

VICTORIA JUNIOR COLLEGE

Preliminary Examinations

HISTORY 9731/02

Date: 19 September 2014

Duration: 3 hours

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READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name, index number and class on all the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper, but start your answer for each question on a fresh piece of paper.

You may use a soft pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working.

Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue and/or correction fluid.

Answer FOUR questions in total. One from Section A and three from Section B.

At the end of the examination, fasten and submit the answer scripts for Section A and Section B separately. Attach the cover page to the front of Section B.

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

You are advised to spend no more than 45 minutes answering each question.

You are reminded of the need for good English and legible handwriting in your answers.

Section A: ASEAN, 1967-1997

You must answer Question 1.

ASEAN AND REGIONAL SECURITY

1 Read the sources and then answer the question.

When answering **Question 1** candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group.

Source A

The extraordinary period of crisis in Southeast Asia has run its course and the task now is to adjust to our revised but continuing interests in the area, and to Asian hopes and requirements. ... The thing they fear the most is the loss of US interest in their future. In each country, the leaders interviewed had some trenchant observations or views worth noting:

President Suharto ... believes it is of critical importance that the US plays a discreet but active role in assisting the ASEAN countries.

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, having little faith in the Thai and worried about Malaysia, looks to the US to provide selective but vital assistance to the ASEAN members.

Prime Minister Razak is focusing on ASEAN, with quiet American support, as a possible security blanket at a time when his insurgency problems could be compounded greatly if Hanoi so chooses.

Memorandum from US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to President Ford, 13 June 1975.

Source B

In view of the fact that ASEAN is not a supranational body with decision-making powers, ultimately it is the individual national member itself which would decide what form the thrust of ASEAN policy should take. Thus far, the members have only agreed to a loose framework in the security field. Problems within ASEAN, primarily the mutual suspicions ... must be solved before any real security co-operation can take place. ... There are indications that the coming decade will not witness any fundamental changes in the move towards the enhancement of security cooperation among the ASEAN states....The Kampuchean issue, which has helped to bring ASEAN closer, is already eight years old. It would seem that ASEAN needs another major crisis to bring its members closer. There is no telling what sort of crisis might erupt in the future and how it would affect the potential for ASEAN security cooperation.

An extract from an article published in an academic journal, 1987.

Source C

The Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia was signed ... on 23 October 1991. It was greeted by the ASEAN states with a strong sense of euphoria and self-congratulation. Speaking at the concluding session of the Paris conference...Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus of the Philippines, "acknowledge[d] with pride...the successful contribution of ASEAN to the process that produced this triumphal event." Malaysia's Foreign Minister reminded the conference delegates that ASEAN had "always, despite the many obstacles, persisted in its search for a peaceful and comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian conflict" and should therefore be entitled to "a sense of fulfilment and achievement". Tommy Koh, Singapore's former Ambassador to the UN, put it differently: "Without ASEAN there would have been no Cambodia issue. Because if we had not taken up the cause of Cambodia in early 1979, and steadfastly championed it, it would have disappeared."

An excerpt from a book about Southeast Asia, written by a historian in 2001.

Source D

Pursuant to the decision [of] ASEAN Heads of Government at their Fourth Meeting in Singapore on 27-28 January 1992 on enhancing regional political and security cooperation, the Foreign Ministers noted that a Special Meeting of the ASEAN Senior Officials on Regional Security was held in Manila on 25-26 June 1992 as well as the reconvening of the Working Group on ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ. They directed the Working Group to complete its work.

[...]

The Foreign Ministers expressed the view that any adverse development in the South China Sea directly affects the peace and security in the region. They emphasised that any territorial or jurisdictional dispute should be resolved by peaceful means, without resort to force. They urged all parties concerned to exercise self-restraint with a view to create in a positive climate for the resolution of these disputes. The Foreign Ministers noted that the Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea initiated and hosted by Indonesia had contributed to a better understanding of the issues involved. They also noted that the informal and unofficial format of the Workshops has enabled open and frank discussions to take place. The Foreign Ministers commended all parties concerned to apply the principles incorporated in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the basis for establishing a code of international conduct over the area. The Foreign Ministers decided to issue a separate Declaration on this matter.

An extract from the Joint Communique of the 25th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Manila, Philippines, 21-22 July 1992.

Source E

In December 1995, Indonesia and Australia announced the conclusion of a security agreement that committed both countries to consultations on security matters and "adverse challenges". This represented a significant departure from Indonesia's non-aligned stand and its declaratory *bebas aktif* (free and active) principle. First suggested by Prime Minister Paul Keating in June 1994, President Suharto only became responsive to the idea in September 1995. The timing gives credence to the interpretation that Indonesia's interest in the agreement was a function of growing concern about potential Chinese claims to the waters around the Natuna Islands, although the "personal chemistry" between Keating and Suharto certainly helped. Indonesia's ASEAN partners were confronted with a *fait accompli*, as President Suharto and State Secretary Moerdiono had failed to consult them. ... However, while in violation of procedural norms, the agreement did not impinge upon the sensitivities of other members. On the contrary, the Philippines expressed its desire for a similar agreement, and Singapore strengthened its military cooperation with Australia in January 1996.

An extract from a journal article published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000.

Now answer the following question.

How far do Sources A-E support the view that members are confident of ASEAN's ability to promote regional security?

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

You must support each answer with examples drawn from **at least three** countries.

- 2 'Moderate movements advanced further than radical ones.' How far do you agree with this view of nationalism in Southeast Asia before World War Two?
- 3 Why did the Japanese Occupation bring about greater progress for nationalist movements in some countries than others?
- 4 'The prevalence of authoritarianism in Southeast Asia is testament to its success.' Discuss.
- 5 How successful have independent Southeast Asian states been in integrating ethnic minorities?
- 6 Assess the impact of interstate tensions on Southeast Asian regionalism.