influence in Southeast Asia. This cooperation in regional

security not only enhanced their strategic partnership but also reinforced their broader alignment against Soviet hegemony.

**Ties improved as China's security concerns aligned with US interests.** Washington also saw Beijing as an reliable ally in balancing Soviet power, and this geopolitical consideration was a driving force behind the normalization of relations and subsequent cooperation. Throughout the 1980s, China and the United States engaged in extensive military and intelligence cooperation. In 1981, the United States lifted its embargo on arms sales to China, allowing for the transfer of military technology and enhancing China's defence capabilities. This period also saw high-level military exchanges, including the visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to Beijing in 1983, which further cemented the strategic partnership. Additionally, both countries supported anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, with China providing logistical support and the United States supplying arms to the Mujahideen. Throughout the 1980s, both countries engaged in strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union. This included intelligence sharing and military cooperation, with the U.S. providing China with advanced technology and military equipment, such as the sale of Black Hawk helicopters in 1984. President Ronald Reagan's visit to China in April 1984 underscored the strategic importance of Sino-American relations. This visit aimed to strengthen ties and included discussions on trade and security cooperation.

**As a result of their common security interests, other areas of Sino-American ties flourished significantly between 1979 and 1989.** Economically, the United States became one of China's key trade partners, leading to a substantial increase in bilateral trade. In 1980, the United States granted China Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status, which was renewed annually, significantly boosting Chinese exports and fostering economic reforms. By 1985, U.S.-China trade had grown from \$2 billion to \$15 billion. American companies began investing in China, including major corporations like Coca-Cola and Boeing, which helped modernize China's industrial base and integrate it into the global economy. Cultural exchanges also flourished during this period. The United States and China signed a bilateral cultural exchange agreement in 1979, leading to increased people-to-people contacts. Thousands of Chinese students and scholars studied in American universities, contributing to educational and scientific advancements. By 1987, over 40,000 Chinese students were studying in the United States. These developments illustrated how common security interests served as a foundation for flourishing bilateral ties across various domains.

On the other hand, the Tiananmen Square Incident in June 1989 and its aftermath starkly illustrated how divergences in security interests between China and the United States could also lead to a rapid deterioration across all areas of their relationship. **The violent crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Beijing showcased China's prioritization of internal security and regime stability, which stood in sharp contrast to the U.S. advocacy for political liberalization and human rights.** This fundamental dissimilarity in security interests became glaringly apparent when the United States, horrified by the events, imposed economic sanctions, including the suspension of military sales, high-level government exchanges, and the freezing of bilateral aid programs. These measures



reflected the U.S. commitment to democratic principles and human rights, which directly conflicted with China's focus on maintaining authoritarian control. The U.S. Congress pushed for further restrictions, including proposals to revoke China's Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status, which threatened to derail the burgeoning trade relationship. Although MFN status was ultimately retained in 1990 and 1991, the incident caused a chill in bilateral economic engagements. American businesses, wary of political instability and ethical concerns, began re-evaluating their investments and operations in China. Politically, the previously flourishing diplomatic engagements were curtailed, with high-level visits and exchanges being significantly reduced. For example, scheduled visits between senior officials were cancelled, and diplomatic dialogue was minimized.

The period up to 1991 saw continued tension and limited cooperation. Efforts to restore normalcy in relations were cautious and slow, reflecting deep-seated mistrust. The George H.W. Bush administration, despite its initial hardline response, attempted to engage China through quiet diplomacy, sending National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft to Beijing in July 1989 and again in December 1989. These visits aimed to stabilize the relationship without publicly endorsing the Chinese government's actions, but they underscored the delicate balance the U.S. sought to maintain between condemning human rights abuses and preserving strategic interests.

