

Lecture 8: Inter-state Tensions and Cooperation

SAJC History Unit, 2024

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1. Introduction

- Security analysts have come to perceive that some sort of security community now exists in SEA. **ASEAN's growing political cohesion** is evidenced by its success in leading an anti-Vietnam coalition in the UN during the **Cambodian Crisis**, by the establishment of an **ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)** and by its prominent role in **Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)** and the **ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)**.
- However, this does not in any way imply that **inter-state tensions, and historical, racial and religious animosities** that characterised member states' relations in the early days of their independence in the 1960s-70s no longer matter with the success of ASEAN regional cooperation. In actual fact, **such inter-state dynamics affect inter-state relations continue to underlie relations between member-states**. It has also placed serious constraints on the development of an ASEAN security and economic community along the lines of the European community.
- Indeed, in the words of then Singapore Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng in 1990, "The prime reason for conflict in SEA was never superpower intervention but **local rivalries that had their root causes in historical animosities, racial and religious divisions or competition for influence and resources.**"

1.1 Main Themes to be Discussed

- Two main areas of focus:
 - **Causes** of interstate conflicts
 - Historical animosities, racial and religious divisions, ideological differences and territorial disputes.
 - **Consequences** of interstate conflicts
 - Mutual suspicion and hostility, impact on regional cooperation, constraints on cooperative regionalism etc.
 - More importantly we will be specifically evaluating the **successes and limitations of ASEAN as a resolution dispute mechanism** through its many efforts and policies such as its predecessors (ASA and MAPHILINDO), ZOPFAN, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, ARF and the idea of ASEAN as a security community.
 - The only instance of UN intervention in SEA interstate disputes would be during the Cambodian Crisis.

1.2 Difference between interstate tensions and interstate conflicts

- **Inter-state tensions** refer to **latent** hostility or opposition between sovereign states. Inter-state tensions often arise when states are locked in a relationship of mutual distrust.
 - Eg: Following Singapore's separation from Malaysia in 1965, relations between the two states were fraught with tension. Each suspected possible subversion by the other in its respective domestic affairs.
- **Inter-state conflicts** are **overt** expressions of hostility and opposition between independent states. They are **manifestations** of inter-state tensions. Inter-state conflicts can take the form of actual physical combat, economic embargoes, diplomatic boycotts and incendiary exchanges between states.
 - Eg: The visit of the Israeli president to Singapore, for instance, was met with adverse comment in Malaysia, with one political representative verbally accusing the PAP leadership of chauvinism. This brought about a flurry of heated diplomatic exchanges between the two neighbours.

1.3 Security Complexes

- What motivates SEA states to behave as they did that would eventually cause bilateral disputes? Conventional scholarship credits SEA with having **2 different security complexes which determine how states relate to each other**. Security complexes refer to their determination of power hierarchy and perception of threats. These are derived from **geographical proximity, historical interactions, ethnicity/religious issues and irredentist behaviour**.
- **Malay Archipelago Complex** (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Brunei)
 - Refers to maritime SEA, where **Indonesia is the dominant and hegemonic power**. A strong sense of proprietary entitlement to order inter-state relations characterised Indonesian foreign policy output in the post-independence years.
 - Examples of Indonesia attempting to impose its will on the region would be Indonesian agitation for a North Kalimantan Federation that sought to integrate the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak and its policy of military confrontation against Malaysia.
 - Singapore, which separated from Malaysia in 1965, had anxieties regarding both Indonesia and Malaysia.
 - Brunei, which benefited from British protectorate status till 1984 was somewhat insulated from such anxieties while Philippines, with a large US military presence till 1991 was also excluded from the dynamics of the Malay Archipelago Complex.

- Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia form the **geostrategic core of ASEAN** and the health of their bilateral relationships is crucial to the association's future and by implication, the future development of cooperative regionalism.
- **Indochina Security Complex** (Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Burma)
 - Main power play is between Thailand and Vietnam. In this complex, Vietnam is the dominant power with hegemonic ambitions while Thailand is the medium power that deflected the Vietnamese threat.
 - The small states of Laos and Cambodia traditionally had their political fortunes determined by Vietnam and/or Thailand. After the communist victory of 1975, Laos and Cambodia gravitated towards Vietnam except for a brief period when Cambodia was ruled by the Khmer Rouge.
 - Burma, owing to its self-imposed isolationism, effectively remained outside the workings of the Indochina security complex.

1.4 Key arguments/issues of contention

- **Bilateral issues and tensions resulting in mutual suspicions/mistrust have been the underlying causes for intra-ASEAN friction** which has inhibited the association's ability to manage the regional environment.
- In fact, ASEAN as an organisation is very much aware of this impediment and has **consciously steered clear of security issues** after its formation in 1967. While there are successes like the resolution of the Cambodian crisis, limited regional economic cooperation and the beginnings of a regional security dialogue under ARF, it is implicit that the effectiveness of these initiatives or cooperation is premised on **concerted avoidance of latent and existing interstate disputes**.
- It is also observed that the **ASEAN member states themselves seldom make use of mediation provisions and dispute settlement mechanisms** under ASEAN. They prefer **bilateralism as the means to resolve disputes**.
- Another peculiar trend observed is that **management of foreign relations and especially in resolving interstate disputes is very much personalised**. ASEAN was founded by a small elite group of first-generation leaders of SEA govts and their relationships with each other can make or break interstate tensions. First generation leaders like Indonesia's Suharto, Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia's Tunku Abdul Rahman and after that Mahathir Mohammed have stayed in power for a very long time and so they would have been integral to the foundation of post-independent interstate relations with each other. Thus we also need to look at the words and actions of these founding fathers in order to figure out what went right/wrong in resolution of disputes.

- So now let's look at the various case studies for substantiation of our key themes.

2. The Water Dispute (Singapore-Malaysia Relations)

2.1 Overview of Singapore-Malaysia Relations

- Relations between Singapore and Malaysia have **alternated between periods of public cordiality and heightened tension**. This can be explained by:
 - **Historical factors**, particularly the circumstances surrounding Singapore's separation from Malaysia as a result of fundamental clash between PAP-led 'Malaysian Solidarity Convention' and the ruling UMNO govt. But Singapore's separation from Malaysia is unique in SEA as it is the only case of **non-violent split** of a minority region seeking to break away from the dominant region. Another unique part is that the same three major ethnic groups remain the same in both countries.



- **Racial-religious tensions**: Malay-Chinese animosity found expression in violent race riots in Singapore (1964, 1969) and Malaysia (1969). The geographical proximity and strong kinship ties between the people of the 2 countries meant that any future outbreak of racial violence in either Malaysia or Singapore can spill over to the other country.



Newspaper article on the immediate government response after the 1964 Racial Riots.



Rioters fleeing from enforcement agencies during the 1969 KL Riots.

- Resentment caused by Singapore's visible economic success: This combined with Singapore's majority Chinese population makes Singapore a convenient scapegoat of Malaysian domestic political and economic discontent with their own economically powerful Chinese minorities.
- Malaysia's perspective: "An anti-Singapore bandwagon is a popular vehicle in Malaysia because it often involves race and religion and therefore has tremendous emotional appeal ... Malaysian leadership cannot ignore public sentiments and the govt has to be seen taking some action over issues that are important to the Malaysians and the Malays in particular."
- Singapore's perspective: S. Rajaratnam once lamented that of all the ASEAN members, "only Singapore has been accorded the unwelcome honor of being Malaysia's punching bag."

