



**DUNMAN HIGH SCHOOL**  
**Year 6 Preliminary Examination 2008**

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**HISTORY**

**9731/02**

Paper 2 History of Southeast Asia c1900-1997

**9 September 2008**

**3 hours**

Additional Materials: Answer Paper  
Cover Page

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**READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST**

Write your name on all the work you hand in.  
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.  
Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

**Section A**

Answer **Question 1**.

**Section B**

Answer any **three** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.  
All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

**Section A****ASEAN AND THE CAMBODIAN CRISIS**

- 1 Read the sources, and then answer the question.

**Source A**

When Vietnam invaded Cambodia, the Vietnamese really believed that the ASEAN response would be no more than passing, sterile rhetoric. ASEAN decided that it had to do something to help out a partner, Thailand, who was immediately threatened. We were convinced that if we did not stand up to Vietnamese aggression, we would be the next victims. Even when ASEAN submitted a resolution calling on the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia, the Vietnamese really thought that ASEAN would make a lot of noise and then we would accept the situation. To the surprise of the Vietnamese and their friends, nothing of that happened. The fact that ASEAN is able to mobilise more support in the UN against the combined lobbying of Vietnam and its communist allies is proof that ASEAN is not ineffectual. It is an ASEAN effort.

*Interview given in 1985 by S. Rajaratnam, former Singapore's Minister for Foreign Affairs*

**Source B**

The solidarity that was achieved over Cambodia was often on paper, while behind the scene the member countries tugged and pulled in different directions. In fact, a reason behind ASEAN success has been its ability to gently trim its common sails to accommodate the different wind currents rather than let them plunder asunder. Development of a two-tier approach in which individual members conduct one set of policies towards Vietnam while ASEAN, as an organization, enunciates another has helped to maintain a common public posture.

*An excerpt from an academic article published in a Western journal in 1990*

**Source C**

ASEAN countries have succeeded in forging a greater consensus of views on major issues. This has made it possible for the Association to speak with one voice at international fora, thus presenting a united front on matters of significance for the region. One notable example of this is the common stand taken by the ASEAN countries on the continued Vietnamese military occupation of Kampuchea. ASEAN's resolution at the UN on the Kampuchea question, which calls for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and self determination for the Kampuchean people, has received the consistent support of the international community.

*An excerpt from a commemorative book published in 1987 to mark the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of ASEAN*

### Source D

After two days of discussions, Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn and Indonesian President Suharto agreed on what was officially described as 'The Kuantan Principle'. The basic idea is simple: Vietnam should not continue to be under Soviet influence, nor should it fall into China's grip. The basic idea is not, however, a new development. But the need to repeat the declaration in the form of a principle is remarkable as the latest call was made bilaterally.

The bluntness of Hussein's call to the Soviet Union to quit Vietnam is seen as recognition that Moscow does not want an early solution in Kampuchea. Hussein's matching call to China, in effect, not to fill the vacuum by forcing its way into Kampuchea is seen to proceed from a perception that China is anxious to have relations with ASEAN.

Indonesia still does not have diplomatic relations with China, and Singapore has openly declared that it will have full ties only after Indonesia does. Thus the Hussein statement was a message that China's continued hawkishness over Kampuchea was unacceptable to Indonesia and meaningful relations with all of ASEAN were not possible.

*An excerpt from an article published in Far Eastern Economic Review in April 1980*

### Source E

In 1989, ASEAN's momentum on Cambodia received another blow when Thailand, suddenly and unilaterally decided to ease the pressure on Vietnam to push its national commercial interests. Thailand's newly elected Prime Minister announced the country's new policy in 'turning the battlefields into marketplaces' around the same time that ASEAN was trying to break the deadlock on Cambodia. The rest of ASEAN members were caught by surprise, to say the least. When asked by his Malaysian and Singaporean counterparts, General Chatichai was reported to have explained that while Thailand's official policy remained unchanged, his government was pursuing a two-track policy on Cambodia.

*An excerpt from an academic article on ASEAN published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in 2005*

Now answer the following question:

*How far do Sources A – E support the view that the lack of consensus within ASEAN was a serious obstacle to resolving the Cambodian crisis?*

**Section B**

You must answer **three** questions from this section. You must support each answer with examples drawn from **at least three** countries.

- 2 To what extent do you agree with the view that the impact of the Japanese Occupation on the development of nationalism in Southeast Asia had been exaggerated beyond its actual significance?
- 3 In your opinion, did the European powers choose to dismantle their colonial empires in Southeast Asia or was decolonisation forced upon them?
- 4 How profound an impact did Communism have on Southeast Asian politics after independence?
- 5 How successful were the Southeast Asian governments in forging national unity after independence?
- 6 How valid is the view that 'inter-state tensions between Southeast Asian states after independence were a result of legacies of colonial rule'?