# **YISHUN JUNIOR COLLEGE** JC2 Preliminary Examination 2018

# **H2 HISTORY** SHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER PAPER 1

9752/01 28/08/2018 TUESDAY 0800h - 1100h

Additional materials: 1 piece of cover page Writing paper

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#### TIME 3 hours

# INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

Write your name and CTG in the spaces provided on the cover page. Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.

Section A

Answer Question 1.

#### Section B

Answer two questions.

At the end of the examination, please hand in your answers for Paper 1 with the cover page placed on top of the answer scripts.

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

# INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES

You are reminded of the need for clear presentation in your answers.

This paper consists of 5 printed pages

#### Section A

You must answer question 1.

## THE END OF THE COLD WAR

1. Read the sources and then answer the questions which follow.

### Source A

We see around us today the marks of our terrible dilemma—predictions of doomsday, antinuclear demonstrations, an arms race in which the West must, for its own protection, be an unwilling participant. At the same time, we see totalitarian forces in the world who seek subversion and conflict around the globe to further their barbarous assault on the human spirit. What, then, is our course? Must civilization perish in a hail of fiery atoms? Must freedom wither in a quiet, deadening accommodation with totalitarian evil? ...While we must be cautious about forcing the pace of change, we must not hesitate to declare our ultimate objectives and to take concrete actions to move towards them...The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.

Excerpt from US president, Ronald Reagan's speech to the British parliament on 8 June 1982.



#### Source B

"LET US LOOK FORWARD TO A FUTURE OF "CHISTONE NYEBO" [CLEAR SKIES] FOR ALL MANKIND." (Pres. Region)

A cartoon by Nicholas Garland, published in the Daily Telegraph, a British newspaper, on 3 January 1986. The words at the bottom of the cartoon are "Let us look forward to a future of chistove nyero (clear skies) for all mankind." (President Reagan).

### Source C

It is obvious, for instance, that the use or threat of force no longer can or must be an instrument of foreign policy. This applies above all to nuclear arms, but that is not the only thing that matters. All of us, and primarily the stronger of us, must exercise self-restraint and totally rule out any outward-oriented use of force...Now let me turn to the main issue--disarmament, without which none of the problems of the coming century can be solved...Today I can report to you that the Soviet Union has taken a decision to reduce its armed forces. Within the next two years their numerical strength will be reduced by 500,000 men...By agreement with our Warsaw Treaty allies, we have decided to withdraw by 1991 six tank divisions from East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to disband them...The next US administration, headed by President-elect George Bush, will find in us a partner who is ready—without long pauses or backtracking—to continue the dialogue in a spirit of realism, openness and good will, with a willingness to achieve concrete results working on the agenda which covers the main issues of Soviet-US relations and world politics. I have in mind, above all, these things: consistent movement toward a treaty on 50 precent reductions in strategic offensive arms while preserving the ABM treaty...and negotiating on the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe.

> Excerpts from Gorbachev's address to the United Nations General Assembly on 7 December 1988.

#### Source D

The atmosphere at the meeting was friendly. We could discuss things freely and without limitation, outlining our views as to various problems and this has made it possible for us to have a more in-depth understanding of many major issues of international politics, bilateral relations and above all, the questions of war and peace, of ending the nuclear arms race and the entire range of problems within that broad topic...We brought here a whole package of major proposals which...could genuinely within a short period of time make it possible to genuinely avert the threat of nuclear war...The US side again wanted us to accept interim solutions that would preserve some American missiles in Europe and some Soviet missiles... We know of the commitment of the US Administration and the President to SDI. Our agreement to the possibility of lab testing makes it possible for the President to go through with the research... and this is where the real fight began. The President insisted until the end that the United States retained the right to...test things related to SDI not only in the laboratories but also out of the laboratories, including in space. I said to the President we were missing a historic chance...And still there is no agreement. The Americans came to this meeting empty-handed, with an entire set of mothballed proposals that made the situation so bad.

Excerpts from Gorbachev's statement in Reykjavik, 12 October 1986.

### Source E

It was Gorbachev's acceptance of a non-Communist government in Poland that, more than anything, opened the floodgates for political change in Eastern Europe...While the events in Eastern Europe were unfolding, Gorbachev insisted on absolute Soviet non-intervention. As he explained to his Politburo, the Soviet Union could not afford to intervene, financially or in terms of the cost in its relationship with the West. But most importantly, Gorbachev believed that it would not be right to intervene—just like the Soviets, the East Europeans should decide their own futures. He attempted to use his willingness to allow change as a bargaining card in his relationship with the new US administration of George Bush, but the cautious Bush was unwilling to give much in return, economically or politically. Steadily though, the relationship between the two countries did improve, especially in terms of arms control, to the point that by 1990 both sides spoke of a partnership rather than a 'Cold War'.

Taken from Hanhimäki, J and Westad, O (ed), 'The Cold War', 2003.

### Source F

As you know from media reports, because Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev is unable, owing to the state of his health, to discharge the duties of President of the USSR, the USSR Vice President has temporarily taken over the performance of the duties of the President...I address you today, ladies and gentlemen, at a moment that is crucial for destinies of the Soviet Union and the international situation throughout the world. Having embarked on the path of profound reforms and having gone a considerable way in this direction, the Soviet Union has now reached a point at which it finds itself faced with a deep crisis...In many regions of the USSR, as a result of inter-ethnic clashes, blood is being spilled, and the collapse of the USSR would have the most serious consequences, not only internally but also internationally. In such conditions, we have no alternative but to take decisive steps to stop the country from sliding into disaster.

Excerpts from the press conference statement given by the new leadership in the State Committee for the State of Emergency on the evening of 19 August 1991.

Now answer the following questions:

- (a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B on Reagan's foreign policies in ending the Cold War. [10]
- (b) How far do Sources A-F support the assertion that Gorbachev's role was crucial in ending the Cold War?

[30]

### Section B

You must answer two questions from this section.

#### EITHER

'The role of the USA was pivotal in explaining the growth of the global economy from 1945 to 1970.' How far do you agree?
[30]

#### OR

3. How far was the South Korean economic transformation from 1970 to 1990 due to the role played by its government? [30]

### AND EITHER

4. 'The United Nations' efforts at maintaining international security from 1945 to 2000 have been a failure.' To what extent do you agree with this view? [30]

#### OR

5. 'The International Court of Justice was ineffective in resolving international disputes from 1945 to 2000.' How far do you agree with this statement? [30]