In conclusion, from 1979 to 1991, China's security interests were the key factor influencing Sino-American relations. When these interests aligned with U.S. objectives, such as during the Sino-Soviet rivalry, bilateral ties improved across economic, political, and cultural domains. Conversely, when Chinese security priorities conflicted with U.S. policies, as seen after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, relations deteriorated comprehensively. Thus, the alignment of security interests determined the overall trajectory of Sino-American interactions, highlighting their central role in shaping the bilateral relationship during this period.

### **3 Assess the impact of Yoshida Doctrine on the development of Japan-US ties during the Cold War. [30]**

The Yoshida Doctrine, formulated by Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in the aftermath of World War II, significantly shaped Japan's foreign policy and its relationship with the United States during the Cold War. The Doctrine emphasized economic recovery and growth while relying on the U.S. for security, thereby avoiding a heavy military burden. This essay evaluates the influence and limitations of the Yoshida Doctrine on the development of Japan-US ties during the Cold War, arguing that while the Doctrine strengthened bilateral relations and benefitted Japan economically and politically, it also made Japan more beholden to the U.S., effectively positioning it as a junior partner.

The Yoshida Doctrine, established by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in 1947, significantly strengthened Japan's economic ties with the United States. By prioritising economic recovery and growth over military expansion, Japan was able to focus its resources on domestic development, leading to substantial US foreign direct investment, particularly in the manufacturing sector. From 1951 to 1960, US investment in Japan



increased fivefold, while the late 1960s saw Japan's GDP growth rate averaging 10%, positioning it as the world's second-largest economy. Japan's exports to the US, including automobiles and electronics, surged, with trade volumes increasing dramatically. By 1971, Japan was exporting over \$5 billion worth of goods to the US annually. The economic partnership provided Japan with access to American markets, technology, and capital, essential for its rapid industrialisation. Furthermore, the reliance on US security allowed Japan to allocate minimal budget to defence, spending less than 1% of its GDP on military expenditures. These savings were redirected towards economic growth and infrastructure development. By 1991, Japan had become the largest creditor nation, its economy deeply intertwined with the US, showcasing the success of the Yoshida Doctrine in forging a mutually beneficial and robust economic relationship.

However, critics argue that the Yoshida Doctrine has made Japan more beholden to the US in its economic relations, undermining its sovereignty. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Japan faced continuous pressure from the US to open its markets to American goods and to reduce trade imbalances. This resulted in various trade agreements where Japan had to make concessions, such as the 1981 voluntary export restraints on automobiles to the US. The Plaza Accord of 1985, which led to the appreciation of the yen, was a direct result of US pressure, demonstrating Japan's limited autonomy in economic policymaking. This revaluation of the yen caused a surge in the value of Japanese exports but also led to significant economic challenges, including a bubble economy in the late 1980s. The necessity to comply with US demands for market liberalisation, intellectual property protections, and other economic reforms further exemplifies the influence the US held over Japan's economic policies. By 1991, Japan, while the largest creditor nation and a global economic powerhouse, found its economic strategies and decisions heavily influenced by its relationship with the US. This dependency underscores the double-edged nature of the Yoshida Doctrine: it facilitated Japan's rapid economic growth and development but also entrenched a level of economic reliance on the US that constrained Japan's economic independence.

Meanwhile, the Yoshida Doctrine significantly enhanced Japan-US security ties by establishing a clear division of labour: Japan focused on economic development while the US provided military protection. This arrangement was formalised in the 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, allowing for the stationing of US forces in Japan to ensure its defence. The treaty granted the US the right to establish military bases in Japan, with around 260,000 US troops stationed there during the Korean War. This alliance was reaffirmed and strengthened in the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which expanded the scope of the security partnership and emphasised mutual defence and cooperation. The treaty included provisions for the defence of Japan and the region, reinforcing the commitment of both nations to each other's security. Under the Doctrine, Japan maintained a pacifist stance, enshrined in its post-war constitution, specifically Article 9, which renounces war and prohibits the maintenance of armed forces for warfare. Instead, Japan relied on the US for defence, which was supported by the presence of US military bases. The strategic bases in Okinawa, home to about 70% of US military facilities in Japan, played a crucial role in maintaining regional security and deterring potential threats from the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War. By the late 1980s,

the Japan-US security alliance had become a cornerstone of both countries' defence policies, illustrating the profound and enduring impact of the Yoshida Doctrine on their strategic partnership.