2.2 Overview of The Water Dispute

- Background information:
 - The 1961 and 1962 Water Agreements are bilateral agreements "confirmed and guaranteed" by Singapore and Malaysia in the 1965 Separation Agreement.
 - The two agreements allow Singapore to draw raw water from Johor at 3 sens per 1000 gallon and for Singapore to supply treated water back to Johor at 50 sens per 1000 gallons.
 - The 1962 Agreement provides for price review 25 years its signing (i.e. in 1987). However, Malaysia did not exercise its right to review the price back then. In 2002, Mahathir explained that Malaysia did not revise the water pricing because they thought Singapore would also review the price of treated water supplied back to Malaysia.
 - Malaysia's right to review both water agreements have now lapsed.

2.3 Causes of tensions/dispute

- Basis for dispute:
 - For Malaysia, it is a question for paying fair price for Singapore acquiring the right to buy water from Johore.
 - For Singapore, it's a **question of sovereignty**, asserting that the Water Agreements is part of the Separation Agreement and if we can renegotiate and change the Water Agreement, then we can also question and change the whole document. This would throw the existence of Singapore as a sovereign state into doubt.
- "Real" motives:
 - Malaysia has repeatedly been trying to use the water issue to **gain leverage in the country's dealings with Singapore**.

- Water is the factor that has tipped the scale to favour Malaysia when it comes to bilateral negotiations between the two countries.
- For Singapore, they are **also using the water issue as political leverage**, using negotiations on water price as part and parcel of a whole package that must also include other areas of contention like Malaysian's continued possession of Tanjong Pagar Railway Station and Singaporean use of Malaysian airspace.

2.4 Manifestations of tensions

- It is important to note that the Malaysian government has never gone to the extent of actually cutting off water supplies to Singapore, in spite of the numerous political sparring which have occurred since separation in 1965. This relationship can be summarised as 'the penchant for Malaysian leaders to periodically exploit the asymmetrically dependent relationship, by threatening to terminate water supply, to express unhappiness over policies pursued by Singapore, to influence governmental decisions in the city-state or for domestic political purposes has generated concerns that Singapore-Malaysia relations may quickly deteriorate, with potentially violent outcomes'.
- Also note that **several issues are tied together with the water dispute** e.g. the use of Malaysian airspace by Singapore's air force, the development of the Malayan Railway land in Singapore, the location of Malaysia's customs, immigration and quarantine facilities.
- Malaysia did not revise water rates in 1986 and 1987 because of financial considerations as it perceived that if the Johore state government raised the price of raw water, it would automatically have to pay higher prices for the treated water it purchased from Singapore.
- The tensions between Malaysia and Singapore came into limelight in 1986 when Malaysian voices called for reconsideration of the water agreement in an attempt to promote their policy objectives or protest against perceived disrespect.
 - E.g. during the **Herzog Crisis**: In 1986, the visit of the Israeli President Chaim Herzog to Singapore triggered verbal attacks by the ruling United Malays National Organisation party urging Kuala Lumpur to prematurely cease water supply.
- Against such political uncertainty, on November 24, 1990, another agreement was signed between the Public Utilities Board (PUB) of Singapore and the Johore state government, supplementary to the 1962 Agreement, which was to expire in 2061 as well.
 - Under this agreement, Singapore was allowed to build a dam across Sungei Linggui to help the extraction of water from Johor River for RM 320 million.
 - The signing of this agreement was acknowledged as a breakthrough in Singapore-Malaysia relations and the culmination of six years of difficult negotiations.

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- Briefly, in 1998, Singapore and Malaysia began negotiations on a “framework of wider cooperation”. During the 1998 Financial Crisis, Malaysia wanted financial loans to support its currency; Singapore suggested that Malaysia give its assurance for a long-term supply of water to Singapore. Malaysia eventually had no need for the loans. Negotiations turned to other matters of mutual interest.
- Subsequently, in 1998, during a political rally in Johore Bahru, the then Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammed criticized Singapore’s decision to relocate Malaysia’s station and its Customs, Immigration, and Quarantine outpost in the south of Singapore to Woodlands in the north and the use of Malaysian airspace by Singapore’s Air Force.
 - This tense situation prompted protestors to call for Malaysia to end its water links with Singapore.
 - Lee Kuan Yew expressed deep concern to Mahathir, that bilateral disputes might lead to Johore severing water supplies, and in such an eventuality, the Singapore Armed Forces would be moved into Johore in order to restore water supply to Singapore.

2.5 Resolution of tensions

- While Singapore tried to negotiate on terms acceptable to both sides, Malaysia kept changing its negotiating positions on the package of items. On water, Malaysia’s asking price kept increasing throughout the negotiations. It increased from 45 sen per thousand gallons in August 2000, to 60 sen in February 2001, to RM6.25 in September 2002.
 - In the late 1990s and early 2000s, during Dr Mahathir's first term in office, the price of water that Malaysia sells to Singapore was part of a package of bilateral issues being negotiated by both sides.
 - Malaysia indicated then that it would take unilateral action to raise the price, quoting 45 sen per thousand gallons in August 2000, before raising it to 60 sen six months later and then RM6.25 in September 2002.
- [Beyond syllabus timeframe] The dispute over the pricing of water emerged again in 2019, when Mahathir announced that the price of raw water will be up for negotiation. He said: “We are of the view that the price of 3 sen for 1,000 gallons of raw water was decided in 1926. At that time, the value of 1 sen could buy a lot of goods, but now with 1 sen we can’t buy anything, even with 3 sens we can’t buy anything. By right, price of goods should be current. So, if you think that the price set in 1926 still remains until the year 3000 — another millennium — is it reasonable? I feel it is unreasonable. Until when?”
- In a speech to the Johor state government, Mahathir urged the government and people of Johor to speak up against what he felt was a "morally wrong" water agreement with Singapore.

He said that the "rich" country of Singapore has been benefiting from "poor" Malaysia on the water issue. "How can such a rich nation with higher per capita income of US\$18,000 (S\$24,300), compared with us, with per capita income of US\$10,000, pay such an unreasonable rate?"

- In response, Singapore FM Vivian Balakrishnan stated in Parliament that these are "strong, emotive words, no doubt intended to rouse public opinion". He reiterated that it is not about who is richer or poorer but about the fundamental principle of respecting the sanctity of agreements.
- Discussion on issue so far: Singapore PM Lee Hsien Loong proposed to Dr Mahathir in November 2018 that their attorneys-general meet to better understand each other's positions on whether Malaysia still had the right to review the price of water under the current pact. The attorneys-general met in December 2018 and would continue their discussion.
- Both countries have been holding discussions on the issue since July 2018. He said officials had met on Dec 2, 2019 and Jan 30, 2020, to "discuss emerging issues relating to reviewing the price of raw water". Negotiations between the two governments on revising the price of water under the 1962 Johor River Water Agreement temporarily stopped due to the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. Discussions and negotiations will resume after the COVID-19 pandemic situation in Malaysia and Singapore have recovered completely.

