

**RAFFLES INSTITUTION**  
**2017 YEAR 6 PRELIMINARY EXAM**

**HISTORY (REVISED)**

**9752/01**

Paper 1: Shaping the International Order (1945 to 2000)

**September 2017**  
**3 hours**

Additional Materials: Answer Paper

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**READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST**

Write your index number, CT group and name on all the work you hand in.  
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.  
Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper. Answer each question on a separate sheet of paper. Write your name and civics class at the top of each new page of writing paper. Answer question 1 in Section A and TWO questions in Section B. It is strongly recommended that you spend approximately 1 hour 15 minutes in Section A.

Begin every question on a separate sheet of paper. At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

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This document consists of **5** printed pages.

## Section A You must answer Question 1. THE VIETNAM WAR

Read the sources and answer the questions that follow.

### Source A

Their objectives have been clearly spelled out in captured documents – to destroy or subvert the GVN/ allied forces, eliminate the GVN governmental structure, create a general uprising among the people, and establish a revolutionary government dominated by the National Liberation Front. In what appears to be an almost incredible miscalculation of their own military capabilities and degree of support they could command from the people, the Communists failed to achieve these stated objectives. It has cost them dearly in manpower – in 12 days some 31000 killed, 5700 detained, probably another 10000 dead from wounds, and unknown number dead from air and military strikes – a total probably amounting to more than half of the forces sued in this attack.

*Central Intelligence Agency Report, 'The Tet Offensive – A Plus or a Minus?', February 1968. [GVN refers to Government of Vietnam, or South Vietnam]*

### Source B

As part of a nationwide wave of surprise attacks by the Communists during the Lunar New Year—the Tet holiday—the resulting six-hour battle was militarily inconsequential. In fact, in strictly military terms, the two-month struggle known as the Tet Offensive was a disaster for the attackers. It ended with the expulsion of the North Vietnamese Army and the southern-based insurgent troops, known in the West as Vietcong, from each place they invaded.

In the theater of public opinion in the United States, however, the attacks were a great success for the North Vietnamese. Brought into the living rooms of Americans by new communications satellites over the Pacific, scenes of the carnage, particularly at the embassy, severely damaged national confidence in the war policies of President Lyndon Johnson, who was already under fire from a frustrated citizenry in a presidential election year. The dramatic developments set in train during Tet led eventually to the withdrawal of American forces and the collapse of South Vietnam.

Tet was a historical anomaly: a battlefield defeat that ultimately yielded victory.

*Taken from an article 'Tet: Who won?' published in the journal 'The Smithsonian', 2004*

### Source C

Both in Vietnam and Washington to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds. For it seems now more certain than ever, that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate. To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past.

To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, if unsatisfactory conclusion. On the off chance that military and political analysts are right, in the next few months we must test the enemy's intentions, in case this is indeed his last big gasp before negotiations.

But it is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could.

*A commentary of Vietnam by Walter Cronkite, aired on a special CBS News broadcast on Feb. 27, 1968.*

### Source D

*From the Los Angeles Times, 1970*



### Source E

Soviet observers reported that, contrary to expectations, their generous supplies of capital and materiel were not reciprocated with influence and respect. If anything, the opposite was true. Historian Ilya V. Gaiduk has summed up the emerging view of the Kremlin in the late 1960s: "The Vietnamese Communists turned out to be unreliable and selfish allies who often caused difficulties for their Soviet comrades. Soviet influence on Hanoi's policy failed to measure up to the scale of Soviet assistance to North Vietnam" The Soviet Union and China continued to offer the North Vietnamese and the NLF assistance after 1968. At the same time, the two regimes (secretly) pursued better relations with the United States despite Nixon's increased use of air power in Vietnam. Both Moscow and Beijing looked to Washington as a potential ally in the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and both recognized that improved relations with the United States would help to stabilize Indochina. Détente was for all three of the major powers about Vietnamization, which meant making the Vietnam War a more exclusively Vietnamese affair and eliminating the fighting as a source of Cold War conflict among the biggest states. Washington, Moscow, and Beijing all recognized that they had a lot to lose if the Vietnam War continued along its existing course. The Soviet Union cooperated with the United States as early as 1968, pushing the North Vietnamese to enter negotiations.

*Observations of the role of the Soviets and Chinese in the Vietnam War adapted from US History in Context, 2006*

### Source F

When it comes to war, the American public is remarkably fickle. In August 1965, when Americans were asked if the U.S. government had made "a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam," 61% of them said "No." But by August 1968, support for the war had fallen to 35%, and by May 1971 it had dropped to 28%.

The antiwar movement gained national prominence in 1965, peaked in 1968, and remained powerful throughout the duration of the conflict. The Civil Rights leaders (were) active proponents of peace in Vietnam. Martin Luther King, Jr. openly expressed support for the antiwar movement on moral grounds ... asserting that the war was draining much-needed resources from domestic programs. He also voiced concern about the percentage of African American casualties in relation to the total population.

The Tet Offensive of late January led many Americans to question the administration's veracity in reporting war progress and contributed to Johnson's decision to retire. After Tet American public opinion shifted dramatically, with fully half of the population opposed to escalation. Dissent escalated to violence. In April protesters occupied the administration building at Columbia University; police used force to evict them. Most Americans pragmatically opposed escalating the U.S. role in Vietnam, believing the economic cost too high. In February 1970 news of the My Lai massacre became public and ignited widespread outrage. In April President Nixon, who had previously committed to a planned withdrawal, announced that U.S. forces had entered Cambodia. Within minutes of the televised statement, protesters took to the streets with renewed focus.

...Antiwar sentiment, previously tainted with an air of anti-Americanism, became instead a normal reaction against zealous excess. The antiwar cause had become institutionalized. By January 1973, when Nixon announced the effective end of U.S. involvement, he did so in response to a mandate unequalled in modern times.

*Adapted from the views of two American Professors of History, 1998*

1 Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B regarding whether the Tet Offensive can be considered a victory for communist forces. [10]

2 How far do sources A to F support the view that the Tet Offensive was responsible for US withdrawal between 1968 and 1973? [30]

### **Section B**

You must answer two questions from this section.

EITHER

2. 'The impact of trade liberalisation on the development of the international economy from 1945 to 2000 was all good'. Discuss. [30]

OR

3. How far do you agree with the view that the main reason for the success of the South Korea economy between 1970 and 1990 was the chaebol? [30]

AND EITHER

4. The main problems of the UN system are to be found in the Charter. Discuss. [30]

OR

5. 'What might have been a new beginning for the UN turned out to be a lost opportunity' How far do you agree with this view of UN peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War? [30]

*End of paper.*