While the Yoshida Doctrine provided Japan with a security umbrella, it also cemented Japan's role as a junior partner in the alliance, leading to overreliance on US security protection. The 1960 protests against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, known as the Anpo protests, highlighted widespread public discontent with Japan's perceived subservience to US military interests, drawing over 100,000 protesters and leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi. Critics argue that this reliance prevented Japan from developing its own robust defence capabilities and fully exercising its sovereignty. The 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation further solidified Japan's dependence by outlining mutual defence roles that heavily favoured US strategic interests, emphasizing Japan's support functions rather than equal partnership in defence operations. This dependence was evident during the Gulf War in 1990-91 when Japan, unable to contribute military forces, provided \$13 billion in financial support instead. By 1991, approximately 50,000 US troops were stationed across Japan, particularly in Okinawa, underscoring the extent of Japan's reliance on American military power. Despite Japan's significant economic growth and technological advancements, this security arrangement limited Japan's ability to independently influence regional security dynamics and address emerging threats autonomously, illustrating the Yoshida Doctrine's double-edged impact on Japan's international standing.

Politically, the Yoshida Doctrine influenced Japan-US relations by fostering a pro-American stance within Japan's political landscape, positioning Japan as a junior partner to the US. Prime Minister Yoshida's pragmatic approach to foreign policy emphasized alignment with US interests, which was critical during the early years of the Cold War. This pro-American stance was evident in Japan's support for US policies in Asia, such as providing logistical support during the Korean War (1950-1953). The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which dominated Japanese politics for much of the Cold War, adhered to the principles of the Yoshida Doctrine, ensuring continuity in Japan-US relations. Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987) was particularly notable for his efforts to strengthen the Japan-US alliance, famously declaring Japan to be an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for the US, symbolizing his commitment to the security alliance. However, this political alignment also faced limitations. Japan's political dependence on the US sometimes restricted its diplomatic autonomy, as seen in its compliance with US demands during trade negotiations and its limited role in international political affairs. Domestic opposition to US military bases, particularly in Okinawa, occasionally strained the bilateral relationship, highlighting the tension between national sovereignty and alliance obligations. Furthermore, Japan's focus on economic growth at the expense of a more active foreign policy led to criticisms that it was a passive player in international affairs, overly reliant on the US for diplomatic direction.

In conclusion, the Yoshida Doctrine has profoundly shaped Japan-US relations. It enabled Japan's rapid economic growth by allowing the country to focus on development while relying on US military protection, establishing a strong bilateral security partnership.

However, it also entrenched Japan's dependence on the US, making it a junior partner and limiting its diplomatic autonomy and defence capabilities.

**4 'The Third Indochina War ended because of efforts made by external parties.'**  
**How far do you agree with this view? [30]**

The Third Indochina War, involving Vietnam, Cambodia, and China from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, was a multifaceted conflict influenced by both internal and external factors. While external parties such as Cold War powers (i.e. the US, USSR, and PRC), ASEAN, and the United Nations played significant roles in influencing the outcome, the primary determinants in ending the war were the internal decisions and initiatives by local protagonists, particularly the Vietnamese. Although external efforts were crucial in facilitating the conclusion of the war, they merely complemented the decisive actions undertaken by Vietnam to withdraw its military forces from Cambodia. Without these actions by Vietnam, the war would not have ended by 1989.

