HISTORY 9752/01

Paper 1 Shaping the International Order (1945-2000)

31 August 2020 3 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Booklet

#### **READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST**

Write your name, civics group and question number on the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the pages in the Answer Booklet.

Write your answer to each question in the booklet.

Do not use paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

#### Section A

Answer Question 1.

#### Section B

Answer **two** questions.

Start each answer on a fresh page in the Answer Booklet.

You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers.

At the end of the examination, all work must be handed in.

If you have used any additional booklets, please insert them inside the 12-page Answer Booklet.

The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question.

### Section A

# You must answer Question 1.

#### The Korean War

1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow.

#### Source A

The new United Nations (UN) proposal of an armistice is unacceptable to this Government. As a counter-proposal, we suggest a simultaneous withdrawal of both Communist and UN forces from Korea, on the condition that a Mutual Defence Pact shall be concluded between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States in advance of its carrying out. The Mutual Defence Pact shall mean that the United Sates' participation on the ROK side will be instantaneous, in case of the Korean peninsula being attacked by any nation or nations. The United States air and naval forces should remain where they are now, pending the build-up of their Korean counterparts to an adequate degree, so as to deter the enemy from attempting another aggression.

From a statement by Republic of Korea President Syngman Rhee in his correspondences with the U.S., June 1953.

#### Source B

On behalf of the Workers' Party of Korea, we express to You, the liberator of the Korean people and the leader of the working peoples of the entire world, our profound gratitude for compassion and assistance which You constantly provide to our people struggling for the freedom and independence of our Motherland. In this letter, we would like to brief You on the current situation at the fronts of the liberation war of our people against the American aggressors.

Having cut off all the communications lines of our troops and joined the assault force that landed in Incheon with the units of their southern front that broke through our frontline, the adversary has a real opportunity to take over the city of Seoul completely. As a result, the units of the People's Army that are still fighting in the southern part of Korea have been cut off from the northern part of Korea, they are torn into pieces and cannot receive munitions, armaments, and food rations. Moreover, some units do not have any communication with each other, while some of them are surrounded by enemy troops.

Therefore, dear [Josef Stalin], we cannot help asking You to provide us with special assistance.

Extracted from a telegram sent by Kim II Sung to Josef Stalin on 29 September 1950.

# **Source C**

My fellow Americans:

I want to talk to you plainly tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East.

In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war. I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June. And they warmly supported the decision of the Government to help the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggressors.

It is right for us to be in Korea now. It was right last June. It is right today.

The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims. It must be clear to everyone that the United States cannot – and will not – sit idly by and await foreign conquest. The only question is: What is the best time to meet the threat and how is the best way to meet it?

The aggression against Korea is the boldest and most dangerous move the Communists have yet made. The attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of Asia.

Excerpted from President Truman's official speech to update the American people on the Korean War on 11 April 1951.

#### Source D

Soviet documents have established that Acheson's words had almost no impact on Communist invasion planning. Moreover, by June 1950, the US policy of containment in Korea through economic means appeared to be experiencing marked success.

Throughout 1949, Stalin consistently refused to approve Kim II Sung's persistent requests to authorize an attack on the ROK. Communist victory in China in fall 1949 pressured Stalin to show his support for a similar Korean outcome. In January 1950, he and Kim discussed plans for an invasion in Moscow, but the Soviet dictator was not ready to give final consent. At an April meeting, Kim II Sung persuaded Stalin that a military victory would be quick and easy because of southern guerilla support and an anticipated popular uprising against Rhee's regime. Still fearing US military intervention, Stalin informed Kim that he could invade only if Mao Zedong approved. During May, Kim II Sung went to Beijing to gain the consent of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Significantly, Mao also voiced concern that the Americans would defend the ROK but gave his reluctant approval as well. Kim II Sung's patrons had joined in approving his reckless decision for war.

Extracted from American historian James Matray's article, 'The Korean War 101: Causes, Course and Conclusion of the Conflict' published in the Association for Asian Studies journal, 2012.

#### Source E

Ridgway, the Commanding General of enemy forces, made a statement today with a proposal that representatives of both warring sides meet on a Danish ship in the port of Wonsan for a meeting on a cessation of combat operations. He declared at the same time that an appropriate guarantee is required; only in this event might combat operations be halted.

Please study and give a reply, but also please inform Comrade Kim II Sung of this directly.

Comrade Kim II Sung presumably should give a reply to Ridgway on 2 or 3 July. He should express agreement in this reply to hold negotiations [between] representatives of both sides about a cessation of combat operations and suggest a time, place, and number of participants of the meeting.

In order to provide our representatives with time to fully prepare for the conference it seems to me advantageous to set 15 July as the date of the beginning of the meeting.

In view of the brief time and great importance of this meeting please maintain direct communications with Comrade Kim II Sung, personally oversee this meeting, and keep me informed at the same time.

Mao Zedong's telegram to Stalin on 30 June 1951.

# Source F



Caption reads: "25 June, the anniversary of the Communist Blunder, What have you gained?"

A US government propaganda leaflet from 1951 featuring Kim II Sung, distributed to North Koreans during the Korean War.

Now answer the following questions:

- (a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources C and D on why USSR became involved in the Korean War. [10]
- (b) How far do Sources A-F support the view that external powers were in control of the Korean War? [30]

# Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

# **EITHER**

2 How far do you agree that the debt crisis of the 1980s was more crippling for the global economy than the oil crises of the 1970s? [30]

# OR

3 "South Korea's economic development from 1970-1990 was a product of favourable external circumstances." Discuss. [30]

# **AND EITHER**

To what extent did structural limitations inhibit the effectiveness of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security from 1945-2000? [30]

# OR

5 Efforts to reform UN peacekeeping were thwarted by superpower intervention rather than by lack of support by members during the period 1945-2000. [30]

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