2.6 Consequences on bilateral and regional security

- Singapore and Malaysia are both founding members of ASEAN, yet **ASEAN played no role in resolving the water dispute**. This can be attributed to **ASEAN's principle of noninterference** in internal affairs.
- The dispute also highlighted the **importance of leaders** in the conduct of bilateral relations; how the role of leaders can either break or make bilateral relations. Another learning point to be discerned is the impact of historical animosities, ethno-religious tensions, socio-economic tensions on the actions and behaviors of leaders.
 - E.g. The water issue subsided briefly after Dr Mahathir stepped down in 2003.
- Indeed the fundamental problems that underlie Singapore-Malaysia relations since 1965 clearly have negative consequences for bilateral political, economic and military cooperation.
- Moreover, given the potential for conflict between the two states, the Singapore-Malaysia relationship has been a key factor in determining the parameters of ASEAN cooperative regionalism as well as its future prospects.

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Theme III: Regional Conflicts and Cooperation

Now take a few moments to recap the causes of Singapore-Malaysia tensions and consequences on bilateral relations as well as on the region.

Causes of inter-state tensions: historical animosities, racial and religious divisions, ideological differences, territorial disputes, transboundary challenges	What are the causes of tensions of Singapore-Malaysia relations that you have observed? In which aspect?
Consequences of inter-state tensions: effects on regional cooperation and security	You can look at the following to assess the consequences: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Method of resolution• Key actors in the resolution process• Significance of resolution outcome

3. Dispute over Sabah (Malaysia-Philippines Relations)

3.1 Overview of the Dispute over Sabah: Historical Basis

- The Sabah dispute has been festering for years, as the Philippines has refused to drop its claim on the resource-rich East Malaysian state of Sabah. Allegations of Malaysian sympathy and support for the Muslim separatist rebellion in the Southern Philippines provide a complicating factor.



3.2 Causes of tensions/dispute

- Since 1704, Sabah has been part of the Sulu Sultanate and the Philippines has claimed sovereignty and ownership as the Sultan of Sulu's successor in interest.
- In 1877, the British North Borneo Company signed an agreement with the Sultan of Sulu for the purpose of acquiring clear title to Sabah in return for annual payment to the Sultan.
 - The valuable minerals, spices and **other** rich sources of revenue of Southeast Asia attracted Europeans to this region. British North Borneo Company leased north borneo in return of 5,000 ringgit to sultan of sulu.
- However, Philippines' claim is that this 1878 Agreement provided merely for the lease, rather than the cessation of these territories. Due to closeness of Sabah to the Philippines border, it has been regarded as very crucial to the Philippines security.
- From 1888, Sabah became a British colony and when Malaysia was established, the British also transferred sovereignty of Sabah to the new Malaysian govt.
- On the other hand, when the US took over Philippines, they have also filed several pro forma claims in 1906 and 1920 that Sabah was part of Sulu. These claims were ignored by the British.

3.3 Manifestation of tensions

- Philippines **first lodged claim over Sabah in 1962 by President Macapagal**. The main motivation was primarily for **domestic political reasons**:
 - To demonstrate independence from USA.
 - Raise international profile for Philippines.
 - Sultan of Sulu has also by 1962 ceded rights over to the Philippines on the condition that Philippines get Sabah back.
- Before the claim was made, Philippines and Malaysia were on the friendliest of terms, but the claim ultimately led to a **diplomatic break**.
- Naturally the deterioration of relations which followed the dispute also meant that almost all work was suspended within the Association of SEA (ASA), the cooperative effort which two govts, along with Thailand, had launched in 1961. In fact, this dispute was **one of the main reasons for ASA's eventual demise**.
- In 1963, Sabah joined the Malaysian Federation. Philippines refused to recognise existence of Malaysia till 1966.
- 1968: **Corregidor Incident**.
 - The Philippine army under Marcos attempted to pursue its claim by sponsoring a training camp for an intended Sabah separatist rebellion in Corregidor.
 - However, a mutiny by trainees at the camp exposed the operation. This led to a suspicion of diplomatic relations and **imposed a severe strain on the workings of ASEAN**.
- In 1968, the Philippine Congress also passed a law affirming claim on Sabah.
- The Marcos Constitution of 1972 openly defined Sabah as part of Philippine territory.
- In 1977, Marcos visited Malaysia for an ASEAN Summit and promised to take steps to drop the claim. But he never did so, in view of the strong nationalist sentiments in the Philippines Congress.
- In 1987, President Aquino also attempted to resolve the issue by making efforts to have the Congress drop the claim but again failed.
- On the other hand, Malaysia has not been an innocent party either due to its support for the Moro separatist movement
 - The Sabah Chief Minister, Tun Mustapha, is known to have supported training camps for Muslim Moro separatist rebels prior to his downfall in the 1976 elections.

- The Philippines continued to allege Malaysian complicity in the Moro rebellion, i.e. hinder Philippine government from dropping its claim to Sabah.
 - In October 1980, the Philippines claimed that Malaysia was tolerating secessionist Moro training camps in Sabah, which was also acting as a supply base.
 - In April 1982, a television programme shown in Australia claimed that British and Australian mercenaries were training the Moro guerillas in Malaysia with finance from Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi.

Analysis: There is thus some evidence that certain Islamic groups in Malaysia have been involved in aiding the Moros; the Malaysian KL govt, it appears, has not actively prevented them doing so, in recognition of the potentially serious domestic political fallout from its local Muslim communities. This unofficial Malaysian support for the Moros has been the main reason why the Philippines has not dropped its claim to Sabah, which can be used as a lever to put pressure on Malaysia to curb the activities of its Moro **sympathisers**.

3.4 Resolution of tensions

- Hard to resolve dispute as we can see that both countries have **strong domestic political reasons to maintain status quo of dispute**:
 - Strong nationalist sentiments in Philippines.
 - Malaysia: Cannot crack down on local Muslim political parties supporting the Moro separatist movement.
- A little-known fact is that the Malaysian KL govt has continued to pay an annual token rental of \$5,300 ringgit to the Sultan of Sulu even as it insists that Philippines has no sovereignty to Sabah. This can also possibly explain why Malaysia has refused to take the dispute to the ICJ as what the Philippines has suggested.

3.5 Consequences on bilateral and regional security

- Philippines' claim over Sabah was one of the two reasons (the other was Konfrontasi) for the failure of Maphilindo in 1963. Nevertheless, the idea underlying Maphilindo provided an important foundation for the ASEAN Declaration.
- ASA was similarly affected by the Sabah issue. Unlike ASEAN's predecessors, however, there was considerably more political will on the part of member nations to sustain ASEAN.
- However, the Sabah dispute is unlikely to lead to interstate conflict, owing to the poor capabilities of the Philippine navy → **very low-intensity conflict**.

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- Malaysia and Philippines have also agreed to **focus on other areas of cooperation** (economic, military) whilst acknowledging that there can be no easy and immediate settlement to the Sabah issue → **maintenance of status quo**.
- Impact on ASEAN and regional cooperation?
 - President Ramos visited Malaysia in early 1993, the first state visit by a Philippine President since 1968. This landmark visit ended with the establishment of a Malaysia-Philippines Joint Commission to deal with bilateral problems.
 - In February 1994, Mahathir led a trade delegation to the Philippines to reciprocate Ramos' earlier visit. The Malaysian govt explained the thaw by ingeniously laying the blame on the Philippine Senate for the lack of resolution on the Sabah issue, stating the delay was not the fault of the Philippine govt.
 - In September 1994, the two countries signed a defence cooperation pact to strengthen their military ties, calling for joint training, exchange of experts, technical transfers and other cooperative ventures between the two armed forces.
- Some post-1998 tensions though:
 - A close friend of Anwar, President Estrada openly criticized the Malaysian govt for the sacking of DPM Anwar in 1998.
 - Response by Malaysia: Postponed some meeting on common border issues.
 - In addition, Malaysia is also competing with Philippines, along with China, Brunei and Vietnam, over control of the resource-rich Spratly Islands.