ASEAN's efforts were pivotal in contributing to the end of the Third Indochina War by actively promoting a firm and united regional stance and garnering global support for Vietnamese military withdrawal from Cambodia. Through tireless lobbying in United Nations General Assembly meetings during the early 1980s, ASEAN successfully passed annual resolutions condemning the Vietnamese occupation and calling for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. In the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) forums, ASEAN countries highlighted the issue, leading to the 1983 NAM Summit in New Delhi, where member states supported ASEAN's position. Key ASEAN countries, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, persistently pushed for a political solution and hosted the 1981 International Conference on Kampuchea. This conference laid the groundwork for future peace settlements by maintaining international pressure on Vietnam. ASEAN's diplomatic efforts culminated in the Paris Peace Agreements of 1991, which included a comprehensive settlement plan for Cambodia. Nevertheless, while ASEAN's efforts were significant, they were supportive rather than decisive, relying on the cooperation and willingness of local parties to engage in dialogue.

The United Nations (UN) also played a vital role in the resolution of the Third Indochina War by facilitating conditions that led to peace. The UN condemned the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and supported the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), which included the Khmer Rouge. From 1979 onward, the UN General Assembly passed annual resolutions condemning the occupation and advocating for a political settlement. Despite these resolutions, Vietnam remained defiant and continued its occupation, arguing that its presence was necessary to protect Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge. Vietnam defended its occupation before the UN General Assembly by presenting itself as a liberator of Cambodia from the brutal regime of the Khmer Rouge, which had committed atrocities during its rule. Vietnam insisted that its troops were essential for maintaining stability and rebuilding Cambodia, which they argued would otherwise fall back into chaos. This stance was maintained despite mounting international criticism and economic sanctions. Vietnam's defiance was also

rooted in its strategic interests, aiming to establish a friendly government in Cambodia and counter Chinese influence in the region. The UN's efforts culminated in the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, which established a comprehensive framework for peace and led to the creation of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to oversee the process, including the withdrawal of foreign troops and the organization of free elections. These actions by the UN were significant in creating international pressure and providing a structured pathway towards peace. However, they complemented rather than directly drove Vietnam's decision to withdraw its troops from Cambodia. The internal decisions by Vietnam, influenced by economic hardship and diplomatic isolation, were the primary determinants in ending the war, with the UN's efforts being crucial but supportive.

In addition, the United States, People's Republic of China (PRC), and Soviet Union (USSR) contributed to shaping the conflict's trajectory and resolution. The United States, keen to limit Soviet and Vietnamese influence, supported ASEAN's diplomatic initiatives, such as the 1981 International Conference on Kampuchea, and provided indirect aid to anti-Vietnamese factions, including the Khmer Rouge and non-communist resistance groups through Thailand. China's 1979 invasion of Vietnam pressured Hanoi by threatening a two-front conflict and resulted in significant casualties and material losses on both sides. Following the invasion, China continued to support the Khmer Rouge with military aid and training, maintaining a proxy conflict that drained Vietnamese resources. The Soviet Union's extensive military and economic aid to Vietnam, including advanced weaponry and military advisors, bolstered Hanoi's occupation capabilities but also strained the Soviet economy, especially during Perestroika under Gorbachev, reducing its ability to support prolonged foreign conflicts. External pressure, particularly from ASEAN and international diplomatic efforts, including numerous UN General Assembly resolutions throughout the 1980s condemning the Vietnamese occupation and calling for Cambodia's independence, played a crucial role in the eventual Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989. While these external efforts were instrumental, internal factors such as Vietnam's economic difficulties, exemplified by its Doi Moi economic reforms in 1986, and the unsustainable cost of occupation were equally critical. Therefore, the ending of the Third Indochina War can be significantly attributed to the persistent efforts of the US, PRC, and USSR.

Contrary to external efforts, internal dynamics within Vietnam were the more decisive factors in ending the war. By the late 1980s, Vietnam faced severe economic difficulties, including hyperinflation nearing 800%, international isolation due to its prolonged occupation of Cambodia, and the cessation of Soviet aid following Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in 1986. Recognizing the unsustainability of their position, the Vietnamese leadership initiated the Đổi Mới (Renovation) policy in December 1986 to transition from a centrally planned economy to a socialist-oriented market economy. The cost of maintaining a large military presence in Cambodia, estimated at \$1.5 billion annually, and significant human losses, with around 55,000 Vietnamese soldiers killed, further pressured Vietnam to find a sustainable exit strategy. Under General Secretary Nguyễn Văn Linh, Vietnam announced the complete withdrawal of its troops from

Cambodia in 1989, driven by economic necessity and a changing international environment. This withdrawal, facilitated by the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991, led to UN-supervised elections in Cambodia.

