



# PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 2008

HISTORY 9731/02

## Paper 2: History of Southeast Asia c1900-1997

Wednesday

27<sup>th</sup> August 2008

3 hours

### READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

1. Answer **four** questions.
2. You must answer Question 1 (Section A), and any three questions from Section B.
3. Enter the questions attempted in the cover sheet.
4. Begin each question on a new sheet of paper.
5. Staple your answers to the **back** of the cover page at the end of the examination
6. Fasten all your work securely together.

### INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers.

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This question paper consists of 5 printed pages (including this page & 1 blank page)

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## **Section A**

### **You must answer Question 1**

#### **The Cambodian Conflict**

1. Read the sources then answer the question.

#### **Source A**

In 1979 invading Vietnamese troops overthrew the murderous Pol Pot. The dispute involves a dizzyingly complex array of parties: the Soviets, the U.S., China, Thailand and ASEAN who were determined to keep Hanoi from overrunning the region and to oust the invaders, even if that means risking a return of the Khmer Rouge killers.

Suddenly, however, a rare convergence of interests among all parties has made the prospect of a political settlement appear. The new optimism has been triggered by a "peace blitz" in Asian capitals. In a startling turnaround from a policy of refusing to talk to Phnom Penh, the new Thai Prime Minister, Chatichai Choonhavan, invited Kampuchean Prime Minister Hun Sen for discussions in Bangkok, possibly to start as early as this week. "Before", says an ASEAN diplomat, "Thailand and ASEAN wouldn't have touched Hun Sen with a 10-ft. pole."

Last week ASEAN foreign ministers met to lay the groundwork for another "informal meeting" in Jakarta that will bring together the Kampuchean government, some if not all of the rebel factions, China, Viet Nam and Thailand. The object is to set up a formal peace parley aimed at devising a government power-sharing formula, nailing down a Vietnamese withdrawal timetable and establishing international monitoring of the peace.

*Scott MacLeod in 1989*

#### **Source B**

Right from the start, the conference faced one major handicap: the absence of the three parties. Boycotting the session were Viet Nam, which has occupied Cambodia for the past 30 months, and the Soviet Union, which had bankrolled the Vietnamese invasion. Cambodia, whose government was installed by Viet Nam, was not invited.

Still, the U.S. and the five-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)\* hoped that the conference would provide what Washington termed a "framework for settlement". The proposal called for disarming all forces contending for power in Cambodia and a neutral, interim government under U.N. supervision would then be established to organize free elections.

In Phnom-Penh, a Cambodian official scoffed at the idea of an effective U.N. peace-keeping force. Moscow characterized the conference as a "provocative farce." Peking was outraged at the prospect of disarming the Khmer Rouge. At week's end a vague compromise plan was adopted that called for "appropriate arrangements".

*Time Magazine, July 27<sup>th</sup> 1981*

### Source C

Indonesia's sense of achievement and pride in its role in bringing peace to Indochina was reflected in these events. Suharto arrived in Hanoi for the first meeting between a head of government and a Vietnamese counterpart since Premier Pham Van Dong visited Thailand's Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanand in 1977.

The head of UNTAC arrived in Phnom Penh to be greeted by Indonesian troops who were part of the first full battalion-sized contingent of UNTAC peacekeepers dispatched to Cambodia. At the peak deployment of foreign peacekeeping forces, Indonesia had the largest force in Cambodia with nearly 2,000 military and police personnel, representing 10 percent of the total. Indonesia's gradually assertive role in the Cambodian peace effort demonstrated that Jakarta was not willing to place its commitment to ASEAN solidarity above its own national interests.

*A US-based website commenting on Indonesia's role in the Vietnam- Cambodian Conflict*

### Source D

ASEAN worked together and despite early bias in favour of Vietnam and the Russians, in the United Nations, we were able to get majority support for our resolution against Vietnam which for years had been an object of respect in the Third World. They voted for our resolution because among other things, ASEAN regional co-operation was an exemplary Third World manifestation. Here were five countries whose relations were fraternal. This had considerable impact on many Third World countries so that when we put forward our resolution, despite their admiration for Vietnam's heroic anti-colonial struggle, the majority voted for us.

*S Rajaratnam in 1987*

### Source E

ASEAN voiced its opposition to the Vietnamese action through diplomatic initiatives. It managed to rally opposition in the UN and was generally successful in denying international recognition of the new Cambodian government. ASEAN played a significant role in cutting Vietnam off from economic assistance and also helped to create the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) as an alternative to the Vietnamese appointed regime in Cambodia. In the late 1980s, ASEAN sponsored the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs) which contributed significantly to the eventual settlement of the Cambodian conflict. To many ASEAN supporters and watchers, the most important effect of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia vis-à-vis ASEAN was that it caused member states to forge more cooperative internal policies, put aside differences and function effectively as a political alliance.

*Shaun Narine in Asian Survey Vol. XXXVII, October 1997*

### Now answer the following question:

How far do sources A-E support the view that ASEAN's role in the resolution of the Vietnam-Cambodia Conflict has been greatly inflated?

## Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section. You must support each answer with examples drawn from **at least three** countries.

2. "Independence was a distant mirage for nationalist movements". Analyze the accuracy of this statement with reference to nationalist movements in the pre war period.
3. "In the period 1945-1957, the success of nationalist movements in Southeast Asia was limited only by their own capabilities". To what extent do you agree with this statement?
4. "In their pursuit of economic growth, the governments in Southeast Asia were ill-prepared to react to the financial crisis." Examine the validity of the above statement.
5. Critically examine the government's role in the creation of a stable and cohesive nation-state in Southeast Asia?
6. To what extent were Southeast Asian nations able to overcome historical differences to encourage regional co-operation?

**END**