Now take a few moments to recap the causes of Malaysia-Philippines tensions and consequences on bilateral relations as well as on the region.

Causes of inter-state tensions: historical animosities, racial and religious divisions, ideological differences, territorial disputes, transboundary challenges	What are the causes of tensions of Malaysia-Philippines relations that you have observed? In which aspect?
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Consequences of inter-state tensions: effects on regional cooperation and security	You can look at the following to assess the consequences: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Method of resolution• Key actors in the resolution process• Significance of resolution outcome
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4. Konfrontasi (Malaysia-Indonesia Relations)

4.1 Backdrop of the dispute- Overview of Malaysia-Indonesia Relations

- Bilateral relations between Malaysia and Indonesia have often been characterised as 'special', owing to similarities based in Malay ethnicity, the Muslim religion and shared history.
- There is however, **one major historical difference** and that is the way in which independence has been attained:
 - The Indonesians had to fight a war of independence against the Dutch whereas the Malaysians were given independence on a silver platter.
 - Thus Sukarno has often lorded this fact over Tunku Abdul Rahman after independence.
- In addition, Indonesia has also from the start aspired to be **the dominant leader of the SEA region**. Such ambitions can be seen in Indonesia hosting the Bandung Conference in 1955, where Sukarno stood alongside Nehru and Nasser, all proclaiming to be leaders of this newly formed Non-Aligned Movement.
 - This was a **further source of superiority over Malaysia** as by 1955, it was not even independent yet.
 - Lastly, Sukarno's close ties with the PKI until the 1965 Coup has also led to tensions between Indonesia and anti-Communist Malaysia.
- **"First among equals"**: Indonesia expects some degree of deference from other ASEAN members as the largest country (in size and population) in SEA. It is also the hegemon within the Malay Archipelago Complex.

4.2 Causes of tensions during Konfrontasi (Confrontation) 1963 – 65

- The Tunku first broached the idea of a merger on 27 May 1961 during a meeting of foreign correspondents held in Singapore. He proposed a unification plan comprising Malaya, Singapore, Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak.
 - This was grounded on his underlying fear of Indonesian expansionism e.g. on 31 May 1945, Muhammad Yamin, an Indonesian parliamentarian gave a speech suggesting that Indonesia should incorporate Sabah as well as West Irian and East Timor into its territory.
 - Furthermore, an independent Singapore outside the federation might spell the end of the PAP, as the party would be deemed to have failed in delivering its electoral promise. There was a chance that the PAP would be replaced by a radical far-left ruling party that was less willing to work with the Malayan government.
- Six months after the Tunku's first announcement, Singapore and Malaya signed a basic agreement on the Malaysia plan and issued a joint statement on 23 November 1961.
 - One month after the joint statement, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) showed its disapproval, criticising that Malaysia 'will grant the United Kingdom the right to continue to use its war bases in Singapore' and consequently help 'SEATO activities which are also aimed against Indonesia, a country that does not like SEATO'.
 - However, Sukarno did not react to PKI's statement at this stage.
- In 1961, Britain appointed Lord Cobbold as a **head** of the Commission of Enquiry between February and April 1962 to complete the fact-finding visit in Sabah and Sarawak. Although only one-third of respondents were strongly in favour of joining the Federation of Malaysia, the Commission concluded that "a Federation of Malaysia is in the best interests of North Borneo and Sarawak".
- In September 1962, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio voiced his country's negative attitude towards Malaysia for the first time, expressing his apprehension about foreign bases on Borneo island.
- However, **Indonesia's objection to the Malaysia plan only came after the Brunei rebellion of December 1962.**
 - Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud, a Brunei politician, directed the North Borneo National Army to rebel against its incorporation into Malaysia, sparking rebellions all over Brunei. However, these were suppressed within a week by the British forces.
 - While there was no clear evidence of Indonesia's involvement in the plot, in his statement on 11 December, the Tunku implied that the Indonesian government had sent aid to the revolt.

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- In addition, President Sukarno offered verbal support to the Brunei rebels by saying that those who did not support the revolt were 'traitors to their own souls', and in Jan 1963, requested that Britain consider the Bruneian objection to the Malaysian plan.
- On 20 January 1963, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio finally declared Konfrontasi. On 13 Feb 1963, Sukarno makes official declaration of Confrontation – "Now I declare officially that Indonesia opposes Malaysia."
- Several reasons were put forward for Indonesia's opposition to the formation of Malaysia. One was that **Indonesia regarded the Federation as a neo-colonial British plot**, especially in light of the fact that Britain would continue to have military bases in Malaya and Singapore.
- Sukarno was also **ambitious to be leader of a Pan-Malayan world** (Greater Indonesia Concept) in SEA. Thus he could not countenance parts of Borneo being part of Malaysia.
- On 28 January 1963, a week after Subandrio's declaration, Philippine President Macapagal also gave a speech that asserted its claim to Sabah and raised objection to the Malaysia plan.
- The British forced the Philippines to set aside its claim to Sabah for the sake of stability in Southeast Asia. In March, the Philippines took a more balanced position and tried to ease the tension between Indonesia and Malaya, when relations between the two countries became particularly strained.
- Philippines' position swung between a 'partisan and peacemaker' in the course of the three-sided dispute until 1966.

4.3 Manifestations of tensions

- On 7 June 1963: Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting held in Manila. The conference produced the **Manila Accord** that proposed a UN ascertainment mission of the wishes of the Borneo people with regards to Malaysia.
- Note: it was also at this point that Macapagal, then President of the Philippines, proposed to establish a regional cooperation organisation, MAPHILINDO.
- On 9 July 1963, the **Malaysia Agreement** was signed and referred to the date of the establishment of Malaysia to be 31st August 1963. The agreement expanded the defence coverage, based on the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement in 1957. The latter was now applied to the whole Malaysian Federation.
- **Sukarno was 'infuriated' by the Tunku's signing the Malaysia Agreement without any consultation with Indonesia and the Philippines.** He argued that the Tunku violated the Manila Accord. Indonesia also suspected that British bases might be used for subversive activities towards Indonesia.