Meanwhile, the rise of a more friendly Cambodian regime under Hun Sen provided a viable alternative. The Vietnamese-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), established in January 1979, gained stability and international recognition, especially after Hun Sen became Prime Minister in 1985. Hun Sen's government was seen as a stable and cooperative partner, making the Vietnamese withdrawal a strategic move to ensure continued influence in Cambodia without direct military involvement. By the late 1980s, the Khmer Rouge, which had been the primary adversary of the Vietnamese-installed PRK, had also been significantly weakened. In December 1987, Hun Sen held direct peace talks with Prince Norodom Sihanouk in France, signalling a willingness for national reconciliation and reducing the internal threat. The following year, in 1988, the JIM (Jakarta Informal Meetings) brought together all Cambodian factions, including the Khmer Rouge, under the auspices of ASEAN and the UN, to discuss peace, further diminishing the Khmer Rouge's influence and threat. These diplomatic efforts, combined with military setbacks suffered by the Khmer Rouge, demonstrated to Vietnam that a continued military presence was no longer necessary to maintain a friendly regime in Cambodia. As such, Vietnam began withdrawing its troops in stages from 1988, completing the withdrawal by September 1989. This gradual withdrawal was motivated by the perceived reduction in the Khmer Rouge threat and the growing stability and legitimacy of Hun Sen's government.

In conclusion, the end of the Third Indochina War was primarily determined by internal dynamics within Vietnam and Cambodia, with external efforts playing a supportive but secondary role. While ASEAN diplomacy, UN interventions, and superpower involvement maintained pressure and facilitated negotiations, they were not the main determinants. The Vietnamese leadership's strategic realignment towards economic reform, prompted by the cessation of Soviet aid and the emergence of a cooperative regime under Hun Sen in Cambodia, alongside the changing political landscape within Cambodia, were the decisive factors in achieving peace. External efforts were crucial in supporting these internal changes, but it was the decisions and initiatives of the local protagonists that ultimately ended the conflict.

## **5 To what extent was the fear of communism a consideration of ASEAN cooperation during the Cold War? [30]**

During the Cold War, the geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia was significantly influenced by the global ideological struggle between communism and capitalism. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), established in 1967, emerged in response to the prevailing uncertainties in Indochina, particularly amid the weakening of America's resolve to sustain its direct military involvement in the Vietnam War. While



ASEAN ostensibly aimed to promote political and economic cooperation among its member states, its formation was significantly driven by fears of communist expansion in the region. However, as the Cold War progressed, ASEAN's cooperation evolved to encompass broader security concerns, economic interests, and the pursuit of regional peace and stability, irrespective of ideological affiliations. Although fear of communism was the primary driver at its inception, it gradually assumed a secondary role within ASEAN's more comprehensive strategy for regional stability.

The fear of communism was the central consideration behind ASEAN's formation and initial cooperation during the Cold War, as evidenced by the Bangkok Declaration of 1967. The founding members—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—shared a common concern over the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. Although the declaration emphasized goals such as economic growth and cultural development, it was underpinned by a clear intent to counter communist influence. This anti-communist stance was particularly relevant given the recent history of Malaysia and Indonesia, both of which had faced communist insurgencies. In Indonesia, the 1965 abortive communist coup led to a vehement anti-communist purge under Suharto. Similarly, Malaysia and Thailand dealt with ongoing communist threats. The weakening of US commitment to the Vietnam War, especially after the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 and the US withdrawal in 1973, heightened regional fears. To solidify their stance against communism and external interference, ASEAN adopted the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration in 1971. ZOPFAN aimed to ensure Southeast Asia remained free from external power influence, promoting regional autonomy and stability amidst Cold War superpower rivalry.

