



**ANDERSON JUNIOR COLLEGE**  
**JC2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 2013**  
**Higher 2/1**

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## **HISTORY**

Paper 1 International History, 1945-2000

**9731/01**

**8814/01**

No Additional Materials are required.

**Mon 02 September 2013**  
**3 hours**

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### **READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST**

Write your name and PDG on all the work you hand in, including this cover sheet.

Write the question numbers of the questions attempted on this cover page.

Write in dark blue or black pen.

Start each answer on a fresh piece of writing paper.

#### **Section A**

Answer **Question 1**.

#### **Section B**

Answer any **three** questions.

Start each answer on a fresh piece of writing paper.

Draw a right-hand margin on every page of your answer script.

At the end of the examination, fasten the answer to each question separately, with this cover sheet attached on top of your answer to the first question.

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

**You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers.**

Name : \_\_\_\_\_

PDG : \_\_\_\_\_

Question No.	Marks
<b>Section A</b>	
1	/25
<b>Section B</b>	
	/25
	/25
	/25
<b>Total Marks:</b>	<b>/100</b>

This document consists of **5** printed pages, including this page.

9731/01 & 8814/01

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**Section A**

You must answer Question 1.

**The United Nations and the Suez Crisis**

**1** Read the sources carefully before answering the question.

**Source A**

The big powers had selected Mr. Hammarskjold as new Secretary-General because they believed he would be content to be the efficient administrator and avoid a politically controversial role. In the Suez crisis, Hammarskjold surprised many people by the force of his attack on Israel, Britain and France for their invasion of Egypt following the seizure of the Suez Canal by President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The British and the French were unprepared for the new political role he had assumed. Under pressure from the United Nations and the United States, they and the Israelis withdrew their forces. On instructions from the General Assembly, Hammarskjold also organized in forty-eight hours the United Nations Emergency Force for the Middle East, which remains on watch along Israel's frontiers and has reduced border incidents to a few minor infractions a year.

From the *New York Times*, 1961.

**Source B**

Before consenting to the arrival of the Force on its territory, Egypt wished to have certain points in the Assembly resolution clarified. In particular, it wanted to know whether, when the Force reached the Armistice Demarcation Line, how long the Force would stay, whether it was supposed to have functions in the Suez Canal area apart from observing the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces and whether it would stay in the Canal area after the Anglo-French withdrawal. Firm assurance was given to the Egyptian authorities that cooperation with the United Nations would not infringe Egyptian sovereignty, detract from Egypt's power freely to negotiate a settlement on the Suez Canal or submit Egypt to any control from the outside. The Secretary-General impressed upon those authorities that the Force provided a guarantee for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt and that, since it would come only with Egypt's consent, it could not stay or operate in Egypt if that consent were withdrawn. On the basis of the General Assembly's resolutions as interpreted by the Secretary-General, the Government of Egypt gave its consent on 14 November to the arrival of UNEF in Egypt, and the first transport of UNEF troops took place on the next day.

From the official United Nations website, 2012.

**Source C**

When the Suez Crisis erupted in 1956, the United Nations Charter did not contain any provisions for using impartial and armed UN forces to stabilize fragile situations. It still does not—but neither has it ever barred such arrangements. For Hammarskjöld, this void was an opportunity rather than a constraint. On the basis of a suggestion from Canada's Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, he devised the concept of peacekeeping in a few days, and managed to assemble the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) within weeks. It testifies to Hammarskjöld's wisdom that the basic principles of UNEF's operation have remained a central feature of all similar UN interventions to this day. Hammarskjöld understood that the Organization's relevance lay in its ability to constantly adapt to new challenges.

From an official United Nations publication, 2011.

**Source D**

Following 2 months of difficult negotiations to obtain the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Egypt, the entry of the UNEF and the start of the Suez Canal clearance operation, Hammarskjöld let Lloyd know how he felt about British delays in agreeing to provide equipment for the clearing of the canal. 'Frankly, I sometimes get angry when I think of how these matters could have been handled if the main parties had been in the same house instead of being separated by their political concerns. For me it remains the most time and nerve consuming operation I have ever tried. I can only say that while I shrug personally if these effort lead to nothing, I would feel that we are, none of us, worth much professionally, if we cannot get around this corner.'

From a journal article written by a political scientist, 1982.

**Source E**

The impasse over Israeli withdrawal from Egypt revived the triangular relationship between Israel, the UN and the US. In essence, Ben-Gurion, the Israeli Prime Minister, wanted Washington to neutralize Hammarskjöld; the Secretary-General needed the pressure which only the Americans could bring to bear on Israel; the Eisenhower Administration sought Israel's removal from Gaza, but preferred that it appear the work of the General Assembly. Suez had put Dulles in the position of choosing between support for Israel, as demanded by a growing segment of American public opinion, and upholding the UN, a policy vital to US foreign relations. To reconcile the two, he agreed that Gaza could be occupied by the UNEF and even placed under a UN administration, but only if the Secretary-General approved. Hammarskjöld, however, would not consent unless the Egyptians did, but Nasser was sure to insist on some measure of return- a contingency repugnant to Ben-Gurion.

From a Western academic publication, 1992.

**Now answer the following question**

*How far do sources A-E show that United Nations' resolution of the Suez Crisis would not have been possible without the United Nations Secretary-General's efforts?*

**Section B**

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

2. Examine the validity of the assertion that it was American aggression that was responsible for the outbreak of the Cold War.
3. “In proactively navigating the end of the Cold War, Gorbachev was simultaneously planting the seeds of the USSR’s destruction”. How far do you agree with the statement with reference to the period from 1985 till 1991?
4. “The ‘Americanisation’ of the global economy brought more harm than good”. Discuss with respect to developments in the global economy from 1945 to 1973.
5. To what extent is it true that China’s breathtaking economic miracle should be credited solely to Deng Xiaoping and no one else?
6. “Religious fundamentalism from 1967 till 2000 owed its rise to protracted inter-state wars”. Discuss.