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- But according to Tunku, the agreement did not break the Manila agreements.
- 26 August 1963, UN began its investigation to ascertain the wishes of the Borneo people.
- On 29 August 1963, Tunku Abdul Rahman declared that Malaysia would be established on 17 September without consulting Indonesia or the Philippines, or even waiting for the result of the UN investigation. The new date was approved by Britain and the Federation members of Malaysia on 26 August.
- Malaya's unilateral declaration of the new date **initiated the deterioration of relations** among Maphilindo member states.
- The result of the United Nations investigation published on 14 September 1963 was that: 'The majority of the peoples of the two territories, having taken them into account, wish to engage, with the peoples of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, in an enlarged Federation of Malaysia through which they can strive together to realise the fulfilment of their destiny'.
- After the establishment of Malaysia, Indonesian mobs damaged the British and Malaysian embassies. In Kuala Lumpur, Malaysians attacked the Indonesian Embassy.
- Although they were still sporadic, Indonesian military threats against Malaysia had intensified. Indonesian naval gunboats fired on Malaysian vessels and the Indonesian Army deployed guerrilla forces in Sabah and Sarawak.
- Actual fighting ensued, with most of the fighting carried out by the Commonwealth troops in Borneo. There was also **attempted infiltration in Johor and sabotage/terrorist bombings in Singapore.**





Indonesian troopers captured and under guard by Malaysian Police

4.4 Resolution of tensions

- Various attempts at holding tripartite ministerial conferences or separate bilateral sessions failed to resolve the tensions.
- The war **only ended with the rise to power of Suharto** in 1965.
 - Suharto nominated Adam Malik as a Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, who took a pragmatic approach regarding Indonesia's new foreign policy.
 - Indonesia needed to improve diplomatic relations with the US and also distanced itself from China and other Sukarno-era communist allies in Asia. Maintaining a political distance from China was essential in securing financial aid from the US, especially since tensions between US and China worsened due to the Vietnam War.
 - Indonesia also softened its aggressive policy towards Malaysia to change its image of aggressor in the eyes of the international community.
 - Konfrontasi was also harmful to the Indonesian economy because it was consuming manpower and resources which should be allocated to economic recovery.
- In early April 1966, Adam Malik announced that Indonesia would soon recognise Singapore, realising this was the first step toward ending the policy of confrontation.
- The ministerial talks between Malik and Tun Razak were held in Bangkok from 29 May to 1 June, agreeing to restore friendly relations and to maintain direct and continuous contact.


4.5 The Singapore connection in the Konfrontasi dispute

- As part of the concept of Malaysia that Indonesia was 'confronting' against, Singapore was not spared, having been hit by a wave of bomb explosions with the first bomb attack just eight days after it joined Malaysia. It culminated in the bombing of MacDonald House that killed two people and injured 33 others.
- The two Indonesian marines that carried out the MacDonald House bombing were apprehended, put on trial and given the death sentence in 1968. Although Singapore's relations with Indonesia improved when power shifted from Sukarno to Suharto, the execution of the two marines responsible for the bombing of MacDonald House during Konfrontasi heightened tensions between the two countries.
- Despite pleas for clemency by Foreign Minister Adam Malik and President Suharto, Singapore stood firm by the verdict and executed the marines on 17 October 1968.
- Response of Indonesia to the hanging of Indonesian commandos by Singapore: They were hailed as national heroes by the Indonesian public. In Jakarta, a young mob sacked the Singapore embassy and tore down the Singapore flag.
- Resolution of tensions:
 - Indonesia was able to move on from the incident after Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's first official visit to Indonesia in May 1973, when he scattered flowers at the graves of the two marines. During the visit, the foreign ministers, S. Rajaratnam and Adam Malik, signed a border agreement that demarcated the maritime boundary between Singapore and Indonesia.

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- In August 1974, Prime Minister Lee hosted President Suharto on his first official visit to Singapore, completing the rapprochement between the two countries.



In early 2014, the naming of an Indonesian Navy ship, KRI Osman Harun, after the two marines, Osman Mohamed Ali and Harun Said, reopened old wounds and stirred up emotions among Singaporeans and Indonesians alike. Because Singapore conducts joint military exercises with the Indonesian Navy, the naming of KRI Osman Harun was not just insensitive, but also damaging to bilateral relations. Singapore has also expressed its disappointment over the ship naming faux pas. Finally, Singapore's response was to ban the warship from Singapore waters. In addition, the Singapore Armed Forces will not sail alongside or participate in training exercises with the military vessel.


4.5 Consequences on bilateral and regional security

- Negative impact on regionalism: **Failure of MAPHILINDO**, formed July 1963 by Malaya, Philippines, Indonesia.
- Suharto's Indonesia took an anti-communist stance and its policy direction became closer to that of Malaysia. This change enabled the two countries to coexist peacefully in the region.
- The new atmosphere of peace and constructiveness between Indonesia and Malaysia encouraged other countries in the region to build harmonious relations too.

Now take a few moments to recap the causes of Malaysia-Indonesia tensions and consequences on bilateral relations as well as on the region.

Causes of inter-state tensions: historical animosities, racial and religious divisions, ideological differences, territorial disputes, transboundary challenges	What are the causes of tensions of Malaysia-Indonesia relations that you have observed? In which aspect?
Consequences of inter-state tensions: effects on regional cooperation and security	You can look at the following to assess the consequences: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Method of resolution• Key actors in the resolution process• Significance of resolution outcome

5. Dispute over Preah Vihear (Thailand-Cambodia Relations)



5.1 Overview of the dispute over Preah Vihear

- The Preah Vihear temple has been at the centre of a border dispute for more than a century.
- After France's withdrawal from Indochina in 1953, Thailand used the **resulting power vacuum** and ordered the occupation of the Preah Vihear temple complex. This process had already begun years earlier with Thailand stationing its keepers around the temple area in 1949 disregarding the French calls for their removal.
- Cambodia then raised the issue with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 6 October 1959, which **ruled on 15 June 1962 that the Preah Vihear temple lies on Cambodian territory and thus falls into Cambodia's sovereignty**.

5.2 Causes of tensions/dispute

- The Preah Vihear temple border dispute had its root in the period when Siam and France signed two treaties in 1904 and 1907:
 - 1904 Treaty: terms stipulated that the temple was situated on Siamese soil
 - 1907 Border Treaty: However, a French map that placed Preah Vihear in Cambodian territory was added in this treaty.
 - Thus, **a seed of fundamental difference between the two countries was sown**, with actual differences to emerge only in the 1950s.
- The nationhood of both states and their **nationalist sentiments** escalated their inclination to securitise the Preah Vihear temple.

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- For Thailand:
 - It was reluctant to accept that its satellite of the 1840s was now a sovereign state. It believed that Cambodia were all of 'original Thai stock' and should be united with Siam.
- For Cambodia:
 - It was about nationalist pride drawn from their history. The Hindu temple was built by the same Khmer civilisation that built Angkor Wat. As Cambodia has a tragic recent history of genocide and civil war, politicians often look to the glorious distant past to inspire nationalist sentiment.
 - Thailand's reoccupation of the temple was not merely a violation of its territorial integrity but also a symbolic invocation of the history of subordination that was still remembered by Khmer elites. As such, Cambodia's foreign policy direction was "shaped by old fears and new anxieties", especially concerning its traditional antagonists. Ignoring the Thai presence could produce a boomerang effect not only upon regime stability but also on the existence of the state.
 - Furthermore, Cambodian nationalists also often use Thailand as a bogeyman to stoke nationalist fervour – charting a litany of wrongs such as the successive Thai invasions that helped destroy the once mighty Khmer empires and rendered the country defenceless against French colonial conquest in the 19th Century.