The fall of South Vietnam in 1975 amplified "domino effect" fears, solidifying ASEAN's fears over the spread of communism in the region. The establishment of communist regimes in Laos and Cambodia in 1975, along with communist insurgencies, real and potential, within and adjacent to ASEAN member countries, underscored the urgency of a collective anti-communist response. The 1976 Bali Summit further solidified ASEAN's unity against communist expansion, resulting in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. These agreements emphasized political stability and economic cooperation as means to resist external interference and ideological threats, highlighting the bloc's strategic positioning against the spread of communism.

ASEAN's economic and cultural initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s, while ostensibly focused on development and integration, were also strategically aimed at countering communist influence. Initiatives such as the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP) promoted economic interdependence and growth, making the region less susceptible to communist ideologies with collective efforts and investments committed to raise living standards through attempts to alleviate poverty and unemployment. The ASEAN Cultural Fund,

established in 1978, promoted regional unity and mutual understanding, reinforcing a collective stance to build up traditional indigenous identity and mutual understanding against external ideological threats. These efforts built a shared culture and fostered solidarity, creating a cohesive front against the backdrop of the global ideological struggle.

While fear of communism remained a consideration for ASEAN from 1976 onwards, its significance gradually lessened as the bloc began addressing broader security and regional stability concerns. ASEAN sought to engage the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) to promote norms of peaceful coexistence and mutual respect. Before 1978, some ASEAN members were already normalizing ties with communist states. Malaysia established diplomatic relations with China in 1974 and with North Vietnam in 1973, aiming to balance regional influences. From 1976, ASEAN initiated several efforts to engage Vietnam, such as inviting Vietnamese representatives to participate in regional dialogues. Singapore's Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam visited Hanoi to discuss potential cooperation, and Thailand conducted diplomatic exchanges to reduce tensions. In 1978, ASEAN invited Vietnam to attend Ministerial Meetings to further integrate it into the regional framework and reduce hostilities. Though largely unsuccessful due to entrenched inherent ideological distrusts between both sides, these actions nonetheless reflected ASEAN's strategy to foster a stable and cohesive Southeast Asia by engaging Vietnam through diplomatic and economic initiatives.

ASEAN's response to the Third Indochina War underscores its evolving pragmatism and commitment to regional stability, highlighting that fear of communism was not its sole consideration. Despite Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the establishment of a pro-Vietnamese government challenging ASEAN's principles of sovereignty and non-interference, the organisation played a crucial role in addressing the Cambodian crisis. The 1981 International Conference on Kampuchea and the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) of 1988-1989, organised under ASEAN's auspices, were significant in bringing all Cambodian factions, including the Khmer Rouge, to the negotiating table. These efforts showcased ASEAN's shift from a strict anti-communist stance to a broader focus on regional peace and stability. Additionally, ASEAN's engagement with various communist entities, such as the Khmer Rouge, the People's Republic of China, the USSR, and even the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), further exemplifies this pragmatism. The gradual withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia by 1989 underscored the effectiveness of ASEAN's diplomatic strategies, emphasizing that regional unity and peace were prioritized over ideological conflicts. Thus, while the fear of communism was a significant consideration, ASEAN's actions during the Cold War demonstrate a balanced approach that ultimately prioritized regional stability over purely ideological concerns.

The fear of communism was the crucial consideration in the formation and early years of ASEAN cooperation between 1967 and 1991. It provided the impetus for regional unity against a common threat and shaped ASEAN's initial policies and actions. However, over

time, the importance of this fear diminished as ASEAN's focus shifted to include broader security concerns, economic development, and regional integration. The end of the Cold War and the inclusion of former communist states into ASEAN underscored this transition. While the fear of communism was a significant factor, it was one of many considerations that influenced ASEAN's evolution and cooperation during this period.