5.3 Manifestations of tensions

- After the French forces left Cambodia following its independence in 1953, Thai police force occupied the area of the Preah Vihear temple under the pretext of strengthening its border defences.
- **Initially Cambodia chose diplomatic negotiation with Thailand** but from 1953 to 1957, these could not produce any reasonable solution. Norodom Sihanouk, the former King and Cambodian leader, insisted that Cambodia withhold the use of force, so as not to deteriorate the border situation.
- In April 1958, Thailand announced to Phnom Penh that Preah Vihear temple belonged to Thailand and boosted its police forces in the temple areas.
- In 1959, Cambodia proposed two possible resolutions: establishing a joint administration for the temple comprising both parties or presenting the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
- Ultimately, Cambodia raised the issue with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 6 October 1959.

5.4 Resolution of tensions

- Arguments by Cambodian's representatives at ICJ
 - Cited the treaty of 1904 and 1907 which placed the temple in Cambodian territory.
 - Argued that Cambodia had never abandoned its sovereignty over the temple while Thailand had not performed any acts of sovereignty after the signing of the treaties.
- Arguments by Thailand's representatives at ICJ
 - Questioned whether the International Court of Justice had jurisdiction in the case because Thailand had never accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.
 - Argued that the treaties were not applicable as Thailand had been compelled under pressure to sign the Franco-Thai Treaties of 1904 and 1907 and did not accepted the map.
- Decision by ICJ in 1962
 - In May 1961, the Court rejected the preliminary objections of the government of Thailand and ruled that it had jurisdiction in the case.
 - In June 1962, **ICJ granted the temple to Cambodia** as Thailand had earlier accepted the terms of the treaty, could not now deny that it was ever a consenting party to the pact. In support of its decision, the Court pointed out that the government of Thailand after 1904 had continued to use and even to publish maps showing Preah Vihear as being situated in Cambodia.

5.5 Consequences on bilateral and regional security

- Responses to the ICJ decision in 1962
 - In Thailand, the judgment of the Court provoked violent protests and a hostile press campaign.
- Concerns over regional security:
 - The tensions between the two countries led the US to be concerned that Thailand would attack Cambodia and that this would lead to a confrontation between Washington and Beijing. Consequently, the US and its allies pressured Thailand's leaders, who eventually decided to relinquish the Preah Vihear temple.
- In late June 1962, the prime minister of Thailand announced that his government would honour its **obligations** under the United Nations Charter.
- Thailand and Cambodia agreed to move forward to find a way to manage the border dispute through dispute management initiatives.

- E.g. A first initiative was **bilateral talks held in 1995**, resulting in a Memorandum of Understanding between Thailand and Cambodia'. Its responsibility was to take care of various issues pertaining to the Thai– Cambodian border in general through consultation and negotiation including the reduction of tension.
- [Beyond syllabus timeframe]: Note that the conflict over Preah Vihear continued even after the 1962 ICJ verdict. While Thailand had to accept that the temple complex was legally in Cambodian hands, a 4.6 km² area surrounding the ruins remained contested.
- In 2008, the dispute re-erupted after a Cambodia–Thailand joint communiqué was signed by the Thai government, supporting Cambodia's intention to list the temple as a World Heritage site of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). Although the joint statement was meant to bring about bilateral collaboration, it backfired as it provoked widespread anti-Cambodian and anti-government protests in Thailand. This eventually culminated in a crisis between the two countries, resulting in a series of armed clashes before coming to an end in mid-2011.

6. Vietnam-Cambodia relations (Third Indochina War)

6.1 Overview of Vietnam-Cambodia relations

- Vietnam had annexed Cambodian territory during the 17thC.
- In the aftermath of the Second Indochina War the international community believed that Cambodia and Vietnam would establish close relations due to their shared Marxist ties. However the apparent communist solidarity between Vietnam and Cambodia was only superficial because even before the fall of Saigon armed clashes took place between both parties within Cambodia.
- Tensions rose in early 1976 following Prince Norodom Ranariddh's warning of the use of force by Cambodia to settle a border dispute over Vietnam's alleged action of moving border markers deeper into Cambodian territory.
- There continued to be strong anti-Vietnamese feelings in Cambodia stemming from Vietnam's invasion and occupation and the subsequent influx of Vietnamese settlers.

6.2 Causes of tensions/dispute

- The conflict in Cambodia was due to several issues:
 - During the French colonial period, France added large areas of Cambodian territory to their Vietnamese colony. **After French rule ended, these areas were not returned to Cambodia but remained with Vietnam.** When Cambodia became independent, it

inherited colonial borders that were not clearly demarcated. As a result, there were numerous border conflicts between Cambodia and Vietnam.

- Vietnam also wanted to forge 'special relations' with Laos and Cambodia in order to lead up to a communist federation of the three Indochinese territories. With reunification, Vietnam renewed their interest in the special relations plan.
- The conflict took on an expanded dimension with the involvement of the USSR and China. USSR expanded its focus into Indochina in the 1970s to keep China in check. China got involved as it did not want Vietnam to control all of Indochina. The worsening of ties was marked by Sino-Vietnamese border incidents in 1977 and 1979.
- 1976 saw a period of improved Cambodia-Vietnam relations:
 - Cambodia called for Vietnam's membership to the UN.
 - Vietnam downplayed reports of widespread human rights violations in Cambodia and commercial flights between Hanoi and Phnom Penh opened in September 1976.
- In May 1976 Cambodian and Vietnamese negotiators met to try and resolve their disputed maritime borders but talks broke down.
- Furthermore many Cambodians resented the loss of the historic Cambodian lands that now form the southernmost territory of Vietnam.
- Consequently 1977 saw a resurgence of fighting.
- In 1977 Pol Pot visited Beijing, solidifying Cambodian-China relations. China soon began sending large quantities of weapons and military hardware to Cambodia.
 - The Cambodia-Vietnam crisis took on the dimension of a proxy conflict between China and the Soviet Union as the Chinese supported the Cambodians while the Soviets backed Vietnam.
- Immediate reason for Vietnamese invasion: The Khmer Rouge's pre-emptive 1978 invasion of Vietnam, as border tensions between the two countries worsened.
 - In May 1978 Pol Pot began a purge of the eastern military zone forcing thousands of Cambodians fleeing to Vietnam.
 - In December 1978 under Vietnamese sponsorship these ex-eastern military zone countries organised as a political military movement whose aim was to overthrow the Cambodian regime. In June 1978 Vietnam prepared for a full-scale invasion of Cambodia.
- Long term Vietnam's security issues. It seemed surrounded by enemies, and could not tolerate an unfriendly Cambodia.

6.3 Manifestations of tensions

- The Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia – the **first sign of any substance to the domino theory** – compelled the ASEAN countries for the first time to adopt a common stance in rejecting Hanoi's intervention as affront to national sovereignty. With the support of USSR, Vietnam in a 180,000-man occupying force invaded Cambodia, expelling Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge Democratic Kampuchea Regime on 25 December 1978.
- On 7 January 1979, Phnom Penh fell to Vietnamese forces. Establishment of a Vietnam-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), headed by Heng Samrin.
- Immediate responses from ASEAN:
 - 9 January 1979: Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, issued a statement on ASEAN's behalf condemning armed conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia and called for UNSC to take immediate steps to end this conflict.
 - 12 January 1979: Emergency ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting in Bangkok, confirming the right of the Cambodian people to self-determination and demanding immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese forces. "Joint Statement" issued, adding clout of all the Foreign Ministers. The aim was to raise global awareness and response using ASEAN as regional conduit.
- On 17 February 1979, China invaded Vietnam as a punitive action in response to Vietnamese aggression in Cambodia. A brief border war ensued. This also came to be known as the Third Indochina War.
 - China entered northern Vietnam and captured several cities near the border. On March 6, 1979, China declared that their punitive mission had been successful and withdrew from Vietnam. However, both China and Vietnam claimed victory. The fact that Vietnamese forces continued to stay in Cambodia for another decade implied that China's campaign was a strategic failure. On the other hand, the conflict had proven that China had succeeded in preventing effective Soviet support for its Vietnamese ally.

6.4 Resolution of tensions (mixed record)

- ASEAN's formula for solving the crisis – a two-pronged approach:
 1. Support of Cambodian nationalists to maintain military pressure on the ground.
 2. Isolate Vietnam and thereby exert political, economic and diplomatic pressure on Vietnam to negotiate.
 3. Offer Vietnam an honourable political settlement which would restore Cambodia as a sovereign and independent state.

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- In the 1980s, ASEAN was to lead to way to bar the Hanoi-based Heng Samrin regime's admission to the United Nations and supporting a government-in-exile called the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). It was composed of three Cambodian political factions, namely Prince Norodom Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC party, the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK; often referred to as the Khmer Rouge) and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) formed in 1982, broadening the de facto deposed Democratic Kampuchea regime. For most of its existence, it was the internationally recognised government of Cambodia.
- **Analysis:** In doing so, ASEAN acquired enhanced international respect as a body with political and diplomatic influence, promoting a policy in Indochina which found favor both in the United States and China.
- As early as 14 November 1979, an ASEAN-sponsored UN resolution 34/22 was passed, calling for withdrawal of all foreign troops from both Vietnam and Kampuchea. It also condemned Chinese use of force. UN refused to recognise the PRK govt.
- The **UN International Conference on Cambodia (ICK)** was held in July 1981, calling for ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign forces under supervision of UN peacekeeping force.
 - It also called for UN-supervised and -arranged free elections in Cambodia.
 - **Significance:** It legitimises ASEAN formula for settlement for settling the Cambodian crisis.
 - The ICK Declaration would form the basis of later ASEAN and UN terms for settlement and would be endorsed in annual resolutions by the UNGA.
- More examples of **ASEAN's effective diplomacy**:
 - 26 Jun 1980: ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued 'Joint Communiqué of the 13th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting' in KL.
 - 28-30 June 1980: Joint statement issued by the Foreign Ministers that the incursion of Vietnamese forces into Thailand directly affected the security of ASEAN member states.
 - 22 Oct 1980: By a vote of 97-23, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 35/6 that called for a special conference on Cambodia.
- Behind this public accord remained **substantial differences in attitudes and interests** among the ASEAN partners, ranging from frontline Thailand, who turned to China as a bulwark against its traditional Vietnamese rival, to the more remote Indonesia, which retained considerable respect for Vietnam's militant nationalist record and saw Beijing as a more ominous long-term threat. Most countries were concerned about increased Chinese involvement in the region, but all resisted becoming enmeshed in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

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- Although ASEAN eventually issued a joint statement to deplore the Vietnamese aggression, diverging perceptions among some member states had given rise to disagreements.
- From Suharto's point of view, China was deemed a more serious threat than Vietnam. As such, Indonesia put forward the idea of granting a certain degree of autonomy to Vietnam for its presence in Cambodia.
- As the interlocutor of ASEAN on the Kampuchea issue, Indonesia was mainly concerned that the conflict might divide the region into two clusters: maritime ASEAN and Indochina under Vietnamese domination. Indonesia feared that a bipolar Southeast Asia could pit the communist against the non-communist states, thereby opening the door to intervention by external great powers.
- On the other hand, both Thailand and Singapore perceived a Soviet-backed Vietnam as a more significant threat than China. To some political observers, inaction may mean that neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia condone sovereignty violation.
- **Three examples of inter-state tensions** as a result of the Cambodian Crisis (covered in ASEAN earlier)

1. Kuantan Principle

- Historical context: A looming threat of Great Powers
- In response to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, the Indonesian President Suharto and Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein Onn met in Kuantan in March 1980. Both parties agreed that the Cambodian conflict posed a grave threat to regional security, if left unchecked. The threat extended beyond the presence of a pro-Vietnam government in Cambodia, particularly the dangers posed by the Soviet Union and China.
- The joint statement issued by Malaysia and Indonesia took into consideration the broader security concerns of the two countries, such as the perceived threat posed by China and the increased influence of the Soviet Union in the region. The statement envisaged a Vietnam free from the influences of both China and the Soviet Union and took into consideration Vietnam's security interests in Cambodia. In other words, **the Kuantan Principle sought to bring Vietnam out of the Sino-Soviet dispute and to reduce the influence of these two powers in the region**. It also displayed a **less confrontational stand** toward Vietnam over the Cambodian situation as compared with the ASEAN policy.
- However, the Kuantan Doctrine was never put into practice as other member states of ASEAN rejected the proposed solution. For instance, the frontline member Thailand was concerned with its border security, given its proximity to Cambodia.
- Although ASEAN eventually issued a joint statement to deplore the Vietnamese aggression, diverging perceptions among some member states had given rise to disagreements.

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- However, Singapore's strident anti-communist posture was essentially aimed at the Soviet Union and its perceived regional proxy, Vietnam. Hence, curiously enough, whereas there was clear evidence of Chinese support for communist insurgency in Southeast Asia, the most aggressive policy pronouncements against communism were those aimed at the Soviet Union.

2. Five + Two Formula

- In 1983, Foreign Ministers of Vietnam and Malaysia met at the New Delhi NAM Summit and came up with a proposal for informal bloc to bloc talks between ASEAN and Vietnam and Laos outside of the ICK formula.
- The '5+2' Formula was endorsed by Singapore and Indonesia. Thailand, backed by China, and Philippines objected and this plan fell through as a result.
- Significance: This represented the second fissure amongst ASEAN members.
- Resolution of the fissures to arrive at win-win solutions
 - In February 1984, Indonesia's military chief Gen Benny Moerdani visited Hanoi and said that Indonesia did not view Vietnam as a threat to SEA.
 - Indonesia thus opened dialogue with Vietnam that supplemented the consensual ASEAN approach in what was seen as a **dual-track diplomacy**. Indonesia was also appointed **ASEAN's 'interlocuter' with Vietnam**.

3. Thai PM Chatichai's announcement that he wanted to "turn the battlefields of Indochina into a marketplace" in August 1988.

- Thai PM Chatichai's announcement regarding the desire to "turn the battlefields of Indochina into a marketplace" can be understood through the lens of political and economic pragmatism. This was motivated by the following considerations:
 - Economic Integration: Chatichai may have recognised the potential for economic development in the aftermath of conflict. By framing the war-torn regions of Indochina as potential marketplaces, he likely aimed to shift the focus from military conflict to economic cooperation.
 - Regional Stability: Turning battlefields into marketplaces suggests a desire for regional stability. Economic development often goes hand in hand with political stability, and by emphasising commerce over conflict, Chatichai might have been signaling a commitment to regional peace.
 - Diplomatic Strategy: The statement may also reflect a diplomatic strategy to position Thailand as a mediator or facilitator in the region. By advocating for economic collaboration, Chatichai could be attempting to play a constructive role in resolving conflicts and promoting cooperation among neighboring countries.

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- National Interests: On a domestic level, the statement may have been driven by a recognition of Thailand's economic interests. If Thai businesses saw opportunities in post-conflict reconstruction and trade in the Indochinese region, advocating for turning battlefields into marketplaces could be a way to promote Thai economic interests and potentially strengthen the country's position in the regional market.
- In **summary**, Chatichai's statement can be interpreted as a strategic move that combines economic pragmatism, diplomatic outreach, and a desire for regional stability. This approach aligned with broader trends in international relations during the period, emphasising economic cooperation as a means to foster peace and development.
- Hence, he shocked his ASEAN members by inviting Hun Sen to Bangkok one month before JIM II. This was done without consultation with ASEAN members.
- Nonetheless, there were **initial signs of success**:
 - In 1985, Vietnam announced that it would withdraw its troops from Cambodia in 1990.
- The Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM)
 - Background: **Indonesia's gradually assertive role** in the Cambodian peace effort showed that **Jakarta was not entirely willing to place its commitment to ASEAN solidarity above its own national interests**.
 - The Jakarta Post, often reflective of official positions, thundered in an editorial, "It is high time to spell out clearly to our ASEAN partners, as the largest archipelagic state in Southeast Asia with a growing national interest to protect, that we simply cannot afford the endless prolonging of the Kampuchean conflict."
 - A caption in the Far Eastern Economic Review caught the mood more succinctly: "Indonesia in ASEAN: fed up being led by the nose."
 - Less colloquially, Indonesian analyst Dewi Fortuna Anwar wrote in the Review: "The challenge for Indonesian foreign policy in the future is how to maintain a balance between an ASEAN policy which requires goodwill and trust of the other members, and satisfying some of the internationalist aspirations of a growing number of the Indonesian political elite."
 - **Outcome**: The first Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM I) took place. It was the first face-to-face talks among the four Cambodian parties and represented a significant diplomatic achievement for ASEAN. The outcome of the meeting was that a 5-point proposal brought up.
 - Feb 1989: Second JIM took place. Vietnam accepted the notion of an "international control mechanism" for Cambodia and this was followed by escalating diplomatic activity. Paved way for PICC to be held in Aug 1989.

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- In April 1989, Vietnam announced the withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia, which was completed in September.
- Reasons for Vietnamese withdrawal of troops:
 - Effectiveness of economic sanctions by UN and Japan.
 - Failure of collectivisation in S Vietnam brought about severe food shortages and serious domestic disturbances in Vietnam.
 - Cambodian occupation a drain on military budget.
 - Soviet Union reduced aid to Vietnam.
- At a Sino-Soviet summit meeting held from 15-18 May 1989, Gorbachev and his Chinese counterpart Deng Xiaoping agreed to a basis for national reconciliation in Cambodia, internationally supervised elections and the convening of an international conference.
 - **Analysis:** The resolution of the crisis on the ASEAN formula for success but trend discerned that it required the superpowers' endorsement and agreement for the terms of this formula to be successfully fulfilled.
- The **Paris Conference on Cambodia** was convened from 30 July to 30 August 1989. It brought together the parties involved (Cambodian factions, Vietnam and ASEAN) and the parties concerned, namely China, USSR, US, France, Britain, Canada, Japan, Australia and India. It **failed** in its aim of laying the groundwork for an international body that would monitor the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and also monitor the proposed truce between the warring Cambodian factions.
- In spite of the failure of the Paris Peace Conference, it **marked a significant shift** in the peace process. This shift occurred when deliberations in the UN started in August 1990, specifically among the 5 Permanent Members of the UNSC.
- They decided that **instead of deferring to ASEAN's leadership role in the process, the UN was a more convenient and appropriate framework** for seeking a comprehensive solution which could promote national reconciliation among the Khmer factions. The deliberations aimed to create a neutral political environment in Cambodia that would enable every Khmer faction to have an equal chance to compete peacefully for office, thus providing the incentive for them to accept a negotiated political settlement. Eventually, the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict were signed in October 1991.
- The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (**UNTAC**) was given the mandate to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. Although ASEAN countries contributed troops to the

UN peacekeeping forces, ASEAN's role in the conflict was significantly reduced because Cambodia was ultimately placed under UNTAC.

- The **Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict** in Paris was signed on 23 October 1991.
 - The mandate included aspects relating to human rights, the organisation and conduct of elections, military arrangements, civil administration, maintenance of law and order, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons and rehabilitation of Cambodian infrastructure.
 - The Agreements would assign the UN an unprecedented role.
- 20 Nov 1991: Establishment of the Supreme National Council (SNC) and on February 1992: Establishment of UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia) to ensure implementation of the above agreement.
 - UNTAC was to comprise between 15,000 and 20,000 UN personnel, including human rights, civil administrative and military components, as well as a police component of some 3,600 police monitors.
- In May 1993, 20 parties took part in the elections. UNTAC oversaw the electoral campaign and registration of voters, as well as the elections. Over 4.2 million people - nearly 90% of the registered voters - cast their ballots to elect a Constituent Assembly. The head of UNTAC declared the elections free and fair.
 - Prince Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC Party was the top vote recipient with a 45.5% vote, followed by Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party, respectively. FUNCINPEC then entered into a coalition with the other parties that had participated in the election.
 - Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen became First and Second Prime Ministers, respectively, in the Royal Cambodian Government (RGC). Prince Sihanouk became King Sihanouk.

6.5 Consequences on bilateral and regional security

- This crisis represented **ASEAN' finest hour**, in standing together to promote a common ideal. It succeeded in creating a SEA identity on the international stage, and was one of the few regional blocs to have worked.
- However, a closer examination shows that **ASEAN did not always cooperate, and member countries placed their own interests first.**

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- ASEAN did not resolve the Cambodian conflict. A comprehensive political settlement was only achieved with the entry of the 5 UNSC Permanent Members and UNTAC's mandate.
- However, ASEAN's role was nonetheless important as **it took the lead** in the search for a comprehensive political settlement.
 - It was ASEAN that initiated and explored whatever practical means to come up with mechanisms to resolve the conflict. ASEAN had protested and rejected Vietnam's violation of international norms of sovereignty and the right of self-determination.
 - ASEAN's stance on Cambodia also reassured Thailand. This support helped gel ASEAN member states and gave the grouping a focus on its respective external relations.
 - It also intensively lobbied in the international arena and continued to open and maintain channels of communications with the different Cambodian factions.
 - ASEAN forced the international community to take up Cambodia's cause and sustained the interest for as long as it could. This accounted for the faithful sponsoring of ASEAN of UN resolutions year after year.
 - At the same time, isolating Vietnam did not mean that ASEAN did not recognise its security interests. This was why ASEAN vacillated between taking a hard and accommodating stance.
 - By promoting conciliation among the warring Khmer factions and between them and the Vietnamese, ASEAN was also a mediator.

Now take a few moments to recap the causes of tensions amongst mainland SEA states and consequences on bilateral relations as well as on the region.

Causes of inter-state tensions: historical animosities, racial and religious divisions, ideological differences, territorial disputes, transboundary challenges	What are the causes of tensions amongst mainland SEA states that you have observed? In which aspect?
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Consequences of inter-state tensions: effects on regional cooperation and security	<p>You can look at the following to assess the consequences:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Method of resolution• Key actors in the resolution process• Significance of resolution outcome
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